War "strategism"

Question

I'm just reading an article and I see this sentiment expressed:

Ukraine has been let down by a US-led reluctance to supply Ukraine with the weapons it needs, meaning Kyiv lost a golden opportunity to strike earlier before Russia had built its defences.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/30/ukraine-russia-war-changed-eu

The article elaborates on this sentiment further, but I'm going to give the idea a name for the purposes of this question: strategism.

It's the idea that advantage is gained in war by acting in a more and more anticipatory way ahead of time, and making more and more material preparations for war.

I see this sentiment expressed often, that if only action had been taken sooner or more quickly, the result would have been more decisively favourable.

What this thinking doesn't seem to account for, is that the enemy can similarly engage in strategism. They too can seek to prepare earlier and act more quickly and decisively, including acting against their opponent's build-up itself (that is, they can attack the strategist simply for building-up and engaging in strategism, with a view to later advantage, even before a specific grievance has arisen that would trigger war in non-strategist circumstances).

The apparent trigger for the Ukraine war was a refusal, when demanded, of the Zelensky regime to desist from the strategism of joining NATO, or of NATO to give a guarantee that any application would be rebuffed.

Therefore, Russia struck against Ukraine before it could conclude its strategist logic of joining NATO. The reason it struck is because NATO membership is seen as a manifestation of strategism - a build-up of strength that would assist Ukraine in a later confrontation.

If there had been more preparations for war sooner (including an earlier application to NATO), then the demand for guarantees may have been lodged by Russia sooner, and the fighting may have commenced sooner (for example, if that demand made even earlier were rebuffed in the same way).

Similarly in WW1, relatively small events triggered general confrontation because all sides knew that strategism would then begin, and it was best to conclude the hostilities under the status quo rather than waiting for anyone else to dig in.

Question: Is there any analysis available, whether looking at historical events or looking at the logic, that this "strategism" actually conveys any advantages to its adherents?

Historical events seem to me to suggest this logic regularly fails. Usually, it touches off war, as the opponent responds in equally strategic terms - either by building up in a way that deprives the strategist first-mover of any additional advantage, or by immediately commencing war before any build-up is achieved by the first-mover.

Therefore, those who wish to engage in strategism, would probably do better to consider it synonymous with an immediate declaration of war (i.e. it will lead to an immediate commitment to fight war with whatever preparations and resources they currently have), rather than a hedge or deterrence against war, or an opportunity to build up against their opponent.

Answer 1

In the center is the following mismatch:

You would gain military advantage if you move to the maximum level of escalation, but you do not know in advance what this level would be.

In the current conflict, it is quite obvious there are a lot of still untapped escalation levels. Should NATO open a second front on Russia and occupy part of its territory? Would China step in there? Would nukes fly?

I think that most people would not want to have that without sufficient motivation, such as exhausting all other options. If Russia were strategizing as the question expects, all of the airport/ammo depots strikes of 24 Feb 2022 would be nuclear. Who wants that, out of blue?

Answer 2

A lack of planning and anticipation certainly did much to precipitate the events of World War 2.

France and the UK had plenty of opportunities to nip the issue in the bud, starting for example with the Ruhr remilitarization in 1936. Or not selling out Czechoslovakia in 1938.

NATO, in the 50s and up, did much to anticipate, and counteract, the expansion of the Soviet Union, a country dedicated to exporting Communism upon the world, whether it wished to or not. This was largely done via a policy of containment and defensive militarization which kept the issue at bay.

Likewise one could argue that the Baltics were probably quite clever in expecting the worst of their eastern neighbor and joining NATO asap.

Of course, there are risks to over-militarization, even for ostensibly defensive purposes and the sustainment and triggering of arms races. The very catastrophe that is meant to be avoided can be instead triggered, if slowly.

This is a notion the USA/West, and China, ought to take deeply to heart in plotting their courses for the coming decades: the world could easily live with both systems (even though I'd much rather not live under "Chinese democracy"). It quite likely could not survive a full war between both blocs. That doesn't mean that the West can't take steps to deter possible Chinese aggressions, such as invading Taiwan. That might, instead, trigger such aggression.

Honestly, I don't exactly know what this question is asking. It starts out by citing a clear issue - the impact of ongoing short term planning by NATO's political leaders wrt Ukraine (for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start, from March 2022 on).

On the other hand, NATO is dealing with a nuclear country so a policy of gradually increasing support, while regrettable to Ukraine, might be better for everyone else. This in line with Alamar's answer - which I've upvoted - better to risk anticipation by your opponent than risking nuclear war by sudden escalation.

Then it saunters by WW1, failing to note that European nationalism, militarism and national hatreds had reached a boiling point which had no easy answer. The alliance bloc system was supposed to deter it, along with a large volume of trade amongst the affected states. It did not, but what would have been the alternative, besides cooler heads and wisdom amongst European countries? Wisdom that only came in the 1950s.

Then the Q seemingly blames the whole mess on Ukraine, ignoring that, by 2022, it had been suffering from Russian depredations since 2014. Depredations also visited upon Georgia in 2008.

The apparent trigger for the Ukraine war was a refusal, when demanded, of the Zelensky regime to desist from the strategism of joining NATO, or of NATO to give a guarantee that any application would be rebuffed.

Now, I do happen to think that the Bush pushing accession for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was an unwise move, especially as it could not in fact be followed up on and apparently started the path to major confrontations with Russia. You will rarely find me defending many of Bush, Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policies. Also, in 2021, a more realistic West might have pursued a less coy approach than claiming Ukraine accession was none of Russia's business. Still, was that a cause for the invasion in 2022? Was Putin's insistence on NATO withdrawing its - limited - troops from the Baltics, to pre-1997 lines, realistic? Keeping also in mind the need for unanimity to accept new countries into NATO, was Ukrainian accession indeed an immediate risk?

What I don't see much of here is any clear question. The following hardly counts:

Question: Is there any analysis available, whether looking at historical events or looking at the logic, that this "strategism" actually conveys any advantages to its adherents?

Of course, preparing for war can lead to war. So can not preparing for war. This is so obvious, and specific better courses of action so hard to answer that I wonder what the point of this question was, besides blaming the "special military operation" on the West and Ukraine.

Even the recent question about the EU being short sighted in not treating Russia better in the 90s, while unclearly stated, had more "meat" to it than this one.

p.s. Come to think of it, what can also avoid war is not invading your neighbor.

p.p.s And please forego coining neologisms just for the sake of it. Or at least try coming up with better ones, if you absolutely must.

Answer 3

Question:

Is there any analysis available, whether looking at historical events or looking at the logic, that this "strategism" actually conveys any advantages to its adherents?

Quote:

Ukraine has been let down by a US-led reluctance to supply Ukraine with the weapons it needs, meaning Kyiv lost a golden opportunity to strike earlier before Russia had built its defences.

Short Answer: You think this is bad. Get yourself a history book on WWII. Now that was ugly. This is downright orderly compared to that!

Leading a democracy has been said to be akin to herding cats. You tell them to go one way and pretty much each does whatever they want. So you can fathom the complexity in leading 30 democracies in NATO. Not only do they each have independent and strong beliefs in the best path forward they are by nature conflicting beliefs, reflecting individual concerns and interests. Building a common vision is a necessary and proper priority. It's also frustrating and unfathomably inefficient. Yes if we all lived in one grand NATO dictatorship we would be much more orderly. But such systems are what lead to the formation of NATO. Those forms of governance are fraught with their own inherent difficulties. So as much as it pains everyone, we all move slowly forward together as issues are debated and common interests come into greater focus.

Answer:

What you refer to as "strategism" isn't a strategy so much as the nature of the democracies which are supporting Ukraine. While supply and sensitive nature of some weapons technologies certainly have played a role in the slow rolling of systems, the over arching issue has been building and maintaining political consensus inside NATO. Support for Ukraine with in NATO is dependent on keeping the alliance togethed. If Ukraine is saved and NATO is left fractured, Ukraine and all of Europe is left in peril. The hawks among the alliance thus must negotiate the path forward with members who's governments and populations are less convinced on the best way forward to achieve not only Ukrainian security but that for all of NATO.

In the United States making this leap has been controversial and is increasingly impactful on the next election cycle; and the United States is many thousands of miles removed from the war. Think of how more fractured political support would be if the country closer and it's near term security was even more threatened.

The same debates active in the United States are playing outmore intensively insidemanyy NATO statse. Pit that against ongoing or impending elections, economic downturns, the cost of aid and a myriad of other domestic political issues which must be balanced and calculated for each of the country's support. These are some of the perfectly valid yet very frustrating reasons for NATO to be moving slowly on some very expensive and controversial weapons Ukraine badly needs. For some of us we perhaps translate this intransigence into cowardice, unfathomable inefficiencies, or just moral bankruptcy of our elected officials; in politics it's just called work.

Look at Poland. There has been no country which has sacrificed more and given a higher percentage of their total ability to benefit Ukraine. They are being ripped apart right now by internal politics and it's even threatening their continued support, currently discontinued. The majority of all NATO aid, be it from the Uk, Canada, Germany or US flows through Poland. If Poland is lost from the alliance it impacts every other nations continued support for Ukraine. Thus for those who support Ukraine, we must all move forward together; as cumbersome as that entails.

Answer 4

It's the idea that advantage is gained in war by acting in a more and more anticipatory way ahead of time, and making more and more material preparations for war.

What this thinking doesn't seem to account for, is that the enemy can similarly engage in strategism.

You also wrote in a comment

On average and in repeated encounters, pre-emption doesn't determine the outcome of war.

Well, this may be true to some extent, but you're probably overstating it. Not everything in life as balanced as a game of chess (where the opening move only confers a slight advantage). In many real-world conflicts, making a good opening move can be a real long-term winner, or confer big advantages. Or as someone in the US army put it:

The “preventor” begins with the advantage of the initiative, but if success is not achieved swiftly and decisively, that advantage will rapidly diminish as the enemy recovers and counterattacks.

See e.g. the 1967 war. The current "campaign between the wars" seem predicated on a similar idea: hit Iran before it can gain too much of a foothold in Syria etc.

Also, you claim perfect lookahead.

Therefore, those who wish to engage in strategism, would probably do better to consider it synonymous with an immediate declaration of war.

This is assuming that a future war is nearly certain. An issue further confounding such matters is that many real-world 'games' are nowhere near that deterministic. How many people were predicting a war in Ukraine back in 2000, when Russia established the counterweight Eurasian Economic Community (which it then wanted Ukraine to join)? Escalation is sometimes obvious and sometimes "in the eye of the beholder".

Even if we stick to joining military alliances, should Russia have invaded Finland (again) already? And should it have done that when Finland was joining the EU in the 190s? Likewise should it have invaded Poland again in the late 1990s, before it joined NATO? Should WW3 have started right after WW2 because of the obvious blocs that formed, and when only one side had nukes? Etc., etc.

BTW, given that outcome of wars is often uncertain beforehand (ask Saddam after he invaded Iran--as for his motivations he [among other things] felt the Iranian revolution was a great threat to his rule because it might motivate all those Shias in Iraq to overthrow him, not too unlike how Putin fears "color revolutions"), "preemptive escalation" to war, even if desirable as a first move, might not be desirable if there's a non-trivial chance you'd (i) lose the war and (ii) be worse off if you do that than if you didn't start the war. Or to quote from that US army paper:

Preventive war, in common with all war, is a gamble.

(And, yeah, the Arab states that attacked Israel in '48 as soon as it was formally declared probably also thought they enjoyed a big advantage then. While nowadays that seems a bit silly with 20/20 hindsight, at least for a while Jordan did control the West Bank etc., so that attack was not that foolish from a pure 'strategism' perspective unless one could predict how the balance of airpower etc. was going to be ~20 years down the road.)

One final issue is that attacks are treated differently by the UN charter than [self-]defense. Building up 'insane' arsenals is not formally forbidden by the UN charter. So, while you seem to lump sending weapons to a country in the same category as attacking, not everyone sees it that way... although surely [something like] the Cuban Missile crisis is [somewhat of] a counter-argument in that regard. (And likewise whether an embargo is really the same as attacking.)