INTRODUCTION
Cyber intrusions into US Critical Infrastructure systems are happening with increased frequency. For many industrial control systems (ICSs), it’s not a matter of if an intrusion will take place, but when. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, 295 incidents were reported to ICS-CERT, and many more went unreported or undetected. The capabilities of our adversaries have been demonstrated and cyber incidents are increasing in frequency and complexity. Simply building a
network with a hardened perimeter is no longer adequate. Securing ICSs against the modern threat requires well-planned and well-implemented strategies that will provide network defense
teams a chance to quickly and effectively detect, counter, and expel an adversary. This paper presents seven strategies that can be implemented today to counter common exploitable
weaknesses in “as-built” control systems.
Secure intrusion detection and countermeasure selection in virtual system usi...
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology
1. The document discusses intrusion detection systems and proposes a cluster-based intrusion detection system for wireless sensor networks.
2. It proposes a multi-level intrusion detection architecture with detection at both the cluster head and network-wide levels.
3. The proposed system would detect intrusions through anomaly detection and has been evaluated through a survey of 50 experts in the field.
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words in
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words in your reply. Indicate at least one source or reference in your original post. Please see syllabus for details on submission requirements.
Module 1 Discussion Question
Search "scholar.google.com" for a company, school, or person that has been the target of a network
or system intrusion? What information was targeted? Was the attack successful? If so, what changes
were made to ensure that this vulnerability was controlled? If not, what mechanisms were in-place to protect against the intrusion.
Reply-1(Shravan)
Introduction:
Interruption location frameworks (IDSs) are programming or equipment frameworks that robotize the way toward observing the occasions happening in a PC framework or system, examining them for indications of security issues. As system assaults have expanded in number and seriousness in the course of recent years, interruption recognition frameworks have turned into an essential expansion to the security foundation of generally associations. This direction archive is planned as a preliminary in interruption recognition, created for the individuals who need to comprehend what security objectives interruption location components serve, how to choose and design interruption discovery frameworks for their particular framework and system situations, how to deal with the yield of interruption identification frameworks, and how to incorporate interruption recognition capacities with whatever remains of the authoritative security foundation. References to other data sources are likewise accommodated the peruse who requires particular or more point by point guidance on particular interruption identification issues.
In the most recent years there has been an expanding enthusiasm for the security of process control and SCADA frameworks. Moreover, ongoing PC assaults, for example, the Stunt worm, host appeared there are gatherings with the inspiration and assets to viably assault control frameworks.
While past work has proposed new security components for control frameworks, few of them have investigated new and in a general sense distinctive research issues for anchoring control frameworks when contrasted with anchoring conventional data innovation (IT) frameworks. Specifically, the complexity of new malware assaulting control frameworks - malware including zero-days assaults, rootkits made for control frameworks, and programming marked by confided in declaration specialists - has demonstrated that it is exceptionally hard to avert and identify these assaults dependent on IT framework data.
In this paper we demonstrate how, by joining information of the physical framework under control, we can distinguish PC assaults that change the conduct of the focused on control framework. By utilizing information of the physical framework we can center around the last goal of the assault, and not on the specific instruments of how vulnerabilities are misused, and how ...
Evasion Streamline Intruders Using Graph Based Attacker model Analysis and Co...Editor IJCATR
Network Intrusion detection and Countermeasure Election in virtual network systems (NICE) are used to establish a
defense-in-depth intrusion detection framework. For better attack detection, NICE incorporates attack graph analytical procedures into
the intrusion detection processes. We must note that the design of NICE does not intend to improve any of the existing intrusion
detection algorithms; indeed, NICE employs a reconfigurable virtual networking approach to detect and counter the attempts to
compromise VMs, thus preventing zombie VMs. NICE includes two main phases: deploy a lightweight mirroring-based network
intrusion detection agent (NICE-A) on each cloud server to capture and analyze cloud traffic. A NICE-A periodically scans the virtual
system vulnerabilities within a cloud server to establish Scenario Attack Graph (SAGs), and then based on the severity of identified
vulnerability toward the collaborative attack goals, NICE will decide whether or not to put a VM in network inspection state. Once a
VM enters inspection state, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is applied, and/or virtual network reconfigurations can be deployed to the
inspecting VM to make the potential attack behaviors prominent.
Secure intrusion detection and countermeasure selection in virtual system usi...eSAT Publishing House
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology
1. The document discusses intrusion detection systems and proposes a cluster-based intrusion detection system for wireless sensor networks.
2. It proposes a multi-level intrusion detection architecture with detection at both the cluster head and network-wide levels.
3. The proposed system would detect intrusions through anomaly detection and has been evaluated through a survey of 50 experts in the field.
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words inmaribethy2y
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words in your reply. Indicate at least one source or reference in your original post. Please see syllabus for details on submission requirements.
Module 1 Discussion Question
Search "scholar.google.com" for a company, school, or person that has been the target of a network
or system intrusion? What information was targeted? Was the attack successful? If so, what changes
were made to ensure that this vulnerability was controlled? If not, what mechanisms were in-place to protect against the intrusion.
Reply-1(Shravan)
Introduction:
Interruption location frameworks (IDSs) are programming or equipment frameworks that robotize the way toward observing the occasions happening in a PC framework or system, examining them for indications of security issues. As system assaults have expanded in number and seriousness in the course of recent years, interruption recognition frameworks have turned into an essential expansion to the security foundation of generally associations. This direction archive is planned as a preliminary in interruption recognition, created for the individuals who need to comprehend what security objectives interruption location components serve, how to choose and design interruption discovery frameworks for their particular framework and system situations, how to deal with the yield of interruption identification frameworks, and how to incorporate interruption recognition capacities with whatever remains of the authoritative security foundation. References to other data sources are likewise accommodated the peruse who requires particular or more point by point guidance on particular interruption identification issues.
In the most recent years there has been an expanding enthusiasm for the security of process control and SCADA frameworks. Moreover, ongoing PC assaults, for example, the Stunt worm, host appeared there are gatherings with the inspiration and assets to viably assault control frameworks.
While past work has proposed new security components for control frameworks, few of them have investigated new and in a general sense distinctive research issues for anchoring control frameworks when contrasted with anchoring conventional data innovation (IT) frameworks. Specifically, the complexity of new malware assaulting control frameworks - malware including zero-days assaults, rootkits made for control frameworks, and programming marked by confided in declaration specialists - has demonstrated that it is exceptionally hard to avert and identify these assaults dependent on IT framework data.
In this paper we demonstrate how, by joining information of the physical framework under control, we can distinguish PC assaults that change the conduct of the focused on control framework. By utilizing information of the physical framework we can center around the last goal of the assault, and not on the specific instruments of how vulnerabilities are misused, and how ...
This document identifies and categorizes various vulnerabilities and threats in cloud computing. It discusses 8 categories of threats: abuse of resources, insecure interfaces, technology sharing issues, data leakages, service hijacking, malicious insiders, data separation, and unknown risks. For each threat, it provides details on how attackers can exploit vulnerabilities as well as recommendations for cloud service providers to mitigate risks, such as implementing strong access controls, encryption, monitoring, and auditing. The conclusion states that while cloud computing is widely adopted, organizations must still be aware of security issues and work to address them.
Identified Vulnerabilitis And Threats In Cloud ComputingIOSR Journals
This document identifies and categorizes various vulnerabilities and threats in cloud computing. It discusses 8 categories of threats: abuse of resources, insecure interfaces, technology sharing issues, data leakages, service hijacking, malicious insiders, data separation, and unknown risks. For each threat, it provides details on how attackers can exploit vulnerabilities as well as recommendations for cloud service providers to mitigate risks, such as implementing strong access controls, encryption, monitoring, and auditing. The conclusion states that while cloud computing is widely adopted, organizations must still be aware of security issues and work to address them.
Gartner predicted that by the end of 2019, 90% of enterprise internet connections would be secured by next-generation firewalls. The document outlines key requirements for next-generation firewalls including identifying applications regardless of port or encryption, identifying users regardless of device or IP address, decrypting encrypted traffic, and protecting against known and unknown threats in real time with predictable multi-gigabit throughput. It discusses the need to close dangerous policy gaps left by legacy firewalls and the evolution of threats that exploit encryption to avoid detection.
Network security is a dynamic art, with dangers appearing as fast as black hats can exploit vulnerabilities. While there are basic “golden rules” which can make life difficult for the bad guys, it remains a challenge to keep networks secure. John Chambers, Executive Chairman of Cisco, famously said “there are two types of companies: those that have been hacked, and those who don’t know they have been hacked”. The question for most organizations isn’t if they’re going to be breached, but how quickly they can isolate and mitigate the threat. In this paper, we’ll examine best practices for effective cybersecurity – from both a proactive (access hardening) and reactive (threat isolation and mitigation) perspective. We’ll address how network automation can help minimize cyberattacks by closing vulnerability gaps and how it can improve incident response times in the event of a cyberthreat. Finally, we’ll lay a vision for continuous network security, to explore how machine-to-machine automation may deliver an auto-securing and self-healing network.
Go to www.esgjrconsultinginc.com
Toward Continuous Cybersecurity With Network AutomationKen Flott
Network security is a dynamic art, with dangers appearing as
fast as black hats can exploit vulnerabilities. While there are
basic “golden rules” which can make life difficult for the bad
guys, it remains a challenge to keep networks secure. John
Chambers, Executive Chairman of Cisco, famously said “there
are two types of companies: those that have been hacked, and
those who don’t know they have been hacked”. The question
for most organizations isn’t if they’re going to be breached, but
how quickly they can isolate and mitigate the threat.
In this paper, we’ll examine best practices for effective
cybersecurity – from both a proactive (access hardening)
and reactive (threat isolation and mitigation) perspective.
We’ll address how network automation can help minimize
cyberattacks by closing vulnerability gaps and how it can
improve incident response times in the event of a cyberthreat.
Finally, we’ll lay a vision for continuous network security, to
explore how machine-to-machine automation may deliver an
auto-securing and self-healing network.
TACTiCS_WP Security_Addressing Security in SDN EnvironmentSaikat Chaudhuri
This document discusses addressing security concerns in SDN environments. It proposes an approach using an application on the SDN controller to monitor alerts from an IDS, analyze network traffic samples, and automate blocking of malicious flows. The application would function similarly to a security operations center (SOC) by correlating security events and taking action. The implementation is demonstrated using the OpenDaylight controller and Mininet virtual network, with SNORT for intrusion detection and sFlow for traffic sampling.
A vulnerability scanner is a software tool that discovers and inventories all networked systems, including servers, PCs, laptops, virtual machines, containers, firewalls, switches, and printers. It attempts to identify the operating system and software installed on each device it detects, as well as other characteristics such as open ports and user accounts.
CoreTrace Whitepaper: Application Whitelisting And Energy SystemsCoreTrace Corporation
Whitepaper Abstract
This white paper explains why application whitelisting is being rapidly adopted as a security and control solution for SCADA systems.
In three major sections, the paper:
Provides a detailed perspective on how application whitelisting technology works.
Discusses the use and benefits of whitelisting technologies in SCADA and Energy environments.
Explains how the technology is adapting to function in environments where controlled software changes are needed.
What is zero trust model of information security?Ahmed Banafa
The zero trust model of information security assumes there are no trusted interfaces, applications, traffic, networks, or users. It requires that all resources be accessed securely on a need-to-know basis and that systems verify and never trust. The model has shifted from protecting networks from outside attacks to also guarding against inside threats, as the primary attack vector has changed from outside-in to inside-out. Implementing a zero trust model involves deploying technologies like next-generation firewalls, sandboxing, and access control to securely verify all users and protect resources.
Project Quality-SIPOCSelect a process of your choice and creat.docxwkyra78
Project Quality-SIPOC
Select a process of your choice and create a SIPOC for this process. Explain the utility of a SIPOC in the context of project management.
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Application security in large enterprises (part 2)
Student Name:
) (
Instructor Name
)
Detailed Description:
Large enterprises of a thousand persons or more often have distinctly distinct data security architectures than lesser businesses. Typically they treat their data security as if they were still little companies.
This paper endeavors to demonstrate that not only do large businesses have an entire ecology of focused programs, specific to large businesses and their needs, but that this software has distinct security implications than buyer or small enterprise software. identifying these dissimilarities, and analyzing the way this can be taken advantage of by an attacker, is the key to both striking and keeping safe a large enterprise.
The Web applications are the important part of your business every day, they help you handle your intellectual property, increase your sales, and keep the trust of your customers. But there's the problem that applications re fast becoming the preferred attack vector of hackers. For this you really need something that makes your application secure.
And, with the persistent condition of today's attacks, applications can easily be get infected when security is not considered and scoped into each phase of the software development life cycle, from design to development to testing and ongoing maintenance of the application. When you take a holistic approach to your application security, you actually enhance your ability to produce and manage stable, secure applications. Applications need training and testing from the leading team of ethical hackers, for this there should be an authentic plan to recover these issues that can help an organization to plan, test, build and run applications smartly and safely.
Large enterprises of a thousand people or even more have distinctly different information security architectures than many other smaller companies. Actually, they treat their information security as if they were still small companies.
We are going to discuss some attempts to demonstrate that not only do large companies have an entire ecology of specialized software, specific to large companies and their needs, but that this software has different security implications than consumer or small business software for the applications. Recognizing these differences, and examining the way this can be taken advantage of by an attacker, is the key to both attacking and defending a large enterprise. It’s really important to cover up the security procedures in the large enterprise.
Key Features:
· Web application security checking from development through output
· Security check web APIs and world wide web services that support your enterprise
· Effortlessly organize, view and share security-test outcomes and histories
· Endow broader lifecycle adoption th ...
Network security involves implementing multiple layers of defenses to protect a network from threats. It includes technologies like firewalls, antivirus software, and intrusion detection systems to manage access and detect malware and exploits. As networks increasingly face hacking threats, strong network security tools are essential for organizations to protect their systems, data, and reputation. Network security strategies aim to authorize only legitimate users while blocking malicious actors from harming the network.
The document discusses a study and implementation of unified threat management (UTM) and web application firewall (WAF) at the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in India. It describes common internal and external threats organizations face, how UTM provides centralized security functions through a single management console, and how WAF protects against attacks like SQL injection, cross-site scripting, denial of service attacks, and session hijacking that target web applications. The advantages of UTM include reduced complexity, ease of deployment, and integration capabilities, while disadvantages include lower performance and potential vendor lock-in for large organizations.
In 3 sentences:
The document discusses information systems for supply chain management and identifies uncertainties, risks, and cybersecurity as key issues. It proposes a new approach for identifying and predicting supply risk under uncertain conditions and a complex solution for securing data in supply chain information systems. Several strategies are discussed for managing risks from new technologies like cloud computing, IoT devices, and DevOps services that are increasingly used in supply chain systems.
Similar to CISA GOV - Seven Steps to Effectively Defend ICS (20)
System Administrators are often on the front lines of computer security. This guide aims to support System Administrators in finding indications of a system compromise.
Vulnerabilities on the Wire: Mitigations for Insecure ICS Device CommunicationMuhammad FAHAD
Modbus, an industrial protocol used for server to client communication, has been
used for over 40 years and is still widely deployed in new ICS installations (Mostia,
2019). Modbus can be transported over serial mediums of RS232, RS485, or it can be
wrapped in an IEEE 802.3 TCP segment. Within TCP, the typical implementation is
Modbus Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) contained in the TCP/IP stack Application layer,
which can be easily viewed in Wireshark (Sanchez, 2017). Modbus uses simple function
calls combined with data range requests to read and write bits, called coils. Additionally,
it can also read and write integers or floats, called registers. When engineers were
encapsulating Modbus within TCP, cybersecurity concerns were nonexistent and,
therefore, Modbus RTU does not have any built-in security mechanisms (Rinaldi, n.d.).
From an ICS security perspective, Modbus is rife with many vulnerabilities and is subject
to Probe, Scan, Flood, Authentication Bypass, Spoof, Eavesdrop, Misdirect, Read/Copy,
Terminate, Execute, Modify, and Delete attacks (Draias, Serhrouchni, & Vogel, 2015)
This document provides guidelines for establishing effective computer security incident response capabilities. It assists organizations in creating incident response teams and processes for efficiently handling incidents. The guidelines can be applied independently of specific hardware, software, protocols or applications. The document recommends establishing planning, preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery as key phases in the incident response process.
Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks by U.S. Department of EnergyMuhammad FAHAD
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural gas, gasoline, water, waste
treatment, transportation) to all Americans. As such, they are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure and require protection from a variety of threats that exist in cyber space today. By allowing the collection and analysis of data and control of equipment such as pumps and valves from remote locations, SCADA networks provide great efficiency and are widely used. However, they also present a security risk. SCADA networks were initially designed to maximize functionality, with little attention paid to security. As a result, performance, reliability, flexibility and safety of distributed control/SCADA systems are robust, while the security of these systems is often weak. This makes some SCADA networks potentially vulnerable to disruption of service, process redirection, or manipulation of operational data that could result in public safety concerns and/or serious disruptions to the nation’s critical infrastructure. Action is required by all organizations, government or commercial, to secure their SCADA networks as part of the effort to adequately protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.
The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, and the Department of Energy, have developed the steps outlined here to help any organization improve the security of its SCADA networks. These steps are not meant to be prescriptive or all-inclusive. However, they do address essential actions to be taken to improve the
protection of SCADA networks. The steps are divided into two categories: specific actions to improve implementation, and actions to establish essential underlying management processes and policies.
The Cyber Kill Chain. 7 Stages of Cyber Kill Chain Supplementary ReadingMuhammad FAHAD
The “cyber kill chain” is a sequence of stages required for an
attacker to successfully infiltrate a network and exfiltrate data
from it. Each stage demonstrates a specific goal along the attacker’s
path. Designing your monitoring and response plan around the cyber kill chain model is an effective method because it focuses on
how actual attacks happen.
Common Malware Types Vulnerability ManagementMuhammad FAHAD
The document discusses common types of malware including viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, ransomware, rootkits, adware, bugs, and bots. It provides a brief definition of each type and explains how they spread and the harm they can cause. The document also discusses symptoms of malware infections and recommendations for prevention and removal, including using antivirus software, keeping systems updated, and being cautious of downloads.
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...Muhammad FAHAD
Dragos, Inc. was notified by the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET of an ICS tailored malware on June 8th, 2017. The Dragos team was able to use this notification to find samples of the malware, identify new functionality and impact scenarios, and confirm that this was the malware employed in the December 17th, 2016 cyber-attack on the Kiev, Ukraine transmission substation which resulted in electric grid operations impact. This report serves as an industry report to inform the electric sector and security community of the potential implications of this malware and the appropriate details to have a nuanced discussion
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control SystemsMuhammad FAHAD
Executive Summary
No industrial operation is free of risk, and different industrial enterprises may legitimately have different “appetites” for certain types of risks. Evaluating cyber risk in industrial control system (ICS) networks is difficult, considering their complex nature. For example, an evaluation can consider (explicitly or implicitly) up to hundreds of millions of branches of a complex attack tree modelling of cyberattacks interaction with cyber, physical, safety and protection equipment and processes. This paper was written to assist cyber professionals to understand and communicate the results of such risk assessments to non-technical business decision-makers.
This paper proposes that cyber risk be communicated as a Design Basis Threat (DBT) line drawn through a representative “Top 20” set of cyberattacks spread across a spectrum of attack sophistication. These Top 20 attacks have been selected to represent cyber threats to industrial sites across a wide range of circumstances, consequences and sophistication. Many industrial cyber risk practitioners will find the list useful as-is, while expert practitioners may choose to adapt the list to their more detailed understanding of their own sites’ circumstances.
Political polarization: threat to international cooperation.aimantahira
Political polarization is an existential threat to international cooperation. It undermines the ability of states to collaborate effectively over shared challenges, potentially hindering progress and across border communication on global issues that require coordinated actions. As per UNDP report, it has hijacked the domestic politics of USA so Pakistan with no exception. Ironically speaking, it is not just limited to state affairs but equally affects International treaties and agreements. So eventually influence the global integration. Hence the countries entrenched in partisan bickering find it challenging to forge the alliances necessary to tackle pressing global issues like climate change or international security.
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International Corporation is based on signed treatyaimantahira
is not merely based on a signed treaty or agreement or even as a result of membership of a certain block rather. In international Arena when countries collaborate, they do share some common believe systems in the form of progress, establishment of peace, improving the quality of life. This share believe system of values, norms, narratives as well as global perception (world view) largely compels the states to join hands. So the states start developing positive outlook (International Corporation) through social ties with the like minded States. Purpose of International Corporation is global common good, which is achieved through the method of Interdependence. States exhibit this interdependent through cross-border trade and connecting markets as per a shared economic agenda.
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This presentation by Edwin Hlangwani, BRICS Young Scientist at the University of Johannesburg, was part of the Expert Exchange "Youth Empowerment for a Just Energy Transition" held on June 18, 2024.
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Protection and referral for CBP members.pptMohammed Nizam
Protection in humanitarian responses is very important· and it is heart· of all humanitarian activities . Effective referral· through updated referral· pathways is vital for protection· responses . To ensure· community· resilience for protection· risk· mitigation and prevention· , capacity-building on referral· pathways is essential· .
The slides for this topic· helps you to guide· some basic knowledge· to teach· CBP members on that.
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Presentation from Session 4 - Digitalisation at the SIGMA-GIZ joint event Advancing Good Governance in Public Administration Reform in the Eastern Partnership Countries, that took place 4-5 June 2024 in Brussels.
As we reflect on our inaugural year at BacharLorai, we celebrate our efforts toward achieving our vision of a world where every Bangladeshi has access to the resources and opportunities needed to thrive. Thanks to our dedicated team and supportive community, we have made significant strides in empowering Bangladeshis worldwide. We've directly impacted over 1,400 lives through diverse, innovative initiatives aimed at addressing crucial societal needs.
1. 1
INTRODUCTION
Cyber intrusions into US Critical Infrastructure systems are happening with increased
frequency. For many industrial control systems (ICSs), it’s not a matter of if an intrusion will
take place, but when. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, 295 incidents were reported to ICS-CERT, and
many more went unreported or undetected. The capabilities of our adversaries have been
demonstrated and cyber incidents are increasing in frequency and complexity. Simply building a
network with a hardened perimeter is no longer adequate. Securing ICSs against the modern
threat requires well-planned and well-implemented strategies that will provide network defense
teams a chance to quickly and effectively detect, counter, and expel an adversary. This paper
presents seven strategies that can be implemented today to counter common exploitable
weaknesses in “as-built” control systems.
Seven Strategies to Defend ICSs
Figure 1: Percentage of ICS-CERT FY 2014 and FY 2015 Incidents Potentially Mitigated by
Each Strategya
a. Incidents mitigated by more than one strategy are listed under the strategy ICS-CERT judged as more effective.
2. 2
If system owners had implemented the strategies outlined in this paper, 98 percent of incidents
ICS-CERT responded to in FY 2014 and FY 2015 would have been prevented. The remaining
2 percent could have been identified with increased monitoring and a robust incident response.
THE SEVEN STRATEGIES
1. IMPLEMENT APPLICATION WHITELISTING
Application Whitelisting (AWL) can detect and prevent attempted execution of malware
uploaded by adversaries. The static nature of some systems, such as database servers and
human-machine interface (HMI) computers, make these ideal candidates to run AWL.
Operators are encouraged to work with their vendors to baseline and calibrate AWL
deployments.
Example: ICS-CERT recently responded to an incident where the victim had to rebuild the
network from scratch at great expense. A particular malware compromised over 80 percent
of its assets. Antivirus software was ineffective; the malware had a 0 percent detection rate
on VirusTotal. AWL would have provided notification and blocked the malware execution.
2. ENSURE PROPER CONFIGURATION/PATCH MANAGEMENT
Adversaries target unpatched systems. A configuration/patch management program centered on
the safe importation and implementation of trusted patches will help keep control systems more
secure.
Such a program will start with an accurate baseline and asset inventory to track what patches are
needed. It will prioritize patching and configuration management of “PC-architecture” machines
used in HMI, database server, and engineering workstation roles, as current adversaries have
significant cyber capabilities against these. Infected laptops are a significant malware vector.
Such a program will limit connection of external laptops to the control network and preferably
supply vendors with known-good company laptops. The program will also encourage initial
installation of any updates onto a test system that includes malware detection features before the
updates are installed on operational systems.
Example: ICS-CERT responded to a Stuxnet infection at a power generation facility. The
root cause of the infection was a vendor laptop.
Use best practices when downloading software and patches destined for your control network.
Take measures to avoid “watering hole” attacks. Use a web Domain Name System (DNS)
reputation system. Get updates from authenticated vendor sites. Validate the authenticity of
3. 3
downloads. Insist that vendors digitally sign updates, and/or publish hashes via an out-of-bound
communications path, and use these to authenticate. Don’t load updates from unverified
sources.
Example: HAVEX spread by infecting patches. With an out-of-band communication path
for patch hashes, such as a blast email, users could have validated that the patches were not
authentic.
3. REDUCE YOUR ATTACK SURFACE AREA
Isolate ICS networks from any untrusted networks, especially the Internet.b
Lock down all
unused ports. Turn off all unused services. Only allow real-time connectivity to external
networks if there is a defined business requirement or control function. If one-way
communication can accomplish a task, use optical separation (“data diode”). If bidirectional
communication is necessary, then use a single open port over a restricted network path.
Example: As of 2014, ICS-CERT was aware of 82,000 cases of industrial control systems
hardware or software directly accessible from the public Internet. ICS-CERT has
encountered numerous cases where direct or nearly direct Internet access enabled a breach.
Examples include a US Crime Lab, a Dam, The Sochi Olympic stadium, and numerous water
utilities.
4. BUILD A DEFENDABLE ENVIRONMENT
Limit damage from network perimeter breaches. Segment networks into logical enclaves and
restrict host-to-host communications paths. This can stop adversaries from expanding their
access, while letting the normal system communications continue to operate. Enclaving limits
possible damage, as compromised systems cannot be used to reach and contaminate systems in
other enclaves. Containment provided by enclaving also makes incident cleanup significantly
less costly.c
b. ICS-ALERT-14-063-01AP, Multiple Reports of Internet Facing Control Systems, ICS-CERT 2015.
c. Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense in Depth, ICS-CERT 2009.
4. 4
Example: In one ICS-CERT case, a nuclear asset owner failed to scan media entering a
Level 3 facility. On exit, the media was scanned, and a virus was detected. Because the asset
owner had implemented logical enclaving, only six systems were put at risk and had to be
remediated. Had enclaving not been implemented, hundreds of hosts would have needed to
be remediated.
If one-way data transfer from a secure zone to a less secure zone is required, consider using
approved removable media instead of a network connection. If real-time data transfer is
required, consider using optical separation technologies. This allows replication of data without
putting the control system at risk.
Example: In one ICS-CERT case, a pipeline operator had directly connected the corporate
network to the control network, because the billing unit had asserted it needed metering
data. After being informed of a breach by ICS-CERT, the asset owner removed the
connection. It took the billing department 4 days to notice the connection had been lost,
clearly demonstrating that real-time data were not needed.
5. MANAGE AUTHENTICATION
Adversaries are increasingly focusing on gaining control of legitimate credentials, especially
those associated with highly privileged accounts. Compromising these credentials allows
adversaries to masquerade as legitimate users, leaving less evidence than exploiting
vulnerabilities or executing malware. Implement multi-factor authentication where possible.
Reduce privileges to only those needed for a user’s duties. If passwords are necessary,
implement secure password policies stressing length over complexity. For all accounts,
including system and non-interactive accounts, ensure credentials are unique, and change all
passwords at least every 90 days.
Require separate credentials for corporate and control network zones and store these in separate
trust stores. Never share Active Directory, RSA ACE servers, or other trust stores between
corporate and control networks.
Example: One US Government agency used the same password across the environment for
local administrator accounts. This allowed an adversary to easily move laterally across all
systems.
5. 5
6. IMPLEMENT SECURE REMOTE ACCESS
Some adversaries are effective at gaining remote access into control systems, finding obscure
access vectors, even “hidden back doors” intentionally created by system operators. Remove
such accesses wherever possible, especially modems as these are fundamentally insecure.
Limit any accesses that remain. Where possible, implement “monitoring only” access enforced
by data diodes, and do not rely on “read only” access enforced by software configurations or
permissions. Do not allow remote persistent vendor connections into the control network.
Require any remote access be operator controlled, time limited, and procedurally similar to
“lock out, tag out.” Use the same remote access paths for vendor and employee connections;
don’t allow double standards. Use two-factor authentication if possible, avoiding schemes
where both tokens are similar types and can be easily stolen (e.g., password and soft certificate).
Example: Following these guidelines would have prevented the BlackEnergy intrusions.
BlackEnergy required communications paths for initial compromise, installation and “plug
in” installation.
7. MONITOR AND RESPOND
Defending a network against modern threats requires actively monitoring for adversarial
penetration and quickly executing a prepared response.
Consider establishing monitoring programs in the following five key places:
1) Watch IP traffic on ICS boundaries for abnormal or suspicious communications.
2) Monitor IP traffic within the control network for malicious connections or content.
3) Use host-based products to detect malicious software and attack attempts.
4) Use login analysis (time and place for example) to detect stolen credential usage or
improper access, verifying all anomalies with quick phone calls.
5) Watch account/user administration actions to detect access control manipulation.
Have a response plan for when adversarial activity is detected. Such a plan may include
disconnecting all Internet connections, running a properly scoped search for malware, disabling
affected user accounts, isolating suspect systems, and an immediate 100 percent password reset.
Such a plan may also define escalation triggers and actions, including incident response,
investigation, and public affairs activities.
Have a restoration plan, including having “gold disks” ready to restore systems to known good
states.
6. 6
Example: Attackers render Windows®d
based devices in a control network inoperative by
wiping hard drive contents. Recent attacks against Saudi Aramco™e
and Sony Pictures
demonstrate that quick restoration of such computers is key to restoring an attacked network
to an operational state.
CONCLUSION
Defense against the modern threat requires applying measures to protect not only the perimeter
but also the interior. While no system is 100 percent secure, implementing the seven key
strategies discussed in this paper can greatly improve the security posture of ICSs.
DISCLAIMER
The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any
warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or
service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance
shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This document “Seven Steps to Effectively Defend Industrial Control Systems” was written in
collaboration, with contributions from subject matter experts working at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security
Agency (NSA).
d. Windows®
is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corp.
e. Saudi Aramco™
is an unregistered trademark of Saudi Arabian Oil Company.
7. 7
CONTACT INFORMATION
POC Phone e-Mail
Department of Homeland Security
ICS-CERT
877-776-7585 ICS-CERT@HQ.DHS.GOV
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Cyber Division - CyWatch
855-292-3937 CyWatch@ic.fbi.gov
National Security Agency (Industry)
Industry Inquiries
410-854-6091 bao@nsa.gov
National Security Agency (Government)
IAD Client Contact Center
410-854-4200 IAD CCC@nsa.gov