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10. industrial networks safety and security tom hammond

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PROFIBUS and PROFINET InternationaI - PI UK
PROFIBUS and PROFINET InternationaI - PI UK

1. The document discusses security issues related to industrial control systems and safety instrumented systems. It notes that increased connectivity between operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) systems has led to growing security threats. 2. The document outlines various security challenges, including potential sabotage of process plant safety systems, loss of safety functions, and compliance with standards and regulations. It analyzes the increasing attack surface and most critical threats to industrial control systems. 3. The document compares approaches to safety and security, referring to relevant standards. It provides an overview of security standards and frameworks like ISA/IEC 62443 that can be used to assess industrial control systems security.

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siemens.com/plant-security-servicesUnrestricted/ © Siemens AG 2016 Safety & Security In Industrial Control Systems Plant Security Services
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 2 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Why Cyber security is an issue for SIS The drivers for Industrial Automation also apply for Safety Instrumented Systems • Open standards • PC-based systems • COTS equipment • Horizontal and vertical integration • IT & OT more connected Other SIS challenges • Integration of Control and Safety • Most systems programmable • Safety Systems are low demand mode • Aging installed base Information technologies are used in industrial automation Increased security threats demand action •Sabotage of the Process Plant Safety Systems •Manipulation of data or application software •Loss of Operator Interface •Loss of Safety Function •Spurious trips •Failure of BPCS maybe initiating event •Common mode failures BPCS and SIS •Compliance with standards and regulations is required
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 3 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) ICS Attack surface is growing Challenges: Increasing vulnerability, high connectivity. Introduction of malware via removable media and external hardware Human error and sabotage Intrusion via remote access Control components connected to the Internet Compromising of smartphones in the production environment Compromising of extranet and cloud components Malware infection via the Internet and Intranet (Distributed) denial-of- service ((D)DOS) attacks Technical malfunctions Source © BSI analysis on cyber security 2016, German Federal Office for Information Security Social engineering and phishing
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 4 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Source © BSI analysis on cyber security 2016, German Federal Office for Information Security Most critical threats to ICS
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 5 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Similarities • Defense in Depth • Lifecycle approach • Stakeholders • Requirement for FSM / SM • Ongoing monitoring needed • Terminology of SIL and SL Differences • Focus (internal v. external) • Maturity of standards • Level of adoption • Willingness to share learning • Assessment of risk “Freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment.” IEC 61508-4 “Prevention of illegal or unwanted penetration of or interference with the proper and intended operation of an industrial automation and control system” IEC 62443-1-1 Safety Security Comparison of Safety and Security
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 6 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) References to Security from Safety standards IEC 61508-1 Edition 2 7.4.2.3 The hazards, hazardous events and hazardous situations of the EUC and the EUC control system shall be determined under all reasonably foreseeable circumstances (including fault conditions, reasonably foreseeable misuse and malevolent or unauthorised action). This shall include all relevant human factor issues, and shall give particular attention to abnormal or infrequent modes of operation of the EUC. If the hazard analysis identifies that malevolent or unauthorized action, constituting a security threat, as being reasonably foreseeable, then a security threats analysis should be carried out. IEC 61511-1 Edition 2 8.2.4 A security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS. NOTE 1: Guidance related to SIS security is provided in ISA TR84.00.09, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, and IEC 62443-2-1:2010. 11.2.12 The design of the SIS shall be such that it provides the necessary resilience against the identified security risks (see 8.2.4).
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 7 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Standards NIST 800-82, 800-30, 800-53 ISA 99 ISA/IEC 62443 NERC-CIP 4 ISO 27032 NIS (Network Information & Security Directive) 2017 UK Government will introduce guidance for CNI companies. WIB M2784 ISO 27002 ISO 27001
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 8 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) IEC62443 Framework
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 9 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) The parties involved in an IACS
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 10 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) SL 4 Capability to protect against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high motivation SL 3 Capability to protect against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivation Capability to protect against casual or coincidental violation Capability to protect against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivationSL 2 SL 1 Protection Levels cover security functionalities and processes Protection Levels Assessment of security functionalities ML 4 Optimized - Process measured, controlled and continuously improved ML 3 Defined - Process characterized, proactive deployment Initial - Process unpredictable, poorly controlled and reactive. Managed - Process characterized , reactiveML 2 ML 1 Assessment of security processes 4 3 2 1 MaturityLevel 2 3 41 Security Level PL 2 Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivationPL 3 PL 4 PL 1 Protection against casual or coincidental violation
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 11 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) IEC 62443 Assessment Phased project approach based on IEC 62443-3-3 tool with following Foundational Requirements • FR 1 Identification and Access Control • FR 2 Use Control • FR 3 System Integrity • FR 4 Data Confidentiality • FR 5 Restrict Data Flow • FR 6 Timely Response to Events • FR 7 Resource Availability ASSESS IMPLEMENT MANAGE Questionnaire Result spider diagram Result chart bar
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 12 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Assessing ICS against IEC62443 Each FR contains several SRs (System Requirements) with harder control measures as the target SL increase SL1-SL4. Level 1 SR 5.1 Network segmentation The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to logically segment automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks and to logically segment critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from other automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 2 SR 5.1 RE 1 Physically network segmentation The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to physically segment automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks and to physically segment critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 3 SR 5.1 RE 2 Independence from non-control system networks The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall have the capability to provide network services to automation solution or IT infrastructure networks, critical or otherwise, without a connection to non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 4 SR 5.1 RE 3 Logical and physical isolation of critical networks The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to logically and physically isolate critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. FR 5 Restrict Data Flow
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 13 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Safety & Security ISA84 WG9 – Annex A - Example SIS Interfaces to the Enterprise Network Air-gapped In this design, the SIS is both logically and physically isolated from communicating with the rest of the zones. Discrete Interfaced SIS and BPCS are still connected using discrete wiring, but they now include a direct point-to-point communication connection. Integrated 2 zone the BPCS and SIS systems are fully integrated and provide direct, real-time communication between the systems. Integrated 1 zone The SIS and BPCS systems are integrated providing greater communication between those systems and higher-level systems.
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 14 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) HSE Operational guide (OG86) • Covers risk identification, and its management including design, maintenance, operation, management systems and competency of staff. • Forms part of the HSE’s EC&I operational delivery guide consistent with other similar operational guides. The following guiding principles were used in producing the guidance: • Protect, detect and respond. It is important to be able to detect possible attacks and respond in an appropriate and timely manner in order to minimize the impacts. • Defence in depth. No single security countermeasure provides absolute protection as new threats and vulnerabilities can be identified at any time. To reduce these risks, implementing multiple protection measures in series avoids single point failures. • Technical, procedural and managerial protection measures. Technology is insufficient on its own to provide robust levels of protection. HSE Operational Guide
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 15 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security The defense in depth concept* provides comprehensive protection Physical access protection to the plant and critical systems + Components with integrated security functions. +Endpoint security: e.g Whitelisting, patching, FW updates, authentication. + Security management for processes and technical measures + Protection of the plant/machine network through segmentation + * based on IEC 62443 Secure remote access via Internet or mobile networks to the plant +
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 16 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security Monitoring Cyber Security Operations Center for a continuous & proactive protection 0100010101100011001010011101001010010001 Cyber Security Operation Center 101101011001110101 00100010101100011001010011101001010010001 Discrete Manufacturing Process Industries Security Correlation and Management Security Information Collector 101101011001110101 Security Information Collector !
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 17 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security Monitoring Most important supported devices OPERATING SYSTEMS Windows XP to Windows 8 Windows Server 2003 to 2012 Linux/UNIX systems NETWORK DEVICES Automation Firewall SCALANCE S, M and X 3rd Party (NG and Application Layer FWs, IDS/IPS, Switches) INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS SIMATIC S7 with specific application DB SIMATIC CP with Security Integrated SINUMERIK PCU SOFTWARE AND SECURITY APPLICATIONS McAfee ePO TrendMicro Symantec
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 18 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Siemens UK Plant Security Services Tom Hammond Industrial IT Product Manager siemens.com/plant-security-services Contact
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 19 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Information Siemens provides products and solutions with industrial security functions that support the secure operation of plants, systems, machines and networks. In order to protect plants, systems, machines and networks against cyber threats, it is necessary to implement – and continuously maintain – a holistic, state-of-the-art industrial security concept. Siemens’ products and solutions only form one element of such a concept. Customer is responsible to prevent unauthorized access to its plants, systems, machines and networks. Systems, machines and components should only be connected to the enterprise network or the internet if and to the extent necessary and with appropriate security measures (e.g. use of firewalls and network segmentation) in place. Additionally, Siemens’ guidance on appropriate security measures should be taken into account. For more information about industrial security, please visit http://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity. Siemens’ products and solutions undergo continuous development to make them more secure. Siemens strongly recommends to apply product updates as soon as available and to always use the latest product versions. Use of product versions that are no longer supported, and failure to apply latest updates may increase customer’s exposure to cyber threats. To stay informed about product updates, subscribe to the Siemens Industrial Security RSS Feed under http://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity.
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 20 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Services and further guidance
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 21 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Plant Security Services Comprehensive, Modular and Scalable Portfolio Intel Security inside • IEC 62443 Assessment • ISO 27001 Assessment • SIMATIC PCS 7 & WinCC Assessment • Risk & Vulnerability Assessment • Security Awareness Training • Security Policy Consulting • Network Security Consulting • Perimeter Firewall Installation • Clean Slate Validation • Anti Virus Installation • Whitelisting Installation • System Backup • Windows Patch Installation • Industrial Security Monitoring • Remote Incident Handling • Perimeter Firewall Management • Anti Virus Management • Whitelisting Management • Patch & Vulnerability Management
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 22 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Best Practice Lots of advice and guidance provided in the form of manuals, whitepapers.
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 23 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Guidance National Cyber Security Centre CPNI
Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 24 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Other Useful Guidance • The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) Security for Industrial Control Systems • EEMUA Information sheet 2. Cyber security assessment process for industrial control systems • NIST Publication 800-82 –Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800- 82r2.pdf • 10 steps to Cyber security available via link http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_featu res/Pages/Relaunch-10-Steps-to-Cyber-Security.aspx • IET Code of Practice “Cyber Security in the Built Environment” • ISA-TR84.00.09-2013 – Security Countermeasures Related to Safety Instrumented Systems

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10. industrial networks safety and security tom hammond

  • 1. siemens.com/plant-security-servicesUnrestricted/ © Siemens AG 2016 Safety & Security In Industrial Control Systems Plant Security Services
  • 2. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 2 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Why Cyber security is an issue for SIS The drivers for Industrial Automation also apply for Safety Instrumented Systems • Open standards • PC-based systems • COTS equipment • Horizontal and vertical integration • IT & OT more connected Other SIS challenges • Integration of Control and Safety • Most systems programmable • Safety Systems are low demand mode • Aging installed base Information technologies are used in industrial automation Increased security threats demand action •Sabotage of the Process Plant Safety Systems •Manipulation of data or application software •Loss of Operator Interface •Loss of Safety Function •Spurious trips •Failure of BPCS maybe initiating event •Common mode failures BPCS and SIS •Compliance with standards and regulations is required
  • 3. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 3 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) ICS Attack surface is growing Challenges: Increasing vulnerability, high connectivity. Introduction of malware via removable media and external hardware Human error and sabotage Intrusion via remote access Control components connected to the Internet Compromising of smartphones in the production environment Compromising of extranet and cloud components Malware infection via the Internet and Intranet (Distributed) denial-of- service ((D)DOS) attacks Technical malfunctions Source © BSI analysis on cyber security 2016, German Federal Office for Information Security Social engineering and phishing
  • 4. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 4 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Source © BSI analysis on cyber security 2016, German Federal Office for Information Security Most critical threats to ICS
  • 5. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 5 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Similarities • Defense in Depth • Lifecycle approach • Stakeholders • Requirement for FSM / SM • Ongoing monitoring needed • Terminology of SIL and SL Differences • Focus (internal v. external) • Maturity of standards • Level of adoption • Willingness to share learning • Assessment of risk “Freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment.” IEC 61508-4 “Prevention of illegal or unwanted penetration of or interference with the proper and intended operation of an industrial automation and control system” IEC 62443-1-1 Safety Security Comparison of Safety and Security
  • 6. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 6 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) References to Security from Safety standards IEC 61508-1 Edition 2 7.4.2.3 The hazards, hazardous events and hazardous situations of the EUC and the EUC control system shall be determined under all reasonably foreseeable circumstances (including fault conditions, reasonably foreseeable misuse and malevolent or unauthorised action). This shall include all relevant human factor issues, and shall give particular attention to abnormal or infrequent modes of operation of the EUC. If the hazard analysis identifies that malevolent or unauthorized action, constituting a security threat, as being reasonably foreseeable, then a security threats analysis should be carried out. IEC 61511-1 Edition 2 8.2.4 A security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS. NOTE 1: Guidance related to SIS security is provided in ISA TR84.00.09, ISO/IEC 27001:2013, and IEC 62443-2-1:2010. 11.2.12 The design of the SIS shall be such that it provides the necessary resilience against the identified security risks (see 8.2.4).
  • 7. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 7 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Standards NIST 800-82, 800-30, 800-53 ISA 99 ISA/IEC 62443 NERC-CIP 4 ISO 27032 NIS (Network Information & Security Directive) 2017 UK Government will introduce guidance for CNI companies. WIB M2784 ISO 27002 ISO 27001
  • 8. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 8 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) IEC62443 Framework
  • 9. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 9 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) The parties involved in an IACS
  • 10. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 10 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) SL 4 Capability to protect against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high motivation SL 3 Capability to protect against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivation Capability to protect against casual or coincidental violation Capability to protect against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivationSL 2 SL 1 Protection Levels cover security functionalities and processes Protection Levels Assessment of security functionalities ML 4 Optimized - Process measured, controlled and continuously improved ML 3 Defined - Process characterized, proactive deployment Initial - Process unpredictable, poorly controlled and reactive. Managed - Process characterized , reactiveML 2 ML 1 Assessment of security processes 4 3 2 1 MaturityLevel 2 3 41 Security Level PL 2 Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources, generic skills and low motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivationPL 3 PL 4 PL 1 Protection against casual or coincidental violation
  • 11. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 11 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) IEC 62443 Assessment Phased project approach based on IEC 62443-3-3 tool with following Foundational Requirements • FR 1 Identification and Access Control • FR 2 Use Control • FR 3 System Integrity • FR 4 Data Confidentiality • FR 5 Restrict Data Flow • FR 6 Timely Response to Events • FR 7 Resource Availability ASSESS IMPLEMENT MANAGE Questionnaire Result spider diagram Result chart bar
  • 12. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 12 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Assessing ICS against IEC62443 Each FR contains several SRs (System Requirements) with harder control measures as the target SL increase SL1-SL4. Level 1 SR 5.1 Network segmentation The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to logically segment automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks and to logically segment critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from other automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 2 SR 5.1 RE 1 Physically network segmentation The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to physically segment automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks and to physically segment critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 3 SR 5.1 RE 2 Independence from non-control system networks The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall have the capability to provide network services to automation solution or IT infrastructure networks, critical or otherwise, without a connection to non-automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. Level 4 SR 5.1 RE 3 Logical and physical isolation of critical networks The automation solution or IT infrastructure shall realize the capability and the operating organization shall use the capability to logically and physically isolate critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks from non-critical automation solution or IT infrastructure networks. FR 5 Restrict Data Flow
  • 13. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 13 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Safety & Security ISA84 WG9 – Annex A - Example SIS Interfaces to the Enterprise Network Air-gapped In this design, the SIS is both logically and physically isolated from communicating with the rest of the zones. Discrete Interfaced SIS and BPCS are still connected using discrete wiring, but they now include a direct point-to-point communication connection. Integrated 2 zone the BPCS and SIS systems are fully integrated and provide direct, real-time communication between the systems. Integrated 1 zone The SIS and BPCS systems are integrated providing greater communication between those systems and higher-level systems.
  • 14. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 14 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) HSE Operational guide (OG86) • Covers risk identification, and its management including design, maintenance, operation, management systems and competency of staff. • Forms part of the HSE’s EC&I operational delivery guide consistent with other similar operational guides. The following guiding principles were used in producing the guidance: • Protect, detect and respond. It is important to be able to detect possible attacks and respond in an appropriate and timely manner in order to minimize the impacts. • Defence in depth. No single security countermeasure provides absolute protection as new threats and vulnerabilities can be identified at any time. To reduce these risks, implementing multiple protection measures in series avoids single point failures. • Technical, procedural and managerial protection measures. Technology is insufficient on its own to provide robust levels of protection. HSE Operational Guide
  • 15. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 15 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security The defense in depth concept* provides comprehensive protection Physical access protection to the plant and critical systems + Components with integrated security functions. +Endpoint security: e.g Whitelisting, patching, FW updates, authentication. + Security management for processes and technical measures + Protection of the plant/machine network through segmentation + * based on IEC 62443 Secure remote access via Internet or mobile networks to the plant +
  • 16. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 16 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security Monitoring Cyber Security Operations Center for a continuous & proactive protection 0100010101100011001010011101001010010001 Cyber Security Operation Center 101101011001110101 00100010101100011001010011101001010010001 Discrete Manufacturing Process Industries Security Correlation and Management Security Information Collector 101101011001110101 Security Information Collector !
  • 17. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 17 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Industrial Security Monitoring Most important supported devices OPERATING SYSTEMS Windows XP to Windows 8 Windows Server 2003 to 2012 Linux/UNIX systems NETWORK DEVICES Automation Firewall SCALANCE S, M and X 3rd Party (NG and Application Layer FWs, IDS/IPS, Switches) INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS SIMATIC S7 with specific application DB SIMATIC CP with Security Integrated SINUMERIK PCU SOFTWARE AND SECURITY APPLICATIONS McAfee ePO TrendMicro Symantec
  • 18. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 18 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Siemens UK Plant Security Services Tom Hammond Industrial IT Product Manager siemens.com/plant-security-services Contact
  • 19. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 19 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Information Siemens provides products and solutions with industrial security functions that support the secure operation of plants, systems, machines and networks. In order to protect plants, systems, machines and networks against cyber threats, it is necessary to implement – and continuously maintain – a holistic, state-of-the-art industrial security concept. Siemens’ products and solutions only form one element of such a concept. Customer is responsible to prevent unauthorized access to its plants, systems, machines and networks. Systems, machines and components should only be connected to the enterprise network or the internet if and to the extent necessary and with appropriate security measures (e.g. use of firewalls and network segmentation) in place. Additionally, Siemens’ guidance on appropriate security measures should be taken into account. For more information about industrial security, please visit http://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity. Siemens’ products and solutions undergo continuous development to make them more secure. Siemens strongly recommends to apply product updates as soon as available and to always use the latest product versions. Use of product versions that are no longer supported, and failure to apply latest updates may increase customer’s exposure to cyber threats. To stay informed about product updates, subscribe to the Siemens Industrial Security RSS Feed under http://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity.
  • 20. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 20 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Security Services and further guidance
  • 21. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 21 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Plant Security Services Comprehensive, Modular and Scalable Portfolio Intel Security inside • IEC 62443 Assessment • ISO 27001 Assessment • SIMATIC PCS 7 & WinCC Assessment • Risk & Vulnerability Assessment • Security Awareness Training • Security Policy Consulting • Network Security Consulting • Perimeter Firewall Installation • Clean Slate Validation • Anti Virus Installation • Whitelisting Installation • System Backup • Windows Patch Installation • Industrial Security Monitoring • Remote Incident Handling • Perimeter Firewall Management • Anti Virus Management • Whitelisting Management • Patch & Vulnerability Management
  • 22. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 22 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Best Practice Lots of advice and guidance provided in the form of manuals, whitepapers.
  • 23. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 23 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Guidance National Cyber Security Centre CPNI
  • 24. Unrestricted © Siemens AG 2016 19.7.2017Page 24 Mark McCormick /Plant Security Services (Digital Factory) Other Useful Guidance • The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) Security for Industrial Control Systems • EEMUA Information sheet 2. Cyber security assessment process for industrial control systems • NIST Publication 800-82 –Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800- 82r2.pdf • 10 steps to Cyber security available via link http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/news_and_featu res/Pages/Relaunch-10-Steps-to-Cyber-Security.aspx • IET Code of Practice “Cyber Security in the Built Environment” • ISA-TR84.00.09-2013 – Security Countermeasures Related to Safety Instrumented Systems