We are swamped with new types of malware every day. The goal of malware analysis is not to reveal every single detail of the malware. It is more important to develop tools for efficiency or introduce automation to avoid repeating the same analysis process. Therefore, malware analysts usually actively develop tools and build analysis systems. On the other hand, it costs a lot for such tool developments and system maintenance. Incident trends change daily, and malware keeps evolving. However, it is not easy to keep up with new threats. Malware analysts spend a long time maintaining their analysis systems, and it results in reducing their time for necessary analysis of new types of malware. To solve these problems, we incorporate DevOps practices into malware analysis to reduce the cost of system maintenance by using CI/CD and Serverless. This presentation shares our experience on how CI/CD, Serverless, and other cloud technologies can be used to streamline malware analysis. Specifically, the following case studies are discussed. * Malware C2 Monitoring * Malware Hunting using Cloud * YARA CI/CD system * Malware Analysis System on Cloud * Memory Forensic on Cloud Through the above case studies, we will share the benefits and tips of using the cloud and show how to build a similar system using Infrastructure as Code (IaC). The audience will learn how to improve the efficiency of malware analysis and build a malware analysis system using Cloud infrastructure.
The document discusses three standards used for classifying vulnerabilities: CVE, CWE, and CVSS. CVE provides identifiers for known vulnerabilities. CWE defines common weakness types. CVSS provides a scoring system to assess vulnerability severity levels. The Heartbleed bug is used as an example, which is identified by CVE-2014-0160, classified under CWE-200 for information exposure, and given a CVSS score of 6.4.
VAPT (Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing) involves evaluating systems and networks to identify vulnerabilities, configuration issues, and potential routes of unauthorized access. It is recommended for SMEs due to common security issues like phishing and ransomware attacks targeting them. The document outlines the types of VAPT testing, why SMEs need it, example data breaches, and estimated costs of common cyber attacks and security services.
Presentación realizada en el congreso MoscowCON (Moscu) sobre aspectos técnicos de la realización de ejercicios de Red Team
The document outlines an agenda for an information security essentials workshop. It discusses key topics like the principles of information security around confidentiality, integrity and availability. It also covers security governance structures, roles and responsibilities, risk management, information system controls and auditing information security. The objectives are to provide an overview of information security, describe approaches to auditing it, and discuss current trends.
This document discusses Nationwide's experience using threat intelligence to focus their MITRE ATT&CK activities. Their initial broad approach analyzing 240+ techniques at once was unsuccessful. They then prioritized techniques based on threats to the financial sector. This focused their efforts on the 27 most relevant threat actors and the 100+ techniques associated with them. They mapped techniques to the ATT&CK matrix and conducted intelligence research. This intelligence-led approach improved their security posture understanding and enabled prioritized, actionable recommendations. The process is ongoing to constantly evolve their defenses based on the latest intelligence.
Personal Identifiable Information (PII) leaks have become more frequent in recent years, and losses from credit card fraud in 2021 have set records respectively in Taiwan and Japan. Where did this information get leaked and sold in the first place? The term "Dark web" refers to websites inaccessible without the use of Tor protocol, and given added privacy and anonymity while using Tor, and marketplaces in it are proven to be very attractive to criminals. An anonymous researcher will share experiences of dealing with vendors from card shops on marketplaces among dark web, focused on insights of shops selling Taiwanese and Japanese PIIs, and therefore, TTPs of hackers from these card shops. We hope to inspire audiences to rethink how to reduce credit card frauds.
- Information Security Management: - APTs - a sophisticated and organized cyber attack to access and steal information from compromised computers.
Social engineering and phishing attacks are the largest threats to companies, as attackers are increasingly relying on tricking users to gain access to systems. Mobile malware and internet-connected devices are also growing vulnerabilities, as more business is conducted and data is stored on mobile and cloud systems. Companies need to invest in protections against these emerging threats like social engineering, mobile malware, cloud vulnerabilities, and weaknesses in the growing Internet of Things. Staying ahead of changing attack types can help reduce vulnerabilities, but protecting against current and future risks is a ongoing challenge.
Introduction to Software Security and Best Practices — Top Software Security flaws — Quick Wins for Practical Software Security
1) Privileged identity, such as system administrator accounts, is the core enabler of cyber attacks according to security reports. 2) Existing security layers like firewalls and antivirus have been breached in major data breaches involving companies like Target and Home Depot. 3) A new security layer focused on privileged identity management (PIM) is needed to protect privileged accounts and help break the cyber attack kill chain.
MITRE ATT&CK is quickly gaining traction and is becoming an important standard to use to assess the overall cyber security posture of an organization. Tools like ATT&CK Navigator facilitate corporate adoption and allow for a holistic overview on attack techniques and how the organization is preventing and detecting them. Furthermore, many vendors, technologies and open-source initiatives are aligning with ATT&CK. Join Erik Van Buggenhout in this presentation, where he will discuss how MITRE ATT&CK can be leveraged in the organization as part of your overall cyber security program, with a focus on adversary emulation. Erik Van Buggenhout is the lead author of SANS SEC599 - Defeating Advanced Adversaries - Purple Team Tactics & Kill Chain Defenses. Next to his activities at SANS, Erik is also a co-founder of NVISO, a European cyber security firm with offices in Brussels, Frankfurt and Munich.
After successfully attacking an endpoint and gaining a foothold there, sophisticated attackers know that to get to the valuable data within an organization they must quietly pivot. From reconnaissance to escalation of privileges to stealing credentials, learn about the tactics and tools that attackers are using today.
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, 3rd Edition, by Mark Ciampa Knowledge and skills required for Network Administrators and Information Technology professionals to be aware of security vulnerabilities, to implement security measures, to analyze an existing network environment in consideration of known security threats or risks, to defend against attacks or viruses, and to ensure data privacy and integrity. Terminology and procedures for implementation and configuration of security, including access control, authorization, encryption, packet filters, firewalls, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). CNIT 120: Network Security http://samsclass.info/120/120_S09.shtml#lecture Policy: http://samsclass.info/policy_use.htm Many thanks to Sam Bowne for allowing to publish these presentations.
Buffer overflows occur when a program allows user input that exceeds the maximum buffer size, overflowing into adjacent memory and potentially altering the program flow. This is a common security issue that has been exploited in many worms. Proper bounds checking on all buffers and techniques like StackGuard and static analysis can help prevent buffer overflows. Other memory corruption issues also exist, such as format string vulnerabilities and integer overflows.
From ATT&CKcon 3.0 By David Barroso, CounterCraft When an adversary engages in a specific behavior, they are vulnerable to expose an unintended weakness. By looking at each ATT&CK technique, we can examine the weaknesses revealed and identify an engagement activity or activities to exploit this weakness. During the presentation we will see some real examples of how we can use different ATT&CK techniques in order to plan different adversary engagement activities.
The document outlines the five main steps of a penetration test: information gathering, vulnerability analysis, exploitation, post-exploitation, and reporting. It describes some key activities for each step such as performing reconnaissance, discovering flaws, establishing access by bypassing security, maintaining control of compromised machines, and mapping exfiltration paths. It also discusses how capture the flag (CTF) exercises can help people start learning about these topics and steps of a penetration test.
This document discusses vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. It defines them as two types of vulnerability testing that search for known vulnerabilities and attempt to exploit vulnerabilities, respectively. Vulnerability assessment uses automated tools to detect known issues, while penetration testing employs hacking techniques to demonstrate how deeply vulnerabilities could be exploited like an actual attacker. Both are important security practices for identifying weaknesses and reducing risks, but require different skills and have different strengths, weaknesses, frequencies, and report outputs. Reasons for vulnerabilities include insecure coding, limited testing, and misconfigurations. The document outlines common vulnerability and attack types as well as how vulnerability assessment and penetration testing are typically conducted.
The document discusses cyber attacks by the Lazarus Group targeting Japan, including Operation Dream Job and details of their tactics, techniques, and procedures. It provides an overview of the Lazarus Group, describes how they used LinkedIn to target a defense company, the malware used including Torisma and LazarusMTB, and encryption methods like RC4 and VEST ciphers for communication with command and control servers.
Jon Noble. Jon will give a brief overview of why you should consider security as part of your CloudStack deployment, why your approach to security needs to be different than in a traditional environment, and also talk about some of the motives behind the attacks – why they attack you and what they do once they have compromised a system.
The document is SecPod Labs' 2022 annual vulnerability report. It summarizes key findings from SecPod's research in 2022, including over 26,000 vulnerabilities discovered, 191 widely exploited vulnerabilities, and 37 zero-day vulnerabilities. The top vulnerabilities of 2022 are described. SecPod's security intelligence coverage for 2022 is also summarized, including coverage of over 22,000 CVEs and 124 malware exploits. The report concludes with SecPod's milestones in 2022 and predictions for 2023 vulnerabilities.
【HITCON FreeTalk 2021 - 近期供應鏈及勒索病毒事件剖析】 ➠ Talk: SolarWinds 供應鏈攻擊事件分析 ➠ Speaker: Fox-IT 研究員 Zywu, 台灣駭客協會理事 CK ➠ Video: https://fb.watch/4hg1RYiQWw/
This document discusses the stages of targeted attacks and the techniques used at each stage. It begins by outlining the 6 main stages of targeted attacks: 1) intelligence gathering, 2) point of entry, 3) command and control communication, 4) lateral movement, 5) data discovery, and 6) data exfiltration. For each stage, it describes common tactics attackers use, such as spearphishing for the point of entry or using encrypted communications over the Tor network for exfiltration. The document emphasizes that comprehensive security measures are needed to detect threats across all stages of attack.
How Attackers Use Exposed Prometheus Server to Exploit Kubernetes Clusters. The first step in any pentesting, ethical hacking or cybercriminal groups, is to gather as much information as you can about the target you want to breach. Why? Simple, to know what technique to use or the appropriate tools to achieve intrusion and evasion of defense systems. Information on versions inside the cluster can map to CVE and vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Information on applications, tools and architectures can be used for competitors. Prometheus in the wild Title Prometheus collects and stores its metrics as time series data, i.e. metrics information is stored with the timestamp at which it was recorded, alongside optional key-value pairs called labels. Prometheus allows (and recommends) using basic authentication, but not enabled by default: https://prometheus.io/docs/operating/security/ Exposing open Prometheus endpoints to the Internet is a bad idea... and as every bad idea, it's highly adopted: What will we us to fingerprint Kubernetes? Title Two of the most widely used exporters offer most of the information that we need: Node ExporterKube State Metrics ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● Physical infrastructure Network interfaces Host OS & kernel Kubernetes components Hostnames and network topology Logical hierarchy Secrets location Applications (and versions) deployed Fingerprinting Physical Infrastructure Title Node Exporter: node_dmi_info bios_vendor: ● SeaBIOS ● Amazon EC2 bios_version: ● seabios-1.9.1-qemu-project.org ● 8f19b21 ● 1.0 bios_release: ● 1.0 bios_date: ● 10/16/2017 ● 04/01/2014 chassis_asset_tag: ● Amazon EC2 chassis_vendor: ● Amazon EC2 ● Alibaba Cloud system_vendor: ● Tencent Cloud ● Amazon EC2 ● Alibaba Cloud product_name: ● m5.xlarge ● Alibaba Cloud ECS product_version: ● pc-i440fx-2.1 board_vendor: ● Amazon EC2 board_asset_tag: ● i-00280f617XXXXX board_vendor: ● Smdbmds ● Amazon EC2 Fingerprinting network interfaces Title Node Exporter: node_network_info{device=~'eth.+'} { address="06:d5:XX:XX:XX:XX", broadcast="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", device="eth0", instance="172.31.XX.XX:9100", instance_az="us-west-2a", instance_id="i-XXXXX", instance_name="XXX-XXX", instance_type="c5.xlarge", instance_vpc="vpc-XXXXXXX", job="ec2_instances", operstate="up" } Fingerprinting network topology Title KSM: kube_node_info kube_service_info * on (service) group_left group by (service,type)(kube_service_spec_type{type="LoadBalancer"}) kube_ingress_info Node hostname Services in the cluster (specially load-balancers) ● namespace ● cluster IP ● node ● (application behind the service can be guessed by name of service/namespace) Ingresses in the cluster
In November 2019, I started monitoring the Bitcoin operation by the adversaries who hid IP addresses of their C&C server in the blockchain. In June 2020, I started collaborating with Professor Christian Doerr of the Hasso Plattner Institute based on the idea of redirecting C&C server communication to a sinkhole server (called takeover), and we successfully achieved this in August. However, the adversaries quickly took evasive action, where they managed to implement an evasion mechanism in only two weeks and restarted their attack. Although we could not conduct our takeover, our monitoring system could worked well. The end of their attack was brought upon by the surge in Bitcoin prices. Due to the fees for the Bitcoin miners, a transaction had reduced the adversaries' profits, and we confirmed the last C&C update was in January 2021 and the abandonment of the attack infrastructure came in March. Since then, no similar attacks have been observed by my monitoring system. Although this attack has already concluded and is unlikely to restart unless the value of Bitcoin declines, I would like to share the know-how I have learned through the direct confrontation with the adversaries. That is, at the time of the confrontation with them, this attack was highly novel, and the adversaries themselves did not fully understand the best solution for its' operation. They needed to evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) while operating the system. We carefully analyzed their TTPs and tried to catch them off their guard. Even more troublesome was the need to understand as quickly as possible what they intended to do each time they were affected by the Bitcoin halving or making a simple operational error. This presentation is a culmination my insights learned from interactions with these adversaries and I am looking forward to sharing this information with everyone.
Presentación de Ignacio Berrozpe, de Check Point, durante la XV Jornada de Seguridad TI de Nextel S.A. en la Alhóndiga de Bilbao el jueves 27 de junio de 2013.
The document discusses FIDO Alliance's efforts to create simpler and stronger authentication standards to replace passwords. It provides an overview of FIDO authentication, including how it works, adoption rates, and certification programs. It also summarizes the Alliance's work in identity verification, binding, and FIDO Device Onboarding to fill gaps and further the passwordless vision.
Ivanti’s Patch Tuesday breakdown goes beyond patching your applications and brings you the intelligence and guidance needed to prioritize where to focus your attention first. Catch early analysis on our Ivanti blog, then join industry expert Chris Goettl for the Patch Tuesday Webinar Event. There we’ll do a deep dive into each of the bulletins and give guidance on the risks associated with the newly-identified vulnerabilities.
As presented by Tim Mackey, Senior Technical Evangelist - Black Duck Software, at LinuxCon/ContainerCon 2016: Cyber threats consistently rank as a high priority for data center operators and their reliability teams. As increasingly sophisticated attacks mount, the risk associated with a zero-day attack is significant. Traditional responses include perimeter monitoring and anti-malware agents. Unfortunately, those techniques introduce performance and management challenges when used at large VM densities, and may not work well with containerized applications. Fortunately, the Xen Project community has collaborated to create a solution which reduces the potential of success associated with rootkit attack vectors. When combined with recent advancements in processor capabilities, and secure development models for container deployment, it’s possible to both protect against and be proactively alerted to potential zero-day attacks. In this session, we’ll cover models to limit the scope of compromise should an attack be mounted against your infrastructure. Two attack vectors will be illustrated, and we’ll see how it’s possible to be proactively alerted to potential zero-day actions without requiring significant reconfiguration of your datacenter environment. Technology elements explored include those from Black Duck, Bitdefender, Citrix, Intel and Guardicore.
As presented at LinuxCon/ContainerCon 2016: Cyber threats consistently rank as a high priority for data center operators and their reliability teams. As increasingly sophisticated attacks mount, the risk associated with a zero-day attack is significant. Traditional responses include perimeter monitoring and anti-malware agents. Unfortunately, those techniques introduce performance and management challenges when used at large VM densities, and may not work well with containerized applications. Fortunately, the Xen Project community has collaborated to create a solution which reduces the potential of success associated with rootkit attack vectors. When combined with recent advancements in processor capabilities, and secure development models for container deployment, it’s possible to both protect against and be proactively alerted to potential zero-day attacks. In this session, we’ll cover models to limit the scope of compromise should an attack be mounted against your infrastructure. Two attack vectors will be illustrated, and we’ll see how it’s possible to be proactively alerted to potential zero-day actions without requiring significant reconfiguration of your datacenter environment. Technology elements explored include those from Black Duck, Bitdefender, Citrix, Intel and Guardicore.
This document discusses container and Kubernetes security. It notes that Gartner predicts more than 75% of organizations will be running containerized applications by 2022. It outlines some recent Kubernetes vulnerabilities and common container security concerns. It then provides recommendations for securing the build pipeline, building on a secure foundation, securing applications, securing container hosts, securing networking environments, and securing management stacks. It discusses how to validate infrastructure created or that will be created in the cloud for applications. It concludes that containers offer benefits if the right policies, practices, and security tools are used to protect against vulnerabilities and attacks.
This document discusses security risks to industrial control systems (ICS) and strategies to protect them. It begins by providing examples of security incidents that impacted real-world critical infrastructure facilities. These include production line stoppages due to malware infections and temporary loss of control from unauthorized access. The document then notes that ICS environments are becoming more open and connected, increasing risk. It argues that security approaches for ICS must focus on integrity, availability and confidentiality to account for their mission-critical nature of continuously operating specialized systems. The document advocates implementing network segmentation, carefully managing external devices and updating systems without interrupting operations.
This document discusses securing cloud environments. It notes that traditional security defenses are insufficient for dynamic cloud environments. It recommends building a protection "bubble" around every machine using the same controls traditionally done at the perimeter, like antivirus, firewalls, and log inspection. It also recommends leveraging hypervisor and cloud context awareness. The document outlines challenges like ensuring proper context awareness and policy management across multiple cloud providers. It briefly describes organized cybercrime networks involved in activities like selling malware, stolen credentials, and illegal services.
Check Point and Cisco presented a joint solution architecture for providing advanced security in private cloud data centers. The solution integrates Check Point security gateways with Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) to enable automated security provisioning and policy orchestration, as well as automatic insertion of Check Point gateways to inspect traffic and prevent threats. This provides advanced threat prevention, visibility, and security controls within private clouds that dynamically adapt to changes in the infrastructure.
The document discusses how VMware products like NSX, vRealize Operations, and vRealize Log Insight can provide monitoring, logging, and security capabilities for Pivotal Cloud Foundry environments. It highlights how NSX delivers inherently secure infrastructure, high performance distributed networking, and availability for PaaS. The document also notes how NSX can help organizations run things cheaper and be more efficient through improved data center operations and reduced CapEx.
Ivanti’s Patch Tuesday breakdown goes beyond patching your applications and brings you the intelligence and guidance needed to prioritize where to focus your attention first. Catch early analysis on our Ivanti blog, then join industry expert Chris Goettl for the Patch Tuesday Webinar Event. There we’ll do a deep dive into each of the bulletins and give guidance on the risks associated with the newly-identified vulnerabilities.
apidays LIVE Paris - Responding to the New Normal with APIs for Business, People and Society December 8, 9 & 10, 2020 Multicluster Service Mesh in Action Denis Jannot, Director of Field Engineering - EMEA at Solo.io
This document provides an overview and summary of a training on analyzing malicious RDP usage. It begins with an introduction to the common use of RDP in attacks. It then covers RDP protocols, vulnerabilities, and common attack vectors like exploiting pre-authentication vulnerabilities. The document discusses analyzing RDP event logs and connections to detect malicious activity. It concludes with recommendations for securing RDP, such as enabling Network Level Authentication, using an RDP gateway, and implementing two-factor authentication.
It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.
ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒��ートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。
While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.
ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。
Yuuma Taki is enrolled in the Hokkaido Information University Information Media Faculty of Information Media (4th year). At university he is focusing on learning about security for lower-level components, such OS and CPU. In his third year of undergraduate school, he worked on trying to implement the OS security mechanism "KASLR", at Sechack365. Currently, he is learning about ROP derivative technology and embedded equipment security.
2021年10月、Lazarusグループに関連する可能性が高いユニークなローダーであるWSLinkの最初の分析を公開。ほとんどのサンプルは難読化され、高度な仮想マシン(VM)難読化機能で保護されている。サンプルには明確なアーティファクトが含まれておらず、当初は難読化を公的に知られているVMと関連付けなかったが、後にそれをCodevirtualizerに接続することに成功。このVMは、ジャンクコードの挿入、仮想オペランドの暗号化、仮想オペコードの重複、難読化手法仮想命令のマージ、ネストされたVMなど、いくつかの追加の難読化技術を導入する。 本発表では、VMの内部を分析し、合理的な時間で難読化技術を「見抜く」ための半自動化されたアプローチについて説明する。また、難読化されたバイトコードと難読化されていないバイトコードを比較し、本手法の有効性を紹介する。われわれの手法は、仮想オペコードのセマンティクスを抽出する既知の難読化解除手法に基づいており、単純化規則によるシンボリック実行を使用。さらに、バイトコードチャンクとVMの内部構成を記号ではなく、具体的な値として扱い、既知の難読化手法で追加の難読化技術を自動的に処理できるようにする。
In October 2021, we published the first analysis of Wslink – a unique loader likely linked to the Lazarus group. Most samples are packed and protected with an advanced virtual machine (VM) obfuscator; the samples contain no clear artifacts and we initially did not associate the obfuscation with a publicly known VM, but we later managed to connect it to CodeVirtualizer. This VM introduces several additional obfuscation techniques such as insertion of junk code, encoding of virtual operands, duplication of virtual opcodes, opaque predicates, merging of virtual instructions, and a nested VM. Our presentation analyzes the internals of the VM and describes our semi automated approach to “see through” the obfuscation techniques in reasonable time. We demonstrate the approach on some bytecode from a protected sample and compare the results with a non-obfuscated sample, found subsequent to starting our analysis, confirming the method’s validity. Our solution is based on a known deobfuscation method that extracts the semantics of the virtual opcodes, using symbolic execution with simplifying rules. We further treat the bytecode chunks and some internal constructs of the VM as concrete values instead of as symbolic ones, enabling the known deobfuscation method to deal with the additional obfuscation techniques automatically.
Kimsuky is a North Korean APT possibly controlled by North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau. Based on reports from the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and other vendors, TeamT5 identified that Kimsuky's most active group, CloudDragon, built a workflow functioning as a "Credential Factory," collecting and exploiting these massive credentials. The credential factory powers CloudDragon to start its espionage campaigns. CloudDragon's campaigns have aligned with DPRK's interests, targeting the organizations and key figures playing a role in the DPRK relationship. Our database suggested that CloudDragon has possibly infiltrated targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Victims include think tanks, NGOs, media agencies, educational institutes, and many individuals. CloudDragon's "Credential Factory" can be divided into three small cycles, "Daily Cycle," "Campaign Cycle," and "Post-exploit Cycle." The"Daily Cycle" can collect massive credentials and use the stolen credentials to accelerate its APT life cycle. In the "Campaign Cycle," CloudDragon develops many new malware. While we responded to CloudDragon's incidents, we found that the actor still relied on BabyShark malware. CloudDragon once used BabyShark to deploy a new browser extension malware targeting victims' browsers. Moreover, CloudDragon is also developing a shellcode-based malware, Dust. In the "Post-exploit Cycle," the actor relied on hacking tools rather than malicious backdoors. We also identified that the actor used remote desktop software to prevent detection. In this presentation, we will go through some of the most significant operations conducted by CloudDragon, and more importantly, we will provide possible scenarios of future invasions for defense and detection.
Social media is no doubt a critical battlefield for threat actors to launch InfoOps, especially in a critical moment such as wartime or the election season. We have seen Bot-Driven Information Operations (InfoOps, aka influence campaign) have attempted to spread disinformation, incite protests in the physical world, and doxxing against journalists. China's Bots-Driven InfoOps, despite operating on a massive scale, are often considered to have low impact and very little organic engagement. In this talk, we will share our observations on these persistent Bots-Driven InfoOps and dissect their harmful disinformation campaigns circulated in cyberspace. In the past, most bots-driven operations simply parroted narratives of the Chinese propaganda machine, mechanically disseminating the same propaganda and disinformation artifacts made by Chinese state media. However, recently, we saw the newly created bots turn to post artifacts in a livelier manner. They utilized various tactics, including reposting screenshots of forum posts and disguised as members of “Milk Tea Alliance,” to create a false appearance that such content is being echoed across cyberspace. We particularly focus on an ongoing China's bots-driven InfoOps targeting Taiwan, which we dub "Operation ChinaRoot." Starting in mid-2021, the bots have been disseminating manipulated information about Taiwan's local politics and Covid-19 measures. Our further investigation has also identified the linkage between Operation ChinaRoot and other Chinese state-linked networks such as DRAGONBRIDGE and Spamouflage.
Malwares written in Go is increasing every year. Go's cross-platform nature makes it an opportune language for attackers who wish to target multiple platforms. On the other hand, the statically linked libraries make it difficult to distinguish between user functions and libraries, making it difficult for analysts to analyze. This situation has increased the demand for Go malware classification and exploration. In this talk, we will demonstrate the feasibility of computing similarity and classification of Go malware using a newly proposed method called gimpfuzzy. We have implemented "gimpfuzzy", which incorporates Fuzzy Hashing into the existing gimphash method. In this talk, we will verify the discrimination rate of the classification using the proposed method and confirm the validity of the proposed method by discussing some examples from the classified results. We will also discuss issues in Go-malware classification.
Goで書かれたマルウェアは年々増加している。Goはクロスプラットフォームの性質を持っており、複数のプラットフォームを標的にしたい攻撃者にとって好都合な言語である。その一方で、ライブラリが静的にリンクされていることからユーザ関数とライブラリの区別が難しく、アナリストにとって解析が困難である。そうした状況で、Goマルウェアの分類や探索の需要が高まっている。 本講演ではgimpfuzzyという新たな提案手法を用いてGoマルウェアに対し類似性の計算や分類が可能であることを検証する。われわれは既存手法であるgimphashにFuzzy Hashingを組み込んだ「gimpfuzzy」を新たに実装した。講演では提案手法を利用し���分類の判別率を検証し、分類された結果の中からいくつかの事例を取り上げその妥当性について確認する。また、Goマルウェアの分類における課題についても検討を行う予定である。
本研究では 2019 年 11 月から C&C サーバーの IP アドレスをブロックチェーンに隠ぺいした攻撃者のビットコイン運用監視を開始した。2020 年 6 月に C&C サーバ通信をシンクホールサーバへ直接誘導する (テイクオーバーと呼ぶ) アイデアによる国際協業を Hasso Plattner Institute の Christian Doerr 教授と開始し、8 月にテイクオーバーに成功した。攻撃者のテイクオーバー回避は早く、約 2 週間で回避メカニズムを実装し攻撃を再開した。テイクオーバーは回避されてしまったが、ビットコイン運用監視は機能し続けた。この攻撃の終息はビットコイン高騰がきっかけとなった。ビットコイン取引における採掘者への手数料が利益を圧迫する要因となり、2021 年 1 月に最後の C&C 情報の更新、3 月に攻撃インフラ放棄を確認した。その後、本研究の監視範囲において同種の攻撃は観察されていない。 この攻撃はすでに終息し、ビットコインの価値が下がらない限り再開される可能性は低いが、本講演では攻撃者との直接対峙により得られたノウハウを共有したい。つまり、攻撃者と対峙していた当時、この攻撃は新規性が高く、攻撃者自身も最適な運用方法を理解できていなかった。運用しながら攻撃手法を進化させる必要があり、われわれも攻撃手法を慎重に分析しながら隙を狙っていた。さらに厄介なのが、攻撃者がビットコイン半減期の影響を受けたり、単純な運用ミスをしたりして、そのたびに、われわれも攻撃者の意図を可能な限り早く理解しなければならなかったという点だ。この対峙により得られた知見は、本講演者による CODE BLUE 講演でも活かしており、本質的なノウハウとして共有する。
Smartian is a tool that enhances smart contract fuzzing with static and dynamic data-flow analyses. It integrates static analysis to identify promising sequences of function calls for generating initial fuzzing seeds. It then uses dynamic analysis to mutate function arguments to realize expected data flows across functions. Smartian implements bug oracles for 13 classes of smart contract bugs. Evaluation shows Smartian outperforms other fuzzers and symbolic executors on benchmarks with known bugs, demonstrating the effectiveness of integrating static and dynamic analyses for smart contract fuzzing.
Imagine a world where a security researcher becomes aware of a security vulnerability, impacting thousands of Open Source Software (OSS) projects, and is enabled to both identify and fix them all at once. Now imagine a world where a vulnerability is introduced into your production code and a few moments later you receive an automated pull request to fix it. Hundreds of thousands of human hours are invested every year in finding common security vulnerabilities with relatively simple fixes. These vulnerabilities aren't sexy, cool, or new, we've known about them for years, but they're everywhere! The scale of GitHub and tools like CodeQL (GitHub's code query language) enable one to scan for vulnerabilities across hundreds of thousands of OSS projects, but the challenge is how to scale the triaging, reporting, and fixing. Simply automating the creation of thousands of bug reports by itself isn't useful, and would be even more of a burden on volunteer maintainers of OSS projects. Ideally, the maintainers would be provided with not only information about the vulnerability, but also a fix in the form of an easily actionable pull request. When facing a problem of this scale, what is the most efficient way to leverage researcher knowledge to fix the most vulnerabilities across OSS? This talk will cover a highly scalable solution - automated bulk pull request generation. We'll discuss the practical applications of this technique on real world OSS projects. We'll also cover technologies like CodeQL and OpenRewrite (a style-preserving refactoring tool created at Netflix and now developed by Moderne). Let's not just talk about vulnerabilities, let's actually fix them at scale. This work is sponsored by the new Dan Kaminsky Fellowship; a fellowship created to celebrate Dan's memory and legacy by funding open-source work that makes the world a better (and more secure) place.
Hash Table, as the most fundamental Data Structure in Computer Science, is extensively applied in Software Architecture to store data in an associative manner. However, its architecture makes it prone to Collision Attacks. To deal with this problem, 25 years ago, Microsoft designed its own Dynamic Hashing algorithm and applied it everywhere in IIS, the Web Server from Microsoft, to serve various data from HTTP Stack. As Hash Table is everywhere, isn't the design from Microsoft worth scrutinizing? We dive into IIS internals through months of Reverse-Engineering efforts to examine both the Hash Table implementation and the use of Hash Table algorithms. Several types of attacks are proposed and uncovered in our research, including (1) A specially designed Zero-Hash Flooding Attack against Microsoft's self-implemented algorithm. (2) A Cache Poisoning Attack based on the inconsistency between Hash-Keys. (3) An unusual Authentication Bypass based on a hash collision. By understanding this talk, the audience won't be surprised why we can destabilize the Hash Table easily. The audience will also learn how we explore the IIS internals and will be surprised by our results. These results could not only make a default installed IIS Server hang with 100% CPU but also modify arbitrary HTTP responses through crafted HTTP request. Moreover, we'll demonstrate how we bypass the authentication requirement with a single, crafted password by colliding the identity cache!
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The abstract was published as a conference proceeding in a Newsletter after being presented as an e-posture and secured 2nd prize during the scientific proceedings of "National Conference on Health Economics and Outcomes Research (HEOR) to Enhance Decision Making for Global Health" held at Raghavendra Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research (RIPER)- Autonomous in association with the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR)-India Andhra Pradesh Regional Chapter during 4th& 5th August 2023. Nasir A. A study on drug utilization evaluation of bronchodilators using the DDD method. RIPER - PDIC Bulletin ISPOR India Andhra Pradesh Regional Chapter Newsletter [Internet]. 2023 Sep;11(51):14. Available from: www.riper.ac.in
In this presentation, I have shown major risks that are to face in a business investment. Also I have shown their classification and sources. This information have taken from my text book -" Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management ~chapter 2 Investment~ " For complete this Presentation I used Figma and Canva. My Role: a. Student Final year - Accounting b. Presentation Designer
In a world where Cloud gives us the ease and flexibility to deploy and scale your apps we often overlook security and control. The fact that resources in the cloud are still shared, the hardware is shared, the network is shared, there is not much insight into the infrastructure unless the logs are exposed by the cloud provider. Even an air gap environment in the cloud is truly not air gapped, it’s a pseudo-private network. Moreover, the general trend in the industry is shifting towards cloud repatriation, it’s a fancy term for bringing your apps and services from cloud back to on-prem, like old school how things were run before the cloud was even a thing. This shift has caused what I call a knowledge gap where engineers are only familiar with interacting with infrastructure via APIs but not the hardware or networks their application runs on. In this talk I aim to demystify on-prem environments and more importantly show engineers how easy and smooth it is to repatriate data from cloud to an on-prem air gap environment.
Destyney Duhon embodies a singular blend of creativity, resilience, and purpose that defines modern entrepreneurial spirit. As a visionary at the intersection of artistry and innovation, Destyney fearlessly navigates uncharted waters, sculpting her journey with a profound commitment to authenticity and impact.This Brand exploration power point is a great example of her dedication to her craft.
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The European Commission has clearly identified open source as a strategic tool for bringing some balance to an EU cloud market currently dominated by a handful of non-EU hyperscalers. Part of that commitment comes through a series of ambitious, multi-million EU projects like the SIMPL platform for Data Spaces and the multi-country “Important Project of Common European Interest on Next Generation Cloud Infrastructure and Services” (IPCEI-CIS). For the first time in the history of the European Union, it is the EU industry who will be leading large-scale open source projects aimed at building European strategic technologies. In this talk we will explain in detail how specific European open source technologies are being brought together as part of some of those projects to start building Sovereign Multi-Cloud solutions that ensure interoperability and digital sovereignty for European users while preventing vendor lock-in in the cloud market, opening up competition in the emerging 5G/edge.