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libinjectionFrom SQLi to XSS
Nick Galbreath @ngalbreath!
Signal Sciences Corp!
nickg@signalsciences.com
Code Blue ∙ Tokyo ∙ 2014-02-17
Nick Galbreath

@ngalbreath
• Founder/CTO of Signal Sciences Corp
• Before: IponWeb (Moscow, Tokyo)
• Before: Etsy (New York City)
What is libinjection?
• A small C-library to detect SQLi attacks in user-
input
• With API in python, lua and php
• Introduced at Black Hat USA 2012
• Open source with BSD license
• https://github.com/client9/libinjection
Why libinjection?
• Existing detection is mostly done with regular expressions
• No unit tests
• No performance (speed) tests
• No coverage tests
• No accuracy or precision tests
• No false positive tests
• “what are they actually doing?”

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libinjection SQLi Today
• Version 3.9.1
• 8000 unique SQLi fingerprints
• 400+ unit tests
• 85,000+ SQLi samples
In Use At
• mod_security WAF - http://www.modsecurity.org/
• ironbee WAF - https://www.ironbee.com/
• glastopf honeypot - http://glastopf.org/
• proprietary WAFs
• internally at many companies
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XSS
Similar to SQLi
• No standard detection library
• Few if any have tests
• Regular expression based detection
• Can we do better?

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• HTML injection attacks
• Javascript injection attacks
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• Attacks existing javascript code.
• Detection can truly be done on client
• A very hard problem
HTML Injection
• HTML injection are attacks against the HTML
tokenization algorithm 

(text “<b>foo</b>” to tags <b>, foo, </b>)
• The goal is to change the context to ‘javascript’ and
execute arbitrary code.
• This seems detectable.
HTML Injection Samples
<b>XSS</b> (raw HTML)

<foo XSS> (tag attribute from user input)

<foo name=XSS> (tag value from user input)

<foo name='XSS'> (quoted value)

<foo name="XSS"> (quoted value)

<foo name=`XSS`> (IE only!)

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Available Now
• Available on github
• http://libinjection.client9.com/
• but… still alpha
$ make test-xss
./reader -t -i -x -m 10 ../data/xss*
../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 149 False test 62_1 <x '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//'>
../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 151 False test 62_2 <! '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(2)//'>
../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 153 False test 62_3 <? '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(3)//'>
../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 352 False test 102 <img src="x` `<script>alert(1)</script>"` `>
../data/xss-soaj1664ashar-pastebin-u6FY1xDA.txt 96 False 92) <--`<img/src=` onerror=alert(1)> --!>
../data/xss-soaj1664ashar.txt21 False <form/action=ja&Tab;vascr&Tab;ipt&colon;confirm(document.cookie)>
<button/type=submit>
../data/xss-xenotix.txt 17 False "'`><?img src=xxx:x onerror=javascript:alert(1)>
../data/xss-xenotix.txt 19 False '`"><?script>javascript:alert(1)</script>
../data/xss-xenotix.txt 610 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)>
../data/xss-xenotix.txt 613 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)>
../data/xss-xenotix.txt 615 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)>
!
XSS : 1628
SAFE : 11
TOTAL : 1639
!
Threshold is 10, got 11, failing.
1639 Total Samples
1628 Detected as XSS
11 False Negatives
IE Unbalanced Quotes
• IE 8+ has strange behaviour with ‘unbalanced
quotes’ inside comments and attribute values.
• Work in progress
Performance
500,000+ 

checks per second

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libinjection: from SQLi to XSS  by Nick Galbreath

  • 1. libinjectionFrom SQLi to XSS Nick Galbreath @ngalbreath! Signal Sciences Corp! nickg@signalsciences.com Code Blue ∙ Tokyo ∙ 2014-02-17
  • 2. Nick Galbreath
 @ngalbreath • Founder/CTO of Signal Sciences Corp • Before: IponWeb (Moscow, Tokyo) • Before: Etsy (New York City)
  • 3. What is libinjection? • A small C-library to detect SQLi attacks in user- input • With API in python, lua and php • Introduced at Black Hat USA 2012 • Open source with BSD license • https://github.com/client9/libinjection
  • 4. Why libinjection? • Existing detection is mostly done with regular expressions • No unit tests • No performance (speed) tests • No coverage tests • No accuracy or precision tests • No false positive tests • “what are they actually doing?”
  • 5. libinjection SQLi Today • Version 3.9.1 • 8000 unique SQLi fingerprints • 400+ unit tests • 85,000+ SQLi samples
  • 6. In Use At • mod_security WAF - http://www.modsecurity.org/ • ironbee WAF - https://www.ironbee.com/ • glastopf honeypot - http://glastopf.org/ • proprietary WAFs • internally at many companies • partial pure-java port
  • 7. XSS
  • 8. Similar to SQLi • No standard detection library • Few if any have tests • Regular expression based detection • Can we do better?
  • 9. Two Types of XSS • HTML injection attacks • Javascript injection attacks
  • 10. XSS Javascript Injection • Includes DOM-style attacks • Attacks existing javascript code. • Detection can truly be done on client • A very hard problem
  • 11. HTML Injection • HTML injection are attacks against the HTML tokenization algorithm 
 (text “<b>foo</b>” to tags <b>, foo, </b>) • The goal is to change the context to ‘javascript’ and execute arbitrary code. • This seems detectable.
  • 12. HTML Injection Samples <b>XSS</b> (raw HTML) <foo XSS> (tag attribute from user input) <foo name=XSS> (tag value from user input) <foo name='XSS'> (quoted value) <foo name="XSS"> (quoted value) <foo name=`XSS`> (IE only!)
  • 13. Browser HTML Tokenization • Previously every browser parsed or tokenised HTML differently. • This lead to a number of different attacks using broken html tags, special characters or encodings. • Now, most browsers now use the same algorithm specified by HTML5.
  • 14. > 65% are HTML5 http://tnw.co/1cqFueo
  • 17. The remainder are IE • And IE only has a few versions • And has some well-known exceptions to the HTML5 parsing rules.
  • 18. IE6 and IE7 • IE7 has only 2% of market share • IE6 will, in time, go away. • Both are likely running on 10 year old machine.
  • 19. IE8 • Somewhere between 10-20% marketshare • The most modern MS browser on Windows XP • Marketshare can only go down.
  • 20. Opera • 1.33% Global Market Share • But maybe 40% of that is ‘Opera Mini’ for phone or embedded systems • Opera has a lot of oddities in HTML functionality and parsing • Ignoring
  • 22. HTML injection attacks
 in HTML5 clients. • No: XML / XSLT injection • No: Any injection for IE6, IE7, Opera, FF and Chrome older than a year. • No: DOM style attacks (need a client solution)
  • 23. libinjection html5 • Full HTML5 Tokenizer. • Does not build a tree or DOMs • Just emits tokenizer events. • Zero copying of data
  • 24. Tokenization Sample TAG_NAME_OPEN img ATTR_NAME src ATTR_VALUE junk ATTR_NAME onerror ATTR_VALUE alert(1); TAG_NAME_CLOSE > <img src=“junk” onerror=alert(1);>
  • 25. Check in each Context Each input is parsed in at least 6 different HTML contexts, because thats how XSS works! <b>XSS</b> (raw HTML) <foo XSS> (tag attribute from user input) <foo name=XSS> (tag value from user input) <foo name='XSS'> (quoted value) <foo name="XSS"> (quoted value) <foo name=`XSS`> (IE only!)
  • 26. Ban Problematic Tokens • Problematic tags, attributes, and values are cataloged. • Tags: <script>, anything XML or SVG related • Attributes: on*, etc • Values: javascript URLs in various formats • and more…
  • 28. XSS Cheat sheets • Most are outdated (exploits for Firefox 3! ) • sorry OWASP :-( • Each entry validated to make sure they are valid for HTML5 browsers.
  • 29. HTML5SEC.org • Fantastic resource • But lists many examples for Firefox 3 and/or obsolete Opera versions • Pruned to focus on HTML5 browsers
  • 30. @soaj1664ashar • Produces interesting new XSS regularly • If you like XSS you should follow him on Twitter
  • 31. Attack / Scanners • Integrate one scanner’s test cases • Using Shazzer fuzz databases - http://shazzer.co.uk/
  • 33. Available Now • Available on github • http://libinjection.client9.com/ • but… still alpha
  • 34. $ make test-xss ./reader -t -i -x -m 10 ../data/xss* ../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 149 False test 62_1 <x '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//'> ../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 151 False test 62_2 <! '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(2)//'> ../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 153 False test 62_3 <? '="foo"><x foo='><img src=x onerror=alert(3)//'> ../data/xss-html5secorg.txt 352 False test 102 <img src="x` `<script>alert(1)</script>"` `> ../data/xss-soaj1664ashar-pastebin-u6FY1xDA.txt 96 False 92) <--`<img/src=` onerror=alert(1)> --!> ../data/xss-soaj1664ashar.txt21 False <form/action=ja&Tab;vascr&Tab;ipt&colon;confirm(document.cookie)> <button/type=submit> ../data/xss-xenotix.txt 17 False "'`><?img src=xxx:x onerror=javascript:alert(1)> ../data/xss-xenotix.txt 19 False '`"><?script>javascript:alert(1)</script> ../data/xss-xenotix.txt 610 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)> ../data/xss-xenotix.txt 613 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)> ../data/xss-xenotix.txt 615 False `"'><img src=xxx:x ?onerror=javascript:alert(1)> ! XSS : 1628 SAFE : 11 TOTAL : 1639 ! Threshold is 10, got 11, failing. 1639 Total Samples 1628 Detected as XSS 11 False Negatives
  • 35. IE Unbalanced Quotes • IE 8+ has strange behaviour with ‘unbalanced quotes’ inside comments and attribute values. • Work in progress
  • 37. TODO 2014-02-17 • It’s alpha — so it’s likely to have some spectacular failures (bypasses) • False-positive QA not completed. • Currently does not handle some IE injections • Does not have a test-bed for experimenting 
 (maybe later this week). • More QA, code-coverage needed • No bindings for scripting languages (soon).