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IACS Network Security & Secure RemoteAccess
Guy Denis gudenis@cisco.com
Rockwell Automation Alliance Manager Europe
www.cisco.com/go/security
11th Feb 2014
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 2
On Average, there is a ratio of 15:1 Industrial
Devices to Enterprise within a manufacturing plant
Industrial Devices
Meter
Sensor
Machines Vehicles Robots
HMII/O
Controller/PLC
Scanner Phone RFID Tag
Enterprise Devices
IP Phone PC Printers Servers
“As manufacturers replace legacy network systems and look for
areas to streamline on a common solution, ARC sees a tremendous
opportunity for growth of EtherNet/IP applications,” according to
Craig Resnick, Research Director, ARC Advisory Group
1
15
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 3
TheftUnintended employee
action
Natural or manmade disaster
Unauthorized
contractor actions
Security patches
Worms, viruses, malware
Denial of serviceSabotage
Unauthorized access
Unauthorized employee
action
Potential Disruptions
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 4
Stuxnet – a wake up call…. breakdown of
Stuxnet
http://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyberweapon.html
Ralph Langner
German Control systems security
consultant
F-Secure wrap-up on Stuxnet
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzadFI7sco

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This document discusses an investor opportunity involving auditing industrial control systems (ICS) for security compliance based on the NIST SP 800-82 framework. It highlights the standard's 16 sections for assessing ICS security and provides brief explanations of requirements under sections like planning/policy/procedures, administrative controls, access control, and network architecture. The document promotes CyberDNA as a trusted partner that can help organizations meet the various technical and policy requirements for securely auditing and protecting their ICS environments.

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Augmentation of a SCADA based firewall against foreign hacking devices
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This document summarizes a research paper that implemented a SCADA-based firewall to protect data transmission from external hacking devices. The paper first discusses a case study where an industrial control system was hacked 46 times. It then provides an overview of industrial firewalls and the differences between industrial and IT firewalls. The paper describes configuring a Tofino industrial firewall with SCADA-HMI and PLC assets. It tests the firewall by simulating scenarios without and with the firewall, showing the firewall prevents an attacker from accessing the PLC simulator based on communication protocols. The paper concludes customized industrial firewalls are needed and protocols must be regularly updated as cyber attacks evolve.

firewallindustrial control systemsplc
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 5
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 6
• Fragile TCP/IP Stacks – NMAP, Ping Sweep lockup
• Little or no device level authentication
• Poor network design – hubs, unmanaged switches
• Windows based IA servers – patching, legacy OS
• Unnecessary services running – FTP, HTTP
• Open environment, no port security, no physical security of switch, Ethernet
ports
• Limited auditing and monitoring of access to IA devices
• Unauthorised use of HMI, IA systems for browsing, music/movie downloads
• Lack of IT expertise in IA networks, many blind spots
Defense in DepthApproach
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 8
Real–Time Control
Fast Convergence
Traffic Segmentation and
Management
Ease of Use
Site Operations and Control
Multi-Service Networks
Network and Security
Management
Routing
Application and Data share
Access Control
Threat Protection
Gbps Link for
Failover Detection
Firewall
(Active)
Firewall
(Standby)
SCADA Application
and Services Servers
Cisco
ASA 5500
Cisco
Catalyst
Switch
Network Services
Cisco Catalyst
6500/4500
Cisco Cat. 3750X
StackWise
Switch Stack
Patch Management, Terminal
Services, Application Mirrors,
AV Servers
Cell/Area #1
(Redundant Star
Topology)
Drive
Controller
HMI Distributed
I/O
Controller
DriveDrive
HMI
Distributed I/O
HMI
Cell/Area #2
(Ring Topology)
Cell/Area #3
(Linear Topology)
IE3000/3010/2000
Layer 2 Access Switch
Controller
Enterprise/IT Integration
Collaboration
Wireless
Application Optimization
Cell/Area Zone
Levels 0–2
Layer 2 Access
Manufacturing Zone
Level 3
Distribution and Core
Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) Firewalls
Enterprise Network
Levels 4–5
Web Apps DNS FTP
Internet

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This webinar will help you get more informed on PenTesting in SCADA and also best practices and methods used on risk assessment. Learning about the criticality in industry, makes you more flexible to boost the skills. Main points covered: • The SCADA ICS function in critical infrastructure industry • Risk exposure of IT vs. SCADA ICS from Cyber Security Perspective • Do's and don’ts of Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing in SCADA ICS Environment Presenter: This webinar was presented by Pedro Putu Wirya, an IT and ICS Security Consultant with an extensive experience in ISMS, and PECB Certified Trainer. Link of the recorded session published on YouTube: https://youtu.be/icq-RTwusZ8

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Unidirectional Security, Andrew Ginter of Waterfall Security
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This presentation reviews the spectrum of perimeter solutions based on unidirectional technology - solutions that are being deployed to protect the safety and reliability of industrial control systems. Learn why the technology is truly unidirectional based on physics and different ways it can be used in SCADA and DCS. Many practitioners find parts of the spectrum to be counter-intuitive. Further, some parts of the spectrum are straightforward to deploy, and others require that practitioners take some care to ensure that the results really are as strong as they should be. Technologies and techniques covered include unidirectional gateways, secure bypass, temporary/programmed gateway reversals, opposing gateways, secure remote access, and parallel operations and IT WANs.

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Defcon 22-aaron-bayles-alxrogan-protecting-scada-dc101
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This document summarizes a presentation on protecting industrial control systems (ICS) and SCADA networks. It discusses challenges with ICS including legacy equipment, long lifecycles, limited space and power, and life safety dependencies. It recommends understanding network flows, using the Purdue model for segmentation, and controlling removable media and configurations. Logging and disaster recovery are also important. While some enterprise IT concepts apply, ICS has differences in patching, applications, and dependencies on services. Remote access requires security, and training blends information security with ICS sensitivities.

defcon
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 9
• Physical Security – limit physical access to authorized
personnel: areas, control panels, devices, cabling, and
control room – escort and track visitors
• Network Hardening – infrastructure framework – e.g.
firewalls with intrusion detection and intrusion prevention
systems (IDS/IPS), and integrated protection of networking
equipment such as switches and routers
• End-point Hardening – patch management, antivirus
software as well as removal of unused applications,
protocols, and services
• Application Security – authentication, authorization, and
audit software
• Device Hardening – change management and restrictive
access
Defense
in Depth
Computer
Device
Physical
Network
Application
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 10
• Security is not a bolt-on
component
• Comprehensive Network
Security Model for
Defense-in-Depth
• Industrial Security Policy
• DMZ Implementation
• Design Remote Partner Access
Policy, with robust & secure
implementation
Secure NetworkArchitectures for
Industrial Control Systems
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 12
Panduit/RA Physical Layer Reference Architectures Design Guide
PSL-DCPL
PSL-DCJB

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Industrial control systems (ICS) are used to control industrial processes and manufacturing equipment. They face unique security challenges compared to traditional IT systems due to their real-time operation and custom hardware and software. This document discusses several past ICS cyber attacks and identifies vulnerabilities in ICS security architecture, configuration management, patch management, and change testing. Proper ICS security requires a cross-functional team approach and careful management of the specialized ICS environment.

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icsnetworkssecurity
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 14
• All network traffic from either side of the DMZ terminates in the DMZ;
network traffic does not directly traverse the DMZ
• Application Data Mirror
• No primary services are permanently
housed in the DMZ
• DMZ shall not permanently
house data
• No control traffic into the DMZ
• Be prepared to “turn-off” access
via the firewall
No Direct
Traffic
Enterprise
Security
Zone
Industrial
Security
Zone
Disconnect Point
Disconnect Point
DMZReplicated
Services
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 15
Level 5
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
Terminal
Services
Patch
Management
AV
Server
Application
Mirror
Web Services
Operations
Application
Server
Enterprise Network
Site Business Planning and Logistics NetworkE-Mail, Intranet, etc.
SCADA
App
Server
SCADA
Directory
Engineering
Workstation
Domain
Controller
SCADA
Client
Operator
Interface
SCADA
Client
Engineerin
g
Workstatio
n
Operato
r
Interfac
e
Batch
Control
Discrete
Control
Drive
Control
Continuou
s
Process
Control
Safety
Control
Sensors Drives Actuators Robots
Enterprise
Zone
DMZ
Process
Control
Domain
Process
Control
Network
Web
E-Mail
CIP
Firewal
l
Firewall
Site Manufacturing Operations and
Control
Area Supervisory
Control
Basic Control
Process
PurdueReferenceModel,ISA-95
IndustrialSecurityStandardISA-99
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 16
1.Firewall Services (Segmentation, Isolation)
2.Application Services (Behavior Enforcement, Application
Intelligence and Awareness, Gateway Capabilities)
3.Logging and Historical Services (Traffic, Event histories)
4.Encryption and Data Integrity Services (remote access, and
secure channels for data transfer)
5.IPS/IDS Services (deep packet inspection – Sourcefire and
Wurldtech Industrial Signatures
1.Malware Detection and Filtering (deep packet and URL
inspection
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 17
VPN
VDI
WSA
IPS
ASA-CX
ASA
ISE
Level 5
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
Level
3½
Enterprise Zone
DMZ
PCD /
Manufacturing Zone
PCN /
Cell / Area Zone
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This presentation was given at BSides Las Vegas 2015. The modern times that we live in, the gentle shift that we are making towards the Internet of Things (IoT) is slowly but surely getting a grip on our day to day lives. The same goes for securing our Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We see that the demand for ICS security is raising and governmental regulations are being established and implement. However, this also means that the need for ICS security professionals is raising as well. More and more security professionals/firms are starting to perform security assessments such as penetration testing on an ICS level. Two years ago I got the question if I was up for the challenge, converting myself from a ‘normal’ security professional to a ICS specific security professional. The purpose of this talk would be to provide a starting point for security professionals that want to make the shift towards ICS Security, just like I did two years ago. While the term starting point might be a bit misleading, the goal would be to provide an ICS 001 talk instead in contrast to an ICS 101 talk.

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Secure Remote Access
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 19
Use Stratix 5900 (1783-SR)
NOT this (or similar such item)
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 21
DefenseinDepth
Securitytechnologiesapplied
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Secure Browsing (HTTPS)
Intrusion Protection and Detection
Remote Terminal Session
Application Security
VLANs
Remote Engineers and Partners
Plant Floor Applications and Data
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 22
WAN
Plant Engineer
Skid Builder
System Integrator
Remote Site
WAN
Router
Plant Site
WAN
Router
• Stand-alone Remote Industrial Application
Example: remote site
Requirements
Connection out from the Plant, direct access
Little to no IT support, little to no alignment with Industrial Automation and Control System security
standards
Potential Solution
IPSecVPN, DMVPN,FlexVPN – ASA5515 and/or STX5900
1783-SR/819
ISR
IPSec
X many

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White paper scada (2)
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The document discusses securing industrial control systems (ICS) infrastructure for compliance with NERC CIP standards and beyond. It outlines the network security challenges for bulk power systems in meeting compliance standards while balancing performance and costs. Real-world security vulnerabilities are described from assessments done by the GAO and Department of Energy. The paper then explains how a unified threat management approach using a single security platform can help simplify NERC compliance by providing firewall, VPN, antivirus, IPS, and authentication capabilities required without needing separate point products. This integrated solution secures the infrastructure while maintaining performance.

© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 23
Cell/Area Zone #3 Cell/Area Zone #4
FactoryTalk
Applications
and Services Ring Topology
Cell/Area Zone #1 Cell/Area Zone #2
Manufacturing Zone
8000 Managed
Layer 2 Switch
ETAP - Embedded
Layer 2 Switch
Ring Topology
Enterprise Zone Enterprise
Network
5700 Managed
Layer 2 Switch
Star Topology
Embedded Layer 2
Switch Linear
Topology
Mobile User
Lightweight AP
(LWAP)
AP as Workgroup
Bridge (WGB)
ERP, Email, Wide Area
Network (WAN)
5100
802.11n – Dual Band
Access point
8300 Managed
Layer 3 Switch
5900 Industrial
Services Router
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 24
Levels 0–2
Cell/Area Zones
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
Enterprise Zone
Levels 4 and 5
Manufacturing Zone
Site Manufacturing
Operations and Control
Level 3
Internet
Enterprise Zone
Levels 4 and 5
Enterprise
WAN
Enterprise
Data Center
Gbps Link Failover
Detection
Firewall
(Active)
Firewall
(Standby)
Patch Management
Terminal Services
Application Mirror
AV Server
Cisco
ASA 5500
Remote Access Server
• RSLogix 5000
• FactoryTalk View Studio
Catalyst
6500/4500
Remote Engineer
or Partner
Enterprise
Connected
Engineer
Enterprise Edge
Firewall
HTTPS
Cisco VPN Client
Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP)
Catalyst 3750
StackWise
Switch Stack
EtherNet/IP
IPSECVPN
SSLVPN
FactoryTalk Application Servers
• View
• Historian
• AssetCentre
• Transaction Manager
FactoryTalk Services
Platform
• Directory
• Security/Audit
Data Servers
1. Remote engineer or partner
establishes VPN to corporate
network; access is restricted to
IP address of plant DMZ firewall
2. Portal on plant firewall enables
access to IACS data, files and
applications
– Intrusion protection system (IPS) on
plant firewall detects and protects
against attacks from remote host
3. Firewall proxies a client session
to remote
access server
4. Access to applications on
remote access server is
restricted to specified plant floor
IACS resources through IACS
application security
© 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 25
1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks
2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network
3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA network
4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services
5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system
6. Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors
7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA network
8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-a-day
incident monitoring
9. Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks, and any other connected
networks, to identify security concerns
10. Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the
SCADA network to evaluate their security
11. Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios
12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers,
system administrators, and users
13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions
or contain sensitive information that require additional levels of protection
14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth
16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements
17. Establish effective configuration management processes
18. Conduct routine self-assessments
19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security
performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance
21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational
personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system
design, operations, or security controls
21 Steps to securing a SCADA network
http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/prepare/21stepsbooklet.pdf
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The document discusses cyber security challenges for industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used in petroleum production. It notes that ICS/SCADA systems are no longer isolated and were not designed with security in mind, making them vulnerable to threats. It outlines potential threats from both external hackers and internal actors seeking to harm operations or steal information. The document then proposes a holistic cyber security approach including governance, technical safeguards, physical security, and crisis management to help mitigate risks. It acknowledges challenges in securing remote sites and ensuring security solutions work with ICS/SCADA systems and protocols.

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Routeco cyber security and secure remote access 1 01

  • 1. IACS Network Security & Secure RemoteAccess Guy Denis gudenis@cisco.com Rockwell Automation Alliance Manager Europe www.cisco.com/go/security 11th Feb 2014
  • 2. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 2 On Average, there is a ratio of 15:1 Industrial Devices to Enterprise within a manufacturing plant Industrial Devices Meter Sensor Machines Vehicles Robots HMII/O Controller/PLC Scanner Phone RFID Tag Enterprise Devices IP Phone PC Printers Servers “As manufacturers replace legacy network systems and look for areas to streamline on a common solution, ARC sees a tremendous opportunity for growth of EtherNet/IP applications,” according to Craig Resnick, Research Director, ARC Advisory Group 1 15
  • 3. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 3 TheftUnintended employee action Natural or manmade disaster Unauthorized contractor actions Security patches Worms, viruses, malware Denial of serviceSabotage Unauthorized access Unauthorized employee action Potential Disruptions
  • 4. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 4 Stuxnet – a wake up call…. breakdown of Stuxnet http://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyberweapon.html Ralph Langner German Control systems security consultant F-Secure wrap-up on Stuxnet http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzadFI7sco
  • 5. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 5
  • 6. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 6 • Fragile TCP/IP Stacks – NMAP, Ping Sweep lockup • Little or no device level authentication • Poor network design – hubs, unmanaged switches • Windows based IA servers – patching, legacy OS • Unnecessary services running – FTP, HTTP • Open environment, no port security, no physical security of switch, Ethernet ports • Limited auditing and monitoring of access to IA devices • Unauthorised use of HMI, IA systems for browsing, music/movie downloads • Lack of IT expertise in IA networks, many blind spots
  • 8. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 8 Real–Time Control Fast Convergence Traffic Segmentation and Management Ease of Use Site Operations and Control Multi-Service Networks Network and Security Management Routing Application and Data share Access Control Threat Protection Gbps Link for Failover Detection Firewall (Active) Firewall (Standby) SCADA Application and Services Servers Cisco ASA 5500 Cisco Catalyst Switch Network Services Cisco Catalyst 6500/4500 Cisco Cat. 3750X StackWise Switch Stack Patch Management, Terminal Services, Application Mirrors, AV Servers Cell/Area #1 (Redundant Star Topology) Drive Controller HMI Distributed I/O Controller DriveDrive HMI Distributed I/O HMI Cell/Area #2 (Ring Topology) Cell/Area #3 (Linear Topology) IE3000/3010/2000 Layer 2 Access Switch Controller Enterprise/IT Integration Collaboration Wireless Application Optimization Cell/Area Zone Levels 0–2 Layer 2 Access Manufacturing Zone Level 3 Distribution and Core Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Firewalls Enterprise Network Levels 4–5 Web Apps DNS FTP Internet
  • 9. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 9 • Physical Security – limit physical access to authorized personnel: areas, control panels, devices, cabling, and control room – escort and track visitors • Network Hardening – infrastructure framework – e.g. firewalls with intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and integrated protection of networking equipment such as switches and routers • End-point Hardening – patch management, antivirus software as well as removal of unused applications, protocols, and services • Application Security – authentication, authorization, and audit software • Device Hardening – change management and restrictive access Defense in Depth Computer Device Physical Network Application
  • 10. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 10 • Security is not a bolt-on component • Comprehensive Network Security Model for Defense-in-Depth • Industrial Security Policy • DMZ Implementation • Design Remote Partner Access Policy, with robust & secure implementation
  • 12. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 12 Panduit/RA Physical Layer Reference Architectures Design Guide PSL-DCPL PSL-DCJB
  • 13. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 14 • All network traffic from either side of the DMZ terminates in the DMZ; network traffic does not directly traverse the DMZ • Application Data Mirror • No primary services are permanently housed in the DMZ • DMZ shall not permanently house data • No control traffic into the DMZ • Be prepared to “turn-off” access via the firewall No Direct Traffic Enterprise Security Zone Industrial Security Zone Disconnect Point Disconnect Point DMZReplicated Services
  • 14. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 15 Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 Level 0 Terminal Services Patch Management AV Server Application Mirror Web Services Operations Application Server Enterprise Network Site Business Planning and Logistics NetworkE-Mail, Intranet, etc. SCADA App Server SCADA Directory Engineering Workstation Domain Controller SCADA Client Operator Interface SCADA Client Engineerin g Workstatio n Operato r Interfac e Batch Control Discrete Control Drive Control Continuou s Process Control Safety Control Sensors Drives Actuators Robots Enterprise Zone DMZ Process Control Domain Process Control Network Web E-Mail CIP Firewal l Firewall Site Manufacturing Operations and Control Area Supervisory Control Basic Control Process PurdueReferenceModel,ISA-95 IndustrialSecurityStandardISA-99
  • 15. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 16 1.Firewall Services (Segmentation, Isolation) 2.Application Services (Behavior Enforcement, Application Intelligence and Awareness, Gateway Capabilities) 3.Logging and Historical Services (Traffic, Event histories) 4.Encryption and Data Integrity Services (remote access, and secure channels for data transfer) 5.IPS/IDS Services (deep packet inspection – Sourcefire and Wurldtech Industrial Signatures 1.Malware Detection and Filtering (deep packet and URL inspection
  • 16. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 17 VPN VDI WSA IPS ASA-CX ASA ISE Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 Level 0 Level 3½ Enterprise Zone DMZ PCD / Manufacturing Zone PCN / Cell / Area Zone 1783-SR
  • 18. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 19 Use Stratix 5900 (1783-SR) NOT this (or similar such item)
  • 19. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 21 DefenseinDepth Securitytechnologiesapplied Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Access Control Lists (ACLs) Secure Browsing (HTTPS) Intrusion Protection and Detection Remote Terminal Session Application Security VLANs Remote Engineers and Partners Plant Floor Applications and Data
  • 20. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 22 WAN Plant Engineer Skid Builder System Integrator Remote Site WAN Router Plant Site WAN Router • Stand-alone Remote Industrial Application Example: remote site Requirements Connection out from the Plant, direct access Little to no IT support, little to no alignment with Industrial Automation and Control System security standards Potential Solution IPSecVPN, DMVPN,FlexVPN – ASA5515 and/or STX5900 1783-SR/819 ISR IPSec X many
  • 21. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 23 Cell/Area Zone #3 Cell/Area Zone #4 FactoryTalk Applications and Services Ring Topology Cell/Area Zone #1 Cell/Area Zone #2 Manufacturing Zone 8000 Managed Layer 2 Switch ETAP - Embedded Layer 2 Switch Ring Topology Enterprise Zone Enterprise Network 5700 Managed Layer 2 Switch Star Topology Embedded Layer 2 Switch Linear Topology Mobile User Lightweight AP (LWAP) AP as Workgroup Bridge (WGB) ERP, Email, Wide Area Network (WAN) 5100 802.11n – Dual Band Access point 8300 Managed Layer 3 Switch 5900 Industrial Services Router
  • 22. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 24 Levels 0–2 Cell/Area Zones Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Enterprise Zone Levels 4 and 5 Manufacturing Zone Site Manufacturing Operations and Control Level 3 Internet Enterprise Zone Levels 4 and 5 Enterprise WAN Enterprise Data Center Gbps Link Failover Detection Firewall (Active) Firewall (Standby) Patch Management Terminal Services Application Mirror AV Server Cisco ASA 5500 Remote Access Server • RSLogix 5000 • FactoryTalk View Studio Catalyst 6500/4500 Remote Engineer or Partner Enterprise Connected Engineer Enterprise Edge Firewall HTTPS Cisco VPN Client Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Catalyst 3750 StackWise Switch Stack EtherNet/IP IPSECVPN SSLVPN FactoryTalk Application Servers • View • Historian • AssetCentre • Transaction Manager FactoryTalk Services Platform • Directory • Security/Audit Data Servers 1. Remote engineer or partner establishes VPN to corporate network; access is restricted to IP address of plant DMZ firewall 2. Portal on plant firewall enables access to IACS data, files and applications – Intrusion protection system (IPS) on plant firewall detects and protects against attacks from remote host 3. Firewall proxies a client session to remote access server 4. Access to applications on remote access server is restricted to specified plant floor IACS resources through IACS application security
  • 23. © 2013 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 25 1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks 2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network 3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA network 4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services 5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system 6. Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors 7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA network 8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring 9. Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks, and any other connected networks, to identify security concerns 10. Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the SCADA network to evaluate their security 11. Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios 12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, system administrators, and users 13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or contain sensitive information that require additional levels of protection 14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process 15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth 16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements 17. Establish effective configuration management processes 18. Conduct routine self-assessments 19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans 20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance 21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system design, operations, or security controls 21 Steps to securing a SCADA network http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/prepare/21stepsbooklet.pdf