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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
o-checker :
Malicious document file detection tool
- File sizes tell whether the document file is malicious or not -
Yuhei Otsubo
1
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Agenda
2
1. Background
2. Structure of malicious document files
3. Overview of o-checker
4. Detection mechanism
5. Demo
6. Application
7. Conclusion
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
1. BACKGROUND
3
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Increase in targeted email attacks (1/3)
4http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic.jsp?aid=industrial_espionage&id=malicious_code_trends
1. Background

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Increase in targeted email attacks (2/3)
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Number of security advisories on targeted email attacks to government
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1. Background
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Increase in targeted email attacks (3/3)
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Example of target attacks
7
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1
2
3
④
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
File types of targeted email attacks
8
Trend of the extension of the attachment of targeted email attacks,Trend Micro Japan(2013)
http://is702.jp/special/1431/
Executable files :59%
Document files :41%
1. Background

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
2. STRUCTURE OF MALICIOUS
DOCUMENT FILES
9
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
文書ファイル
Exploit
Shellcode
Malware executable file
Decoy file(for display)
Structure of malicious document files
10
Abuses a browsing
software
vulnerability
Creates a malware
executable file and
a decoy file then
executes/opens them
Encoded by various
ways.
No relation with
document contents
2. Structure of malicious document files
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Example of malicious document files
11
2. Structure of malicious document files
Bitmap View Hex View
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Exploit(1/2)
12
• Object 29
• A JavaScript action
• Its script is stored in object
31.
2. Structure of malicious document files
• Object 31
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Exploit(2/2)
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After decoding the Flate compression data
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2. Structure of malicious document files
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Shellcode
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2. Structure of malicious document files
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Executable file(2/2)
17
After decode
2. Structure of malicious document files
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Decoy file
18
2. Structure of malicious document files
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
3. OVERVIEW OF O-CHECKER
19
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
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Document file
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Shellcode
Malware executable file
Decoy file(for display)
traditional methods of malicious document detection
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malicious code
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Traditional methods
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Vicious circle
21
If a detection method focuses on codes that can be written
arbitrarily by attackers
Vicious circle
Creates a signature based on
malicious code.
Defender
Changes malicious code so that it can
avoid detection.
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Breaking the vicious circle
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Vicious circle
Creates a signature based on
structural analysis of file formats.
Defender
Changes malicious code so that it can
avoid detection.
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Changes file format syntax so that it
can avoid detection.
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Characteristic of malicious document ~based on file format
23
A document file is an aggregate of pictures, text, and auxiliary data.
There is no data which a browsing software does not process.
Whether a browsing software processes data or not
reason
Exploit 
for abusing a browsing software
vulnerabilities
Shellcode  exploit code includes shellcode
Executable file -
If a browsing software parses it, the
contents will be displayed garbled or
a browsing software will malfunction.
Decoy file -
If a browsing software parses it, the
contents will be displayed garbled or
a browsing software will malfunction.
Each data has its purpose.
3. Overview of o-checker
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Detection mechanism (simplified)
All of structures match
directly to contents
Contents Structures
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mismatched to contents
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It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.

CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Performance of o-checker
25
• High speed and high detection rates
detection rates:98.9% Average execution time:0.3s
• Almost maintenance-free
Updating
frequency
Remarks
Anti-virus software Every day 200,000 new type of malware per day
(2012)※
o-checker
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none
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file format comes out.
msanalysis.py
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3. Overview of o-checker
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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
4. DETECTION MECHANISM
26
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Inspection items
27
(A) Attached data after EOF
(B) Anomaly file size
(C) Data not referred from FAT
(D) Free sector in the last sector
(E) Unaccounted-for sector
(F) Unaccounted-for section
(G) Unreferenced object
(H) Camouflaged stream
Rich Text
CFB
PDF
o-checker
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of Rich Text files
28
{¥rtf
Hello!¥par
This is some {¥b bold} text.¥par
}
RTF files are usually 7-bit ASCII plain text. RTF consists of
control words, control symbols, and groups. ※
※:wikipedia
an example, RTF code
The signature that
indicates a RTF file
(}) corresponding to the first ({) is located
at the end of a file (EOF).
4. Detection mechanism

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(A) Attached data after EOF
29
{¥rtf
Hello!¥par
This is some {¥b bold} text.¥par
}
MZ・
ク
・ コ エ ヘ!ク
L!This program cannot be run in
DOS mode.$ 猝t讀ォオ、ォオ、ォオュモ
招ヲォオュモ楫喚オ、ォオ0ェオュモ卸・オュモ匏ウォ
Rich、ォオ
PE d・ ヤノ[J ・ "
An executable
file is
inserted at
the end of a
file in order
not to affect
the display.
a RTF file embedded with an executable files.
Data exists after EOF.
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
CFB (doc,xls,ppt,jtd/jtdc)
30
Root Storage
Storage 1 Storage 2
Storage 3
Stream A
Stream B Stream C
[MS-CFB] – v20130118 Compound File Binary Format (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd942138.aspx)
In file system
Stream → File
Storage → Folder
CFB:Compound File Binary
• A layered structure can be stored in one file.
• An archive format which Microsoft Corp. developed
• It is used by Microsoft Word etc.
doc,ppt,xls,jtd/jtdc※
4. Detection mechanism
※:jtd and jtdc are used by Ichitaro (一太郎),
a Japanese word processor developed by
JustSystems Corp.
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of CFB files
31
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
-2
-2
3
-2
-1
-2
Directory Entry
index
sector
Stream Name:a.txt
Size:696 Index:2
Stream Name:b.txt
Size:318 Index:5
Storage Name:root
Size:- Index:-
FAT
(File Allocation Table)
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Physical structure of CFB
32
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
512 Byte
(512 or 4096) x N Byte
FileSize = 512 + (512 or 4096) x N
= 512 x M
The file size of a regular CFB file is
certainly a multiple of 512.
4. Detection mechanism

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ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

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[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...

While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue.

[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo

ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(B) Anomaly file size
33
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
-2
-2
3
-2
-1
-2
FAT
(File Allocation Table)
Directory Entry
malware6
7
The size of the file except a header is not
a multiple of the size of sector.
 If the file size is divided by 512, the
remainder will come out.
Stream Name:a.txt
Size:696 Index:2
Stream Name:b.txt
Size:318 Index:5
Storage Name:root
Size:- Index:-
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(C) Data not referred from FAT
34
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
-2
-2
3
-2
-1
-2
Directory Entry
malware6
7
The file exceeds the area
-1
The area which can be referred to by FAT:
(The number of sectors of FAT)×128×512 (Byte)
Stream Name:a.txt
Size:696 Index:2
Stream Name:b.txt
Size:318 Index:5
Storage Name:root
Size:- Index:-
FAT
(File Allocation Table)
?
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(D) Free sector in the last sector
35
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
-2
-2
3
-2
-1
-2
Directory Entry
malware6
The sector corresponding to the end of the
file (n-th sector) is a free sector.
-1
When the size of sector is 512,
n = (file size-512)/512
n
Stream Name:a.txt
Size:696 Index:2
Stream Name:b.txt
Size:318 Index:5
Storage Name:root
Size:- Index:-
FAT
(File Allocation Table)
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(E) Unaccounted-for sector
36
Header
FAT0
Directory Entry
Stream A
Stream A
Free Sector
Stream B
1
2
3
4
5
Physical Structure
-2
-2
3
-2
-1
-2
Directory Entry
malware6
There is a sector which cannot be classified
into FAT (DI-FAT and mini-FAT are included),
DE, stream and free sector.
-2
Stream Name:a.txt
Size:696 Index:2
Stream Name:b.txt
Size:318 Index:5
Storage Name:root
Size:- Index:-
FAT
(File Allocation Table)
4. Detection mechanism

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While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.

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ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

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While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.

CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
PDF document
Structure of PDF:Physical structure
Comment (Header)
Body
Cross-reference table
Trailer Comment(EOF)
Sequence of indirect
objects (fonts, pages and
sampled images)
1 0 obj
2 0 obj
n 0 obj
End-of-file marker
x 0 obj <</R2 /P-64 /V 2 /O
(dfhjaklgk… …>>
A PDF file is an aggregate of many objects(numeric, string, a
sequence of bytes etc.)
4 elements
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of PDF:Types of objects
38
Basic Objects
(A) Numeric
(B) String
(C) Name
(D) Boolean
(E) Null
Composite Objects
(F) Array
(G) Dictionary
Others
(H) Stream(a sequence of bytes)
(I) Indirect(referring to other objects)
(PDF32000-1:2008 7.3)
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of PDF:Stream filter
39
Filter Name Description
/ASCIIHexDecode Decodes data encoded in an ASCII hexadecimal representation, reproducing
the original binary data.
/ASCII85Decode Decodes data encoded in an ASCII base-85 representation, reproducing the
original binary data.
/LZWDecode Decompresses data encoded using the LZW adaptive compression method,
reproducing the original text or binary data.
/FlateDecode Decompresses data encoded using the zlib/deflate compression method,
reproducing the original text or binary data.
/RunLengthDecode Decompresses data encoded using a byte-oriented run-length encoding
algorithm, reproducing the original text or binary data.
/CCITTFaxDecode Decompresses data encoded using the CCITT facsimile standard, reproducing
the original data.
/JBIG2Decode Decompresses data encoded using the JBIG2 standard, reproducing the
original monochrome image data.
/DCTDecode Decompresses data encoded using a DCT technique based on the JPEG standard,
reproducing image sample data that approximates the original data.
/JPXDecode Decompresses data encoded using the wavelet-based JPEG2000 standard,
reproducing the original image data.
(PDF32000-1:2008 7.4)
Stream filters indicate how to decode stream data. The standard filters
are summarized in the following table.
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of PDF:Document structure
40
Trailer
Document
information
Document catalog
Outline
hierarchy
Page tree
Page Page
Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image
:Object
Structure of a PDF document
:Link
By following the link from trailer, all objects
can be referred to.
4. Detection mechanism

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ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。 本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。 パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者 日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定 米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針(Vulnerabilities Equities Process)、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。 パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of PDF:Encryption
41
Structure of a PDF document enctypted
Encryption applies to almost all strings and streams in the PDF file.
Leaving the other object types unencrypted allows random access to the
objects within a document. (except for the object stored in ObjStm)
Trailer
Document
information
Document catalog
Outline
hierarchy
Page tree
Page Page
Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image
:Object
:Link
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Structure of PDF:ObjStm (Object Streams)
42
ObjStm (Object Streams) are introduced in
PDF 1.5. The purpose of ObjStm is to allow
indirect objects other than streams to be
stored more compactly by using the facilities
provided by stream compression filters.
( PDF32000-1:2008 7.5.7)
Packing Compressing Encryption
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(F) Unaccounted-for section
43
PDF Document
Comment(Header)
Body
Cross-reference table
Trailer
Comment(EOF)
Executable file
Classifying objects into four
elements from the head of a
file, there is data which
cannot be classified.
4. Detection Mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
(G) Unreferenced object
44
Executable file
A PDF file embedded with a executable files
When an executable file is inserted as an object in disregard of
document structure, it is often unreferenced.
Executable file :Object embedded with
an executable file
Trailer
Document
information
Document catalog
Outline
hierarchy
Page tree
Page Page
Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image
:Object
:Link
4. Detection mechanism

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In October 2021, we published the first analysis of Wslink – a unique loader likely linked to the Lazarus group. Most samples are packed and protected with an advanced virtual machine (VM) obfuscator; the samples contain no clear artifacts and we initially did not associate the obfuscation with a publicly known VM, but we later managed to connect it to CodeVirtualizer. This VM introduces several additional obfuscation techniques such as insertion of junk code, encoding of virtual operands, duplication of virtual opcodes, opaque predicates, merging of virtual instructions, and a nested VM. Our presentation analyzes the internals of the VM and describes our semi automated approach to “see through” the obfuscation techniques in reasonable time. We demonstrate the approach on some bytecode from a protected sample and compare the results with a non-obfuscated sample, found subsequent to starting our analysis, confirming the method’s validity. Our solution is based on a known deobfuscation method that extracts the semantics of the virtual opcodes, using symbolic execution with simplifying rules. We further treat the bytecode chunks and some internal constructs of the VM as concrete values instead of as symbolic ones, enabling the known deobfuscation method to deal with the additional obfuscation techniques automatically.

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Executable file
(H) Camouflaged Stream
45
Camouflaged Filter
Putting to the end of Streams
Regular Stream EOD
End-of-data marker
Data used for decoding
(Decoding is successful.)
Data which is not used for decoding
When the filter is FlateDecode, DCTDecode or JBIG2Decode,
entropy
Plain Text small
FlateDecode big
Execution file big
An attacker camouflages as the
object is using the filter of which
value of entropy is similar to the
value of entropy of executable
files.
(Decoding goes wrong.)
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Malicious documents Clean documents
File type Extension Quantity
Average
size(KB)
Quantity
Average
size(KB)
Rich Text rtf 98 266.5 199 516.2
doc 36 252.2 1,195 106.1
CFB xls 49 180.4 298 191.7
jtd/jtdc 17 268.5 - -
PDF pdf 164 351.2 9,109 101.7
Total 364 291.8 10,801 322.7
Experiment
46
Document files used for
targeted email attacks
from 2009 to 2012※1
Clean document files
classified according to
contagio a malware dump
site※2
※1:Rich Text by which the extension was camouflaged by doc is
counted as rtf.
※2:http://contagiodump.blogspot.jp/2013/03/16800-clean-and-11960-
malicious-files.html
4. Detection mechanism
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Detection rate of o-checker
47
99.0%
77.5%
90.2%
97.1%
96.1%
49.4%
43.9%
63.4%
99.0%
98.0%
99.4%
Rich Text
CFB
PDF
o-checker
4. Detection mechanism
(A) Attached data after EOF
(B) Anomaly file size
(C) Data not referred from FAT
(D) Free sector in the last sector
(E) Unaccounted-for sector
(F) Unaccounted-for section
(G) Unreferenced object
(H) Camouflaged stream
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
5. DEMO
48

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Output of o-checker
49
C:¥tmp>pdfanalysis.py a.pdf
00000000-00000008:comment,
00000009-0000000F:comment,
00000010-00000110:obj 25 0 old(not used)
00000111-00000197:obj 26 0 old(not used)
:
00003622-000036B0:trailer
000036B1-000036C2:startxref 00003617
000036C3-000036C9:comment,
000036CA-0000E9E2:unknown
0000E9E3-0000E9E9:comment,
0000E9EA-0000EAEA:obj 25 0 ObjStm [7, 8, 13]
:
0001209D-000120A3:comment,
000120A4-000120A7:unknown
FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 7 0 xref from None
FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 8 0 xref from None
:
Offset address Classification result
Decoy Document
ObjStm
5. Demo
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Judgment option
50
C:¥tmp>pdfanalysis.py a.pdf -j
00000000-00000008:comment,
00000009-0000000F:comment,
00000010-00000110:obj 25 0 old(not used)
00000111-00000197:obj 26 0 old(not used)
:
:
0001209D-000120A3:comment,
FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 7 0 xref from None
FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 8 0 xref from None
:
Malicious!
“-j” is
a judgment option.
The three judgment types
“Malicious!”,
“Suspicious!” or
“None!”
will be shown at the end
of an output.
5. Demo
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
51
DEMO 1
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
6. APPLICATION
52

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Application to NIDS
53
Network cable
NIDS
o-checker
Packet
Capture
Reconstruct
e-mails
Alert
o-checker can be introduced into an existing system
without updating.
6. Application
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
NIDS
Problems of the application
54
o-checker
Alert
Failure to recover
e-mails
~2%
Broken document files
~2%
False positive
up ~2%
False positives increases because of the performance
of e-mail recovering software.
Network cable
Packet
Capture
Reconstruct
e-mails
6. Application
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
NIDS
Enhanced o-checker
55
new
o-checker
Alert
Deselection of broken document files based on
structural analysis of file formats
Network cable
Packet
Capture
Reconstruct
e-mails
Failure to recover
e-mails
~2%
Broken document files
~2%
False positive
up ~0%
6. Application
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
o-checker
Application to android (1)
56
Mail server
Manual delete
Manual check

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CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
57
DEMO 2
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
E-mailer
o-checker
Application to android (2)
58
Mail server
Auto delete
Auto check
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
7. CONCLUSION
59
CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan
Conclusion
60
• Tradition detectional method reaches
its limit.
• Structural analysis of file formats
is effective to detect malicious
document files that have embedded
executable files.
• Various application of o-checker is
possible. Because it can detect
malicious documents by high
probability at high speed.
7. Conclusion

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o-checker : Malicious document file detection tool - Malicious feature can be detected based on file size by Yuuhei Ootsubo

  • 1. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan o-checker : Malicious document file detection tool - File sizes tell whether the document file is malicious or not - Yuhei Otsubo 1
  • 2. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Agenda 2 1. Background 2. Structure of malicious document files 3. Overview of o-checker 4. Detection mechanism 5. Demo 6. Application 7. Conclusion
  • 3. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 1. BACKGROUND 3
  • 4. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Increase in targeted email attacks (1/3) 4http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/topic.jsp?aid=industrial_espionage&id=malicious_code_trends 1. Background
  • 5. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Increase in targeted email attacks (2/3) 5 Number of security advisories on targeted email attacks to government institutions ※GSOC:Government Security Operation Coordination team 1. Background
  • 6. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Increase in targeted email attacks (3/3) 6 5.4% → 33% research commissioned by METI(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), (2007,2011) Rate of companies that had experienced targeted attacks 1. Background 2007 2011
  • 7. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Example of target attacks 7 secret Send emails with malware Open an attachment Infected with malware Network of companies and private individuals Attacker Victim Data exfiltration 1 2 3 ④ 1. Background
  • 8. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan File types of targeted email attacks 8 Trend of the extension of the attachment of targeted email attacks,Trend Micro Japan(2013) http://is702.jp/special/1431/ Executable files :59% Document files :41% 1. Background
  • 9. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 2. STRUCTURE OF MALICIOUS DOCUMENT FILES 9
  • 10. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 文書ファイル Exploit Shellcode Malware executable file Decoy file(for display) Structure of malicious document files 10 Abuses a browsing software vulnerability Creates a malware executable file and a decoy file then executes/opens them Encoded by various ways. No relation with document contents 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 11. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Example of malicious document files 11 2. Structure of malicious document files Bitmap View Hex View
  • 12. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Exploit(1/2) 12 • Object 29 • A JavaScript action • Its script is stored in object 31. 2. Structure of malicious document files • Object 31 • A JavaScript script(Exploit) • Flate compression method
  • 13. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Exploit(2/2) 13 After decoding the Flate compression data ↓Shellcode encoded by escape() function 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 14. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Shellcode 14 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 15. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Shellcode 15 2. Structure of malicious document files Decoder : 40 Bytes Shellcode is encoded with printable characters
  • 16. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Executable file(1/2) 16 Encoded executable file 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 17. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Executable file(2/2) 17 After decode 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 18. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Decoy file 18 2. Structure of malicious document files
  • 19. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 3. OVERVIEW OF O-CHECKER 19
  • 20. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Utilizes particular patterns found through static/dynamic analysis. Document file Exploit Shellcode Malware executable file Decoy file(for display) traditional methods of malicious document detection 20 malicious code 3. Overview of o-checker Traditional methods • Particular patterns can be changed by encode. • There are cases when exploits only work on specific environments and dynamic analysis is difficult. Problems
  • 21. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Vicious circle 21 If a detection method focuses on codes that can be written arbitrarily by attackers Vicious circle Creates a signature based on malicious code. Defender Changes malicious code so that it can avoid detection. Attacker 3. Overview of o-checker
  • 22. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Breaking the vicious circle 22 Vicious circle Creates a signature based on structural analysis of file formats. Defender Changes malicious code so that it can avoid detection. Attacker Changes file format syntax so that it can avoid detection. 3. Overview of o-checker If a detection method focuses on file formats that cannot be written arbitrarily by attackers
  • 23. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Characteristic of malicious document ~based on file format 23 A document file is an aggregate of pictures, text, and auxiliary data. There is no data which a browsing software does not process. Whether a browsing software processes data or not reason Exploit  for abusing a browsing software vulnerabilities Shellcode  exploit code includes shellcode Executable file - If a browsing software parses it, the contents will be displayed garbled or a browsing software will malfunction. Decoy file - If a browsing software parses it, the contents will be displayed garbled or a browsing software will malfunction. Each data has its purpose. 3. Overview of o-checker
  • 24. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Detection mechanism (simplified) All of structures match directly to contents Contents Structures A part of structures is mismatched to contents Contents Structures Normal document files Malicious document files Detection based on structural analysis of document formats 3. Overview of o-checker
  • 25. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Performance of o-checker 25 • High speed and high detection rates detection rates:98.9% Average execution time:0.3s • Almost maintenance-free Updating frequency Remarks Anti-virus software Every day 200,000 new type of malware per day (2012)※ o-checker Almost none It needs update, if a new document file format comes out. msanalysis.py input Documentation files embedded with executable files pdfanalysis.py input Alert 3. Overview of o-checker ※:http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/2012_by_the_numbers_Kaspersky_Lab_now_detects_200000_new_malicious_programs_every_day
  • 26. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 4. DETECTION MECHANISM 26
  • 27. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Inspection items 27 (A) Attached data after EOF (B) Anomaly file size (C) Data not referred from FAT (D) Free sector in the last sector (E) Unaccounted-for sector (F) Unaccounted-for section (G) Unreferenced object (H) Camouflaged stream Rich Text CFB PDF o-checker 4. Detection mechanism
  • 28. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of Rich Text files 28 {¥rtf Hello!¥par This is some {¥b bold} text.¥par } RTF files are usually 7-bit ASCII plain text. RTF consists of control words, control symbols, and groups. ※ ※:wikipedia an example, RTF code The signature that indicates a RTF file (}) corresponding to the first ({) is located at the end of a file (EOF). 4. Detection mechanism
  • 29. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (A) Attached data after EOF 29 {¥rtf Hello!¥par This is some {¥b bold} text.¥par } MZ・ ク ・ コ エ ヘ!ク L!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.$ 猝t讀ォオ、ォオ、ォオュモ 招ヲォオュモ楫喚オ、ォオ0ェオュモ卸・オュモ匏ウォ Rich、ォオ PE d・ ヤノ[J ・ " An executable file is inserted at the end of a file in order not to affect the display. a RTF file embedded with an executable files. Data exists after EOF. 4. Detection mechanism
  • 30. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan CFB (doc,xls,ppt,jtd/jtdc) 30 Root Storage Storage 1 Storage 2 Storage 3 Stream A Stream B Stream C [MS-CFB] – v20130118 Compound File Binary Format (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd942138.aspx) In file system Stream → File Storage → Folder CFB:Compound File Binary • A layered structure can be stored in one file. • An archive format which Microsoft Corp. developed • It is used by Microsoft Word etc. doc,ppt,xls,jtd/jtdc※ 4. Detection mechanism ※:jtd and jtdc are used by Ichitaro (一太郎), a Japanese word processor developed by JustSystems Corp.
  • 31. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of CFB files 31 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -2 Directory Entry index sector Stream Name:a.txt Size:696 Index:2 Stream Name:b.txt Size:318 Index:5 Storage Name:root Size:- Index:- FAT (File Allocation Table) 4. Detection mechanism
  • 32. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Physical structure of CFB 32 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure 512 Byte (512 or 4096) x N Byte FileSize = 512 + (512 or 4096) x N = 512 x M The file size of a regular CFB file is certainly a multiple of 512. 4. Detection mechanism
  • 33. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (B) Anomaly file size 33 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -2 FAT (File Allocation Table) Directory Entry malware6 7 The size of the file except a header is not a multiple of the size of sector.  If the file size is divided by 512, the remainder will come out. Stream Name:a.txt Size:696 Index:2 Stream Name:b.txt Size:318 Index:5 Storage Name:root Size:- Index:- 4. Detection mechanism
  • 34. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (C) Data not referred from FAT 34 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -2 Directory Entry malware6 7 The file exceeds the area -1 The area which can be referred to by FAT: (The number of sectors of FAT)×128×512 (Byte) Stream Name:a.txt Size:696 Index:2 Stream Name:b.txt Size:318 Index:5 Storage Name:root Size:- Index:- FAT (File Allocation Table) ? 4. Detection mechanism
  • 35. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (D) Free sector in the last sector 35 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -2 Directory Entry malware6 The sector corresponding to the end of the file (n-th sector) is a free sector. -1 When the size of sector is 512, n = (file size-512)/512 n Stream Name:a.txt Size:696 Index:2 Stream Name:b.txt Size:318 Index:5 Storage Name:root Size:- Index:- FAT (File Allocation Table) 4. Detection mechanism
  • 36. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (E) Unaccounted-for sector 36 Header FAT0 Directory Entry Stream A Stream A Free Sector Stream B 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Structure -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -2 Directory Entry malware6 There is a sector which cannot be classified into FAT (DI-FAT and mini-FAT are included), DE, stream and free sector. -2 Stream Name:a.txt Size:696 Index:2 Stream Name:b.txt Size:318 Index:5 Storage Name:root Size:- Index:- FAT (File Allocation Table) 4. Detection mechanism
  • 37. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan PDF document Structure of PDF:Physical structure Comment (Header) Body Cross-reference table Trailer Comment(EOF) Sequence of indirect objects (fonts, pages and sampled images) 1 0 obj 2 0 obj n 0 obj End-of-file marker x 0 obj <</R2 /P-64 /V 2 /O (dfhjaklgk… …>> A PDF file is an aggregate of many objects(numeric, string, a sequence of bytes etc.) 4 elements 4. Detection mechanism
  • 38. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of PDF:Types of objects 38 Basic Objects (A) Numeric (B) String (C) Name (D) Boolean (E) Null Composite Objects (F) Array (G) Dictionary Others (H) Stream(a sequence of bytes) (I) Indirect(referring to other objects) (PDF32000-1:2008 7.3) 4. Detection mechanism
  • 39. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of PDF:Stream filter 39 Filter Name Description /ASCIIHexDecode Decodes data encoded in an ASCII hexadecimal representation, reproducing the original binary data. /ASCII85Decode Decodes data encoded in an ASCII base-85 representation, reproducing the original binary data. /LZWDecode Decompresses data encoded using the LZW adaptive compression method, reproducing the original text or binary data. /FlateDecode Decompresses data encoded using the zlib/deflate compression method, reproducing the original text or binary data. /RunLengthDecode Decompresses data encoded using a byte-oriented run-length encoding algorithm, reproducing the original text or binary data. /CCITTFaxDecode Decompresses data encoded using the CCITT facsimile standard, reproducing the original data. /JBIG2Decode Decompresses data encoded using the JBIG2 standard, reproducing the original monochrome image data. /DCTDecode Decompresses data encoded using a DCT technique based on the JPEG standard, reproducing image sample data that approximates the original data. /JPXDecode Decompresses data encoded using the wavelet-based JPEG2000 standard, reproducing the original image data. (PDF32000-1:2008 7.4) Stream filters indicate how to decode stream data. The standard filters are summarized in the following table. 4. Detection mechanism
  • 40. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of PDF:Document structure 40 Trailer Document information Document catalog Outline hierarchy Page tree Page Page Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image :Object Structure of a PDF document :Link By following the link from trailer, all objects can be referred to. 4. Detection mechanism
  • 41. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of PDF:Encryption 41 Structure of a PDF document enctypted Encryption applies to almost all strings and streams in the PDF file. Leaving the other object types unencrypted allows random access to the objects within a document. (except for the object stored in ObjStm) Trailer Document information Document catalog Outline hierarchy Page tree Page Page Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image :Object :Link 4. Detection mechanism
  • 42. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Structure of PDF:ObjStm (Object Streams) 42 ObjStm (Object Streams) are introduced in PDF 1.5. The purpose of ObjStm is to allow indirect objects other than streams to be stored more compactly by using the facilities provided by stream compression filters. ( PDF32000-1:2008 7.5.7) Packing Compressing Encryption 4. Detection mechanism
  • 43. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (F) Unaccounted-for section 43 PDF Document Comment(Header) Body Cross-reference table Trailer Comment(EOF) Executable file Classifying objects into four elements from the head of a file, there is data which cannot be classified. 4. Detection Mechanism
  • 44. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan (G) Unreferenced object 44 Executable file A PDF file embedded with a executable files When an executable file is inserted as an object in disregard of document structure, it is often unreferenced. Executable file :Object embedded with an executable file Trailer Document information Document catalog Outline hierarchy Page tree Page Page Content stream Annotations Content stream Thumbnail image :Object :Link 4. Detection mechanism
  • 45. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Executable file (H) Camouflaged Stream 45 Camouflaged Filter Putting to the end of Streams Regular Stream EOD End-of-data marker Data used for decoding (Decoding is successful.) Data which is not used for decoding When the filter is FlateDecode, DCTDecode or JBIG2Decode, entropy Plain Text small FlateDecode big Execution file big An attacker camouflages as the object is using the filter of which value of entropy is similar to the value of entropy of executable files. (Decoding goes wrong.) 4. Detection mechanism
  • 46. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Malicious documents Clean documents File type Extension Quantity Average size(KB) Quantity Average size(KB) Rich Text rtf 98 266.5 199 516.2 doc 36 252.2 1,195 106.1 CFB xls 49 180.4 298 191.7 jtd/jtdc 17 268.5 - - PDF pdf 164 351.2 9,109 101.7 Total 364 291.8 10,801 322.7 Experiment 46 Document files used for targeted email attacks from 2009 to 2012※1 Clean document files classified according to contagio a malware dump site※2 ※1:Rich Text by which the extension was camouflaged by doc is counted as rtf. ※2:http://contagiodump.blogspot.jp/2013/03/16800-clean-and-11960- malicious-files.html 4. Detection mechanism
  • 47. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Detection rate of o-checker 47 99.0% 77.5% 90.2% 97.1% 96.1% 49.4% 43.9% 63.4% 99.0% 98.0% 99.4% Rich Text CFB PDF o-checker 4. Detection mechanism (A) Attached data after EOF (B) Anomaly file size (C) Data not referred from FAT (D) Free sector in the last sector (E) Unaccounted-for sector (F) Unaccounted-for section (G) Unreferenced object (H) Camouflaged stream
  • 48. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 5. DEMO 48
  • 49. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Output of o-checker 49 C:¥tmp>pdfanalysis.py a.pdf 00000000-00000008:comment, 00000009-0000000F:comment, 00000010-00000110:obj 25 0 old(not used) 00000111-00000197:obj 26 0 old(not used) : 00003622-000036B0:trailer 000036B1-000036C2:startxref 00003617 000036C3-000036C9:comment, 000036CA-0000E9E2:unknown 0000E9E3-0000E9E9:comment, 0000E9EA-0000EAEA:obj 25 0 ObjStm [7, 8, 13] : 0001209D-000120A3:comment, 000120A4-000120A7:unknown FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 7 0 xref from None FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 8 0 xref from None : Offset address Classification result Decoy Document ObjStm 5. Demo
  • 50. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Judgment option 50 C:¥tmp>pdfanalysis.py a.pdf -j 00000000-00000008:comment, 00000009-0000000F:comment, 00000010-00000110:obj 25 0 old(not used) 00000111-00000197:obj 26 0 old(not used) : : 0001209D-000120A3:comment, FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 7 0 xref from None FFFFFFFF-FFFFFFFF:obj 8 0 xref from None : Malicious! “-j” is a judgment option. The three judgment types “Malicious!”, “Suspicious!” or “None!” will be shown at the end of an output. 5. Demo
  • 51. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 51 DEMO 1
  • 52. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 6. APPLICATION 52
  • 53. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Application to NIDS 53 Network cable NIDS o-checker Packet Capture Reconstruct e-mails Alert o-checker can be introduced into an existing system without updating. 6. Application
  • 54. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan NIDS Problems of the application 54 o-checker Alert Failure to recover e-mails ~2% Broken document files ~2% False positive up ~2% False positives increases because of the performance of e-mail recovering software. Network cable Packet Capture Reconstruct e-mails 6. Application
  • 55. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan NIDS Enhanced o-checker 55 new o-checker Alert Deselection of broken document files based on structural analysis of file formats Network cable Packet Capture Reconstruct e-mails Failure to recover e-mails ~2% Broken document files ~2% False positive up ~0% 6. Application
  • 56. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan o-checker Application to android (1) 56 Mail server Manual delete Manual check
  • 57. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 57 DEMO 2
  • 58. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan E-mailer o-checker Application to android (2) 58 Mail server Auto delete Auto check
  • 59. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 7. CONCLUSION 59
  • 60. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan Conclusion 60 • Tradition detectional method reaches its limit. • Structural analysis of file formats is effective to detect malicious document files that have embedded executable files. • Various application of o-checker is possible. Because it can detect malicious documents by high probability at high speed. 7. Conclusion
  • 61. CODE BLUE Feb.17 (Mon) - 18 (Tue), 2014 Tokyo, Japan 61 Thank you!