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Questions tagged [philosophy]

Questions involving philosophy of mathematics. Please consider if Philosophy Stack Exchange is a better site to post your question.

-1 votes
0 answers
48 views

Gödel Incompleteness theorems - gap between first order logic and arithmetic

I have a doubt concerning Gödel's incompleteness theorem which might be stupid but that makes me uneasy. If I'm not mistaken, Gödels proof is broadly undertaken using first order formulas, numbering ...
user1358735's user avatar
4 votes
0 answers
85 views

(When) are recursive "definitions" definitions?

This is a "soft" question, but I'm greatly interested in canvassing opinions on it. I don't know whether there is anything like a consensus on the answer. Under what conditions (if any) are ...
ac2357's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
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What are the criteria for a subject to be under the domain of mathematics [duplicate]

It is to my understanding that mathematics is in some way the domain of all logical systems. However unconventional, as long as certain criterias are met, they could be considered as part of ...
Arden Tsang's user avatar
9 votes
4 answers
959 views

Proof by Contradiction: "Bad Form" or "Finest Weapon"? Reconciling Perspectives [duplicate]

G.H. Hardy famously described proof by contradiction as "one of a mathematician's finest weapons." However, I've encountered claims that some schools of thought consider proof by ...
Nagaraju Chukkala's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
93 views

Confused about abstract models for axiomatic systems

I am studying axiomatic systems and I have a hard time understanding how one is supposed to come up with an "abstract" model for an axiomatic system. I will use the following example taken ...
ado sar's user avatar
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0 votes
0 answers
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statements that can be accepted by finitists.

"On the finitist view, the formula $\exists n P(n)$ is meaningful only when it is used as a statement specifying how to calculate an $n$ for which $P(n)$ is true". It is mentioned as above ...
nilpotent's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
229 views

Why do we use real numbers for (for example) masses in physics and how do we verify product axioms? [closed]

I have studied the definition of real numbers as V.A.Zorich explains it in his first book Mathematical Analysis I. Basically, he says that any set of objects that respects a certain list of properties ...
Nameless's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
104 views

Why Does This Proof Hold?

I'm currently reading "Mathematics Without Numbers" by Hellman, G., and I'm on pages 26-27. It seems like Hellman is discussing opposition to viewing mathematical proofs solely through the ...
유준상's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
129 views

Why do we need a metatheory if we can include self-referencing language in the object theory?

I am wondering why we need to have a metatheory in order to talk about a theory- why can't we just add self-referencing terms to the language of the formal system on which the theory itself is based, ...
Princess Mia's user avatar
  • 3,019
3 votes
2 answers
111 views

What is the formal system when we are using many different sets of axioms?

I am just starting to learn about formal systems, and have learnt that the many axiom systems in Mathematics, such as those of plane geometry, Peano's axioms, vector axioms, etc. can each be used to ...
Princess Mia's user avatar
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2 votes
1 answer
133 views

Definite description in homotopy type theory

I asked this question there and I have been suggested to ask it here. In a paper by David Corfield, we have an account of definite description in homotopy type theory. The author gives the following ...
Bruno's user avatar
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1 vote
0 answers
120 views

Are quasi-sets (and therefore Schrödinger logic(s)) studied by mathematicians or are they purely in the domain of philosophers?

Context: I'm a fan of different kinds of logic. I'm conflicted about whether different logics actually exist beyond, say, a philosophical oddity. The Question: Are quasi-sets (and therefore ...
Shaun's user avatar
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3 votes
2 answers
125 views

Creating larger structures from smaller ones without an explicit construction

I'm asking this question as a replacement for my previous one, which I admit isn't clear, and which I am voting to close. Hopefully I'll be clearer now. Admittedly, I'm not sure if this question ...
jvf's user avatar
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2 votes
2 answers
161 views

Is everything an object in Math, just like in Objected-Oriented Programming? (Tao's Analysis I)

I am reading Tao's Analysis I, and there are a number of passages which seem to suggest an object-oriented point of view of mathematics reminiscent of the object-oriented programming with which I, as ...
Princess Mia's user avatar
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-2 votes
2 answers
152 views

Why is addition not completely defined here?

Say for the natural numbers, we define addition this way: $0 + 0 = 0$, and if $n+m = x$, then $S(n) + m = n+S(m) = S(x) $ Say we have the regular Peano axioms, except we delete the axiom of ...
Princess Mia's user avatar
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3 votes
1 answer
136 views

Which forcing technique implies "every set is countable from some perspective"? Which notion of "the same set" is used between models?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-skolem/ contains this claim: Further, the multiverse conception leads naturally to the kinds of conclusions traditional Skolemites tended to favor. Let $a$ ...
truth_enjoyer's user avatar
0 votes
2 answers
72 views

Trying to understand how numbers themselves (s0, ss0, sss0, etc) are represented in Gödel numbering

Problem solved: I did not actually read the table given on page 70 of nagel and newman. s does have a Godel number. It's 7. So ss0 would be broken down into 7, 7, and 6, since 0 is given the number 6. ...
Devery Sheridan's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
33 views

On motivations of continuous geometry

The development of continuous geometry as an abstract field seems to be following a trend of removing the significance of low-dimensional entities from geometry. As classical treatments of geometry ...
Aryan's user avatar
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2 votes
1 answer
134 views

Can the fundamental theorems of real analysis be proven/developed without proof by contradiction?

I've been reading about philosophical debates between mathematicians, and some seemed to reject the ideas of real analysis (such as the extreme value theorem) based on a school called "...
boley's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
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Mathematical Induction: Strong vs Weak Form

I have a rather naive question: The usual mathematical induction works by the same scheme: Let $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ a pos integer and $A(k), n_0 \le k \in \mathbb{N}$ family of statements. Then the &...
user267839's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
231 views

Are there any problems about the difference between set theoretic definitions of polynomials?

I am a novice about this question, so if there is a misunderstanding then I apologize for it. As for Peano axioms, if I choose Zermelo natural numbers, and you choose von Neumann ones, then this doesn'...
categoricalequivalent's user avatar
3 votes
0 answers
78 views

Why pullback of ideal sheaf should be the conormal sheaf?

I'm sorry that this isn't really a math question, but this gap between my intuition and the truth bothers me. For closed subvariety (for simplicity) with ideal sheaf $\mathcal{I}$, the pullback $i^*(\...
okabe rintarou's user avatar
0 votes
2 answers
75 views

For every object, is there a unique notion of isomorphism?

Do you think that, according to most mathematicians, the following claim holds? (Claim) For every object, there is a unique notion of isomorphism. Perhaps one might think that for some sets, such as $(...
andpersand's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
284 views

doesn't the independency phenomenon make a case for non-classical logic? [closed]

alright, this question is philosophical and somewhat fuzzy. i also admit to knowing little about logic. all in all, this question can possibly be easily resolved by either pointing to (perhaps even ...
windfish's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
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What is the logical system of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus?

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus states simply that 6 The general form of the truth function is: $[\bar p, \bar\xi, N(\bar \xi)]$. This is the general form of the sentence. Wikipedia and other sources ...
MaudPieTheRocktorate's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
114 views

Finitists reject the Axiom of Infinity - are there groups who reject the others?

I've seen rejections of the Axiom of Infinity. This is called finitism. Some ultrafinitists even add the negation of the Axiom of Infinity. Definitely doable. I've seen rejections of the Axiom of ...
Amitai's user avatar
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2 votes
2 answers
83 views

Is there a term for the idea that mathematical objects are defined by their relationships?

In a recent Veritasium video discussing Euclid's Elements, Alex Kontorovich comments that Euclid's definitions of primitive objects (e.g. "A point is that which has no part.") are absurd and ...
Richard's user avatar
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0 votes
1 answer
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Conceptual Question regarding Shannon Entropy and bits

It is said that the number of "information bits" contained in a certain piece of information can be roughly translated as the number of yes/no-questions that would have to be answered in ...
Xerxes123's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
65 views

Do we ever reason about a non-associative algebra without embedding it in an associative algebra?

This question most certainly contains some errors in phrasing. It is on the subject of the philosophy of mathematics, and it is hard to stay precise when reaching towards the fundamentals of math. ...
Cort Ammon's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
119 views

A philosophical question on the nature of mathematics [closed]

I had a seemingly simply question today, that goes as following. What do we need for a mathematics to exist in a universe, or a system, more broadly speaking? Is it a matter of having the ability to ...
tadas turonis's user avatar

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