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Honestly, I don't exactly know what this question is asking. It starts out by citing a clear issue - the impact of ongoing short term planning by NATO's political leaders wrt Ukraine (for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start, from March 2022 on). On

On the other hand, NATO is dealing with a nuclear country so a policy of gradually increasing support, while regrettable to Ukraine, might be better for everyone else. This in line with Alamar's answer - which I've upvoted - better to risk anticipation by your opponent than risking nuclear war by sudden escalation.

Honestly, I don't exactly know what this question is asking. It starts out by citing a clear issue - the impact of ongoing short term planning by NATO's political leaders wrt Ukraine (for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start). On the other hand, NATO is dealing with a nuclear country so a policy of gradually increasing support, while regrettable to Ukraine, might be better for everyone else.

Honestly, I don't exactly know what this question is asking. It starts out by citing a clear issue - the impact of ongoing short term planning by NATO's political leaders wrt Ukraine (for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start, from March 2022 on).

On the other hand, NATO is dealing with a nuclear country so a policy of gradually increasing support, while regrettable to Ukraine, might be better for everyone else. This in line with Alamar's answer - which I've upvoted - better to risk anticipation by your opponent than risking nuclear war by sudden escalation.

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Now, I do happen to think that the Bush pushing accession for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was an unwise move, especially as it could not in fact be followed up on. and apparently started the path to major confrontations with Russia. You will rarely find me defending muchmany of Bush, Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policies. Also, in 2021, a more realistic West might have pursued a less coy approach than claiming Ukraine accession was none of Russia's business. Still, was that a cause for the invasion in 2022? Was Putin's insistence on NATO withdrawing its - limited - troops from the Baltics, to pre-1997 lines, realistic? Keeping also in mind the need for unanimity to accept new countries into NATO, was Ukrainian accession indeed an immediate risk?

What I don't see much of here is any clear question. The following hardly counts:

Now, I do happen to think that the Bush pushing accession for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was an unwise move, especially as it could not in fact be followed up on. You will rarely find me defending much of Bush, Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policies. Still, was that a cause for the invasion in 2022?

What I don't see much of is any clear question.

Now, I do happen to think that the Bush pushing accession for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was an unwise move, especially as it could not in fact be followed up on and apparently started the path to major confrontations with Russia. You will rarely find me defending many of Bush, Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policies. Also, in 2021, a more realistic West might have pursued a less coy approach than claiming Ukraine accession was none of Russia's business. Still, was that a cause for the invasion in 2022? Was Putin's insistence on NATO withdrawing its - limited - troops from the Baltics, to pre-1997 lines, realistic? Keeping also in mind the need for unanimity to accept new countries into NATO, was Ukrainian accession indeed an immediate risk?

What I don't see much of here is any clear question. The following hardly counts:

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A lack of planning and anticipation certainly did much to precipitate the events of World War 2.

France and the UK had plenty of opportunities to nip the issue in the bud, starting for example with the Ruhr remilitarization in 1936. Or not selling out Czechoslovakia in 1938.

NATO, in the 50s and up, did much to anticipate, and counteract, the expansion of the Soviet Union, a country dedicated to exporting Communism upon the world, whether it wished to or not. This was largely done via a policy of containment and defensive militarization which kept the issue at bay.

Likewise one could argue that the Baltics were probably quite clever in expecting the worst of their eastern neighbor and joining NATO asap.

Of course, there are risks to over-militarization, even for ostensibly defensive purposes and the sustainment and triggering of arms races. The very catastrophe that is meant to be avoided can be instead triggered, if slowly.

This is a notion the USA/West, and China, ought to take deeply to heart in plotting their courses for the coming decades: the world could easily live with both systems (even though I'd much rather not live under "Chinese democracy"). It quite likely could not survive a full war between both blocs. That doesn't mean that the West can't take steps to deter possible Chinese aggressions, such as invading Taiwan. That might, instead, trigger such aggression.

Honestly, I don't exactly know what this question is asking. It starts out by citing a clear issue - the impact of ongoing short term planning by NATO's political leaders wrt Ukraine (for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start). On the other hand, NATO is dealing with a nuclear country so a policy of gradually increasing support, while regrettable to Ukraine, might be better for everyone else.

Then it saunters by WW1, failing to note that European nationalism, militarism and national hatreds had reached a boiling point which had no easy answer. The alliance bloc system was supposed to deter it, along with a large volume of trade amongst the affected states. It did not, but what would have been the alternative, besides cooler heads and wisdom amongst European countries? Wisdom that only came in the 1950s.

Then the Q seemingly blames the whole mess on Ukraine, ignoring that, by 2022, it had been suffering from Russian depredations since 2014. Depredations also visited upon Georgia in 2008.

The apparent trigger for the Ukraine war was a refusal, when demanded, of the Zelensky regime to desist from the strategism of joining NATO, or of NATO to give a guarantee that any application would be rebuffed.

Now, I do happen to think that the Bush pushing accession for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was an unwise move, especially as it could not in fact be followed up on. You will rarely find me defending much of Bush, Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policies. Still, was that a cause for the invasion in 2022?

What I don't see much of is any clear question.

Question: Is there any analysis available, whether looking at historical events or looking at the logic, that this "strategism" actually conveys any advantages to its adherents?

Of course, preparing for war can lead to war. So can not preparing for war. This is so obvious, and specific better courses of action so hard to answer that I wonder what the point of this question was, besides blaming the "special military operation" on the West and Ukraine.

Even the recent question about the EU being short sighted in not treating Russia better in the 90s, while unclearly stated, had more "meat" to it than this one.

p.s. Come to think of it, what can also avoid war is not invading your neighbor.

p.p.s And please forego coining neologisms just for the sake of it. Or at least try coming up with better ones, if you absolutely must.