Cyber security for the smart grid, Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, USC
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- The smart grid extends power systems into homes and businesses, creating new security challenges as critical infrastructure connects to less secure networks. - We need accurate models of the smart grid that consider both cyber and physical pathways between components in order to understand vulnerabilities and identify security weaknesses across the integrated system. - A federated approach is needed to both secure the smart grid and model its complex interactions, as the system spans multiple organizations with critical and non-critical functions that must be isolated despite sharing physical infrastructure.
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Cyber security for the smart grid, Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, USC
- 1. Cyber Security for the Smart Grid Dr. Clifford Neuman Center for Computer Systems Security Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California Southern California Smart Grid Research Symposium USC, Los Angeles October 6, 2009
- 2. Evolution of the power distribution network Local power systems Interconnected More centralized control Automated reaction to events Reaching into the neighborhoods Encompassing the home Trends in Power Systems
- 3. Power systems span large geographic areas and multiple organizations. Such systems are naturally federated Avoiding cascading blackouts requires increasingly faster response in distant regions. Such response is dependent on network communication. Regulatory, oversight, and “operator” organizations exert control over what once were local management issues. Staged power alerts and rolling blackouts Even more players as the network extends to the home. Customers Information Providers Federation in Power Systems
- 4. Availability used to be the critical service for power control networks. The control network for interconnects was managed separately. Sole purpose was to exchange commands and information needed to keep the system functional. Integrity and confidentiality was provided through limited physical access. Traditional Security and the Smart Grid
- 5. The control network is increasingly dependent on other networks . The phone network today is implemented on digital networks. The network has connections to the open Internet. Data for billing & monitoring made available to others. Network Data Integrity can be maintained through encryption, but availability requires dedicated and/or redundant links. Information Integrity is affected by the number and nature of the parties involved It becomes an issue of trust and confidence. Traditional Security and the Smart Grid
- 6. As the smart grid moves into the home, confidentiality becomes important. Much inferred about customers by power consumption profile. Economic value to consumption data Information integrity becomes critical HAN components bridge the two networks. Appliances managed based on information from the Internet. Have an effect on power grid. Traditional Security and the Smart Grid Internet Interconnect Distribution Neighborhood HAN M
- 7. We need an accurate model for security in the smart grid in order to understand its vulnerabilities. A model allows us to simulate and emulate A model allows us to identify weaknesses. Today’s models are not accurate. Separate models for cyber and physical. Each model addresses only those threats we have already seen. Modeling Security in the Smart Grid
- 8. As a security problem, we need to model Smart Grid security using an adversarial model. Traditional security limits information and control flow within the cyber realm. For the Smart Grid we must model physical pathways. E.g. effects of tripping a breaker in one part of a system will have effects in another part, independent of the cyber communication between them. These causal relationships should be modeled as information and control channels. Procedures and processes in the physical realm convert information channels into control channels. Understanding Smart Grid Security
- 9. Domain and security experts should identify all classes of sensors, actuators, and potential measurement points in the system. Decide how each is associated with control and information channels. Identify the other parties on the channel. Identify security services needed for the channel. Confidentiality Integrity Availability / Performance Isolation Access Control Anomaly Detection / Intrusion Detection Trust Management Securing the Smart Grid
- 10. Automated response to detected voltage changes. We should model an associated control channel from those entities capable of causing voltage fluctuations. Home automation controller. This creates a control channel from the customer. The affect of such change in load must be considered and mitigated. Control channels to the customers computer now become part of the smart grid, even if the intent was to avoid dependence on the Internet. Some Examples
- 11. Dependence on unsecure web sites as control channels. End customer smart devices (including hybrid vehicles) will make decisions based on power pricing data. What if the pricing channel is not secure Such as a third party web site. An attack on the third party web site could set pricing data arbitrarily high or low. Effectively cycling large number of end devices almost simultaneously. California’s recent power crisis demonstrated that perceived pricing fluctuations form control channels. Well the prices were real, though not the basis for them. This led to rolling blackouts. How We Might Get it Wrong
- 12. We must recognize that complete physical separation is no longer possible Because the Smart Grid extends into physically unsecure areas. Thus we must provide isolation through technical means. Improve support in the hardware, OS, and middleware to achieve it. Design the system to identify policy on control flows so that Smart Grid components enforce it. Securing The Smart Grid
- 13. Both critical and non-critical functions may share physical infrastructure. Control functions vs. billing functions. The systems and network must, at their lowest levels, provide the separation needed by the critical functions. To prevent compromise or denial of service by the less critical functions To contain the effect of a compromise of a critical function from spreading to other parts of the system. Cyber Isolation for the Smart Grid
- 14. Simulations commonly used in power grid to evaluate scenario response. Often using proprietary modeling tools. Cyber attack simulation and emulation capabilities available. Testbeds like DETER (at USC-ISI) can be used to identify response to cyber attacks. These need to be combined Support for federated experiments in DETER could allow separate emulation and simulation of multiple cyber and physical components. A Note on Simulation
- 15. The Smart Grid extends to homes & businesses New security implications for such connections. Hidden control channels. Critical and non-critical functions will not be separate Availability is critical Performance isolation needed for critical communication. The federated nature of the smart grid demands: Federated architectures to secure it. Federated systems to model it Existing security for the power grid does not address the implications of the new architecture. Summary
- 16. For More Information For updates and related information http://clifford.neuman.name/presentations/2009/20091006-neuman-SmartGrid/ http:// clifford.neuman.name / http://ccss.usc.edu/