SlideShare a Scribd company logo
SRLabs	Template	v12
How	much	security	is	too	much?
Dr.	Karsten	Nohl	<nohl@srlabs.de>
What	you	will	take	away	from	this	keynote
2
1. Hear	from	a	security	researcher	and	
practitioner	about	which	protections	work	
and	which	are	unnecessary
2. A	better	understanding	of	the	security-
innovation	trade-off
3. Some	ideas	for	deploying	effective	
(but	never	perfect!)	security	measures
How	security	
pros	view	
themselves
3
vs.
4
Product	security Information	security
Remove	hacking	risks	for	
your	customers
Protect	your	own	systems	
from	hacking
We	ask	the	question	
How	much	security	is	too	much?	
in	two	areas
A B

Recommended for you

Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...

A method to define minimum controls, policies, and procedures to apply to devices not controlled by the organization.

cmhsecsummit
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations CenterCyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center

This document proposes replacing existing security operation centers (SOCs) with modernized Cyber Intelligence Operations Centers (CIOCs) to better coordinate organizational cyber defense strategies. The CIOC would integrate intelligence cycle processes, defense-in-depth approaches, big data analytics, and control frameworks. This centralized command structure is needed to mobilize against cyber threats in a coordinated, strategic manner across both private and public sectors. The document outlines the growing cyber threat landscape and need for modernized processes to predict, prevent, detect, and respond to attacks as organizations fight an undeclared global cyber war.

socintellligencesecurity
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of SecurityKeynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security

Critical Exploitable Vulnerabilities Increased Investment Cost Per Exploit 5 Critical Attributes Top Cureent Trends

evolutioninformation securitymobile security
Agenda
5
1 Security	researchers*	take	
extreme	positions
2 Many	companies	only	react	to	extreme	positions
3 The	security	community	is	fighting	vulnerabilities,	
not	risks
Information	security
Product	security
*	As	reported	in	the	media
A
B
Terrible	year	for	iOS	security,	right?
6
Pegasus	
malware
FBI-style	
hardware	
hacking
Your	iPhone	getting	hacked	is	rather	unlikely
7
Pegasus	
malware
FBI-style	
hardware	
hacking
- 1	billion	iOS	devices	
possibly	vulnerable
+ Only	one	(!)	
attempted	infection
+ Apple	patched	the	
vulnerability	within	
10	days	
- Hack	is	now	publicly	
available	at	low	cost
+ Only	possible	with	
hardware	access
+ Only	works	against	
the	oldest	22%	of	
iPhones	(5c	and	
older,	March	2016)
Source	for	graph:	http://info.localytics.com/blog/how-will-apples-newest-iphone-impact-mobile-engagement
iPhone	market	break-down	
[Apr	2016]
6
5S
6S
6	Plus
6S	Plus
5
5C
4S
4
Agenda
8
1 Security	researchers	take	extreme	positions
2 Many	companies	only	react	to	
extreme	positions
3 The	security	community	is	fighting	vulnerabilities,	
not	risks
Product	security
A

Recommended for you

Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert HurlbutThreat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut

This document summarizes a presentation on threat modeling concepts and processes. It began with defining key threat modeling terms like assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. It described threat modeling as understanding potential threats to a system. The presentation covered approaches like STRIDE and asking questions. It emphasized decomposing systems and identifying threats through data flows. Determining mitigations and risk ratings for threats was also discussed. The goal of threat modeling is to have an ongoing, living understanding of security risks to a system.

devseccon boston 2017devsecops
The path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy AntonThe path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy Anton

This document discusses 10 controls (C1 through C10) for developing secure software. Each control is described in 1-2 pages and addresses how it mitigates many of the top 10 risks from the OWASP list, including injection, XSS, sensitive data exposure, access control issues, and more. Specific techniques are provided, such as query parameterization to prevent SQL injection, output encoding to prevent XSS, validating all input, secure authentication and authorization practices, encrypting data, and centralized error handling.

devsecopsdevseccon boston 2017
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended UseIIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use

How to ensure that security implemented in IoT devices and systems is up to the provider's requirements and yet don't mean over-spending on unnecessary mechanisms? That's what the Security Maturity Model, developed by Industrial Internet Consortium with our contribution, is about. Read more at http://iiconsortium.org/.

iotiiotics
9
Android 654.44.3	(and	older)
Hacked	devices vs.	market	break-down	(%)
0 50 100
Market
break-
down
Hacked
phones
~2%
hacked
Not	
hacked
Few	Android	phones	get	hacked;	those	that	do	are	outdated
Source:	developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html ,
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf,
Should	mobile	really	be	a	chief	security	concern?
10
<0.1%
~2%
(<0.2%	for	current	devices) 20-40%
iOS	infection	rate Android	infection	rate Windows	infection	rate
http://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/src/uploads/2016/05/Pandalabs-2016-T1-EN-LR.pdf
Companies	InfoSec	priorities	are	not	aligned	with
actual	incidents
11
vs.
1. Buy	iOS security	software
2. Ban	or	lock	down	Android
devices
…
10. Do	something	uncreative	about	
Windows security,	like	
upgrading	antivirus	software
1. Windows
2. Windows
3. Social	engineering
4. Windows
…
100.Android
ILLUSTRATIVE
Typical	corporate	InfoSec	priorities Actual	endpoint	hacking	incidents
Agenda
12
1 Security	researchers	take	extreme	positions
2 Many	companies	only	react	to	extreme	positions
3 The	security	community	is	fighting	
vulnerabilities,	not	risks
Product	security
A

Recommended for you

Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael MontecilloLuncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo

The document discusses the evolution of cybersecurity threats and the IBM X-Force mission to monitor threats, research new attacks and develop protections, and educate customers. It outlines how threats have become more sophisticated, organized, and challenging over time as cybercrime has become organized. It also summarizes IBM's security capabilities and coverage across networks, endpoints, vulnerabilities, malware, and more.

ntxissastemissa
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional

The document discusses the importance of a full stack cyber security approach from an information security professional's perspective. It recommends scanning both external and internal networks as the first and second lines of defense, similar to an airbag and seatbelt in a car. The document also provides an overview of a product demo for a network security workflow automation tool that allows for discovery scanning, dynamic asset management, risk prioritization, and flexible reporting.

information securityit securitycybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is difficult. It is a serious endeavor which over time strives to find a balance in managing the security of computing capabilities to protect the technology which connects and enriches the lives of everyone. Characteristics of cyber risk continue to mature and expand on the successes of technology innovation, integration, and adoption. It is no longer a game of tactics, but rather a professional discipline, continuous in nature, where to be effective strategic leadership must establish effective and efficient structures for evolving controls to sustain an optimal level of security. This presentation will discuss the emerging challenges as it analyzes the cause-and-effect relationships of factors driving the future of cybersecurity.

securityfutureinformation security
Your	time	is	best	spent	protecting	from	most	likely	threats
13
Low Medium High
Vulnerability	/	
Hacking	ease
Hacker	incentive Damage Risk
Don’t	bother	
protecting	
your	
Internet-
connected	
computers	
from	
BadUSB
before	you	
solved	the	
malware	
challenge
Infect	computers	
from	
USB	firmwares	
Local	attack	
propagation
(Varies	by	
system)
Infect	Windows	
through	
e-mail	attachments	
or	malicious	websites
Remote	infection (Varies	by	
system)
BadUSB
Targeted	
malware	
ILLUSTRATIVE
Next	big	hacking	frontier:
Cars?
14
Security	caution	can	delay	safety,	and	ultimately	kill	people
15
0
1
2
3
4
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Car	fatalities	per	100	million	miles	[US]
Autonomous	cars?Airbags
Adaptive	cruise	control
ABS
ESC
§ If	we	test	all	new	car	components	for	hacking	
risks,	we	delay	their	introduction
§ A	delay	of	3	months	due	to	security	design	and	
testing	means	more	people	get	killed	on	the	road
§ 200.000 more	people	die	within	the	next	10	years
SOURCE:	https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_motor_vehicle_deaths_in_U.S._by_year
Agenda
16
1 Everybody	breaks	security	rules	
(but	we	don’t	usually	talk	about	it)
2 Unpopular	security	controls	are	not	effective,	
and	worse:	they	inhibit	innovation
3 For	security	or innovation	to	work,	
we	need	user-friendly	solutions
4 Threat	monitoring	is	user-friendly.	It	increases	
motivation,	productivity,	innovation	and security
Product	security
Information	security
B
A

Recommended for you

Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?

A presentation made to the 6th Cyber Resiliency Workshop, sponsored by Mitre Corporation (May 18, 2016)

resiliencycenter for internet securitycyber
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and IdeasBlack Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas

The document discusses several topics related to cybersecurity including integrating endpoint technologies to stop threats, developing adaptive defenses to identify attackers, using threat modeling to assess vulnerabilities, selecting effective endpoint security products, protecting critical servers from advanced threats, finding exploitable flaws through fuzzing, implementing the top 4 critical controls, modern botnets posing major risks to banks, gathering additional threat intelligence from security tools, and training admins to detect and react to attacks.

cybersecuritybhusa2015infosec
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On TrainingCybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training

Cyber security hands on-training. Learn advanced applications of Cyber Security to embedded systems. It’s all about Cyber and Security. Proudly presented by: Tonex.Com Index / Highlights: Understanding cyber security, risk and action tools. Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). What is Secure Embedded Systems ? How does it protect ? Advance methods & procedure to analyze, reverse, debug ? Value of risk assessment methodologies, failure analysis ? How to set up and measure successful mission control system ? Which professionals need to learn cyber security approaches ? Case studies and workshop. Request more information Sign up for Hands-On Cybersecurity Course https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/cyber-security-embedded-systems-training-bootcamp-hands-on/

cyber securitycyber security hands on-traininghands on-training
Restrictive	protections	are	easily	and	often	circumvented
17
Standard	circumvention
Skype	tunnels	its	traffic	through	
web	proxies	and	regularly	
changes	its	server	addresses
Standard	“protection”	practice
Block	everything	else	
at	firewall
Corporate	user
Internet
✗
Funnel	web	browsing
through	proxy	server
Large	hacks	are	often	the	result	of	protections	circumvented	by	
people	who	“need	to	do	their	job”
18
Hacking	case
Target lost	credit	card	data	for	
300	million	customers
Root	cause
A	Target	supplier	installed	a	remote	
access	tool	to	tunnel	into	target	
network	for	maintenance
Target’s CEO Steps Down Following
The Massive Data Breach
Agenda
19
1 Everybody	breaks	security	rules
2 Unpopular	security	controls	are	not	effective,	
and	worse:	they	inhibit	innovation
3 For	security	or innovation	to	work,	
we	need	user-friendly	solutions
4 Threat	monitoring	is	user-friendly.	It	increases	
motivation,	productivity,	innovation	and security
Information	security
B
20

Recommended for you

Cy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company PresentationCy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company Presentation

CyCOPS is an information security company based in Hyderabad, India founded in 2008. It has a team of 25 security professionals with certifications like CISSP and CEH. CyCOPS provides services like vulnerability assessments, penetration testing, security audits, digital forensics, and wireless security. It has experience working with clients in India and abroad from sectors like banking, government, and technology. CyCOPS also partners with IBM and Sipera Systems to offer additional managed security services and unified communications security solutions.

Defense In-Depth
Defense In-DepthDefense In-Depth
Defense In-Depth

The document discusses implementing a defense-in-depth security strategy for internal networks, which combines best practices, policies, and tiered defenses. It recommends automating primary security tasks, deploying network access control systems, implementing rigorous patching, and focusing on high-risk assets. A behavioral approach is also needed to validate the full extent of any network security threats.

LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, граблиLK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли

This document provides an overview of the KL SOC (Security Operations Center). It discusses the SOC's scope, including monitoring, vulnerability assessment, incident management, and threat hunting. It outlines the incident lifecycle and processes for detection, data analysis, validation, categorization, prioritization, and response. It also discusses threat intelligence products, a digital forensics lab, search capabilities, and notable APT campaigns over time. The document reviews internal redteaming, levels of detection, service lines, and research conducted by the SOC.

Case	study	– typical	Enterprise/SOA bus	evades	classic	network	
security	techniques
21
Low-level	protections	that	do	not	prevent	app	level	hacks	are	not	shown:	
firewalls,	IPS,	proxies,	and	SSL	gateways	
Service	
bus
Authentication	
server
Critical	
databases
User	requests	are	often	passed	on	all	the	way	to	critical	services	on	the	bus	
External	and	
internal	users
Web	
application	
firewall
(unmanaged)
Application	
servers
App
App
Circumventing	restrictive	controls	often	is	net	positive
22
Area	 Incident	example Cost
Destructive	
damage
§ Scada	hack	damages	factory 10m 2%
Lost	revenue
§ Major	government	contract	does	not	
close
50m 1%
Image	
impact
§ Major	marketing	campaign	needed	to	
offset	hacking	impact
§ Smaller	campaign	needed	to	offset	
smaller	hacking	impact
15m
1.5m
1%
10%
Competitive	
damage
§ Theft	of	major	IP	(patent	application,	
design	document)
§ Negotiation	details	stolen	(M&A,	long-
term	contracts)
5m
2m
10%
10%
Effective	total	cost	per	year <2m
Likelihood
per	year
Trade-off	function.	 Invest	until	damage	elasticity	=	
incremental	protection	effort
Security	can	save	millions vs.
§ “Billion	dollar	ideas”	
mostly	grow	from	
creative	people	freely	
playing	with	innovative	
technology,	which	is	the	
opposite	of	what	
security	often	aims	for
§ Microsoft	paid	
USD	9	billion	to	buy	
Skype,	a	technology	the	
Microsoft	policies	
would	not	allow
§ German	“Datenschutz”	
vs.	Silicon	Valley	profits
Trade-off	function.	
Protect	until	and	as	long	
as	innovation	can	flourish
Restrictive	security	can	
destroy	billions in	value
Too	little	and	too	much	protection	hinders	innovation
23
Damage Protection	effort Innovation	potential
Incidents	
spread	fear	
Restrictions kill	
innovation	energy
Agenda
24
1 Everybody	breaks	security	rules
2 Unpopular	security	controls	are	not	effective,	
and	worse:	they	inhibit	innovation
3 For	security	or innovation	to	work,	
we	need	user-friendly	solutions
4 Threat	monitoring	is	user-friendly.	It	increases	
motivation,	productivity,	innovation	and security
Information	security
B

Recommended for you

SentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers GuideSentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers Guide

SentinelOne was founded in 2013 by an elite group of cybersecurity and defense experts who share a strong passion for disruption, and a clear vision for a path forward in a post-antivirus era. Building on their experiences learned at Check Point Software Technologies, IBM, Intel Security, Palo Alto Networks, and White Hat Security, the team is committed to the mission of defeating advanced cyber threats and instilling confidence in our digital way of life. Find out more at https://sentinelone.com

cybersecurityinformation technologydata protection solution
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial

This document discusses web application security and summarizes key topics from a presentation on the subject. It introduces the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 list of vulnerabilities, covering Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in more detail. It also discusses security frameworks like ISO 27001 and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). The presentation emphasizes the importance of validating all user input to prevent injection attacks.

owaspapplication security
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティは���れくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl

10 年にわたる精力的なセキュリティ研究と、数年にわたるリスク管理者としての経験を通じて、カールステン・ノールは情報セキュリティに関する議論を進める中で、もっといい結果が残せたのではないかと考えるようになった。 世間では、非の打ち所のない IT セキュリティ対策を講じることが、企業の規模に依らずその企業にとって最も重要なものであると確信されている。我々はシステムの可用性やブランドに対する高評価を確保するため、詐欺行為を回避するため、そして情報の機密性を保持するためにセキュリティを必要としている。 浅はかな考えで採用された防御策は、生産性、イノベーションの可能性、そして組織の幸福度にすら、それぞれ大きな外部性を持つ。行き過ぎたセキュリティ対策は、不充分なセキュリティ対策よりも悪いものなのだろうか? 今回の講演では、現代のセキュリティの研究での様々な実例を通じて、セキュリティとイノベーションの間に発��するドレードオフの関係について取り扱う。講演では、いくつかのハッキングの研究は、多くの人に最善にセキュリティを提供することによって、および、脅威を広く広め過ぎることによって、非生産的であることへの気づきを提供する。 --- カールステン・ノールKarsten Nohl カールステン・ノールは 2006 年からセキュリティレベルの格差について幅広く講演している。彼は共同研究者と共に、モバイル通信や支払いに利用されるような世間で幅広く使用されている情報基盤における欠陥を発見してきた。アジアの 4G とデジタルサービスのプロバイダ、ベルリンの Security Research Labs の主任研究員、新たな IT 脅威の分析に特化したリスクマネジメントのシンクタンクにおける業務を通じて、カールステンは顧客の独自システムのセキュリティ評価に取り組み、セキュリティとイノベーションの間で発生するトレードオフの関係に強い興味を抱くようになった。ラインラントからあまり遠くないハイデルベルグで電気工学を学び、2008 年にヴァージニア大学で博士号を修めた。

cb16securitykeynote
Less-restrictive	protection	alternatives	often	exist
25
§ Many	complex	passwords
§ Web	proxy	blocklists
§ No	admin	rights	for	users
§ Corporate	phones	(Blackberrys)
§ Endless	pentesting
§ Security	policy
§ DLP
Restrictive	protections
§ Single-sign-on	using	smartphones
§ SSL	termination	and	monitoring
§ Process	monitoring
§ BYOD	with	ActiveSync	and	VPN
§ Bug	bounties	
§ Awareness	campaigns
§ Awareness;	or	simply	more	trust
Innovation-friendly	alternatives
Where	no	restrictive	alternative	exists,	close	risk	
monitoring may	allow	you	to	keep	restrictive	
protection	switched	off	until	a	risk	becomes	real
Agenda
26
1 Everybody	breaks	security	rules
2 Unpopular	security	controls	are	not	effective,	
and	worse:	they	inhibit	innovation
3 For	security	or	innovation	to	work,	
we	need	user-friendly	solutions
4 Threat	monitoring	is	user-friendly.	It	increases	
motivation,	productivity,	innovation	and security
Information	security
B
Forest	or	Trees?	(Security	Monitoring	is	hard!)
27
SOC	ramp-up	delivers	fast	results	only	in	top-down	manner
Bottom-up – Start with data Top-down – Start with threats
18 months Days per use case
Forensically investigate
incidents
Start with most relevant
threats
Create tailored use cases
Collect only data needed
for current use case
§ Add advanced use cases
§ Generate alarms
§ Become familiar with data
§ Integrate more sources
§ Collect available data sources
§ Create simple use cases
28
vs

Recommended for you

[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...

The most common story that we hear: something happens with ATM that makes it empty, leaving no forensic evidence. No money and no logs. We have collected huge number of cases on how ATMs could be hacked during our researches, incidents responses and security assessments. A lot of malware infects ATM through the network or locally. There are black boxes, which connect to communications port of devices directly. There are also network attacks, such as rogue processing center or MiTM. How to stop the ATMs fraud? How to protect ATMs from attacks such as black box jackpotting? How to prevent network hijacking such as rogue processing center or MiTM? Some of these issues can be fixed by configuration means, some fixed by compensation measures, but many only by vendor. We will tell you about what bank can do now and what we as a community of security specialists should force to vendors. Before we spoke about vulnerabilities and fraud methods used by criminals. Now we would like to combine our expertise to help financial and security society with more direct advices how to implement security measures or approaches to make ATMs more secure. --- Olga Kochetova Olga is interested in how various devices interact with cash or plastic cards. She is a senior specialist for the penetration testing team at Kaspersky Lab. Olga has authored multiple articles and webinars about ATM security. She is also the author of advisories about various vulnerabilities for major ATM vendors and has been a speaker at international conferences, including Black Hat Europe, Hack in Paris, Positive Hack Days, Security Analyst Summit, Nuit Du Hack, Hack In The Box Singapore and others. --- Alexey Osipov Lead Expert on a Penetration Testing Team at Kaspersky Lab. An author of variety of techniques and utilities exploiting vulnerabilities in XML protocols and telecom equipment security. Author of advisories for various vulnerabilities for major ATM vendors. A speaker at international security conferences: Black Hat, Hack in Paris (presenting the paper on ATM vulnerabilities), NoSuchCon Paris, Nuit du Hack, Hack In The Box Singapore, Positive Hack Days, Chaos Communication Congress.

cb16atmhardware
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレスlibinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス

SQLi攻撃の迅速で正確な検知をする libinjection は Black Hat USA 2012 で紹介された。 2年たった現在、そのアルゴリズムは多くのオープンソースや専用WAFsやハニーポットで利用されている。 本講演では、XSSを検知する新しいアルゴリズムを紹介する。 SQLi 同様、libinjection アルゴリズムは正規表現を使わず、とても速く、誤検��率が少ない。 そして、オリジナルの libinjection アルゴリズムのように、GitHubで無償の使用許諾で入手できる。 ニック・ガルブレス - Nick Galbreath ニック・ガルブレス氏は、オンライン広告取引システム開発の世界的リーディング企業である IPONWEB の技術担当副社長である。 IPONWEB 以前は、セキュリティ・詐欺・認証・その他大企業的機能を扱う監視グループ Etsyの技術部長。 Etsy 以前は彼はソーシャルとeコマース企業に所属し、それらに�� Right Media、UPromise、Friendster、Open Marketなどがある。 彼の著書に「Cryptography for Internet and Database Applications (Wiley)」がある。 彼は、Black Hat、Def Con、DevOpsDays、OWASP関連イベントでの講演経験を持つ。 ボストン大学の数学修士を保有、現在は東京在住である。 講演歴) 2013年 - LASCON http://lascon.org/about/, 基調講演者, 米国・テキサス州オースティン - DevOpsDays 日本・東京 - Security Development Conference (Microsoft), 米国・カリフォルニア州サンフランシスコ - DevOpsDays 米国・テキサス州オースティン - Positive Hack Days http://phdays.com, ロシア・モスクワ - RSA USA, San Francisco, CA, 講師とパネリスト 2012年 - DefCon 米国・ネバダ州ラスベガス - BlackHat USA 米国・ ネバダ州ラスベガス - その他

nick galbreathsecurityxss
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang

OS Xのセキュリティ脆弱性研究はMacのデバイスが人気になるにつれ、より人気が高まっている。OX XのIOKitはユーザモードからの切り替えにおけるカーネル自身およびカーネル拡張の危殆化によりハッカーからの多くの攻撃にさらされている。多くの研究者はこの分野の研究(リファレンスを参照のこと)を進めており、我々は本研究分野の次のいくつかの成果を共有したい。 1. カーネル脆弱性を検出するためのコンテキストエンライトメントによるパッシブファジングフレームワーク 2. SMAP&SMEPをバイパスするためのユーザモードプログラムからカーネルメモリを占有するための��クスプロイト技術 3. 本ファジング手法により検出された脆弱性の活用方法とOS Xに対し二度の成功をもたらしたルート詐取のための新たなエクスプロイト手法 我々は次の新たな手法を紹介する。PFACEと呼ばれる、OS X IO Kitに対するコンテキストエンライトメントによるパッシブファジングである。PFACEは次のような特徴を有する。 第一に、条件依存でありシステムクラッシュをもたらすコードの実行および検出を深くまた広く許可する。次に以下が含まれるモジュールを出力する。コンテキスト:脆弱性の疑いに対するインジケーター。インジケーターは最初にモジュールをレビューするための手段としてレビュアーにとって有用であろう。 多くの脆弱性を有する場合、主要な課題はどのようにROPガジェットをユーザモードプログラムからカーネル空間に転送するかである。なぜなら近年のOS XではSMAPおよびSMEPを許可しているためである。高名なセキュリティ研究者であるステファン・エッサーはOSDataはカーネルメモリを占拠する良い構造であると提案している。[リファレンスセクション5]もちろんOSDataは確かによいデータ構造である。しかし、実際にはOSDataが機能しないいくつかの課題が存在する。我々はOSDATAがユーザモードプログラムからカーネルメモリを占拠するよう機能させるための新たな手法を発見し、本手法により、新たな脆弱性の検出およびOS X (10.11.3) のルート詐取に成功している。 実際に我々はCVEにおける多くの脆弱性を発見しており、ファジング効果によるカーネルクラッシュを実現している。また、我々はMac OS X(10.11.3)においていくつかの脆弱性を使って、二つの異なるローカル権限昇格手法を確立している。 --- Moony Li & Jack Tang

fuzzingosxkernel
Take	aways
29
Questions?
Karsten Nohl <nohl@srlabs.de>
2
3
4
The	largest	risk-cost	trade-off	is	between	
restrictions	and	innovation potential
Often,	innovation-friendly	alternatives	exist	
that	can	replace	restrictive	choices
Risks need	to	be	monitored and	managed:	
“Protection	from	everything”	kills	
innovation,	thereby	kills	the	very	things	you	
want	to	protect
1
We	chase	after	vulnerabilities	instead	of	
risks by	forgetting	about	hackers’	incentives

More Related Content

What's hot

OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan MarcilOWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
Jonathan Marcil
 
Application security meetup 27012021
Application security meetup 27012021Application security meetup 27012021
Application security meetup 27012021
lior mazor
 
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber AttacksLessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
Mighty Guides, Inc.
 
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
centralohioissa
 
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations CenterCyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center
Bill Ross
 
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of SecurityKeynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Priyanka Aash
 
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert HurlbutThreat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
DevSecCon
 
The path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy AntonThe path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy Anton
DevSecCon
 
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended UseIIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
Kaspersky
 
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael MontecilloLuncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
North Texas Chapter of the ISSA
 
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24
 
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
Matthew Rosenquist
 
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
John Gilligan
 
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and IdeasBlack Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Tripwire
 
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On TrainingCybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training
Tonex
 
Cy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company PresentationCy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company Presentation
ChaitanyaS
 
Defense In-Depth
Defense In-DepthDefense In-Depth
Defense In-Depth
Will Kelly
 
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, граблиLK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
Positive Hack Days
 
SentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers GuideSentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers Guide
Exclusive Networks ME
 
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
Neil Matatall
 

What's hot (20)

OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan MarcilOWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
OWASP Québec: Threat Modeling Toolkit - Jonathan Marcil
 
Application security meetup 27012021
Application security meetup 27012021Application security meetup 27012021
Application security meetup 27012021
 
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber AttacksLessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
Lessons Learned: Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks
 
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
Steven Keil - BYODAWSCYW (Bring Your Own Device And Whatever Security Control...
 
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations CenterCyber Intelligence Operations Center
Cyber Intelligence Operations Center
 
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of SecurityKeynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
Keynote Session : The Non - Evolution of Security
 
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert HurlbutThreat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
Threat Modeling workshop by Robert Hurlbut
 
The path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy AntonThe path of secure software by Katy Anton
The path of secure software by Katy Anton
 
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended UseIIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
IIC IoT Security Maturity Model: Description and Intended Use
 
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael MontecilloLuncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
Luncheon - 2016-05-19 IBM Security - Threat Intelligence by Michael Montecillo
 
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
Outpost24 webinar - A day in the life of an information security professional
 
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
2014 the future evolution of cybersecurity
 
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
Is Cyber Resilience Really That Difficult?
 
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and IdeasBlack Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
Black Hat USA 2015: A Visual Snapshot of Security Threats, Trends and Ideas
 
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On TrainingCybersecurity Hands-On Training
Cybersecurity Hands-On Training
 
Cy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company PresentationCy Cops Company Presentation
Cy Cops Company Presentation
 
Defense In-Depth
Defense In-DepthDefense In-Depth
Defense In-Depth
 
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, граблиLK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
LK Inhouse SOC — команда, задачи, грабли
 
SentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers GuideSentinelOne Buyers Guide
SentinelOne Buyers Guide
 
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
2008: Web Application Security Tutorial
 

Viewers also liked

[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
CODE BLUE
 
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレスlibinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
CODE BLUE
 
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
CODE BLUE
 
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
Saya Katafuchi
 
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
CODE BLUE
 
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
Ryosuke Shimizu
 
Azureで始めるDevOps
Azureで始めるDevOpsAzureで始めるDevOps
Azureで始めるDevOps
Atsushi Kojima
 
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
CODE BLUE
 
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
Saya Katafuchi
 
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみようEdomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
Satoshi Mimura
 
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
wintechq
 
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそElastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
Masamitsu Maehara
 
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみたElastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
Masamitsu Maehara
 
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
Masamitsu Maehara
 

Viewers also liked (20)

[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
 
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
[CB16] ATMS how to break them to stop the fraud. by Olga Kochetova & Alexey O...
 
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレスlibinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
libinjection : SQLi から XSS へ by ニック・ガルブレス
 
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
[CB16] (P)FACE :アップルのコアへ、そしてルート権限へのエクスプロイト by Moony Li & Jack Tang
 
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
[CB16] WireGuard: Next Generation Abuse-Resistant Kernel Network Tunnel by Ja...
 
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for A...
 
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] Who put the backdoor in my modem? by Ewerson Guimaraes
 
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes
 
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
 
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
マルウェア解析講座そのいち〜仮想環境下では暴れないけど質問ある?〜
 
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
[CB16] EXOTIC DATA RECOVERY & PARADAIS by しもがいとだい
 
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
第一回バイナリゆるゆる勉強会スライド
 
Azureで始めるDevOps
Azureで始めるDevOpsAzureで始めるDevOps
Azureで始めるDevOps
 
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
[CB16] IoTとしての自動車とセキュリティ: リモートサービスのセキュリティ評価とその対策の検討 - by 和栗直英
 
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
第3回長崎デジタルコンテストLT『リバースエンジニアリング入門』
 
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみようEdomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
Edomae 2015 - マルウェアを解析してみよう
 
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
Microsoft Antimalware for Azure による Azure 仮想マシンの簡易的なマルウェア対策
 
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそElastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
Elastic{on}オープンな世界へようこそ
 
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみたElastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
Elastic stack 世界にさらしたサーバを可視化してみた
 
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
AWS Security JAWS 経済的にハニーポットのログ分析をするためのベストプラクティス?
 

Similar to [CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl

PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red HatPCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
PCM
 
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana iisf...
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana   iisf...Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana   iisf...
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana iisf...
Eoin Keary
 
Barcamp: Open Source and Security
Barcamp: Open Source and SecurityBarcamp: Open Source and Security
Barcamp: Open Source and Security
Joshua L. Davis
 
Trending it security threats in the public sector
Trending it security threats in the public sectorTrending it security threats in the public sector
Trending it security threats in the public sector
Core Security
 
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
Black Duck by Synopsys
 
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docxPaper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
aman341480
 
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats PredictionsMcAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
Matthew Rosenquist
 
Security economics
Security economicsSecurity economics
Security economics
Yansi Keim
 
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber SecurityIDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
inside-BigData.com
 
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSIIBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
AGILLY
 
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating NewsOpen Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
Black Duck by Synopsys
 
Cyber Security
Cyber Security Cyber Security
Cyber Security
Rohit Srivastava
 
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
Tim Grieveson
 
Hpe security research cyber risk report 2016
Hpe security research  cyber risk report 2016Hpe security research  cyber risk report 2016
Hpe security research cyber risk report 2016
at MicroFocus Italy ❖✔
 
HPE Security Report 2016
HPE Security Report 2016HPE Security Report 2016
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
Angela Gunn
 
Talks submitted
Talks submittedTalks submitted
Talks submitted
Kim Minh
 
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacksResponding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
IBM
 
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
Dalia Reda
 
Presentation defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
Presentation   defend your company against cyber threats with security solutionsPresentation   defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
Presentation defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
xKinAnx
 

Similar to [CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl (20)

PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red HatPCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
PCM Vision 2019 Breakout: IBM | Red Hat
 
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana iisf...
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana   iisf...Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana   iisf...
Web security – application security roads to software security nirvana iisf...
 
Barcamp: Open Source and Security
Barcamp: Open Source and SecurityBarcamp: Open Source and Security
Barcamp: Open Source and Security
 
Trending it security threats in the public sector
Trending it security threats in the public sectorTrending it security threats in the public sector
Trending it security threats in the public sector
 
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
Open Source Insight: AI for Open Source Management, IoT Time Bombs, Ready for...
 
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docxPaper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
Paper 1 According to the authors, privacy and security go han.docx
 
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats PredictionsMcAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
McAfee Labs 2017 Threats Predictions
 
Security economics
Security economicsSecurity economics
Security economics
 
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber SecurityIDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
IDC Best Practices in Private Sector Cyber Security
 
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSIIBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
IBM MobileFrist Protect - Guerir la Mobilephobie des RSSI
 
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating NewsOpen Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
Open Source Insight: Security Breaches and Cryptocurrency Dominating News
 
Cyber Security
Cyber Security Cyber Security
Cyber Security
 
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
HPE Cyber Risk Report 2016
 
Hpe security research cyber risk report 2016
Hpe security research  cyber risk report 2016Hpe security research  cyber risk report 2016
Hpe security research cyber risk report 2016
 
HPE Security Report 2016
HPE Security Report 2016HPE Security Report 2016
HPE Security Report 2016
 
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
2016 HPESR Cyber Risk Report
 
Talks submitted
Talks submittedTalks submitted
Talks submitted
 
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacksResponding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
Responding to and recovering from sophisticated security attacks
 
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
Security Solution - IBM Business Connect Qatar Defend your company against cy...
 
Presentation defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
Presentation   defend your company against cyber threats with security solutionsPresentation   defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
Presentation defend your company against cyber threats with security solutions
 

More from CODE BLUE

[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman [cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka [cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
CODE BLUE
 

More from CODE BLUE (20)

[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
 
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
 
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
 
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman [cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
 
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
 
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka [cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
 
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
 
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
 
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
 
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
 
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
 
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
 
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
 

Recently uploaded

Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar SlidesCoordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
Safe Software
 
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdfBT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
Neo4j
 
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdfINDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
jackson110191
 
Research Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
Research Directions for Cross Reality InterfacesResearch Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
Research Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
Mark Billinghurst
 
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
Stephanie Beckett
 
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALLBLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
Liveplex
 
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide DeckWPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
Lidia A.
 
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of TimeQuality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
Aurora Consulting
 
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 202420240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
Matthew Sinclair
 
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptxHow to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
Adam Dunkels
 
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS InfrastructureRecent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
KAMAL CHOUDHARY
 
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetryObservability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
Eric D. Schabell
 
Best Programming Language for Civil Engineers
Best Programming Language for Civil EngineersBest Programming Language for Civil Engineers
Best Programming Language for Civil Engineers
Awais Yaseen
 
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
Kief Morris
 
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creation
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creationCookies program to display the information though cookie creation
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creation
shanthidl1
 
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU CampusesThe Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
Larry Smarr
 
Password Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
Password Rotation in 2024 is still RelevantPassword Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
Password Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
Bert Blevins
 
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
BookNet Canada
 
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptxHow RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
SynapseIndia
 
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptxRPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
SynapseIndia
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar SlidesCoordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
Coordinate Systems in FME 101 - Webinar Slides
 
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdfBT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
BT & Neo4j: Knowledge Graphs for Critical Enterprise Systems.pptx.pdf
 
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdfINDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
INDIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTER PLANES LIST.pdf
 
Research Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
Research Directions for Cross Reality InterfacesResearch Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
Research Directions for Cross Reality Interfaces
 
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
What’s New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices May 2024
 
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALLBLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: GUIDEBOOK FOR ALL
 
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide DeckWPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
WPRiders Company Presentation Slide Deck
 
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of TimeQuality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
Quality Patents: Patents That Stand the Test of Time
 
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 202420240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
20240702 QFM021 Machine Intelligence Reading List June 2024
 
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptxHow to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
 
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS InfrastructureRecent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
Recent Advancements in the NIST-JARVIS Infrastructure
 
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetryObservability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
Observability For You and Me with OpenTelemetry
 
Best Programming Language for Civil Engineers
Best Programming Language for Civil EngineersBest Programming Language for Civil Engineers
Best Programming Language for Civil Engineers
 
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
[Talk] Moving Beyond Spaghetti Infrastructure [AOTB] 2024-07-04.pdf
 
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creation
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creationCookies program to display the information though cookie creation
Cookies program to display the information though cookie creation
 
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU CampusesThe Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
The Increasing Use of the National Research Platform by the CSU Campuses
 
Password Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
Password Rotation in 2024 is still RelevantPassword Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
Password Rotation in 2024 is still Relevant
 
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
Details of description part II: Describing images in practice - Tech Forum 2024
 
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptxHow RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
How RPA Help in the Transportation and Logistics Industry.pptx
 
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptxRPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
RPA In Healthcare Benefits, Use Case, Trend And Challenges 2024.pptx
 

[CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl