ICSA 2019 Architectural Security Weaknesses in Industrial Control Systems

The Radiflow-NEC solution uses two-factor authentication and firewall rules enforced by Radiflow routers to securely limit industrial control system access during remote or on-site maintenance to specific devices and commands. NEC's physical security solutions combine with Radiflow's ruggedized routers to authenticate technicians' identities and continuously monitor their locations, only granting access to the devices and areas necessary to perform maintenance tasks. Any violations of the rules are instantly blocked and alerts are sent to the control center along with network traffic logs and video footage.

This document summarizes a research paper that proposes a design for a secure, Wi-Fi integrated electricity meter called an Impregnable Device for Secured Metering (IDSM). The IDSM consists of a sophisticated meter with additional security features compared to traditional meters. It uses Wi-Fi communication, a microcontroller, and a centralized monitoring and control unit. Random number addressing cryptography (RAC) is chosen as the most secure encryption technique. The meter in each home connects via a wireless network to a server that calculates billing amounts and sends updates to be displayed on the home meter, reducing labor while increasing transparency. The design aims to provide secure communication at high speeds with an advanced metering system and unique database backend.

This document summarizes an embedded web server based interactive data acquisition and control system. The system uses an ARM9 processor running RTLinux to both acquire data from sensors and control industrial devices. It allows remote monitoring and control via a web browser. The ARM9 handles data acquisition, control functions, and an embedded web server simultaneously. Analog sensor signals are converted to digital with an ADC and stored in external memory. The web server portion allows clients to access the stored data and send control instructions via HTML pages. This embedded single-board solution provides reliable real-time data acquisition and remote control capabilities with low resource usage.

This document provides an overview of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. It describes the basic hardware and software architecture of SCADA, including distributed databases, data servers, PLCs, and control programs in the field. The document also outlines key SCADA functionality such as access control, HMI, trending, alarm handling, logging, archiving, report generation, and automation capabilities. SCADA systems are typically used in industrial processes and facilities to monitor and control equipment and processes.

A Distributed Control System (DCS) integrates multiple process controllers and PLCs to monitor and control distributed equipment remotely. There are several types of DCS including Smart DCS and SixTrak IPm. When choosing a DCS system, factors like reliability, compatibility, graphical interface, processing speed, cost and ease of use must be considered. DCS systems have advantages like robustness, flexibility and security but also disadvantages like component costs and difficulty of programming and maintenance. Major DCS manufacturers include Honeywell, ABB and Siemens. In Saudi Arabia, DCS systems are used by companies like Saudi Aramco, power plants and factories.

SCADA systems are one of the most important part of industrial operations. Before SCADA, plant personnel had to monitor and control industrial process via selector switches, pushbuttons and dials for analog signals. As manufacturing grew and sites became more remote, relays and timers were used to assist supervision. With the onset of technology and advent of network based protocols, these systems became more reliable, fast and it became easy to troubleshoot problems. Indeed progress also brings vulnerabilities, which was no new for SCADA. The IP protocols brought threat to the security of these systems. The devastation that cyber predators on SCADA can inflict, could be illustrated by the Stuxnet virus attack. This paper discusses what SCADA systems are, their uses, protocols being used by these systems, vulnerabilities and ways to combat those vulnerabilities. It focusses on the use of Blockchain Technology as a step in security of such systems. Diksha Chhonkar | Garima Pandey "SCADA Systems: Vulnerabilities and Blockchain Technology" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-4 | Issue-4 , June 2020, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd31586.pdf Paper Url :https://www.ijtsrd.com/computer-science/computer-security/31586/scada-systems-vulnerabilities-and-blockchain-technology/diksha-chhonkar

Industrial control systems like SCADA are critical to national infrastructure but pose security challenges. They control crucial systems like pipelines and electrical utilities. While initially proprietary, SCADA systems now use open standards and IT components, making them vulnerable to cyber attacks which could have catastrophic impacts. A defense-in-depth strategy is needed, combining network segmentation, firewalls, log collection, and host and network intrusion prevention/detection to secure these vital systems.

This document provides an overview of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. It discusses key components of SCADA including field instrumentation, remote stations, communication networks, and central monitoring stations. It also describes common SCADA configurations, modes of communication, and differences between SCADA and DCS systems. The goal is to introduce SCADA basics and provide context for those familiar and unfamiliar with these systems.

Bogdan Matache is a cyber security specialist with over 15 years of experience in IT, energy, and industrial control systems. He has penetration tested and hacked several industrial control and IoT systems, including fuel pumps, asphalt stations, cars, drones, and smart home devices. Matache now works as an auditor at EnerSec, focusing on cyber security for the energy sector. He discusses the growth of IoT and risks of attacks against availability, integrity and confidentiality in both SCADA and IoT systems. Matache also outlines common attack types, hardware, software and malware used to target these systems.

The document discusses standards for cybersecurity in the energy sector. It notes that threats are increasing as energy infrastructure becomes more connected and data-driven. The document outlines some key cybersecurity standards for the energy industry including NERC CIP, IEEE1686, and IEC 62351. It maps these standards based on their level of technical detail and completeness. The document also discusses best practices for cybersecurity including technological and operational controls and how standards relate to controls for protection, detection and response.

This document discusses cyber security concerns regarding smart grid technology integration. It outlines how increased data sharing and connectivity between new and legacy systems introduces new cyber vulnerabilities. It then summarizes existing cyber security standards from organizations like ISO, NERC, and IEC that can provide frameworks for addressing these vulnerabilities. Finally, it notes challenges integrating new technologies with legacy systems and the need for a strategic roadmap to help guide secure technology adoption.

Smart grids is an added communication capabilities and intelligence to traditional grids,smart grids are enabled by Intelligent sensors and actuators, Extended data management system,Expanded two way communication between utility operation system facilities and customers,Network security ,National integration ,Self healing and adaptive –Improve distribution and transmission system operation,Allow customers freedom to purchase power based on dynamic pricing ,Improved quality of power-less wastage ,Integration of large variety of generation options. We have seen the more complex and critical infrastructure the more vulnerable they are. From the Year of 1994 we have seen lots of incidents where SmartGrid were Hacked the latest and booming incident was Stuxnet Worm which targeted Nuclear Power System of Iran and Worldwide.There are different types of Attacks we will see. Security needed for Smart Grid.