Transforming Smart Building Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT
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Using a smart building as their case study, Forescout Research Labs investigated how IoT devices can be leveraged as an entry point to a building’s network, where legacy OT assets, IT systems and IoT devices all intersect. Key findings from our research include: • How the IoT is impacting the organizational threat landscape • The additional risks that IoT devices introduce • How to evolve your cybersecurity strategy for the age of IoT
Report
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[1]
ABI Research, Internet of Everything Market Tracker, QTR 3, 2018
[2]
M. Hung, “Leading the IoT: Gartner Insights on How to Lead in a Connected World,” Gartner, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_
digital.pdf
2
New Risks from IoT Devices
The number of IoT devices in organizational networks is rapidly increasing. These devices
are mostly unmanaged, come from a multitude of vendors, use non-standard operating
systems, support a diversity of (often insecure) protocols and may dynamically connect to
other devices inside or outside the organization’s network.
The IoT has already experienced
significant growth in the past
decade and is expected to reach
more than
30 billion
connected devices by 2022[1]
BY 2020, more than
25%
of identified attacks in
enterprises will involve
the IoT [2]](https://cdn.statically.io/img/www.slideshare.net/)
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Transforming Smart Building Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT
- 1. RISE OF THE MACHINES Transforming Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT This report from the Forescout Research Team explores how IoT devices can be leveraged by attackers in a building’s network, where legacy OT assets, IT systems and IoT devices all intersect.
- 2. 2 [1] ABI Research, Internet of Everything Market Tracker, QTR 3, 2018 [2] M. Hung, “Leading the IoT: Gartner Insights on How to Lead in a Connected World,” Gartner, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_ digital.pdf 2 New Risks from IoT Devices The number of IoT devices in organizational networks is rapidly increasing. These devices are mostly unmanaged, come from a multitude of vendors, use non-standard operating systems, support a diversity of (often insecure) protocols and may dynamically connect to other devices inside or outside the organization’s network. The IoT has already experienced significant growth in the past decade and is expected to reach more than 30 billion connected devices by 2022[1] BY 2020, more than 25% of identified attacks in enterprises will involve the IoT [2]
- 3. 3 The Internet of Things (IoT) in a Smart Building Consumer-grade IoT devices are entering, and reshaping, the building automation industry. Below is an illustration of IoT devices found within a typical smart building network and how these systems communicate with one another. Workstations IoT Platform Building Management Workstations VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM SMART LIGHTING SYSTEMIoT SYSTEM HVAC SYSTEM IP Camera Building Controller Building Controller Lighting Bridge Smart TV IoT Gateway IoT Gateway NVR Wearable Medical Device Smart Plug Sensor Display Badge Reader Door Lock Thermostat Fan Smart Light Motion Sensor Network Switch TYPICAL SMART BUILDING NETWORK
- 4. 4 Smart Buildings: Where OT, IT and IoT All Intersect To better understand the current risk landscape for smart buildings and its implications, the Forescout Research Team investigated how video surveillance systems (VSS), smart lighting systems, and other IoT devices could be used by cyber criminals to infiltrate a building network. Video Surveillance System (VSS) Smart Lighting System IoT System
- 5. Key Findings How the IoT impacts the cybersecurity landscape for today’s organizations, focusing on the interplay between IoT and legacy OT devices The abuse of a smart building network by exploiting vulnerabilities in a VSS, Philips Hue and the MQTT protocol in a lab setting Specific security challenges from the vulnerabilities in devices like video surveillance systems (VSS), smart lighting systems and IoT systems What organizations can do to reduce risk and better protect their enterprise networks in the age of IoT 5
- 6. 6 Security Challenges of IoT Devices IoT systems, including devices, gateways, and platforms, are notoriously vulnerable to cyberattacks. Attacks against these systems could include: • Exploitation of default or weak credentials: This is notoriously common and simple way for a hacker to gain access to a device or network. • Web application and API attacks: This category encompasses methods like database and command injections, directory traversal, and cross-site scripting. These represent the low-hanging fruit for an attacker targeting an IoT device and can be performed in a semi- automatic fashion using available open source tools. • Lower-level exploits: This method targets firmware using tactics like a buffer overflow or memory corruption issues to disable the device or allow arbitrary code execution. • Protocol-based attacks: Attackers can use these to exploit vulnerabilities like the lack of authentication, encryption, and integrity validation to sniff and exfiltrate or tamper with sensitive data. [1] [1] Forescout, Rise of the Machines: Transforming Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT, 2019: https://www.forescout.com/places-in-network/building-automation-system-bas/trans- forming-cybersecurity-strategy-for-the-iot/
- 7. 7 3 Simple Strategies to Tear Down a Building Network To demonstrate how an attacker would exploit vulnerabilities to enter a smart building network using IoT devices, the Forescout team’s lab setup included three systems, video surveillance, smart lighting, and an IoT system. Network Switch AttackerInternet SMART LIGHTING SYSTEMIoT SYSTEM VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM IP Camera IP Camera IP Camera IoT Gateway Lighting Bridge Smart Light Motion Sensor Smart Light LAB SETUP
- 8. 8 Strategy 1: Video Surveillance Systems The precursors of modern video surveillance systems (VSS) were closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems that use analog signals and coax cables to communicate in a closed network. As technology advanced, digital cameras supporting IP communication were integrated into VSSs. Today, many buildings have a hybrid VSS architecture that is quite complex, containing a variety of legacy and new systems. Switches / Routers Analog CameraI P Camera (with VMS) Video Encoder DVR NVR IP Camera (with VMS) Analog Camera Analog Camera Analog Camera Analog Camera IP Camera IP Camera IP CameraVideo Decoder MonitorL ocal Server Local Monitoring PC Remote Monitoring PC Remote Server Internet
- 9. 9 Video Surveillance Systems: The Protocols RTSP RTP 9 • Real-time Transport Protocol, usually over UDP • Designed for real-time transfer of audio and video data • Unidirectional from server (camera) to client (NVR) • Secure version SRTP available, but rarely used • Real Time Streaming Protocol, usually over TCP • Very similar to HTTP • Designed to control stream parameters, not deliver the data • RTSP communication mandatory before starting to stream
- 10. 1010 Video Surveillance Systems: The Vulnerabilities Some of the vulnerabilities found in many VSS commonly used in large organizations were: Use of unencrypted video streams via RTP/RTSP Unwanted communication links between the IT network and the VSS caused by firewall misconfiguration Unwanted services and insecure protocols enabled, including FTP and UPnP Weak passwords to access IP cameras Vulnerable cameras [1] [1] Forescout, Rise of the Machines: Transforming Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT, 2019: https://www.forescout.com/places-in-network/building-automation-system-bas/ transforming-cybersecurity-strategy-for-the-iot/
- 11. 11 Video Surveillance Systems: The Attacks Assuming a man-in-the-middle attacker (an attacker inside the network that can sniff and, when necessary, modify packets), the Forescout team successfully carried out two attacks: denial of service and footage replay. Denial of service Footage replayLAB
- 12. 12 Anatomy of the Footage Replay Attack 1. Establish a man in the middle 2. Eavesdrop the traffic and record the video footage 3. Replace RTSP command <get param> with <teardown> 4. Replay the pre-captured stream to the NVR
- 13. 13 Strategy 2: Smart Lighting Smart lighting systems are connected to a network, which allows them to be monitored and controlled from a central system or via the cloud. For this experiment, the Forescout Research Team used a Philips Hue. Wi-Fi Network ZigBee Network Philip Hue System Wi-Fi Router Hue Bridge Smart Light Motion SensorSmart Light
- 14. 14 Smart Lighting: The Vulnerabilities • The Philips Hue uses a dedicated bridge device that connects all lights on its own network. • In order to work with remote systems, the bridge must be connected to a Wi-Fi router, providing a potential network entry point for a malicious actor. Wi-Fi Network ZigBee Network Philip Hue System Wi-Fi Router Hue Bridge Smart Light Motion SensorSmart Light
- 15. 15 Attacking The Philips Hue The Philips Hue supports an API that allows a user to interact with a bridge, and therefore the lights, using RESTful HTTP requests. [1] Using this API, the Forescout team devised and implemented two types of attacks with a physical consequence: denial of service by switching off the lights and a platform reconfiguration. [1] PenTestPartners, “Hijacking Philips Hue,” [Online]. Available: https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hijacking-philips-hue/. Denial of service Platform reconfiguration LAB
- 16. 16 Anatomy of the Attacks 1. Sniff a valid API token transmitted in cleartext HTTP 2. Send an HTTP PUT request with the sniffed token and the “off” command: PUT http://<bridge_addr>/api/<token>/lights/<number>/state {“on”:false} 3. Automate the request above via script for lights continuously off 4. Optional: use the same valid token to reconfigure the platform and use it as an entry point into the network: PUT http://<bridge_addr>/api/<token>/config {“ipaddress”:<ip_addr>, “dhcp”:false, “netmask”:<netmask>, “gateway”:<gtw>}
- 17. 17 Strategy 3: IoT System When planning their attack on the IoT system, the Forescout Research Team decided to focus on the messaging (application) layer, specifically on the most widely used protocol in IoT systems, MQTT. [1] Publisher Publisher MQTT Broker Subscriber Subscriber MQTT [1] Eclipse IoT Working Group, AGILE IoT, IEEE, and Open Mobile Alliance, “IoT Developer Survey 2018,” 2018. [Online]. Available: https://iot.eclipse.org/resources/iot-developer-survey/ iot-developer-survey-2018.pdf.
- 18. 1818 The Vulnerabilities: MQTT • MQTT is an M2M connectivity protocol, designed to be lightweight, and is therefore unencrypted. • Because of this, it’s highly recommended to use an encrypted transport layer security (TLS) stream on MQTT communications, since unencrypted traffic may disclose sensitive information, including topics, values of data points or even credentials. • However, there are thousands of MQTT servers not using TLS, disclosing sensitive information, as well as allowing remote control, to any client who remotely subscribes to a topic. [1] [2] [1] V. Pasknel, “Hacking the IoT with MQTT,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://morphuslabs.com/hacking-the-iot-with-mqtt-8edaf0d07b9b. [2] M. Hron, “Are smart homes vulnerable to hacking?,” Avast, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://blog.avast.com/mqtt-vulnerabilities-hacking-smart-homes.
- 19. 19 Exploiting MQTT Like the attacks on the video surveillance system, for the case of the IoT system, the Forescout Research Team leveraged a protocol (MQTT), rather than specific devices. Using this method, they devised and implemented two types of attacks: information gathering and denial of service. Information gathering Denial of serviceLAB
- 20. 20 MQTT: Anatomy of the Attacks Information gathering: An attacker can gather information about the IoT network, such as available assets and their location, configuration information or even sensitive information like credentials by either passively sniffing traffic or subscribing to interesting topics and receiving published messages. Denial of service: An attacker can flood a broker with connection attempts or heavy payloads, which can be amplified by requiring a higher Quality-of-Service level in the protocol.
- 21. 21 CONCLUSION In the age of IoT, legacy security solutions like endpoint agents, antivirus, and traditional IT intrusion detection systems are not enough because either they are unsupported by embedded devices or they are incapable of understanding the network traffic generated by these devices. Organizations need to implement solutions that empower them with fully automated visibility and control across their entire enterprise. Cybersecurity Strategy Fully automated complete visibility Operational Technology Campus Data Center and Cloud IoT 21
- 22. 2222 This presentation is a brief summary of an in-depth research report detailing the growth of IoT, possible business risks and cybersecurity strategy planning. Download the “Rise of the Machines: Transforming Cybersecurity Strategy for the Age of IoT” report from the Forescout Research Team to learn more. READ THE FULL REPORT Still Curious?
- 23. 23 About the Researchers Daniel dos Santos holds a PhD in computer science from the University of Trento and has experience in security consulting and research. He is a researcher at Forescout, focusing on vulnerability research and the development of innovative features for SilentDefense. Mario Dagrada holds a PhD in computational physics from the University Pierre Marie Curie in Paris and has experience in high performance software development, security and research. He is a researcher at Forescout, focusing on medical device security and the development of innovative features for SilentDefense. Michael Yeh holds a joint master’s degree in cybersecurity from the Technical University of Eindhoven and the Radboud University. He worked as an intern at Forescout during the development of this research project. Martín Pérez Rodríguez has studied Computer Science & Engineering at the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid and the Technical University of Eindhoven. After his internship, he started working as a DevOps Engineer at Forescout. Elisa Costante Elisa Costante holds a PhD in computer science from the Eindhoven University of Technology. She is an expert in IT and OT security and privacy. As director of the Industrial and OT Innovation Technology at Forescout, she drives the execution of pioneering theoretical and experimental work addressing the cyber security challenges posed by the IT/OT convergence. Her tasks include the generation of original content to boost awareness and thought leadership and the identification, building and testing of prototypes for innovative products and services in line with the overall product strategy.
- 24. 24 About Forescout Connect with us Forescout Technologies is the leader in device visibility and control. Our unified security platform enables enterprises and government agencies to gain complete situational awareness of their extended enterprise environments and orchestrate actions to reduce cyber and operational risk. Forescout products deploy quickly with agentless, real-time discovery and classification, as well as continuous posture assessment. www.forescout.com @Forescout Forescout Technologies