SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Tracking the entire
iceberg
- long-term APT malware C2
protocol emulation and scanning
Who am I?
@cci_forensics
Past Research
CB 2022
Motivation
Overview
CB 2022

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Slides for a college course based on "Incident Response & Computer Forensics, Third Edition" by by Jason Luttgens, Matthew Pepe, and Kevin Mandia". Ch 1: Real-World Incidents Teacher: Sam Bowne Website: https://samsclass.info/121/121_F16.shtml

securityhackingincident response
Target
Summary
Winnti 4.0 ShadowPad
Prevalence Low High
First-observed
year
2016 (start-up
sequence),
2018 (new C2
protocol)
2015
Scanning start
year
2019 2021
Supported
protocols
TCP/TLS/HTTP(S)/
UDP
TCP/SSL/HTTP(S)/
UDP/DNS
Unique feature Server-mode Multiple protocol
listening at a single
port
Winnti 4.0
CB 2022
Winnti Malware
Kaspersky
Novetta
CB 2022
Winnti Malware 4.0
Macnica Networks
version 4.0
CB 2022
Version 3.0 Version 4.0
Initial component Dropper Loader and DAT file
Initial encryption
algorithm
DES AES
Initial encryption key
cracking
Easy Hard
Worker encryption 1-byte XOR and nibble swap DPAPI or AES with host-
specific key

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A Threat Hunter Himself
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This document discusses Nationwide's experience using threat intelligence to focus their MITRE ATT&CK activities. Their initial broad approach analyzing 240+ techniques at once was unsuccessful. They then prioritized techniques based on threats to the financial sector. This focused their efforts on the 27 most relevant threat actors and the 100+ techniques associated with them. They mapped techniques to the ATT&CK matrix and conducted intelligence research. This intelligence-led approach improved their security posture understanding and enabled prioritized, actionable recommendations. The process is ongoing to constantly evolve their defenses based on the latest intelligence.

mitreinfosecatt&ck
Winnti Malware 4.0 (Cont.)
CB 2022
struct struc_work_config {
char campaignID[64];
char MAC_addr[6];
int c2_proto; // enum_proto
...
}
enum enum_proto {
none = 0x0,
TCP = 0x1,
HTTP = 0x2,
HTTPS = 0x3,
TLS = 0x4,
UDP = 0x5,
};
C2 Protocol
CB 2022
Packet Format
CB 2022
struct struc_custom_header
{
__int16 temp_key_seed;
__int16 unk_word; // initial value is 2
__int16 signature; // 0x45DB
int payload_len;
};
struct struc_custom_payload_init
{
int payload_type; //
request:0xEE775BAA/0x4563CEFA/0x5633CBAD,
response:0xFACEB007/0x5633CBAD
int unk_dword; // request:0,
response:0xC350/0xC352
GUID guid;
char null_bytes[14];
__int16 seq_num; // starting from 1
__int16 null_word;
};
Encryption
AppCall
CB 2022

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HTTP Protocol
CB 2022 Customized packet
Customized packet size
HTTP: Size Calculation from Cookie
Value
CB 2022
$ python validate_cookie.py 640ABEFB16D2CE36E7E83E1B8BEF31B2500ABEFB
dw0=0xfbbe0a64, dw1=0x36ced216, dw2=0x1b3ee8e7, dw3=0xb231ef8b, dw4=0xfbbe0a50
The cookie value validated. dword key = 0x34
HTTP: Dummy Data in GET Request
CB 2022
Size = 0
Size = 0
Behavior After the Initial Handshake
CB 2022
struct struc_nested_payload // at least 0x14 bytes
{
// e.g., cmd_ID=5 & dispatch_ID=1 order to send victim info
__int16 cmd_ID;
__int16 dispatch_ID;
...
int additional_data_len;
struc_data_cmd1 additional_data; // flexible size
};
struct struc_custom_payload_next
{
__int16 messageID;
...
__int16 signature; // 0x45db
int nested_payload_len;
struc_nested_payload nested_payload;
};

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incident responseir
Scanner Implementation
CB 2022
ZMap
• Internet-wide port scan
• TCP 443 & 80
• UDP 443 & 53 (customized
packet required)
Stand-alone
Python
Script
• HTTP(S): Decode and
Validate Cookie value
• Others: Get suspicious
responses with the same
size and different key
IDAPython
AppCall
• Decrypt response’s
customized packet
• Validate signature
and payload size in
the header
How to Differentiate Server-mode
Infections and C2 Servers
[DEBUG] server header: unknown word = 0x2, header signature = 0x45db, payload length = 0x2a
[*] server payload: payload type = 0xfaceb007, unknown dword = 0xc352, GUID = 0b8212dc-
e364-4c18-ac0b-26382beb1387, sequence number = 2
[DEBUG] server header: unknown word = 0x2, header signature = 0x45db, payload length = 0x2a
[*] server payload: payload type = 0xfaceb007, unknown dword = 0x0, GUID = 00000000-0000-
0000-0000-000000000000, sequence number = 1
Server-mode: the same GUID as client, sequence number incremented
C2: null GUID, sequence number reset
CB 2022
Result: Population by Protocol
CB 2022
TLS
35%
HTTPS
29%
HTTP
20%
TCP
11%
UDP
5%
TLS HTTPS HTTP TCP UDP
0
5
10
15
20
25
D
e
c
-
1
9
F
e
b
-
2
0
A
p
r
-
2
0
J
u
n
-
2
0
A
u
g
-
2
0
O
c
t
-
2
0
D
e
c
-
2
0
F
e
b
-
2
1
A
p
r
-
2
1
J
u
n
-
2
1
A
u
g
-
2
1
O
c
t
-
2
1
D
e
c
-
2
1
F
e
b
-
2
2
A
p
r
-
2
2
J
u
n
-
2
2
A
u
g
-
2
2
number
of
active
C2s
period
Result: Change in Number of Active C2s
CB 2022
1st
disclosure
2nd
disclosure

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Public Reports Related to Winnti 4.0
C2s
Trellix
Recorded Future
CB 2022
ShadowPad
CB 2022
ShadowPad Malware
SentinelOne
CB 2022
C2 Protocol
TCP HTTP(S)/UDP
Key size 4 2
Header size 0x14 8
Payload size in the initial
handshake packet
Up to 0x3F HTTP(S): Up to 0x1F,
UDP: 0x10
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red teamoffensive securityinformation security
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cyber threat intelligencethreatintelligence
IPAddressing .pptx
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C2 Protocol (Cont.)
CB 2022
Variant name C2 protocol Config size Attribution Source
Variant1
(aka ScatterBee)
TCP/UDP 0x896 APT41 Positive
Technologies
Variant2 HTTP(S) 0x85C Tonto Team ESET
Variant3 HTTP(S) 0x85C unknown Positive
Technologies
TCP Protocol
QuickLZ
CB 2022
struct struc_common_header
{
int session_key;
int plugin_and_cmd_id; // plugin_id (0x68) << 16 + cmd_id (0x51) byVariant1
int module_code; // 0
int payload_size_compressed; // QuickLZ
int payload_size_original;
};
TCP Protocol (Cont.)
Dr.WEB
white paper
CB 2022
HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols
CB 2022
struct struc_proto_header
{
__int16 session_key;
__int16 type; // 0 in HTTP, req=0x1001/res=(0x2002|0x5005) in UDP
__int16 session_src_id; // random 2 bytes, generated by both client/server
__int16 session_dst_id; // req=0, res=client's session_src_id
};

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embedded linuxraspberrypii2c
HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols (Cont.)
CB 2022
UDP packet encoding byVariant1
HTTP(S) packet encoding byVariant2
HTTP(S) packet encoding byVariant3
HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols (Cont.)
CB 2022
struc_proto_header
payload = TCP packet
struc_common_header
QuickLZ-compressed
payload
Scanner Implementation
CB 2022
Scanning start period Target protocol/port/variant
September 2021 HTTP/443 (Variant2 &Variant3)
October 2021 TCP/443 & UDP/53 (Variant1)
June 2022 UDP/443 (Variant1), HTTP/80 (Variant3)
Scanner Implementation (Cont.)
CB 2022
ZMap • Internet-wide port scan
• Targets as mentioned previously
Stand-alone
Python
Script
• Decode the response packet
• Validate the decoded values
• TCP: payload size fields
• HTTP(S)/UDP: type and
session_dst_id

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networkingopentalkmulticast
Stu t17 a
Stu t17 aStu t17 a
Stu t17 a

The document discusses security issues related to connected devices in homes and organizations. It provides results from scanning various devices on home and work networks, including details on open ports and services. It finds issues like outdated protocols, self-signed certificates, and lack of encryption on some devices. It notes that many administrators and users are unaware of vulnerabilities in connected devices. It recommends steps administrators and developers can take to improve device security, such as applying patches, network segmentation, monitoring traffic, using encryption, and penetration testing.

Nessus scan report using the defualt scan policy - Tareq Hanaysha
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The Nessus scan report summarizes the results of a vulnerability scan performed on a Windows Vista system. The scan found 20 open ports, with 46 low, 8 medium and no high severity issues. Common services like MySQL, HTTP, and SMB were identified. The operating system was determined to be Windows Vista Home and the host name was tareq-laptop. Detailed information is provided about issues found on specific ports including unknown services, web servers, and NetBIOS information retrieved from the host.

nessus vulnerability scan by tareq hanaysha
Multiple Protocol Listening at a Single
Port
CB 2022
[*] config size = 0x85c
..
[+] C2 Entry 0 (offset 0xbc): 'HTTPS://wwa1we.wbew.amazon-corp.wikaba.com:443'
[+] C2 Entry 1 (offset 0xed): 'HTTP://wwa1we.wbew.amazon-corp.wikaba.com:443'
..
SHA256: d011130defd8b988ab78043b30a9f7e0cada5751064b3975a19f4de92d2c0025
Hostname/port matched
Multiple Protocol Listening at a Single
Port (Cont.)
CB 2022
$ ./c2fs.py -d -l corpus/query.txt -p 443 -f sp httpVariant2
..
[*] malware options: family = ShadowPad; targeted protocol = http (version =Variant2)
[*] ShadowPad specific options: version =Variant2; key size = 2; key endian = big; header size = 0x8; header
type = 0x0; client session ID = 53978
[D] POST: http://137.220.185.203:443/ (proxy={}, stream=True, timeout=30)
[+] 137.220.185.203,active,client session ID matched (type=0x0)
..
$ ./c2fs.py -d -l corpus/query.txt -p 443 -f sp httpsVariant2
..
[*] malware options: family = ShadowPad; targeted protocol = https (version =Variant2)
[*] ShadowPad specific options: version =Variant2; key size = 2; key endian = big; header size = 0x8; header
type = 0x0; client session ID = 52256
[D] POST: https://137.220.185.203:443/ (proxy={}, stream=True, timeout=30)
[+] 137.220.185.203,active,client session ID matched (type=0x0)
Result: Population by Variant
CB 2022
Variant1
48%
Variant3
42%
Variant2
10%
Variant1 Variant3 Variant2
0
5
10
15
20
25
S
e
p
-
2
1
O
c
t
-
2
1
N
o
v
-
2
1
D
e
c
-
2
1
J
a
n
-
2
2
F
e
b
-
2
2
M
a
r
-
2
2
A
p
r
-
2
2
M
a
y
-
2
2
J
u
n
-
2
2
J
u
l
-
2
2
A
u
g
-
2
2
S
e
p
-
2
2
number
of
active
C2s
period
Result: Change in Number of Active C2s
CB 2022
System
issue
New
variant?

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cisco
05 module managing your network enviornment
05  module managing your network enviornment05  module managing your network enviornment
05 module managing your network enviornment

Upon reading the document, the key steps in a router's start-up process can be summarized as follows: 1. When power is applied, the router performs a power-on self-test and loads the bootstrap code from ROM to initialize hardware and find the IOS image. 2. The IOS image is then loaded from flash memory or another source such as TFTP into RAM where it is decompressed and executed. 3. The startup configuration is loaded, typically from NVRAM. If no configuration is present, the router enters setup mode to configure initial settings.

 
by Asif
Samples Communicating with C2 IPs
CB 2022
Sample Malware
family
C2 IP address C2
Protocol/Port
used by sample
Sample
submission
date on VT
C2 first-seen
date by
scanner
C2 last-seen
date by
scanner
Spyder 156.240.104.149 TLS/443 2021/10/26 2021/10/16 2021/10/16
ReverseWindow 43.129.188.223 TCP/10333 2022/02/27 2021/10/17 2022/10/04
ShadowPad 213.59.118.124 UDP/443 2022/03/20 2022/03/06 2022/09/27
Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Code Similarity
CB 2022
Spyder Winnti 4.0 Worker
Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Command IDs
CB 2022
Command Spyder Winnti 4.0Worker
tag id cmd_ID dispatch_ID
Verify the client 1 1 1 1
Send victim information 5 3 5 1
Send plugins information 6 1 6 9 or 13
Save plugin parameters 6 2 6 2
Save plugin data 6 3 6 3
Load and run plugin entrypoint and
export function #1
6 4 6 6
Run plugin export function #4 and
unload the plugin
6 5 6 7
Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Command IDs (Cont.)
CB 2022
Command Spyder Winnti 4.0Worker
tag id cmd_ID dispatch_ID
Heartbeat 6 6 6 8
Run plugin export function #2 6 7 6 10
Run plugin export function #3 6 8 6 11
Send current connection information 7 2 - (no
command)
-
Run function pointer of the 2nd
parameter obtained by running
export function #1
11 - 11 -

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The report considers practical aspects of reliability of existing systems allowing authentication of photographic evidence originality. The reporter examines a vulnerability in the Canon Original Data Security system of image authenticity verification, which was designed to authenticate originality of images captured by the Canon digital reflex still cameras.

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Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Comparison
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Server-mode support No Yes
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CB 2022
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CB 2022
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CB 2022
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CB 2022
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CB 2022
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It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.

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Printer has become one of the essential devices in the corporate intranet for the past few years, and its functionalities have also increased significantly. Not only print or fax, cloud printing services like AirPrint are also being supported as well to make it easier to use. Direct printing from mobile devices is now a basic requirement in the IoT era. We also use it to print some internal business documents of the company, which makes it even more important to keep the printer safe. Nowadays, most of the printers on the market do not have to be connected with USB or traditional cable. As long as you are using a LAN cable connected to the intranet, the computer can find and use the printer immediately. Most of them are based on protocols such as SLP and LLMNR. But is it really safe when vendors adopt those protocols? Furthermore, many printers do not use traditional Linux systems, but use RTOS(Real-Time Operating System) instead, how will this affect the attacker? In this talk, we will use Canon ImageCLASS MF644Cdw and HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M283fdw as case study, showing how to analyze and gain control access to the printer. We will also demonstrate how to use the vulnerabilities to achieve RCE in RTOS in unauthenticated situations.

Research Publication Demerits:
Developer’s Reaction
CB 2022
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in Jul 2022
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While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.

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ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

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Acknowledgement
CB 2022
Indicators of Compromise
CB 2022
Indicator Type Context
0a3279bb86ff0de24c2a4b646f24ffa196ee639cc23c64a
044e20f50b93bda21
SHA256 Winnti 4.0 dat file
03b7b511716c074e9f6ef37318638337fd7449897be99
9505d4a3219572829b4
SHA256 ShadowPad Variant1
aef610b66b9efd1fa916a38f8ffea8b988c20c5deebf4db8
3b6be63f7ada2cc0
SHA256 ShadowPad Variant2
d011130defd8b988ab78043b30a9f7e0cada5751064b3
975a19f4de92d2c0025
SHA256 ShadowPad Variant3
1ded9878f8680e1d91354cbb5ad8a6960efd6ddca2da1
57eb4c1ef0f0430fd5f
SHA256 Spyder communicating with the
ShadowPad C2 (156.240.104.149)
536def339fefa0c259cf34f809393322cdece06fc4f2b37f
06136375b073dff3
SHA256 ReverseWindow communicating
with the ShadowPad C2
(43.129.188.223)
9447b75af497e5a7f99f1ded1c1d87c53b5b59fce224a3
25932ad55eef9e0e4a
SHA256 ShadowPad Variant1
communicating with the
ShadowPad C2 (213.59.118.124)
Questions?
CB 2022

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[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulation and Scanning by Takahiro Haruyama

  • 1. Tracking the entire iceberg - long-term APT malware C2 protocol emulation and scanning
  • 2. Who am I? @cci_forensics Past Research CB 2022
  • 5. Target Summary Winnti 4.0 ShadowPad Prevalence Low High First-observed year 2016 (start-up sequence), 2018 (new C2 protocol) 2015 Scanning start year 2019 2021 Supported protocols TCP/TLS/HTTP(S)/ UDP TCP/SSL/HTTP(S)/ UDP/DNS Unique feature Server-mode Multiple protocol listening at a single port
  • 8. Winnti Malware 4.0 Macnica Networks version 4.0 CB 2022 Version 3.0 Version 4.0 Initial component Dropper Loader and DAT file Initial encryption algorithm DES AES Initial encryption key cracking Easy Hard Worker encryption 1-byte XOR and nibble swap DPAPI or AES with host- specific key
  • 9. Winnti Malware 4.0 (Cont.) CB 2022 struct struc_work_config { char campaignID[64]; char MAC_addr[6]; int c2_proto; // enum_proto ... } enum enum_proto { none = 0x0, TCP = 0x1, HTTP = 0x2, HTTPS = 0x3, TLS = 0x4, UDP = 0x5, };
  • 11. Packet Format CB 2022 struct struc_custom_header { __int16 temp_key_seed; __int16 unk_word; // initial value is 2 __int16 signature; // 0x45DB int payload_len; }; struct struc_custom_payload_init { int payload_type; // request:0xEE775BAA/0x4563CEFA/0x5633CBAD, response:0xFACEB007/0x5633CBAD int unk_dword; // request:0, response:0xC350/0xC352 GUID guid; char null_bytes[14]; __int16 seq_num; // starting from 1 __int16 null_word; };
  • 13. HTTP Protocol CB 2022 Customized packet Customized packet size
  • 14. HTTP: Size Calculation from Cookie Value CB 2022 $ python validate_cookie.py 640ABEFB16D2CE36E7E83E1B8BEF31B2500ABEFB dw0=0xfbbe0a64, dw1=0x36ced216, dw2=0x1b3ee8e7, dw3=0xb231ef8b, dw4=0xfbbe0a50 The cookie value validated. dword key = 0x34
  • 15. HTTP: Dummy Data in GET Request CB 2022 Size = 0 Size = 0
  • 16. Behavior After the Initial Handshake CB 2022 struct struc_nested_payload // at least 0x14 bytes { // e.g., cmd_ID=5 & dispatch_ID=1 order to send victim info __int16 cmd_ID; __int16 dispatch_ID; ... int additional_data_len; struc_data_cmd1 additional_data; // flexible size }; struct struc_custom_payload_next { __int16 messageID; ... __int16 signature; // 0x45db int nested_payload_len; struc_nested_payload nested_payload; };
  • 17. Scanner Implementation CB 2022 ZMap • Internet-wide port scan • TCP 443 & 80 • UDP 443 & 53 (customized packet required) Stand-alone Python Script • HTTP(S): Decode and Validate Cookie value • Others: Get suspicious responses with the same size and different key IDAPython AppCall • Decrypt response’s customized packet • Validate signature and payload size in the header
  • 18. How to Differentiate Server-mode Infections and C2 Servers [DEBUG] server header: unknown word = 0x2, header signature = 0x45db, payload length = 0x2a [*] server payload: payload type = 0xfaceb007, unknown dword = 0xc352, GUID = 0b8212dc- e364-4c18-ac0b-26382beb1387, sequence number = 2 [DEBUG] server header: unknown word = 0x2, header signature = 0x45db, payload length = 0x2a [*] server payload: payload type = 0xfaceb007, unknown dword = 0x0, GUID = 00000000-0000- 0000-0000-000000000000, sequence number = 1 Server-mode: the same GUID as client, sequence number incremented C2: null GUID, sequence number reset CB 2022
  • 19. Result: Population by Protocol CB 2022 TLS 35% HTTPS 29% HTTP 20% TCP 11% UDP 5% TLS HTTPS HTTP TCP UDP
  • 21. Public Reports Related to Winnti 4.0 C2s Trellix Recorded Future CB 2022
  • 24. C2 Protocol TCP HTTP(S)/UDP Key size 4 2 Header size 0x14 8 Payload size in the initial handshake packet Up to 0x3F HTTP(S): Up to 0x1F, UDP: 0x10 CB 2022
  • 25. C2 Protocol (Cont.) CB 2022 Variant name C2 protocol Config size Attribution Source Variant1 (aka ScatterBee) TCP/UDP 0x896 APT41 Positive Technologies Variant2 HTTP(S) 0x85C Tonto Team ESET Variant3 HTTP(S) 0x85C unknown Positive Technologies
  • 26. TCP Protocol QuickLZ CB 2022 struct struc_common_header { int session_key; int plugin_and_cmd_id; // plugin_id (0x68) << 16 + cmd_id (0x51) byVariant1 int module_code; // 0 int payload_size_compressed; // QuickLZ int payload_size_original; };
  • 28. HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols CB 2022 struct struc_proto_header { __int16 session_key; __int16 type; // 0 in HTTP, req=0x1001/res=(0x2002|0x5005) in UDP __int16 session_src_id; // random 2 bytes, generated by both client/server __int16 session_dst_id; // req=0, res=client's session_src_id };
  • 29. HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols (Cont.) CB 2022 UDP packet encoding byVariant1 HTTP(S) packet encoding byVariant2 HTTP(S) packet encoding byVariant3
  • 30. HTTP(S) and UDP Protocols (Cont.) CB 2022 struc_proto_header payload = TCP packet struc_common_header QuickLZ-compressed payload
  • 31. Scanner Implementation CB 2022 Scanning start period Target protocol/port/variant September 2021 HTTP/443 (Variant2 &Variant3) October 2021 TCP/443 & UDP/53 (Variant1) June 2022 UDP/443 (Variant1), HTTP/80 (Variant3)
  • 32. Scanner Implementation (Cont.) CB 2022 ZMap • Internet-wide port scan • Targets as mentioned previously Stand-alone Python Script • Decode the response packet • Validate the decoded values • TCP: payload size fields • HTTP(S)/UDP: type and session_dst_id
  • 33. Multiple Protocol Listening at a Single Port CB 2022 [*] config size = 0x85c .. [+] C2 Entry 0 (offset 0xbc): 'HTTPS://wwa1we.wbew.amazon-corp.wikaba.com:443' [+] C2 Entry 1 (offset 0xed): 'HTTP://wwa1we.wbew.amazon-corp.wikaba.com:443' .. SHA256: d011130defd8b988ab78043b30a9f7e0cada5751064b3975a19f4de92d2c0025 Hostname/port matched
  • 34. Multiple Protocol Listening at a Single Port (Cont.) CB 2022 $ ./c2fs.py -d -l corpus/query.txt -p 443 -f sp httpVariant2 .. [*] malware options: family = ShadowPad; targeted protocol = http (version =Variant2) [*] ShadowPad specific options: version =Variant2; key size = 2; key endian = big; header size = 0x8; header type = 0x0; client session ID = 53978 [D] POST: http://137.220.185.203:443/ (proxy={}, stream=True, timeout=30) [+] 137.220.185.203,active,client session ID matched (type=0x0) .. $ ./c2fs.py -d -l corpus/query.txt -p 443 -f sp httpsVariant2 .. [*] malware options: family = ShadowPad; targeted protocol = https (version =Variant2) [*] ShadowPad specific options: version =Variant2; key size = 2; key endian = big; header size = 0x8; header type = 0x0; client session ID = 52256 [D] POST: https://137.220.185.203:443/ (proxy={}, stream=True, timeout=30) [+] 137.220.185.203,active,client session ID matched (type=0x0)
  • 35. Result: Population by Variant CB 2022 Variant1 48% Variant3 42% Variant2 10% Variant1 Variant3 Variant2
  • 37. Samples Communicating with C2 IPs CB 2022 Sample Malware family C2 IP address C2 Protocol/Port used by sample Sample submission date on VT C2 first-seen date by scanner C2 last-seen date by scanner Spyder 156.240.104.149 TLS/443 2021/10/26 2021/10/16 2021/10/16 ReverseWindow 43.129.188.223 TCP/10333 2022/02/27 2021/10/17 2022/10/04 ShadowPad 213.59.118.124 UDP/443 2022/03/20 2022/03/06 2022/09/27
  • 38. Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Code Similarity CB 2022 Spyder Winnti 4.0 Worker
  • 39. Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Command IDs CB 2022 Command Spyder Winnti 4.0Worker tag id cmd_ID dispatch_ID Verify the client 1 1 1 1 Send victim information 5 3 5 1 Send plugins information 6 1 6 9 or 13 Save plugin parameters 6 2 6 2 Save plugin data 6 3 6 3 Load and run plugin entrypoint and export function #1 6 4 6 6 Run plugin export function #4 and unload the plugin 6 5 6 7
  • 40. Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Command IDs (Cont.) CB 2022 Command Spyder Winnti 4.0Worker tag id cmd_ID dispatch_ID Heartbeat 6 6 6 8 Run plugin export function #2 6 7 6 10 Run plugin export function #3 6 8 6 11 Send current connection information 7 2 - (no command) - Run function pointer of the 2nd parameter obtained by running export function #1 11 - 11 -
  • 41. Spyder & Winnti 4.0: Comparison CB 2022 Spyder Winnti 4.0 Payload encoding / encryption single-byte XOR AES in CTR mode (key given as a cmdline argument) C2 Protocol TLS TCP/TLS/HTTP(S)/UDP Server-mode support No Yes 3rd-party library uthash, Mbed TLS uthash Reported year 2020 2019
  • 42. Incident Response Case Triggered by Discovered C2 CB 2022
  • 44. How to Get Input (Port Scan) Data scanning target ports CB 2022 ZMap Shodan CenSys TCP/10333 4,940,037 4 1,306 TCP/55555 3,199,856 86 486,497 Note: The data was collected in 2021/11
  • 45. Anonymization CB 2022 Tor Commercial VPN service Cost Free Non-free Supported protocols TCP TCP/UDP Risk of being blocked High Low
  • 48. Anti-Scanning Techniques: Cobalt Strike (Cont.) blocked CB 2022
  • 50. Pros and Cons of Research Publication in Cobalt Strike Case JSAC 2021 CB 2022
  • 51. Research Publication Merits: Stopping MS Azure domain fronting stated CB 2022 Source: Exposing Malware in Linux-Based Multi-Cloud Environments
  • 52. Research Publication Merits: Stopping Ongoing Attack Campaign CB 2022 Source: Exposing Malware in Linux-Based Multi-Cloud Environments
  • 54. Research Publication Demerits: Threat Actor’s Reaction APT41 CB 2022 Protocol/Port Stager-disabled/Total in Sep 2021 Stager-disabled/Total in Jul 2022 HTTP/80 217/559 (38%) 208/387 (53%) HTTPS/443 210/928 (22%) 206/431 (47%) DNS/53 46/150 (30%) 51/51 (100%) Change in the result of a single scan
  • 58. Indicators of Compromise CB 2022 Indicator Type Context 0a3279bb86ff0de24c2a4b646f24ffa196ee639cc23c64a 044e20f50b93bda21 SHA256 Winnti 4.0 dat file 03b7b511716c074e9f6ef37318638337fd7449897be99 9505d4a3219572829b4 SHA256 ShadowPad Variant1 aef610b66b9efd1fa916a38f8ffea8b988c20c5deebf4db8 3b6be63f7ada2cc0 SHA256 ShadowPad Variant2 d011130defd8b988ab78043b30a9f7e0cada5751064b3 975a19f4de92d2c0025 SHA256 ShadowPad Variant3 1ded9878f8680e1d91354cbb5ad8a6960efd6ddca2da1 57eb4c1ef0f0430fd5f SHA256 Spyder communicating with the ShadowPad C2 (156.240.104.149) 536def339fefa0c259cf34f809393322cdece06fc4f2b37f 06136375b073dff3 SHA256 ReverseWindow communicating with the ShadowPad C2 (43.129.188.223) 9447b75af497e5a7f99f1ded1c1d87c53b5b59fce224a3 25932ad55eef9e0e4a SHA256 ShadowPad Variant1 communicating with the ShadowPad C2 (213.59.118.124)