Timeline for War "strategism"
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
18 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct 1, 2023 at 18:06 | comment | added | alamar | So Georgia made poor decisions in this situation. Bad to be them. Perhaps this can also be said about Russia in Feb 2022. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:46 | comment | added | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | FWIW I think the Wikipedia article kinda glossed over some Georgian behavior at the start. Putin by P. Short IIRC claims Georgia shelled urban areas at the very start, killing quite a few people. Not apparent in wiki. Still, my take is Russia deliberately provoked an attack by stoking up separatist attacks before. Yes, I know about the exodus numbers. Not good. Az. should let UNHRC in pronto, asap. Then again, look at a map of the enclave. Not a realistic, nor internationally recognized, border. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:45 | comment | added | alamar | @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Azerbaijan has no chance of showing how they respect Armenians' rights. 90k refugees already left through the Armenian border. Out of 120-150k pre-war population of NKR. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:41 | comment | added | alamar | I don't think anybody denies that Georgia has tried to recapture South Ossetia. Russia did not actually do anything to Georgia other than pushing it to 2008 LOC and then going back to base, as far as I know. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:37 | comment | added | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | @alamar Precisely. Russia was not reacting in Ukraine, it was initiating. See my point? True, Saakashvili was beating war drums in advance, but it would have been an amazing feat of logistics to pull this off by keeping such a large force on full alert for a long time. Unless of course, it was hoped that ongoing provocations might push Georgia to do stupid things. BTW, I don't know much about Armenia - Azerbaijan but I can't say I am that surprised, or condemning, of Az. getting its land back. The one thing they should be help up to is respecting human rights on recovered land. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:37 | comment | added | alamar | @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Russia was able to move circa 150k troops into Ukraine on 24th of February 2022. But of course it is expected that Russian intelligence knew of Georgian plans way in advance. | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 17:17 | comment | added | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | @alamar There's a reason I am skeptical about quick availability of forces: they are hard to do. NATO has for years tried to keep a short notice force reaction force: it only manages 5000 personnel within 2 days. Or the Euro battlegroup: 3000 Having 40k able to respond within 48hrs is extremely unlikely unless it was pre-planned. And it's not like Russia is showing itself to be the superstar of combat logistics these days, eh? | |
| Oct 1, 2023 at 10:44 | comment | added | alamar | @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Well maybe they were. But since Russia is directly over the border, and a large force was held there in the aftermatch ot Chechen war, I don't see why 48 hours cold call is unrealistic. | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 19:52 | comment | added | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | Georgia behaved very much like Russia did in Chechnya, twice, - trying to regain separatist territory. Now, it may not have been the wisest decision, but some people of a conspirational bent - not me, of course - might even wonder how a Russian expeditionary force of 40000 troops was able to just react right away, within 48hrs at most. Almost as if they'd told to expect a Georgian adventure. | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 19:01 | comment | added | alamar | Georgia has tried to do the same thing in 2008 as Azerbaijan did just a week ago - strike South Ossetia and cause tens of thousands refuges to flee it, then reclaim territory. Potraying Georgia as a victim here is deeply irresponsible. | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 17:28 | comment | added | got trolled too much this week | "What I don't see much of here is any clear question". Indeed. But it's usually better to VTC such "questions". The OP is already well-known on this site for "discussion starters" and drowning any Q&A with dozens if not hundreds of comments. | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 17:03 | comment | added | Steve | As I say, in the NATO missile crisis of 62-63, the response to the US stationing nukes in Turkey was that the Soviets stationed some in Cuba, depriving the US of any preparatory advantage, but significantly reducing the time either side had to think (or call the other side) and make decisions before any nukes launched would hit. They disengaged from this dangerous situation by moving back from each other again, not by beginning to make further preparations to win the nuclear exchange (which had either side seemed to do so at that crucial moment, would likely have triggered that exchange). | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:50 | comment | added | Steve | My question is whether there is any evidence that attempting this tooling-up avoids war, instead of bringing it forward? Or if it did bring it forward, that it was possible to significantly out-prepare the enemy before they triggered the war due to the preparations? People, yourself included, speculate that better preparations may have avoided war or resolved it to Ukraine's benefit. It's not unreasonable to ask, when in history was the last time this approach seemed to work? What seemingly oncoming or simmering conflict died down, once either side turned its munitions factories up to 11? | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:38 | comment | added | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | Well, one problem with your Q is that it is really, really, unclear whether it is asking about the run up to the war. Or the conduct of actions since the start of the war. Retooling munitions factories from March 2022 on absolutely should have been on the menu and has zero bearing on actions undertaken by Russia in February 2022. What was Russia going to do extra? Double-plus invasion? | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:36 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:29 | comment | added | Steve | "for example a lack of foresight by Europe in retooling their munitions industry from the start" - but faced with an enemy tooling up for war and interfering in Ukraine, would Russia have then prepared better itself, or struck earlier, so that the tooling was once again incomplete or inadequate at the outset of war? I appreciate the long answer although it meanders somewhat, but the quoted remark here is an instance of what I'm suspecting is the fallacy of "strategism". It doesn't account that the opponent can also adjust dynamically, by themselves upping the ante or striking sooner. | |
| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:25 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Sep 30, 2023 at 16:12 | history | answered | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |