Current state of automotive network security
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Many electronic devices have been used by automobiles.These devices are connected each other and communicate to control automobile. Recent years, automotive network has been connected to smartphones and the internet. It makes new threats turn up. This slides summarizes how automotive network security have been and what is expected as incoming threats.
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Current state of automotive network security
- 1. FFRI,Inc. Monthly Research Current state of automotive network security FFRI,Inc. http://www.ffri.jp Ver 2.00.01 1
- 2. FFRI,Inc. Background • Many electronic devices have been used by automobiles • These devices are connected each other and communicate to control automobiles • Recent years, automotive network has been connected to smartphones and the internet. It makes new threats turn up. • This slides summarizes how automotive network security have been and what is expected as incoming threats. 2
- 3. FFRI,Inc. Automotive networks • Contemporary automobiles consist of many electronic devices. • Electronic controls are used in many parts of automobiles such as engines, brakes and doors and they are connected each other. – They communicate each other and do proper controls • Display current speed • Locking a door and so on • Representative automotive networks are CAN, LIN and FlexRay 3
- 4. FFRI,Inc. CAN (Controller Area Network) • De facto standard of automotive networks • It connects ECUs(Electronic Controller Unit) and provides communication by broadcasting • ODB-II port(for diagnostic use) can be used to access CAN ECU (Controlling a door) ECU (Controlling lights) ECU (Controlling air conditioner) ECU (…) 4
- 5. FFRI,Inc. Reported problems about automotive networks 1 • In 2010, K. Koshcer at University of Washington published “Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile” – Shows practical security risks of CAN – Accesses CAN via ODB-II – DoS attack and rewriting memory on ECUs are feasible – Shows threats such as faking speed meter, disable brakes – Points out a possibility of malicious code injection into ECU 5
- 6. FFRI,Inc. Reported problems about automotive networks 2 • In 2013 at DefCon21, Charlie Miller presented actual proof of threats for automotive networks – Presented concrete methods of analyzing CAN packets and result of the analysis • Ford Escape • Toyota Prius are the actual targets – Showed actual proof of stopping engines and rewriting firmware 6
- 7. FFRI,Inc. Problems and threats of CAN and ECU • CAN is broadcast base protocol. It is easy to eavesdrop communications • CAN’s specification does not have an authentication process • Arbitrary packet can be sent to ECU • ECU do not have method to authenticate it （However, diagnostic protocol (UDS) has an authentication standard for ECU implementation) • Rewriting ECU programs is possible Trade-off against requirements for automotive networks such as real-time processing, maintainability, cost 7
- 8. FFRI,Inc. New threats • Recent years, automotive network has been connected to smartphones and the internet • It is now more likely to happen malware attacking and remote attack via smartphones • Android devices connected to automotive and wireless adaptors also have been appearing Possibility to access automotive networks remotely 8
- 9. FFRI,Inc. Proposed measures • Mainly 2 directions – Making conventional network more secure Example: • Cyber-Security for the Controller Area Network (CAN)Communication Protocol http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cwlin/publications/40108_13.pdf – Securing CAN communication itself. Make it possible to authenticate packets between ECUs. – New measures for new threats Example: • Towards a Secure Automotive Platform http://www.secunet.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Download/Printmaterial/englisc h/sn_Whitepaper_Secure_Automotive_Platform_E.pdf – Access control to automotive network using ARM TrustZone – Devices connected to automotive networks such as Android devices are the target (Threats as an attack vector) – Virtually switch CPU running Android and CPU communicates automotive networks. – No influence to automotive network when Android side has a problem 9
- 10. FFRI,Inc. Summery • Recent years, they point out the problems on CAN which is de facto standard of automotive networks • Currently there are actual proof of intrusion into CAN via ODBII port • In future, it may be realized to the intrude as connection to automotive networks from more smartphones and the internet accelerates. • It is proposed to secure network protocols (authentication, tampering detection) and to make access control to automotive network using TrustZone • As more devices are connected to automotive networks, to keep taking actions to new threats are required 10
- 11. FFRI,Inc. References • • • • • • • • 車載ネットワーク・システム徹底解説 (佐藤道夫 CQ出版社 2005) Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units http://www.exploit-db.com/download_pdf/27404/ 2011年度自動車情報セキュリティの動向に関する調査 http://www.ipa.go.jp/files/000024413.pdf 2012年度自動車情報セキュリティの動向に関する調査 http://www.ipa.go.jp/files/000027274.pdf 組み込みシステムのセキュリティ～～自動車情報セキュリティの視点から～～ http://www.ipa.go.jp/files/000013557.pdf Cyber-Security for the Controller Area Network (CAN) Communication Protocol http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cwlin/publications/40108_13.pdf Towards a Secure Automotive Platform http://www.secunet.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Download/Printmaterial/engl isch/sn_Whitepaper_Secure_Automotive_Platform_E.pdf •11
- 12. FFRI,Inc. Contact Information E-Mail : research—feedback@ffri.jp Twitter : @FFRI_Research 12