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FFRI,Inc.
1
Security in the IoT World:
Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for Automobiles
Naohide Waguri
FFRI, Inc.
waguri@ffri.jp
October 21, 2016
CODE BLUE 2016
FFRI,Inc.
Who am I?
• I previously worked as a network engineer.
(Software QA, Software Developer)
• My current job is investigating and researching automotive security.
• I talked about Windows 10 IoT Core
at CODE BLUE 2015.
• I build CAN transceivers and diagnostic tools as a hobby.
(to repair my cars… )
2
FFRI,Inc.
Internet of Things (IoT)
• Several years have passed since use of this term started.
• A wide variety of devices are now connected to the Internet.
• The growth rate is particularly high in sectors related to human life,
such as the automotive, industrial, and medical sectors.
3
総務省 平成27年度版 情報通信白書より抜粋
(出展) IHS Technology
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks
on automobiles.
4
Message injection to (CAN) buses
Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the
Internet

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FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks
on automobiles.
5
Message injection to (CAN) buses
Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the
Internet
We will talk about this entry point. But…
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks
on automobiles.
6
Message injection to (CAN) buses
Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected
to the Internet
We will talk about this entry point. But…
First of all
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks
on automobiles.
7
Message injection to (CAN) buses
Abusing vulnerabilities in the systems (or devices) that
connected to the Internet
We will talk about this entry point… But,
We will talk A LITTLE about this entry point.
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• In most cases, the target of this entry point is a
diagnostic port.
• Now, diagnostic ports are also used for various
applications other than maintenance.
8
Message injection to (CAN) buses
For example, owners intentionally connect the OBD-II dongle to vehicles. They need to pay
attention before connecting a dongle to their vehicle because the security level of the
vehicle decreases if the device is vulnerable or malicious.
We recommend the use of devices from reliable manufactures and developers.

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FFRI,Inc.
For example, owners intentionally connect the OBD-II dongle to vehicles. They need to pay
attention before connecting a dongle to their vehicle because the security level of the
vehicle decreases if the device is vulnerable or malicious.
We recommend the use of devices from reliable manufactures and developers.
Current State of Automotive Security
9
バス上に追加されたデバイスからのメッセージ(インジェクション)
I disassembled an OBD-II dongle sold at popular online shops and auctions.
I found that it was a FAKE because it was using a microcontroller
different from the item description…
Also, the Bluetooth PIN cannot be changed…
The threat classification can change from “Physical” to “Adjacent”
if a vulnerable or malicious dongle is connected.
ELM327
PIC18 
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks
on automobiles.
10
Message injection to (CAN) buses
Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the
Internet
Here is the main subject!
FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
• The most famous case of a threat to a connected car…
11
Source: https://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/150701_car_hackers_43-vscocam-photo-1.jpg
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Current State of Automotive Security
• A recent case…
12
Source: http://keenlab.tencent.com/en/2016/09/19/Keen-Security-Lab-of-Tencent-Car-Hacking-Research-Remote-Attack-to-Tesla-Cars/

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FFRI,Inc.
Current State of Automotive Security
13
2015
2016
Aug
Oct
Feb
Jun
Source: Samy Kamkar,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3olXUbS-prU
Drive It Like You Hacked It: New Attacks And
Tools to Wirelessly Steal Cars, DEFCON 23
Source: Jianhao Liu, Jason Yan,
https://www.syscan360.org/en/archives/,
Car Hacking: Witness Theory to Scary and
Recover From Scare, SyScan360 2015
Source: Pen Test Partners LLP,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSioTiaX_-Q
Source: Troy Hunt,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt33m7G_42Q
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Motivation
• Vulnerabilities in systems where an "automobile is part of the IoT"
have been reported, one after another, from 2015 and beyond.
• These threats are not as serious as the “Jeep Hack” vulnerability, but…
・ Personal Information is stolen by attackers.
・ Vehicle position and travel history are stolen by attackers.
・ Doors are unlocked by attackers, allowing vandalism of cars.
These are threats to the (information) assets of the vehicle owner.
14
FFRI,Inc.
Vehicle
Motivation
15
Mobile
Apps
Web
Browser
ECU
Remote Service
Web
Server
DB
Machine Boundary
Internet Boundary
Internet Boundary
BlackBox
BlackBox
The system on the other side of the Internet boundary is basically a black box because each
OEM uses its own unique system.
Furthermore, we should not attempt penetration testing via a web browser because it could
be deemed a cyber-attack if attempted without permission.
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Web
Browser
Vehicle
Motivation
16
Mobile
Apps
ECU
Remote Service
Web
Server
DB
Machine Boundary
Internet Boundary
Internet Boundary
Blackbox
BlackBox
This approach is possible but highly challenging.
I would need vehicles and subscriptions to remote control services in order to
analyze the communication between the vehicle and system.
(Also, we need to purchase the remote control service in most cases.)

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Web
Browser
Vehicle
Motivation
17
Mobile
Apps
ECU
Remote Service
Web
Server
DB
Machine Boundary
Internet Boundary
Internet Boundary
BlackBox
BlackBox
Apps can be easily obtained.
(This is also true from the standpoint of the attacker.)
Among the entities that make up the service, this is likely to be the cause of a
vulnerability.
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Investigation Target and Goal
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Phase 0: Collect apps that integrate with the services provided by
each OEM.
Phase 1: Create a report on each app using AndroBugs.
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vulnerabilities in Android Apps.
• Open source and written in Python.
• A static analysis tool that consumes Android APK (no source code).
• Scan for “known common coding vulnerabilities”
• Designed for massive analysis and to efficiently finding bugs.
• You can easily extend new features or vulnerability vectors.
What is AndroBugs?
• AndroBugs is a vulnerability scanner for Android apps that was
presented at Black Hat EUROPE 2015 by Mr. Yu-Cheng Lin.
19
Source: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Lin-Androbugs-Framework-An-Android-Application-Security-Vulnerability-Scanner.pdf
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Investigation Target and Goal
20
Phase 2: Analyze the analysis reports for each app.
Understand the security level of apps provided by OEMs and
consider necessary corrective measures.
Phase 0: Collect apps that integrate with the services provided by
each OEM.
Phase 1: Create a report for each app using AndroBugs.

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Typical Risks in Mobile Apps
21
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
M4 – Insecure
Authentication
M5 – Insufficient
Cryptography
M6 – Insecure
Authorization
M7 – Client Code
Quality
M8 – Code
Tampering
M9 – Reverse
Engineering
M10 – Extraneous
Functionality
Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10
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(2016 RC)
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Vulnerabilities in Investigation Targets
22
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
M4 – Insecure
Authentication
M5 – Insufficient
Cryptography
M6 – Insecure
Authorization
M7 – Client Code
Quality
M8 – Code
Tampering
M9 – Reverse
Engineering
M10 – Extraneous
Functionality
Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10
OWASP
Mobile Top 10 Risks
(2016 RC)
FFRI,Inc.
Overview: M1 – Improper Platform Usage
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M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
Platform security controls are improperly used,
such as the scope of public activities or fragment
activity handling.
Example:
The app will crash with a security exception if
fragment injection occurs because the activity class
that inherits from PreferenceActivity does not
override isValidFragment().
FFRI,Inc.
Platform security controls are improperly used, such
as the scope of public activities or fragment activity
handling.
Example:
The app will crash with a security exception if
fragment injection occurs because the activity class
that inherits from PreferenceActivity does not
override isValidFragment().
Overview: M1 – Improper Platform Usage
24
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
Among the three vulnerability risks, this was
detected second-most by AndroBugs.
However, the results of our investigation did not
find any vulnerabilities.

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Overview: M2 – Insecure Data Storage
25
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
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external storage, outputting it to logs, etc.
Examples:
Outputting transmission data that contains
sensitive information to the debug log.
Using MODE_WORLD_READABLE/WRITABLE to
enable access from other apps when getting the
instance of SharedPreference.
FFRI,Inc.
Sensitive data is handled insecurely by saving it to
external storage, outputting it to logs, etc.
Examples:
Outputting transmission data that contains sensitive
information to the debug log.
Using MODE_WORLD_READABLE/WRITABLE to
enable access from other apps when getting the
instance of SharedPreference.
Overview: M2 – Insecure Data Storage
26
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
Among the three vulnerability risks, this was the
least detected by AndroBugs.
And the results of our investigation did not find any
vulnerabilities.
FFRI,Inc.
Overview: M3 – Insecure Communication
27
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are allowed
because SSL communication is implemented
incorrectly.
Many cases have been reported where verification
of the server certificate is skipped.
Examples:
Skip hostname verification.
Implement a custom (empty) trustmanager in order
to skip certificate validation.
FFRI,Inc.
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are allowed
because SSL communication is implemented
incorrectly.
Many cases have been reported where verification of
the server certificate is skipped.
Examples:
Skip hostname verification.
Implement a custom (empty) TrustManager in order
to skip certificate validation.
Overview: M3 – Insecure Communication
28
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure Data
Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
Among the three of vulnerabilities risk, this
was the most detected by AndroBugs.
In addition, we confirmed actually vulnerable
apps.

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The state of VPN protocols is not pretty, with popular options, such as IPsec and OpenVPN, being overwhelmingly complex, with large attack surfaces, using mostly cryptographic designs from the 90s. WireGuard presents a new abuse-resistant and high-performance alternative based on modern cryptography, with a focus on implementation and usability simplicity. It uses a 1-RTT handshake, based on NoiseIK, to provide perfect forward secrecy, identity hiding, and resistance to key-compromise impersonation attacks, among other important security properties, as well as high performance transport using ChaCha20Poly1305. A novel IP-binding cookie MAC mechanism is used to prevent against several forms of common denial-of-service attacks, both against the client and server, improving greatly on those of DTLS and IKEv2. Key distribution is handled out-of-band with extremely short Curve25519 points, which can be passed around in the likes of OpenSSH. Discarding the academic layering perfection of IPsec, WireGuard introduces the idea of a "cryptokey routing table", alongside an extremely simple and fully defined timer-state mechanism, to allow for easy and minimal configuration; WireGuard is actually securely deployable in practical settings. In order to rival the performance of IPsec, WireGuard is implemented inside the Linux kernel, but unlike IPsec, it is implemented in less than 4,000 lines of code, making the implementation manageably auditable. The talk will examine both the cryptography and kernel implementation particulars of WireGuard and explore an offensive attack perspective on network tunnels. --- Jason Donenfeld Jason Donenfeld is an independent security researcher and software developer, with a broad background of experience, well-known in both the security community and the open source world, and has pioneered several exploitation techniques. He has worked with many severe vulnerabilities in widespread software projects, including working on 0-day vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel, as well as extensive hardware reverse engineering. His security work spans advanced mathematical and geometric algorithms, cryptography, and remote exploitation. Jason founded Edge Security (www.edgesecurity.com), a highly capable security consulting firm, with expertise in vulnerability discovery, security assessments, reverse engineering, hardened development, and physical security.

cb16code bluecrypto
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] 難解なウェブアプリケーションの脆弱性 by Andrés Riancho

この講演では、難解なWebアプリケーションの脆弱性を詳しく見せる。これらの脆弱性は多くのセキュリティ・コンサルタントの簡易な脆弱性診断では見逃される可能性があり、リモートコード実行、認証バイパスや、実際にお金を支払うことなくPayPal経由でお店の商品を購入されてしまうことに繋がる。 SQLインジェクションは廃れたが、私は気にしない。null、nil、NULLの世界や、noSQLインジェクション、通話音声傍受に繋がるHostヘッダ・インジェクション、PayPalの二重支払い、RailsのMessage Verifierのリモートコード実行の世界を探検しようではないか。 --- アンドレス・リアンチョ Andres Riancho アンドレス・リアンチョはアプリケーション・セキュリティの専門家であり、現在はコミュニティを前提としたオープン・ソースのw3afプロジェクトを率いていて、世界中の企業に徹底的なWebアプリケーション侵入テストサービスを提供している。 研究の分野では、3comやISSからのIPS装置に対し重大な脆弱性を発見していて、元雇用者のひとりが行ったSAP研究に貢献し、何百ものWebアプリケーションに対して脆弱性を報告している。 彼が注力しているものは常に、Webアプリケーションのセキュリティ分野である。それは彼が開発したw3afであり、侵入テスターやセキュリティ・コンサルタントたちに幅広く使われるWebアプリケーション攻撃、Auditフレームワークだ。アンドレスは、BlackHat(米国と欧州)、SEC-T(スウェーデン)、DeepSec(オーストリア)、OWASP World C0n(米国)、CanSecWest(カナダ)、PacSecWest(日本)、T2(フィンランド)、Ekoparty(ブエノスアイレス)など、世界中の多くのセキュリティ会議において講演をし、トレーニングの場を設けてきた。 アンドレスは、自動Webアプリケーション脆弱性の検知と開発を更に研究するため、2009年にWebセキュリティに特化したコンサルタント会社Bonsai Information Securityを設立している。

cb16web securitycode blue
FFRI,Inc.
Vulnerabilities Found?
YES!
But I cannot disclose the app name… 
29
It is an extremely common vulnerability
in the implementation of
SSL/TLS communication.
FFRI,Inc.
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 1: HTTP communication that contains user information
• One activity loads an HTTP URL into WebView.
• The URL posts user information to the server in clear text.
• The other URLs on the same host use HTTPS.
So, this might be based on some policy, but…
30
FFRI,Inc.
31
Others are using HTTPS.
(All the same host)
But this is using HTTP…
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 1: HTTP communication that contains user information
FFRI,Inc.
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
32
Sources: https://www.ipa.go.jp/about/press/20140919_1.html
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/582497

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[CB16] 私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか? by Ewerson Guimaraes

私達はかなり長い間、スパイ行為が国や政府、大企業にまで及んでいたことを見てきた。ネットワーク機器、電話、その他関連機器に数多くのバックドアが見つかり、メディアによって事件として報道された。 この講演では、大きな疑問となっている、モデム/ルーターのRTN、機器に見つかったバックドアについて説明する。その理由は、ベンダー情報がなく、だれが製造メーカーなのかといった情報もないというのに、市場での製造、販売、流通に少なくとも7企業が関わっていたからだ。しかも、その一部は全く現存していなかった。 これが、研究課題につながる質問へと私達を導いた:「私のモデムに誰がバックドアを仕掛けたのか?」 --- エワーソン・ギマラインス Ewerson Guimaraes Fumec大学でコンピューター・サイエンスの学位を取得したセキュリティ・アナリストであり、Epam Systemsの研究者でもある。脆弱性診断士として、Offensive Security(OSCP)、Elearn(WPT)から認定されており、ブラジルの情報セキュリティ/コンピューター雑誌「H4ck3r」と「GEEK」に論文が掲載されている。その上、IBM、McAfee、Skype、Technicolor、Tufin、TrendMicroなどといった大企業にて見つかった脆弱性や勧告を、SecurityFocusに投稿した。Metasploitフレームワーク・プロジェクトへのモジュールの開発に貢献。ミナスジェライス州最初のハッカープレース、BHackカンファレンスやArea31の設立者であり、現役のKali Linuxコミュニティコントリビューターである。

hardwarecode bluecb16
[CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl
[CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl[CB16] Keynote: How much security is too much? by Karsten Nohl
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Based on one decade of impactful security research and several years as a risk manager, Karsten Nohl reflects upon what he would have done differently in pushing a data security agenda. Our community is convinced that stellar IT security is paramount for companies large and small: We need security for system availability, for brand reputation, to prevent fraud, and to keep data private. But is more security always better? Poorly chosen protection measures can have large externalities on the productivity, innovation capacity, and even happiness of organizations. Can too much security be worse than too little security? This talk investigates the trade-off between security and innovation along several examples of current security research. It finds that some hacking research is counter-productive in bringing the most security to most people, by spreading fear too widely. --- Karsten Nohl Karsten Nohl has spoken widely on security gaps since 2006. He and co-investigators have uncovered flaws in mobile communication, payment, and other widely-used infrastructures. In his work at an Asian 4G and digital services provider, and as Chief Scientist at Security Research Labs in Berlin, a risk management think tank specializing in emerging IT threats, Karsten challenges security assumptions in proprietary systems and is fascinated by the security-innovation trade-off. Hailing from the Rhineland, he studied electrical engineering in Heidelberg and earned a doctorate in 2008 from the University of Virginia.

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[CB16] 基調講演: セキュリティはどれくらいが適量? – How much security is too much? – by Karsten Nohl
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10 年にわたる精力的なセキュリティ研究と、数年にわたるリスク管理者としての経験を通じて、カールステン・ノールは情報セキュリティに関する議論を進める中で、もっといい結果が残せたのではないかと考えるようになった。 世間では、非の打ち所のない IT セキュリティ対策を講じることが、企業の規模に依らずその企業にとって最も重要なものであると確信されている。我々はシステムの可用性やブランドに対する高評価を確保するため、詐欺行為を回避するため、そして情報の機密性を保持するためにセキュリティを必要としている。 浅はかな考えで採用された防御策は、生産性、イノベーションの可能性、そして組織の幸福度にすら、それぞれ大きな外部性を持つ。行き過ぎたセキュリティ対策は、不充分なセキュリティ対策よりも悪いものなのだろうか? 今回の講演では、現代のセキュリティの研究での様々な実例を通じて、セキュリティとイノベーションの間に発生するドレードオフの関係について取り扱う。講演では、いくつかのハッキングの研究は、多くの人に最善にセキュリティを提供することによって、および、脅威を広く広め過ぎることによって、非生産的であることへの気づきを提供する。 --- カールステン・ノールKarsten Nohl カールステン・ノールは 2006 年からセキュリティレベルの格差について幅広く講演している。彼は共同研究者と共に、モバイル通信や支払いに利用されるような世間で幅広く使用されている情報基盤における欠陥を発見してきた。アジアの 4G とデジタルサービスのプロバイダ、ベルリンの Security Research Labs の主任研究員、新たな IT 脅威の分析に特化したリスクマネジメントのシンクタンクにおける業務を通じて、カールステンは顧客の独自システムのセキュリティ評価に取り組み、セキュリティとイノベーションの間で発生するトレードオフの関係に強い興味を抱くようになった。ラインラントからあまり遠くないハイデルベルグで電気工学を学び、2008 年にヴァージニア大学で博士号を修めた。

cb16securitykeynote
FFRI,Inc.
33
What kind of vulnerability is a server certificate
validation flaw?
And what kind of risk does it pose?
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
FFRI,Inc.
34
脆
弱
Install the vulnerable app
from Google Play or the App Store Legitimate server
Replace
certificate
The app will encrypt
communication with a fake
certificate if certificate is not
validated.
Decrypt
and
eavesdrop, manipulate Encrypted again using
valid certificate.
Malicious
Wi-Fi
router
The communication may contain
sensitive information because it is
assumed to be encrypted.
It could be sent to a fake URL in
order to steal further information.
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
FFRI,Inc.
• Hostname verification is skipped because
ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER is used.
• Certificate verification is skipped because a custom (empty)
TrustManager is used.
• WebView displays the page even if it is malicious because of
SslErrorHandler.proceed() in certificate verification.
35
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
FFRI,Inc.
36
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw

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End-user’s requirements for secure IT products are continually increased in environment that are affected directly to human life and industry such as IoT, CPS. Because vendors and end-user sell or buy products based on trustworthy or objective security evaluation results, security evaluation roles are important. Security Evaluations are divided to two parts, one is evaluation on design level such as ISO/IEC 29128(Verification of Cryptographic Protocols) and another one is post-implementation level such as ISO/IEC 15408(Common Criteria). These security evaluation standards, both ISO/IEC 29128 and ISO/IEC 15408, advise to use formal verification and automated tools when high assurance level of target products is required. For a long time, vulnerability detection using automated tools have been tried and studied by many security researchers and hackers. And recently, the study related to automated vulnerability detection are now more active than ever in hacking community with DARPA’s CGC(Cyber Grand Challenge). But, too many tools are developed continually and usually each tool has their own purpose to use, so it’s hard to achieve ultimate goal of security evaluation effectively and verify evaluation results. Furthermore, there are no references for categorizing about automated tools on perspective of security evaluations. So, in this presentation we will list up, categorize and analyze all of automated tools for vulnerability detection and introduce our result such as pros and cons, purpose, effectiveness, etc. -- InHyuk Seo My name is Inhyuk Seo(Nick: inhack). I graduated B.S. in Computer Science and Engineering at Hanyang University(ERICA) in 2015. Now I’m a researcher and M.S. of SANE(Security Analaysis aNd Evaluation) Lab at Korea University. I’m interested in Programming Language, Software Testing, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence. In 2012, I completed high-quality information security education course “the Best of the Best(BoB)” hosted by KITRI(Korea Information Technology Research Institute) and conducted “Exploit Decoder for Obfuscated Javascript” Project. I participated in many projects related with vulnerability analysis. I conducted “Smart TV Vulnerability Analysis and Security Evaluation” and “Developing Mobile Security Solution(EAL4) for Military Environment ”. Also, I participated in vulnerability analysis project for IoT products of various domestic tele-communications. -- Jisoo Park Jisoo Park graduated with Dongguk University B.S in Computer science engineering. He participated in secure coding research project in Programming Language Lab and KISA(Korea Internet & Security Agency). He worked as a software QA tester at anti-virus company Ahnlab. He also completed high-quality information security education course “Best of the Best” hosted by KITRI(Korea Information Technology Research Institute) and conducted security consulting for Car sharing service company. Now, Jisoo Park is a

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Internet of Things Security: IBM HorizonWatch 2016 Trend Brief
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securitytechnologyiot
FFRI,Inc.
37
• This vulnerability poses the risk that the user ID and password are
intercepted when the user logs into the service using the app.
Example of Vulnerabilities Found
Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
FFRI,Inc.
Summary of risks of the app in which vulnerabilities were
found
38
Theft of personal
information
(name, address, etc.)
Theft of vehicle
information
(GPS, etc.)
If the communication is intercepted when the user registersPossibility of
eavesdropping
(login or registration)
Account
hijacking
(spoofing)
Send any
message
(e.g., replay attack)
Uninvestigated
message
specification
Vehicle theft
Possibility of further
attacks and damage
(e.g., vandalism)
Vehicle control
hijacking
(unlock doors, etc.)
FFRI,Inc.
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
Vulnerable Apps
• Why did these vulnerabilities occur?
39
Debugging code in the release build
Sample code copy & pasted (some might say “appropriated”) from the
Internet
Bad specifications
(Lack of understanding of secure design and coding)
FFRI,Inc.
• There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We
will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication
to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated.
40
(出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版
http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf
Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information
Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication
Implement appropriate exception handling for SSLException
(e.g., user notification)
Do not implement a custom TrustManager
Do not implement a custom HostnameVerifier
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
Vulnerable Apps

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linuxopen sourceblack duck software
FFRI,Inc.
Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information
Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication
Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLExceptiopn
(For example, such as user notification)
Do not implement custom TrustManager
Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier
• There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We
will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication
to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated.
41
(出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版
http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf
What is sensitive information?
We need to understand the system and user
information that must be protected in advance.
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
Vulnerable Apps
FFRI,Inc.
Use the HTTPS communication if it contains sensitive information
Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication
Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLExceptiopn
(For example, such as user notification)
Do not implement custom TrustManager
Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier
• There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We
will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication
to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated.
42
(出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版
http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf
Vulnerable processing of incoming data may be
targeted by attackers.
We need to perform fuzz testing.
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
Vulnerable Apps
FFRI,Inc.
Use the HTTPS communication if it contains sensitive information
Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication
Implement the appropriate exception handling for SSLException
(e.g., user notification)
Do not implement custom TrustManager
Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier
• There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We
will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication
to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated.
43
(出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版
http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf
Caused by
certificate error
Necessary to consider the
behavior for each feature
specification
Exception occurs if there is a certificate error
→ There may be an MITM attack in progress
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
Vulnerable Apps
FFRI,Inc.
Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information
Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication
Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLException
(e.g., user notification)
Do not implement a custom TrustManager
Do not implement a custom HostnameVerifier
• There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We
will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication
to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated.
44
(出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版
http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf
Use the private CA root certificate to validate the server
certificate if you are using a private certificate.
Do not do this to skip certificate validation even if you are
debugging.
Corrective Measures and Considerations for
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45
・If you are going to develop an Android app…
・If you want to know other rules for Android apps…
・If you have not read these yet…
Android アプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド
(http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf)
Check it out and give it a try! (Sorry, this is Japanese only.)
FFRI,Inc.
Summary: Scan Reports
• Not all positive scan results are true vulnerabilities because
AndroBugs reports common vulnerabilities mechanically.
• AndroBugs detects many SSL security alerts because most risk
factors arise from apps using HTTP communication.
• We created a web-based custom scan report for each app by using
the reports output by AndroBugs.
46
FFRI,Inc.
Summary: Scan Reports
47
Scan report sample
We investigated
critical vulnerability risks
FFRI,Inc.
Summary: Scan Reports
48
App
Author
Remote Control
Feature
No. of
Critical
Vulnerabiltiy Risks
M1 – Improper
Platform Usage
M2 – Insecure
Data Storage
M3 – Insecure
Communication
A Yes 11 5 1 5
B No 5 3 1 1
C No 5 2 1 2
D No 5 2 1 2
E Yes 4 0 0 4
F Yes 4 1 1 2
G Yes 3 0 0 3
H Yes 2 1 0 1
I Partial 1 0 0 1
J Yes 1 0 0 1
K Partial 0 0 0 0

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mobile securitycybersecurityappknox
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Internet of Things - A Different Kind of Scary v2
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The document discusses the threats posed by the growing Internet of Things (IoT), noting that IoT devices are vulnerable to life-threatening hacking, as illustrated by examples of medical devices, cars, and industrial systems being hacked. It warns that the majority of IoT devices have vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminals, and stresses the importance of implementing security controls like firewalls, encryption, access controls and regular security updates to protect IoT devices and prevent threats to confidentiality, integrity and availability. It recommends conducting regular risk assessments, penetration testing and security training to help secure organizations' IoT environments.

FFRI,Inc.
Summary: Possibility of Exploits in the Future
49
App Author Note
A
We confirmed there are exploitable vulnerabilities. There is a risk of MITM attacks.
Classes that inherit from PreferenceActivity do not implement isValidFragment().
The app might crash due to fragment injection if the class becomes a public activity.
B We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
C We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
D We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
Analysis will take a long time because the app was obfuscated.
E
We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
This app crashes as part of an activity because it does not support the new permission model starting from
Android M.
F We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
Analysis will take a long time because the app was obfuscated.
G We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
H We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
I We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
J We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
K We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
FFRI,Inc.
Conclusions
• Client-side vulnerabilities were confirmed in remote control services for
which other vulnerabilities have been reported recently.
• However, most of the apps did not have the above implementation errors.
• Most apps have been easy to analyze because they are not
obfuscated.
50
The results of this report apply to only Android apps.
Even if the client app is secure, if the server or vehicle is vulnerable, then
attackers will target those vulnerable points.
Services like remote control have the potential of being scaled to monitoring of
many vehicles at the same time for autonomous cars.
Therefore, we need to consider the security of the system as a whole, not only
the individual apps and vehicles.
FFRI,Inc.
Future Work
• Continue the analysis…
– We have not yet finished analyzing all of the vulnerability risks
detected by AndroBugs.
• This investigation did not cover all of the available apps.
– We also want to investigate other apps that were outside of the
scope of this investigation.
• Our investigation scope at this time was only Android apps.
– We also want to investigate server/vehicle-side applications if we
have a chance.
51
FFRI,Inc.
Thank you!
52

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irjet
Unified application security analyser
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Enable best-of-breed security testing for enterprise, web and mobile applications • Facilitate application security testing for your customers at the appropriate stage of their development lifecycle • Identify security vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS) • Automate correlation of static, dynamic and interactive application security testing results • Deliver detailed reporting to your customers that summarise security vulnerabilities, assesses potential risk and offers remediation tactics

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[CB16] Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for Automobiles by Naohide Waguri

  • 1. FFRI,Inc. 1 Security in the IoT World: Analyzing the Security of Mobile Apps for Automobiles Naohide Waguri FFRI, Inc. waguri@ffri.jp October 21, 2016 CODE BLUE 2016
  • 2. FFRI,Inc. Who am I? • I previously worked as a network engineer. (Software QA, Software Developer) • My current job is investigating and researching automotive security. • I talked about Windows 10 IoT Core at CODE BLUE 2015. • I build CAN transceivers and diagnostic tools as a hobby. (to repair my cars… ) 2
  • 3. FFRI,Inc. Internet of Things (IoT) • Several years have passed since use of this term started. • A wide variety of devices are now connected to the Internet. • The growth rate is particularly high in sectors related to human life, such as the automotive, industrial, and medical sectors. 3 総務省 平成27年度版 情報通信白書より抜粋 (出展) IHS Technology
  • 4. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks on automobiles. 4 Message injection to (CAN) buses Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the Internet
  • 5. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks on automobiles. 5 Message injection to (CAN) buses Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the Internet We will talk about this entry point. But…
  • 6. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks on automobiles. 6 Message injection to (CAN) buses Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the Internet We will talk about this entry point. But… First of all
  • 7. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks on automobiles. 7 Message injection to (CAN) buses Abusing vulnerabilities in the systems (or devices) that connected to the Internet We will talk about this entry point… But, We will talk A LITTLE about this entry point.
  • 8. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • In most cases, the target of this entry point is a diagnostic port. • Now, diagnostic ports are also used for various applications other than maintenance. 8 Message injection to (CAN) buses For example, owners intentionally connect the OBD-II dongle to vehicles. They need to pay attention before connecting a dongle to their vehicle because the security level of the vehicle decreases if the device is vulnerable or malicious. We recommend the use of devices from reliable manufactures and developers.
  • 9. FFRI,Inc. For example, owners intentionally connect the OBD-II dongle to vehicles. They need to pay attention before connecting a dongle to their vehicle because the security level of the vehicle decreases if the device is vulnerable or malicious. We recommend the use of devices from reliable manufactures and developers. Current State of Automotive Security 9 バス上に追加されたデバイスからのメッセージ(インジェクション) I disassembled an OBD-II dongle sold at popular online shops and auctions. I found that it was a FAKE because it was using a microcontroller different from the item description… Also, the Bluetooth PIN cannot be changed… The threat classification can change from “Physical” to “Adjacent” if a vulnerable or malicious dongle is connected. ELM327 PIC18 
  • 10. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • There are two entry points for researching and investigating attacks on automobiles. 10 Message injection to (CAN) buses Exploiting vulnerabilities in systems (or devices) connected to the Internet Here is the main subject!
  • 11. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • The most famous case of a threat to a connected car… 11 Source: https://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/150701_car_hackers_43-vscocam-photo-1.jpg
  • 12. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security • A recent case… 12 Source: http://keenlab.tencent.com/en/2016/09/19/Keen-Security-Lab-of-Tencent-Car-Hacking-Research-Remote-Attack-to-Tesla-Cars/
  • 13. FFRI,Inc. Current State of Automotive Security 13 2015 2016 Aug Oct Feb Jun Source: Samy Kamkar, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3olXUbS-prU Drive It Like You Hacked It: New Attacks And Tools to Wirelessly Steal Cars, DEFCON 23 Source: Jianhao Liu, Jason Yan, https://www.syscan360.org/en/archives/, Car Hacking: Witness Theory to Scary and Recover From Scare, SyScan360 2015 Source: Pen Test Partners LLP, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSioTiaX_-Q Source: Troy Hunt, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt33m7G_42Q
  • 14. FFRI,Inc. Motivation • Vulnerabilities in systems where an "automobile is part of the IoT" have been reported, one after another, from 2015 and beyond. • These threats are not as serious as the “Jeep Hack” vulnerability, but… ・ Personal Information is stolen by attackers. ・ Vehicle position and travel history are stolen by attackers. ・ Doors are unlocked by attackers, allowing vandalism of cars. These are threats to the (information) assets of the vehicle owner. 14
  • 15. FFRI,Inc. Vehicle Motivation 15 Mobile Apps Web Browser ECU Remote Service Web Server DB Machine Boundary Internet Boundary Internet Boundary BlackBox BlackBox The system on the other side of the Internet boundary is basically a black box because each OEM uses its own unique system. Furthermore, we should not attempt penetration testing via a web browser because it could be deemed a cyber-attack if attempted without permission.
  • 16. FFRI,Inc. Web Browser Vehicle Motivation 16 Mobile Apps ECU Remote Service Web Server DB Machine Boundary Internet Boundary Internet Boundary Blackbox BlackBox This approach is possible but highly challenging. I would need vehicles and subscriptions to remote control services in order to analyze the communication between the vehicle and system. (Also, we need to purchase the remote control service in most cases.)
  • 17. FFRI,Inc. Web Browser Vehicle Motivation 17 Mobile Apps ECU Remote Service Web Server DB Machine Boundary Internet Boundary Internet Boundary BlackBox BlackBox Apps can be easily obtained. (This is also true from the standpoint of the attacker.) Among the entities that make up the service, this is likely to be the cause of a vulnerability.
  • 18. FFRI,Inc. Investigation Target and Goal 18 Phase 0: Collect apps that integrate with the services provided by each OEM. Phase 1: Create a report on each app using AndroBugs.
  • 19. FFRI,Inc. • A system that helps find actual security vulnerabilities in Android Apps. • Open source and written in Python. • A static analysis tool that consumes Android APK (no source code). • Scan for “known common coding vulnerabilities” • Designed for massive analysis and to efficiently finding bugs. • You can easily extend new features or vulnerability vectors. What is AndroBugs? • AndroBugs is a vulnerability scanner for Android apps that was presented at Black Hat EUROPE 2015 by Mr. Yu-Cheng Lin. 19 Source: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Lin-Androbugs-Framework-An-Android-Application-Security-Vulnerability-Scanner.pdf
  • 20. FFRI,Inc. Investigation Target and Goal 20 Phase 2: Analyze the analysis reports for each app. Understand the security level of apps provided by OEMs and consider necessary corrective measures. Phase 0: Collect apps that integrate with the services provided by each OEM. Phase 1: Create a report for each app using AndroBugs.
  • 21. FFRI,Inc. Typical Risks in Mobile Apps 21 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication M4 – Insecure Authentication M5 – Insufficient Cryptography M6 – Insecure Authorization M7 – Client Code Quality M8 – Code Tampering M9 – Reverse Engineering M10 – Extraneous Functionality Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10 OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks (2016 RC)
  • 22. FFRI,Inc. Vulnerabilities in Investigation Targets 22 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication M4 – Insecure Authentication M5 – Insufficient Cryptography M6 – Insecure Authorization M7 – Client Code Quality M8 – Code Tampering M9 – Reverse Engineering M10 – Extraneous Functionality Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10 OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks (2016 RC)
  • 23. FFRI,Inc. Overview: M1 – Improper Platform Usage 23 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Platform security controls are improperly used, such as the scope of public activities or fragment activity handling. Example: The app will crash with a security exception if fragment injection occurs because the activity class that inherits from PreferenceActivity does not override isValidFragment().
  • 24. FFRI,Inc. Platform security controls are improperly used, such as the scope of public activities or fragment activity handling. Example: The app will crash with a security exception if fragment injection occurs because the activity class that inherits from PreferenceActivity does not override isValidFragment(). Overview: M1 – Improper Platform Usage 24 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Among the three vulnerability risks, this was detected second-most by AndroBugs. However, the results of our investigation did not find any vulnerabilities.
  • 25. FFRI,Inc. Overview: M2 – Insecure Data Storage 25 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Sensitive data is handled insecurely by saving it to external storage, outputting it to logs, etc. Examples: Outputting transmission data that contains sensitive information to the debug log. Using MODE_WORLD_READABLE/WRITABLE to enable access from other apps when getting the instance of SharedPreference.
  • 26. FFRI,Inc. Sensitive data is handled insecurely by saving it to external storage, outputting it to logs, etc. Examples: Outputting transmission data that contains sensitive information to the debug log. Using MODE_WORLD_READABLE/WRITABLE to enable access from other apps when getting the instance of SharedPreference. Overview: M2 – Insecure Data Storage 26 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Among the three vulnerability risks, this was the least detected by AndroBugs. And the results of our investigation did not find any vulnerabilities.
  • 27. FFRI,Inc. Overview: M3 – Insecure Communication 27 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are allowed because SSL communication is implemented incorrectly. Many cases have been reported where verification of the server certificate is skipped. Examples: Skip hostname verification. Implement a custom (empty) trustmanager in order to skip certificate validation.
  • 28. FFRI,Inc. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are allowed because SSL communication is implemented incorrectly. Many cases have been reported where verification of the server certificate is skipped. Examples: Skip hostname verification. Implement a custom (empty) TrustManager in order to skip certificate validation. Overview: M3 – Insecure Communication 28 M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication Among the three of vulnerabilities risk, this was the most detected by AndroBugs. In addition, we confirmed actually vulnerable apps.
  • 29. FFRI,Inc. Vulnerabilities Found? YES! But I cannot disclose the app name…  29 It is an extremely common vulnerability in the implementation of SSL/TLS communication.
  • 30. FFRI,Inc. Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 1: HTTP communication that contains user information • One activity loads an HTTP URL into WebView. • The URL posts user information to the server in clear text. • The other URLs on the same host use HTTPS. So, this might be based on some policy, but… 30
  • 31. FFRI,Inc. 31 Others are using HTTPS. (All the same host) But this is using HTTP… Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 1: HTTP communication that contains user information
  • 32. FFRI,Inc. Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw 32 Sources: https://www.ipa.go.jp/about/press/20140919_1.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/582497
  • 33. FFRI,Inc. 33 What kind of vulnerability is a server certificate validation flaw? And what kind of risk does it pose? Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
  • 34. FFRI,Inc. 34 脆 弱 Install the vulnerable app from Google Play or the App Store Legitimate server Replace certificate The app will encrypt communication with a fake certificate if certificate is not validated. Decrypt and eavesdrop, manipulate Encrypted again using valid certificate. Malicious Wi-Fi router The communication may contain sensitive information because it is assumed to be encrypted. It could be sent to a fake URL in order to steal further information. Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
  • 35. FFRI,Inc. • Hostname verification is skipped because ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER is used. • Certificate verification is skipped because a custom (empty) TrustManager is used. • WebView displays the page even if it is malicious because of SslErrorHandler.proceed() in certificate verification. 35 Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
  • 36. FFRI,Inc. 36 Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
  • 37. FFRI,Inc. 37 • This vulnerability poses the risk that the user ID and password are intercepted when the user logs into the service using the app. Example of Vulnerabilities Found Case 2: Server certificate validation flaw
  • 38. FFRI,Inc. Summary of risks of the app in which vulnerabilities were found 38 Theft of personal information (name, address, etc.) Theft of vehicle information (GPS, etc.) If the communication is intercepted when the user registersPossibility of eavesdropping (login or registration) Account hijacking (spoofing) Send any message (e.g., replay attack) Uninvestigated message specification Vehicle theft Possibility of further attacks and damage (e.g., vandalism) Vehicle control hijacking (unlock doors, etc.)
  • 39. FFRI,Inc. Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps • Why did these vulnerabilities occur? 39 Debugging code in the release build Sample code copy & pasted (some might say “appropriated”) from the Internet Bad specifications (Lack of understanding of secure design and coding)
  • 40. FFRI,Inc. • There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated. 40 (出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版 http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication Implement appropriate exception handling for SSLException (e.g., user notification) Do not implement a custom TrustManager Do not implement a custom HostnameVerifier Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps
  • 41. FFRI,Inc. Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLExceptiopn (For example, such as user notification) Do not implement custom TrustManager Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier • There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated. 41 (出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版 http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf What is sensitive information? We need to understand the system and user information that must be protected in advance. Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps
  • 42. FFRI,Inc. Use the HTTPS communication if it contains sensitive information Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLExceptiopn (For example, such as user notification) Do not implement custom TrustManager Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier • There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated. 42 (出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版 http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf Vulnerable processing of incoming data may be targeted by attackers. We need to perform fuzz testing. Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps
  • 43. FFRI,Inc. Use the HTTPS communication if it contains sensitive information Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication Implement the appropriate exception handling for SSLException (e.g., user notification) Do not implement custom TrustManager Do not implement custom HostnameVerifier • There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated. 43 (出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版 http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf Caused by certificate error Necessary to consider the behavior for each feature specification Exception occurs if there is a certificate error → There may be an MITM attack in progress Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps
  • 44. FFRI,Inc. Use HTTPS communication when sending sensitive information Verify the safety of the received data if it uses HTTP communication Implement the appropriate exception handling to SSLException (e.g., user notification) Do not implement a custom TrustManager Do not implement a custom HostnameVerifier • There are various vulnerabilities and enabling factors in Android. We will introduce implementation rules for HTTP/HTTPS communication to prevent the vulnerability found in the app we investigated. 44 (出展)Androidアプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド 2016年9月1日版 http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf Use the private CA root certificate to validate the server certificate if you are using a private certificate. Do not do this to skip certificate validation even if you are debugging. Corrective Measures and Considerations for Vulnerable Apps
  • 45. FFRI,Inc. 45 ・If you are going to develop an Android app… ・If you want to know other rules for Android apps… ・If you have not read these yet… Android アプリのセキュア設計・セキュアコーディングガイド (http://www.jssec.org/dl/android_securecoding.pdf) Check it out and give it a try! (Sorry, this is Japanese only.)
  • 46. FFRI,Inc. Summary: Scan Reports • Not all positive scan results are true vulnerabilities because AndroBugs reports common vulnerabilities mechanically. • AndroBugs detects many SSL security alerts because most risk factors arise from apps using HTTP communication. • We created a web-based custom scan report for each app by using the reports output by AndroBugs. 46
  • 47. FFRI,Inc. Summary: Scan Reports 47 Scan report sample We investigated critical vulnerability risks
  • 48. FFRI,Inc. Summary: Scan Reports 48 App Author Remote Control Feature No. of Critical Vulnerabiltiy Risks M1 – Improper Platform Usage M2 – Insecure Data Storage M3 – Insecure Communication A Yes 11 5 1 5 B No 5 3 1 1 C No 5 2 1 2 D No 5 2 1 2 E Yes 4 0 0 4 F Yes 4 1 1 2 G Yes 3 0 0 3 H Yes 2 1 0 1 I Partial 1 0 0 1 J Yes 1 0 0 1 K Partial 0 0 0 0
  • 49. FFRI,Inc. Summary: Possibility of Exploits in the Future 49 App Author Note A We confirmed there are exploitable vulnerabilities. There is a risk of MITM attacks. Classes that inherit from PreferenceActivity do not implement isValidFragment(). The app might crash due to fragment injection if the class becomes a public activity. B We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. C We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. D We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. Analysis will take a long time because the app was obfuscated. E We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. This app crashes as part of an activity because it does not support the new permission model starting from Android M. F We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. Analysis will take a long time because the app was obfuscated. G We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. H We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. I We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. J We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app. K We could not find any exploitable vulnerabilities in this app.
  • 50. FFRI,Inc. Conclusions • Client-side vulnerabilities were confirmed in remote control services for which other vulnerabilities have been reported recently. • However, most of the apps did not have the above implementation errors. • Most apps have been easy to analyze because they are not obfuscated. 50 The results of this report apply to only Android apps. Even if the client app is secure, if the server or vehicle is vulnerable, then attackers will target those vulnerable points. Services like remote control have the potential of being scaled to monitoring of many vehicles at the same time for autonomous cars. Therefore, we need to consider the security of the system as a whole, not only the individual apps and vehicles.
  • 51. FFRI,Inc. Future Work • Continue the analysis… – We have not yet finished analyzing all of the vulnerability risks detected by AndroBugs. • This investigation did not cover all of the available apps. – We also want to investigate other apps that were outside of the scope of this investigation. • Our investigation scope at this time was only Android apps. – We also want to investigate server/vehicle-side applications if we have a chance. 51

Editor's Notes

  1. 07/16/96