IRJET- A Review of the Concept of Smart GridIRJET Journal
This document proposes a novel privacy enhancing routing algorithm called Optimal Privacy Enhancing Routing Algorithm (OPERA) for wireless networks. OPERA uses a statistical game-theoretic framework to optimize routing privacy given a utility function. It considers a global adversary that can observe transmissions across the entire network. OPERA formulates the privacy-utility tradeoff problem as a linear program that can be efficiently solved. Simulation results show that OPERA reduces the adversary's identification likelihood by up to half compared to random and greedy heuristics, and up to five times compared to a pattern matching scheme. OPERA also outperforms traditional information-theoretic approaches.
Semantic Modeling & Monitoring for Real Time Decision Making: Results and Nex...Drogkaris Prokopios
The document discusses semantic modeling and monitoring for real-time decision making within Greece's Cyber Crime Center of Excellence (GCC). It presents research on developing dynamic models of critical infrastructures to monitor systems, manage risks, and enable adaptive response to disruptions. A case study of applying this approach to the air traffic sector is described, involving modeling data exchange in airport collaborative decision making systems to analyze security and evaluate key performance indicators. Next steps involve further implementation within the GCC to enhance cyber defense of critical national infrastructure.
An explicit trust model towards better system securitycsandit
The document proposes an explicit trust model to improve system security. The model defines trust as a combination of characteristics like invulnerability, integrity, verification, and trustworthiness. It identifies categories of functional and transactional trust with levels like operational, verifiable, and denied trust. The model includes a trust engine that calculates trust metrics based on these characteristics and assigns trust levels before code execution. This allows trust to evolve based on historical performance, strengthening security by restricting access based on trust levels. A formal analysis evaluates security versus performance, and an asset threat model shows how common attacks could be addressed.
The document discusses linguistic structures for incorporating fault tolerance into application software. It begins by explaining that as software complexity increases, software faults have become more prevalent and impactful, necessitating fault tolerance at the application level. It then establishes a set of desirable attributes for application-level fault tolerance structures and surveys current solutions, assessing each according to these attributes. The goal is to identify shortcomings and opportunities to develop improved fault tolerance structures.
A predictive framework for cyber security analytics using attack graphsIJCNCJournal
Security metrics serve as a powerful tool for organizations to understand the effectiveness of protecting computer networks. However majority of these measurement techniques don’t adequately help corporations to make informed risk management decisions. In this paper we present a stochastic security framework for obtaining quantitative measures of security by taking into account the dynamic attributes associated with vulnerabilities that can change over time. Our model is novel as existing research in attack graph analysis do not consider the temporal aspects associated with the vulnerabilities, such as the availability of exploits and patches which can affect the overall network security based on how the vulnerabilities are interconnected and leveraged to compromise the system. In order to have a more realistic representation of how the security state of the network would vary over time, a nonhomogeneous model is developed which incorporates a time dependent covariate, namely the vulnerability age. The daily transition-probability matrices are estimated using Frei's Vulnerability Lifecycle model. We also leverage the trusted CVSS metric domain to analyze how the total exploitability and impact measures evolve over a time period for a given network.
This document describes an approach to optimizing event-based programs using static analysis techniques. It aims to reduce overhead from indirect function calls and argument passing by exploiting predictability in common event sequences. The approach first profiles a program to identify frequent event patterns, then applies various compiler optimizations informed by the profile information. Examples of event-based systems that could benefit include graphical user interfaces, distributed object systems, and operating system kernels.
Secure intrusion detection and attack measure selectionUvaraj Shan
This document proposes NICE, a framework for secure intrusion detection and attack mitigation in virtual network systems. NICE uses distributed agents on cloud servers to monitor traffic, detect vulnerabilities, and generate attack graphs. It profiles virtual machines to identify their state and vulnerabilities. When potential attacks are detected, NICE can quarantine suspicious VMs and inspect their traffic. The attack analyzer correlates alerts, constructs attack graphs, and selects appropriate countermeasures based on the graphs. Evaluations show NICE can effectively detect attacks while minimizing performance overhead for the cloud system.
This document proposes a two-phase system using genetic algorithms and fuzzy logic to classify intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts and reduce false positives. In the first phase, similar alerts are grouped and normalized. Irrelevant alerts are identified through asset verification. In the second phase, labeled alerts are classified using genetic fuzzy rules to efficiently detect intrusions. The system is tested on KDD Cup 99 dataset and effectively reduces false positives through optimized fuzzy rules, reducing analyst workload.
The document proposes a risk-aware response mechanism to systematically counter routing attacks in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It introduces an extended Dempster-Shafer mathematical theory of evidence that incorporates importance factors to assess risk. The mechanism collects evidence from intrusion detection and routing table changes, assesses risk using the extended evidence model, makes adaptive response decisions based on risk levels, and performs responses like isolating malicious nodes and recovering routing tables. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the risk-aware approach.
Preemptive modelling towards classifying vulnerability of DDoS attack in SDN ...IJECEIAES
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has become an essential networking concept towards escalating the networking capabilities that are highly demanded future internet system, which is immensely distributed in nature. Owing to the novel concept in the field of network, it is still shrouded with security problems. It is also found that the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is one of the prominent problems in the SDN environment. After reviewing existing research solutions towards resisting DDoS attack in SDN, it is found that still there are many open-end issues. Therefore, these issues are identified and are addressed in this paper in the form of a preemptive model of security. Different from existing approaches, this model is capable of identifying any malicious activity that leads to a DDoS attack by performing a correct classification of attack strategy using a machine learning approach. The paper also discusses the applicability of best classifiers using machine learning that is effective against DDoS attack.
This document proposes enhancing safety through situation-aware user interfaces. It discusses collecting user context data through the interface and analyzing it to derive the user's state and detect situations. The interface could then plan and execute adaptations like adjusting privileges if it detects the user has changed or become distressed. It presents a proof-of-concept interface built in Tcl/Tk that logs user actions, analyzes them to detect discomfort, and dynamically resizes widgets based on screen size. The interface aims to improve safety, usability and experience by making interfaces aware of dynamic contexts and situations.
This document proposes a security policy and architecture for computational grids. The key points are:
1. The security policy is designed to integrate heterogeneous trust domains while allowing each domain to enforce its own local security policies.
2. The policy focuses on authentication to allow single sign-on for users and processes across domains, while delegating access control to local policies.
3. It defines global and local subjects, with partial mappings between them, to support single sign-on while respecting local naming schemes.
4. The policy requires mutual authentication for cross-domain operations and allows locally authenticated subjects to access resources according to local access control policies.
5. It enables processes to act on behalf of users with deleg
InfoSec Technology Management of User Space and Services Through Security Thr...ecarrow
The focus of this paper will demonstrate the need to clearly define
and segregate various user space environments in the enterprise
network infrastructure with controls ranging from administrative
to technical and still provide the various services needed to
facilitate the work space environment and administrative
requirements of an enterprise system. Standards assumed are
industry practices and associated regulatory requirements with
implementations as they apply to the various contextual
applications. This is a high level approach to understanding the
significance and application of an effective secure network
infrastructure. The focus is on end user needs and the associated
services to support those needs. Conceptually user space is a
virtual area allocated to the end user needs identified with specific
services to support those needs by creating a virtual playground.
To manage risk, the concept of creating a "security threat gateway
(STG)" isolates and secures each user space with its associated
services. Emphasis will be placed on the functional managerial
process and application of the STG, safeguarding one user space
from another, to facilitate the use of the needed services to
perform the operational tasks of the organization. When user’s
needs and associated components are clearly identified, then it is
possible for anyone to use this model as a template, to guide them
in creating an effective strategy for their own network security.
This approach is practical in orientation and application, focusing
on a high level perspective and assumes the reader already has a
low level technical background for a tactical implementation in
mitigating risk to the enterprise network infrastructure.
IRJET- Secure Scheme For Cloud-Based Multimedia Content StorageIRJET Journal
This document proposes a secure scheme for cloud-based multimedia content storage. It has two novel components: (1) a method to create signatures for 3D videos that captures depth signals efficiently, and (2) a distributed matching engine for multimedia objects that achieves high scalability. The system was implemented and deployed on Amazon and private clouds. Experiments on over 11,000 3D videos and 1 million images showed the system accurately detects over 98% of copies, outperforming YouTube's protection system which fails to detect most 3D video copies. The system provides cost-efficient, scalable multimedia content protection leveraging cloud infrastructure.
The document describes an algorithm for tolerating crash failures in distributed systems called the algorithm of mutual suspicion (AMS). AMS allows the backbone of a distributed application to tolerate failures of up to n-1 of its n components. Each node runs one agent of the backbone consisting of 3 tasks: D for the system database, I for monitoring "I'm alive" signals, and R for error recovery. The coordinator periodically sends "I'm alive" messages and assistants reply with acknowledgments. If a node does not receive the expected messages, it enters a suspicion period and may deduce a crashed component and initiate recovery actions.
If you’re having trouble finding the time and energy to market your business, it may be your habits are to blame! You can’t grow your business if you aren’t marketing consistently and putting yourself in front of people who are already looking for your solutions. And you can’t market consistently if you have poor time management and productivity habits. What you CAN do is make simple shifts in your mindset to break through these challenges and make progress in reaching your goals. In this week’s podcast, I share some simple ways you can change your habits to find more time for marketing.
Human beings emerged in Africa around 250,000 years ago and began migrating out of Africa around 100,000 years ago, populating the world. Paleolithic societies consisted of small bands of 25-30 hunter-gatherers who were nomadic. Around 12,000 years ago, agriculture began to emerge, allowing people to produce surplus food and live in larger, more permanent settlements. Early civilizations developed around 3500-3000 BC in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Peru, featuring city life, class divisions, and early forms of government. While sharing common features, Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations also had important differences in their development.
This document discusses the different types of "si clauses" or conditional sentences in French. There are three main types: first conditional for likely present or future situations, second conditional for unlikely past situations, and third conditional for impossible past situations. Examples of each type are provided along with their English equivalents using "if...then". A quiz with 15 example sentences follows to test understanding of the different conditional structures.
This document proposes a multi-agent architecture for incident reaction in information system security. The architecture has three layers - low level interacts directly with the infrastructure, intermediate level correlates alerts and deploys reaction actions using multi-agent systems, and high level provides supervision and manages business policies. The architecture was tested for data access control and aims to quickly and efficiently react to attacks while ensuring policy compliance. The document discusses requirements like scalability, autonomy, and global supervision. It also describes the key components of alert management, reaction decision making, and policy definition/deployment to implement the architecture using a multi-agent approach.
Este documento médico proporciona información personal sobre José Francisco Javier Blanquer Gregori, incluyendo su fecha de nacimiento, lugar de nacimiento, departamento y centro de salud donde trabaja, y sus funciones como médico de atención primaria.
1) The document proposes a dynamic approach for assigning functions and responsibilities to agents in a multi-agent system for critical infrastructure management.
2) The approach uses an agent's reputation, which is based on past performance, to determine which agents receive which responsibilities as crisis situations change over time.
3) Assigning responsibilities dynamically based on reputation allows the system to continue operating effectively if an agent becomes isolated or has reduced capabilities during a crisis.
Defensa Centralizada contra amenazas multi-vector - Configuración de un centr...Eventos Creativos
Charla impartida por Dragos Lungu de BitDefender, en el evento "Asegura IT Camp2" que tuvo lugar los días 22, 23 y 24 de Octubre de 2010 en El Escorial.
At midlife, she has reinvented herself as a rookie jockey and has won several key races despite a lifelong battle with bipolar disorder. I interviewed Sylvia as part of a package celebrating phenomenal women.
The document discusses how social governance can make governments more effective through improved communication, collaboration, and transparency. It notes that traditionally governments communicated through paper files that got lost, but even with computers communication is inefficient through many emails and phone calls. Collaboration on programs is also lacking, as different departments don't work together well. There is also a lack of transparency, with questions about decisions and delays. The document argues that social business can help by allowing governments to crowdsource from citizens, better collaborate in online groups, and more openly share information and status updates.
The document defines and provides examples for various words related to concepts like abstraction, compliance, expediting tasks, diligence, relevance, dissent, reverence, extolling, reprehensible actions, advocacy, pragmatism, endorsement, redundancy, conspicuousness, incessance, rigor, scrutiny, and discord.
Charla impartida de Igor Lukic de Zendal Backup, en el I Curso de Verano de Informática Forense de la Facultad de Informática de la Universidad de A Coruña.
This document proposes enhancements to the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model by integrating the concept of responsibility. It summarizes the existing RBAC model and user-role/permission-role assignment processes. It then presents a responsibility model built around three concepts: an employee's obligations derived from responsibilities, the rights required to fulfill obligations, and the employee's commitment to fulfill obligations. The paper argues RBAC could be improved by incorporating acceptance of responsibility within the role assignment process. It proposes integrating the responsibility model with RBAC to address identified weaknesses and modeling the integrated model using the OWL ontology language.
A security decision reaction architecture for heterogeneous distributed networkchristophefeltus
This document proposes a multi-agent system architecture for reacting to security alerts in heterogeneous distributed networks. The architecture has three layers - low, intermediate, and high - and consists of agents that perform alert correlation, reaction decision making, and policy deployment. The agents communicate by exchanging messages. The architecture is intended to allow for quick and efficient reaction to security attacks while ensuring coordinated configuration changes across network components. It was developed and illustrated using a case study of a medical application distributed across buildings, campuses, and metropolitan areas.
This document proposes a multi-agent system architecture for reacting to security alerts in heterogeneous distributed networks. The architecture has three layers - a low level that interfaces with the target infrastructure, an intermediate level that correlates alerts from different domains and deploys reaction actions, and a high level global view. It uses an ontology and Bayesian network based decision support system to help agents make decisions according to preferences and influence diagrams. The approach is illustrated using a case study of a medical application distributed across buildings, campuses and metropolitan areas.
The document proposes a multi-agent system architecture for incident reaction in telecommunication networks. The architecture has three layers - low level at the network interface, intermediate level to correlate alerts, and high level with a global view. Agents represent components like alert correlation, reaction decision-making, and policy deployment. The reaction decision agent receives alerts and decides if a reaction is needed based on policies, organization knowledge, and specified behavior. It defines new policy rules for the reaction. The policy deployment agent instantiates and sends the new policies to policy enforcement points to change the network security state. A decision support system using ontologies, Bayesian networks, and influence diagrams helps the agents make decisions.
A multi agent based decision mechanism for incident reaction in telecommunica...christophefeltus
The document proposes a multi-agent based decision system for responding to incidents in telecommunications networks. It describes a three-layer distributed architecture with low, intermediate, and high levels to coordinate incident response. The low level interfaces with the network, the intermediate level correlates alerts and deploys response actions, and the high level has a global view for decision making. The architecture uses multi-agent systems for autonomous response capabilities. It also incorporates an OntoBayes model to help agents make decisions based on preferences, ontology, Bayesian networks, and influence diagrams. The approach was tested for data access control and aims to enable timely, adaptive incident response across complex, distributed infrastructure.
The document proposes an agent-based architecture for multi-level security incident reaction in distributed telecommunication networks. The architecture has three levels: a low level interface with the infrastructure, an intermediate level using multi-agent systems to correlate alerts and deploy reactions across domains, and a high level for global supervision and policy management. The architecture was designed based on requirements like scalability, availability, autonomy, and robust reaction and alert management across distributed systems. It was successfully tested for implementing data access control policies.
This document proposes a framework for regulating security policies that integrates business requirements. It describes an architecture for a policy regulation system dedicated to computer network security. The architecture is based on identifying phases to react to failures or attacks. It aims to react quickly to attacks by implementing immediate countermeasures, while also adopting new policies to prevent future attacks, taking business goals into account.
The document proposes a conceptual trusted incident reaction architecture based on a multi-agent system. The architecture includes three main components: (1) an alert correlation engine that collects and analyzes alerts, (2) a policy instantiation engine that decides on and defines reactions to confirmed alerts, and (3) a policy deployment point that deploys new policies on targeted networks. A decision support system is included to help agents make decisions under uncertainty using an ontology, Bayesian networks, and influence diagrams. The architecture is illustrated using a case study of a medical application network.
The purpose of this paper two fold. First and foremost it presents a background narrative on the origins, innovations and applications of novel structural automation technologies and the rarity of experts involved in research, development and practice of this field. The second part of this paper presents a rudimentary framework for a solution addressing this paucity – the creation of an interdisciplinary academic program at PAAET that will be the first ever in the region to address applied information communication technologies ICT in the design, planning, engineering and management of structural automation projects. In doing so, we need also to define the level of implementation. This field, as all fields in ICT, have been loosely defined and most applications carry less weight in its implementation than what should be applied. This paper gives an attempt to define an indexing scheme by which we can easily classify such implementation and generate a ranking by which we can safely define its level of ―Intelligence‖.International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Multi agents based architecture for is security incident reactionchristophefeltus
This document proposes a multi-agent architecture for responding to security incidents in information systems. The architecture has three layers: a low level that interfaces with the targeted infrastructure, an intermediate level that correlates alerts and deploys response actions using multi-agent systems, and a high level that provides supervision and manages business policies. The architecture was designed based on requirements like scalability, availability, autonomy, and global supervision. It aims to quickly and efficiently respond to attacks while ensuring responses do not violate business policies. The document then discusses using a multi-agent system with JADE to represent nodes in the architecture and facilitate communication and coordination between components for selecting and deploying response policies.
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words inmaribethy2y
Include at least 250 words in your posting and at least 250 words in your reply. Indicate at least one source or reference in your original post. Please see syllabus for details on submission requirements.
Module 1 Discussion Question
Search "scholar.google.com" for a company, school, or person that has been the target of a network
or system intrusion? What information was targeted? Was the attack successful? If so, what changes
were made to ensure that this vulnerability was controlled? If not, what mechanisms were in-place to protect against the intrusion.
Reply-1(Shravan)
Introduction:
Interruption location frameworks (IDSs) are programming or equipment frameworks that robotize the way toward observing the occasions happening in a PC framework or system, examining them for indications of security issues. As system assaults have expanded in number and seriousness in the course of recent years, interruption recognition frameworks have turned into an essential expansion to the security foundation of generally associations. This direction archive is planned as a preliminary in interruption recognition, created for the individuals who need to comprehend what security objectives interruption location components serve, how to choose and design interruption discovery frameworks for their particular framework and system situations, how to deal with the yield of interruption identification frameworks, and how to incorporate interruption recognition capacities with whatever remains of the authoritative security foundation. References to other data sources are likewise accommodated the peruse who requires particular or more point by point guidance on particular interruption identification issues.
In the most recent years there has been an expanding enthusiasm for the security of process control and SCADA frameworks. Moreover, ongoing PC assaults, for example, the Stunt worm, host appeared there are gatherings with the inspiration and assets to viably assault control frameworks.
While past work has proposed new security components for control frameworks, few of them have investigated new and in a general sense distinctive research issues for anchoring control frameworks when contrasted with anchoring conventional data innovation (IT) frameworks. Specifically, the complexity of new malware assaulting control frameworks - malware including zero-days assaults, rootkits made for control frameworks, and programming marked by confided in declaration specialists - has demonstrated that it is exceptionally hard to avert and identify these assaults dependent on IT framework data.
In this paper we demonstrate how, by joining information of the physical framework under control, we can distinguish PC assaults that change the conduct of the focused on control framework. By utilizing information of the physical framework we can center around the last goal of the assault, and not on the specific instruments of how vulnerabilities are misused, and how ...
Executable Security Policies: Specification and Validation of Security Policiesijwmn
Security Policies constitute the core of network protection infrastructures. However, their development is a sensitive task because it can be in opposition with the security requirements (e.g. lack of rule or conflicting rules). A specification task seems to be indispensible in order to clarify the desired exigencies. A validation process for security policies becomes then necessary before their deployment to avoid resources network damages. Nowadays, there is no automated tool in the network security world allowing such task. Moreover, we have found that the theory developed for this aim in the software engineering domain can be adapted for security policies because several similarities exist between the expressions of the needs in the two domains as mentioned in several studies. Hence, we propose in this paper a specification and validation framework for security policies, inspired from software engineering tools, where: (1) we introduce the concept of executable specifications to build the concept of Executable Security Policies (2) we propose a new specification language based on an adapted modeling and inspired from Promela (3) we build a validation model based on the newly introduced language and (4) we define a 3-steps validation process of the executable security policy. The validation process is based on the main security properties, i.e. consistency, completeness and preservation of safety and liveness. Moreover, the consistency related to multiple security policies is treated through a detection algorithm and a resolution method.
This document proposes a metamodel for modeling reputation-based multi-agent systems using an adaptation of the ArchiMate enterprise architecture modeling framework. It describes a case study applying this metamodel to model an electrical distribution critical infrastructure system. Key elements of the metamodel include:
- Representing agents and their behaviors through policies that integrate both behavior and trust components
- Modeling trust relationships between agents using a reputation-based trust model
- Illustrating the metamodel layers and components on a system that detects weather alerts and broadcasts messages to the public through various channels like SMS or social media
This document discusses integrating webhook support into alert policies for an alert notification system. It begins by introducing alert notifications and their importance for cybersecurity. Webhooks allow applications to automatically send notifications when events occur. The proposed system would allow alert policies to be integrated with webhooks, sending warning messages via email or webhook notifications. Benefits of this approach include customizable messages, automated alerting and responses, simple integration, monitoring and reliability. The methodology describes configuring alert policies with webhook profiles containing URLs and payloads. When alerts trigger, notifications can be sent to webhooks or administrators by email. This provides a way for systems to automatically communicate about security issues. Future work could include categorizing webhook profiles and adding validation and filtering of messages.
Essay QuestionsAnswer all questions below in a single document, pr.docxjenkinsmandie
Essay Questions
Answer all questions below in a single document, preferably below the corresponding topic.
Responses should be no longer than half a page.
One
1. A security program should address issues from a strategic, tactical, and operational view. The
security program should be integrated at every level of the enterprise’s architecture. List a
security program in each level and provide a list of security activities or controls applied in these
levels. Support your list with real-world application data.
2. The objectives of security are to provide availability, integrity, and confidentiality protection to
data and resources. List examples of these security states where an asset could lose these
security states when attacked, compromised, or became vulnerable. Your examples could
include fictitious assets that have undergone some changes.
3. Risk assessment can be completed in a qualitative or quantitative manner. Explain each risk
assessment methodology and provide an example of each.
Two
1. Access controls are security features that are usually considered the first line of defense in
asset protection. They are used to dictate how subjects access objects, and their main goal is to
protect the objects from unauthorized access.
These controls can be administrative, physical, or technical in nature and should be applied in a
layered approach, ensuring that an intruder would have to compromise more than one
countermeasure to access critical assets. Explain each of these controls of administrative,
physical, and technical with examples of real-world applications.
2. Access control defines how users should be identified, authenticated, and authorized. These
issues are carried out differently in different access control models and technologies, and it is up
to the organization to determine which best fits its business and security needs. Explain each of
these access control models with examples of real-world applications.
3. The architecture of a computer system is very important and comprises many topics. The
system has to ensure that memory is properly segregated and protected, ensure that only
authorized subjects access objects, ensure that untrusted processes cannot perform activities
that would put other processes at risk, control the flow of information, and define a domain of
resources for each subject. It also must ensure that if the computer experiences any type of
disruption, it will not result in an insecure state. Many of these issues are dealt with in the
system’s security policy, and the security model is built to support the requirements of this
policy. Given these definitions, provide an example where you could better design computer
architecture to secure the computer system with real-world applications. You may use fictitious
examples to support your argument.
Three
1. Our distributed environments have put much more responsibility on the individual user, facility
management, and administrative procedures and controls than in th.
This document outlines a 5-step process for managing organizational ICT security:
1. Identify the organization's business objectives to ensure ICT resources support them.
2. Identify all ICT resources, including network infrastructure, servers, user devices, and hardware.
3. Identify and assess risks to ICT resources, such as theft, damage, and unauthorized access, and prioritize them based on likelihood and cost.
4. Develop activities to mitigate risks through a 7-layered approach involving policies, physical security, perimeter controls, internal access management, host protection, and application hardening.
5. Implement and monitor the security program with roles for the CIO, CISO, ICT
Unit III AssessmentQuestion 1 1. Compare and contrast two.docxmarilucorr
Unit III Assessment:
Question 1
1. Compare and contrast two learning theories. Which one do you believe is most effective? Why?
Your response should be at least 200 words in length.
Question 2
1. Explain how practice helps learning. Give examples of how this has helped you.
Your response should be at least 200 words in length.
Running head: RANSOMWARE ATTACK 1
RANSOMWARE ATTACK 2
Situational Report on Ransomware Attack
Name
Institution
Date
Ransomware Attack-Situational Report
The current attack involves ransomware located inside the organizational network. The ransomware attacker has also raised the demand to $5000 in Bitcoin per nation-state. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin present significant challenges and has widespread financial implications. The malware was zipped and protected with a password. The affected hosts had executable files and also malicious artifacts. The malware dropped some items in the database. The malware also had to write privileges as it uploaded some files to the webserver (Johnson, Badger, Waltermire Snyder & Skorupka, 2016). The malware also retrieved some files from the server using the “GET” HTTP request. The file hash and requested passed onto the urls indicate a breach of security.
Security Incident Report / SITREP #2017-Month-Report#
Incident Detector’s Information
Date/Time of Report
15/02/2018 1.40 p.m.
First Name
Amanda
Last Name
Smith
OPDIV
Avitel/Information Security
Title/Position
System Analyst
Work Email Address
[email protected]
Contact Phone Numbers
Work 321-527-4477
Government Mobile
Government Pager
Other
Reported Incident Information
Initial Report Filed With (Name, Organization)
CISO, Avitel Analysts
Start Date/Time
15/02/2018
Incident Location
HR Office
Incident Point of Contact (if different than above)
Internal Ransomware
Priority
Level 2
Possible Violation of ISO/IEC 27002:2013
YES ISO/IEC 27002
Privacy Information - ISO 27000 (Country Privacy Act Law)
The incident violated ISO 27000. The attack is an indication of failure in the state of the corporate network or existing security policies.
The target suffered adversely by limiting the conference participants from accessing the network resources. The violation was intentional.
Incident Type
Alteration of information from the server. There are database queries indicating that the attack involved modifying some entries in the database.
US-CERT Category
Ransomware/ Unauthorized Access
CERT Submission Number, where it exists
The ransomware attack can be reported to the CCIRC Canadian Cyber Incidence Response Centre Team for an appropriate response to the incident.
Description
The ransomware makes it quite difficult to guess the password unless the conference participants pay the demanded amount. The Crypto-ransomware locks the system unless the system is unlocked via the password.
1. User asked to update links
2. User disables security controls
3. Malware opens a command prompt
4. The script u ...
future internetArticleERMOCTAVE A Risk Management Fra.docxgilbertkpeters11344
This document introduces a new risk management framework called ERMOCTAVE for assessing risks associated with adopting cloud computing. ERMOCTAVE combines two existing risk management methods - Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE). It structures the processes of OCTAVE into three phases and maps the components of ERM to each phase to provide a more comprehensive approach. The document then describes ERMOCTAVE in detail and provides a case study example of how it can be applied by a company migrating parts of its system to Microsoft Azure cloud.
future internetArticleERMOCTAVE A Risk Management FraDustiBuckner14
future internet
Article
ERMOCTAVE: A Risk Management Framework for IT
Systems Which Adopt Cloud Computing
Masky Mackita 1, Soo-Young Shin 2 and Tae-Young Choe 3,*
1 ING Bank, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium; [email protected]
2 Department of IT Convergence Engineering, Kumoh National Institute of Technology, Gumi 39177, Korea;
[email protected]
3 Department of Computer Engineering, Kumoh National Institute of Technology, Gumi 39177, Korea
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-54-478-7526
Received: 22 June 2019; Accepted: 3 September 2019; Published: 10 September 2019
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Abstract: Many companies are adapting cloud computing technology because moving to the cloud
has an array of benefits. During decision-making, having processed for adopting cloud computing,
the importance of risk management is progressively recognized. However, traditional risk management
methods cannot be applied directly to cloud computing when data are transmitted and processed by
external providers. When they are directly applied, risk management processes can fail by ignoring
the distributed nature of cloud computing and leaving numerous risks unidentified. In order to fix
this backdrop, this paper introduces a new risk management method, Enterprise Risk Management
for Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (ERMOCTAVE), which combines
Enterprise Risk Management and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation for
mitigating risks that can arise with cloud computing. ERMOCTAVE is composed of two risk management
methods by combining each component with another processes for comprehensive perception of risks.
In order to explain ERMOCTAVE in detail, a case study scenario is presented where an Internet seller
migrates some modules to Microsoft Azure cloud. The functionality comparison with ENISA and
Microsoft cloud risk assessment shows that ERMOCTAVE has additional features, such as key objectives
and strategies, critical assets, and risk measurement criteria.
Keywords: risk management; ERM; OCTAVE; cloud computing; Microsoft Azure
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a technology that uses virtualized resources to deliver IT services through the
Internet. It can also be defined as a model that allows network access to a pool of computing resources
such as servers, applications, storage, and services, which can be quickly offered by service providers [1].
One of properties of the cloud is its distributed nature [2]. Data in the cloud environments had become
gradually distributed, moving from a centralized model to a distributed model. That distributed nature
causes cloud computing actors to face problems like loss of data control, difficulties to demonstrate
compliance, and additional legal risks as data migration from one legal jurisdiction to another. An example
is Salesforce.com, which suffered a huge outage, locking more than 900,000 subscribers out of important
resources needed for business trans ...
Future internet articleermoctave a risk management fraarnit1
This document introduces a new risk management framework called ERMOCTAVE for assessing risks associated with adopting cloud computing. ERMOCTAVE combines two existing risk management methods - Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) - to provide a more comprehensive approach. The framework distributes ERM components across the three phases of the OCTAVE method. A case study is presented to demonstrate how ERMOCTAVE can be applied to assess risks when migrating systems to the Microsoft Azure cloud.
Similar to Conviction model for incident reaction architecture monitoring based on automatic sensors alert detection (20)
Multi-Agent System (MAS) monitoring solutions are designed for a plethora of usage topics. Existing approach mostly used cloned back-end architectures while front-end monitoring interface tends to constitute the real specificity of the solution. These interfaces are recurrently structured around three dimensions: access to informed knowledge, agent’s behavioural rules, and restitution of real-time states of specific system sector. In this paper, we propose prototyping a sector-agnostic MAS platform (Smart-X) which gathers in an integrated and independent platform all the functionalities required to monitor and to govern a wide range of sector specific environments. For illustration and validation purposes, the use of Smart-X is introduced and explained with a smart-mobility case study.
This document provides an agenda and overview for a joint workshop on security modeling hosted by the ArchiMate Forum and Security Forum. The workshop aims to identify opportunities to improve the conceptual and visual modeling of enterprise information security using TOGAF and ArchiMate. The agenda includes introductions, a research spotlight on strengthening role-based access control with responsibility modeling, an open discussion on complementing TOGAF and ArchiMate with enhanced security modeling, and identifying next steps. The workshop purpose is to enable better security architecture decisions and drive usage of TOGAF and ArchiMate for security architecture.
Aligning the business operations with the appropriate IT infrastructure is a challenging and critical activity. Without efficient business/IT alignment, the companies face the risk not to be able to deliver their business services satisfactorily and that their image is seriously altered and jeopardized. Among the many challenges of business/IT alignment is the access rights management which should be conducted considering the rising governance needs, such as taking into account the business actors' responsibility. Unfortunately, in this domain, we have observed that no solution, model and method, fully considers and integrates the new needs yet. Therefore, the paper proposes firstly to define an expressive Responsibility metamodel, named ReMMo, which allows representing the existing responsibilities at the business layer and, thereby, allows engineering the access rights required to perform these responsibilities, at the application layer. Secondly, the Responsibility metamodel has been integrated with ArchiMate® to enhance its usability and benefits from the enterprise architecture formalism. Finally, a method has been proposed to define the access rights more accurately, considering the alignment of ReMMo and RBAC. The research was realized following a design science and action design based research method and the results have been evaluated through an extended case study at the Hospital Center in Luxembourg.
This document proposes an innovative systemic approach to risk management across interconnected sectors. It suggests using enterprise architecture models to manage cross-sector risks in Luxembourg's complex ICT ecosystem. The approach would provide regulators an overview of all players and systems, as well as models of different sectors to analyze collected data and risks at a national level, fostering accurate and reactive risk mitigation across economic domains.
This document proposes extending the HL7 standard with a responsibility perspective to better manage access rights to patient health records. It presents the ReMMo responsibility metamodel, which defines actors' responsibilities and associated access rights. The paper aims to align ReMMo with the HL7-based eSanté healthcare platform model in Luxembourg to semantically enhance access controls based on users' real responsibilities rather than just roles. It will first map concepts between the two models, then evaluate the alignment through a prototype applying inference rules.
This document presents a study that aims to develop and validate a responsibility model to improve IT governance. It analyzes concepts of responsibility from literature and frameworks like COBIT. The researchers developed a responsibility model with key concepts like obligation, accountability, right, and commitment. They then compare this model to COBIT's representation of responsibility to identify areas for potential enhancement, like adding concepts that COBIT lacks. The document illustrates how the responsibility model could be used to refine COBIT's process for identifying system owners and their responsibilities.
This document proposes an innovative approach called SIM (Secure Identity Management) that aims to make access management policies closer aligned with business objectives. It does this in two ways:
1) By focusing the policy engineering process on business goals and responsibilities defined in processes, using concepts from the ISO/IEC 15504 standard. This links capabilities and accountabilities to process outcomes and work products.
2) By defining a multi-agent system architecture to automate the deployment of policies across heterogeneous IT components and devices. The agents provide autonomy and ability to adapt rapidly according to context.
The approach was prototyped using open source components and aims to improve how access rights are defined according to business needs and deployed across an organization
This document proposes a methodological approach for specifying services and analyzing service compliance considering the responsibility dimension of stakeholders. The approach includes a product model and process model. The product model has three layers: an informational layer describing service context and concepts, an organizational layer describing business rules and roles, and a responsibility dimension layer linking the two. The process model outlines steps for service architects to identify context, define concepts and rules, specify services, and analyze compliance. The approach is illustrated with an example of managing access rights for sensitive healthcare data exchange between organizations.
This document discusses integrating responsibility aspects into service engineering for e-government. It proposes a multi-layered approach including an ontological layer defining legal concepts, an organizational layer describing roles and stakeholders, an informational layer representing data structures and integrity constraints, and a technical layer representing IT components. A responsibility meta-model is also introduced to align responsibilities across these layers and facilitate interoperability between services that share data. The approach aims to ensure service compliance and manage risks associated with e-government services.
This document proposes a responsibility modeling language (ReMoLa) to align access rights with business process requirements. ReMoLa is a responsibility-centered meta-model that integrates concepts from the business and technical layers, with the concept of employee responsibility bridging the two. It incorporates four types of obligations from the COBIT framework to refine employee responsibilities and better assign access rights. ReMoLa maps responsibilities to roles in the RBAC model to leverage its advantages for access right management while ensuring responsibilities align with business tasks and employee commitment.
The document describes the NOEMI assessment methodology, which was developed as part of a research project to help very small enterprises (VSEs) improve their IT practices. The methodology aims to assess VSEs' IT capabilities in order to facilitate collaborative IT management across organizations. It was designed to be aligned with common IT standards like ISO/IEC 15504 and ITIL, but adapted specifically for VSEs. The methodology has been tested through several case studies with VSEs in Luxembourg, with promising results.
This document provides a preliminary literature review of policy engineering methods related to the concept of responsibility. It summarizes key access control models and discusses how they address concepts like capability, accountability, and commitment. The document also reviews engineering methods and how they incorporate responsibility considerations. The overall goal is to orient further research towards a new policy model and engineering method that more fully addresses stakeholder responsibility.
This document proposes an extension of the ArchiMate enterprise architecture framework to model multi-agent systems for critical infrastructure governance. The authors develop a responsibility-driven policy concept and metamodel layers to represent agent behavior and organizational policies across technical, application, and organizational layers. The approach is illustrated through a case study of a financial transaction processing system.
This document summarizes an experimental prototype of the OpenSST protocol for secured electronic transactions. OpenSST was developed to achieve high security, simplicity in software engineering, and compatibility with existing standards. The prototype uses OpenSST for the authorization portion of electronic payments in an e-business clearing solution. It describes the OpenSST message format and types, and discusses how OpenSST is implemented in the prototype's three-element architecture of an OpenSST proxy, reverse proxy, and server.
This document proposes an automatic reaction strategy for critical infrastructure SCADA systems. It defines a three-layer metamodel for modeling SCADA components and two types of policies (cognitive and permissive) that govern component behavior. It then presents a two-phase method for identifying these policies from the SCADA architecture and formalizing them to support an automatic reaction strategy. This strategy is modeled as an integral part of the SCADA architecture using the defined metamodel and policy identification method. It includes organizational and application layers with main actors, strategies, and components that realize the reaction policies based on expected automation levels.
This document discusses the NOEMI model, a collaborative management model for ICT processes in SMEs. The model was developed by the Centre Henri Tudor and tested with a cluster of 8 partner SMEs. Key aspects of the model include defining ICT activities across 5 domains, assessing each SME's capabilities, and having an operational team manage activities for the cluster under a coordination committee. The experiment showed improved cost control, management, and partner satisfaction compared to alternatives like outsourcing or hiring individual IT staff. The research is now ready for market transfer as the successful model is adopted long-term by participating SMEs.
This document proposes a methodology for aligning business and IT policies using a responsibility model. The methodology is a five-step approach consisting of collecting information, defining capabilities, accountabilities and commitments, linking responsibilities to processes, validating the model, and defining policies. It is illustrated with a case study from an IT company where they define an access control policy using this methodology and responsibility model. The responsibility model defines three components - capabilities, accountabilities, and commitments - to clarify roles and responsibilities for policy definition.
More from Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (20)
Deploying DAPHNE Computational Intelligence on EuroHPC Vega for Benchmarking ...University of Maribor
Slides from talk:
Aleš Zamuda, Mark Dokter:
Deploying DAPHNE Computational Intelligence on EuroHPC Vega for Benchmarking Randomised Optimisation Algorithms.
2024 International Conference on Broadband Communications for Next Generation Networks and Multimedia Applications (CoBCom), 9--11 July 2024, Graz, Austria
https://www.cobcom.tugraz.at/
ScieNCE grade 08 Lesson 1 and 2 NLC.pptxJoanaBanasen1
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Dalghren, Thorne and Stebbins System of Classification of AngiospermsGurjant Singh
The Dahlgren, Thorne, and Stebbins system of classification is a modern method for categorizing angiosperms (flowering plants) based on phylogenetic relationships. Developed by botanists Rolf Dahlgren, Robert Thorne, and G. Ledyard Stebbins, this system emphasizes evolutionary relationships and incorporates extensive morphological and molecular data. It aims to provide a more accurate reflection of the genetic and evolutionary connections among angiosperm families and orders, facilitating a better understanding of plant diversity and evolution. This classification system is a valuable tool for botanists, researchers, and horticulturists in studying and organizing the vast diversity of flowering plants.
A mature quasar at cosmic dawn revealed by JWST rest-frame infrared spectroscopySérgio Sacani
The rapid assembly of the first supermassive black holes is an enduring mystery. Until now, it was not known whether quasar ‘feeding’ structures (the ‘hot torus’) could assemble as fast as the smaller-scale quasar structures. We present JWST/MRS (rest-frame infrared) spectroscopic observations of the quasar J1120+0641 at z = 7.0848 (well within the epoch of reionization). The hot torus dust was clearly detected at λrest ≃ 1.3 μm, with a black-body temperature of
K, slightly elevated compared to similarly luminous quasars at lower redshifts. Importantly, the supermassive black hole mass of J1120+0641 based on the Hα line (accessible only with JWST), MBH = 1.52 ± 0.17 × 109 M⊙, is in good agreement with previous ground-based rest-frame ultraviolet Mg II measurements. Comparing the ratios of the Hα, Paα and Paβ emission lines to predictions from a simple one-phase Cloudy model, we find that they are consistent with originating from a common broad-line region with physical parameters that are consistent with lower-redshift quasars. Together, this implies that J1120+0641’s accretion structures must have assembled very quickly, as they appear fully ‘mature’ less than 760 Myr after the Big Bang.
A slightly oblate dark matter halo revealed by a retrograde precessing Galact...Sérgio Sacani
The shape of the dark matter (DM) halo is key to understanding the
hierarchical formation of the Galaxy. Despite extensive eforts in recent
decades, however, its shape remains a matter of debate, with suggestions
ranging from strongly oblate to prolate. Here, we present a new constraint
on its present shape by directly measuring the evolution of the Galactic
disk warp with time, as traced by accurate distance estimates and precise
age determinations for about 2,600 classical Cepheids. We show that the
Galactic warp is mildly precessing in a retrograde direction at a rate of
ω = −2.1 ± 0.5 (statistical) ± 0.6 (systematic) km s−1 kpc−1 for the outer disk
over the Galactocentric radius [7.5, 25] kpc, decreasing with radius. This
constrains the shape of the DM halo to be slightly oblate with a fattening
(minor axis to major axis ratio) in the range 0.84 ≤ qΦ ≤ 0.96. Given the
young nature of the disk warp traced by Cepheids (less than 200 Myr), our
approach directly measures the shape of the present-day DM halo. This
measurement, combined with other measurements from older tracers,
could provide vital constraints on the evolution of the DM halo and the
assembly history of the Galaxy.
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS – THE IMPORTANCE OF FAIR TESTING.pptxJoanaBanasen1
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Ethical considerations play a crucial role in research, ensuring the protection of participants and the integrity of the study. Here are some subject-specific ethical issues that researchers need
Probing the northern Kaapvaal craton root with mantle-derived xenocrysts from...James AH Campbell
"Probing the northern Kaapvaal craton root with mantle-derived xenocrysts from the Marsfontein orangeite diatreme, South Africa".
N.S. Ngwenya, S. Tappe, K.A. Smart, D.C. Hezel, J.A.H. Campbell, K.S. Viljoen
El Nuevo Cohete Ariane de la Agencia Espacial Europea-6_Media-Kit_english.pdfChamps Elysee Roldan
Europe must have autonomous access to space to realise its ambitions on the world stage and
promote knowledge and prosperity.
Space is a natural extension of our home planet and forms an integral part of the infrastructure
that is vital to daily life on Earth. Europe must assert its rightful place in space to ensure its
citizens thrive.
As the world’s second-largest economy, Europe must ensure it has secure and autonomous access to
space, so it does not depend on the capabilities and priorities of other nations.
Europe’s longstanding expertise in launching spacecraft and satellites has been a driving force behind
its 60 years of successful space cooperation.
In a world where everyday life – from connectivity to navigation, climate and weather – relies on
space, the ability to launch independently is more important than ever before. With the launch of
Ariane 6, Europe is not just sending a rocket into the sky, we are asserting our place among the
world’s spacefaring nations.
ESA’s Ariane 6 rocket succeeds Ariane 5, the most dependable and competitive launcher for decades.
The first Ariane rocket was launched in 1979 from Europe’s Spaceport in French Guiana and Ariane 6 will continue the adventure.
Putting Europe at the forefront of space transportation for nearly 45 years, Ariane is a triumph of engineering and the prize of great European industrial and political
cooperation. Ariane 1 gave way to more powerful versions 2, 3 and 4. Ariane 5 served as one of the world’s premier heavy-lift rockets, putting single or multiple
payloads into orbit – the cargo and instruments being launched – and sent a series of iconic scientific missions to deep space.
The decision to start developing Ariane 6 was taken in 2014 to respond to the continued need to have independent access to space, while offering efficient
commercial launch services in a fast-changing market.
ESA, with its Member States and industrial partners led by ArianeGroup, is developing new technologies for new markets with Ariane 6. The versatility of Ariane 6
adds a whole new dimension to its very successful predecessors
2. Figure 1. ReD node Architecture mapped with BARWAN case study [14]
Fig. 1 illustrates the ReD architecture applied on the BARWAN
1
use-case [2]. The flow is supposed to begin with an alert detected
by the automatic sensors (termed IDS). This alert is sent to the
ACE of BuildingA (BuildingA_ACE) agent that does or does not
confirm the alert to the PIE. Afterwards, the PIE decides to apply
new policies or to forward the alert to an ACE from a higher layer
(upper ACE). Its PIE agent sends the policies to the PDP agent,
which decides which PEP is able to implement it in terms of rules
or script on devices (laptop, InfoPad server, fileserver, etc.). Then
the PDP agent returns the new policy to the PEP agent that knows
how to transform a policy into an understandable rule or script for
the component. The Fig. 2 presents a more detailed view of the
architecture of the use case.
As previously explained, ReD specifications are embedded in
reaction policies managed at the multi-agents system (MAS)
management layer. These policies specify the responsibility of
each agent on the network and their evolution according to
reaction. The formalization of the agent responsibilities has been
achieved according to the responsibility model presented in the
next section.
3. AGENT RESPONSIBILITY
3.1 Responsibility Model
In a non-crisis context, agents are assigned to responsibilities like
PEP, PIE, ACE, etc. By analyzing for instance the activity of
monitoring the fileserver (see Fig. 2), we observe e.g. that the PEP
concerned by that activity has the responsibility to collect the log
file on the firewall, to make a basic correlation between the values
1
Bay Area Research Wireless Access Network project, conducted at the
University of California at Berkeley.
and the previous log values and to report this analysis to the ACE
in case of suspected alert. In order to perform the monitoring
activity, the PEP is assigned to obligations of achieving some
tasks and he gains in parallel the access rights needed to perform
these tasks. When a crisis occurs, for instance a DoS attack, one
or more PEP agents can be isolated from the rest of the network,
the normal monitoring rules and procedures do no longer work as
usual and it is required to change the responsibility of the agents.
For instance, in the above case, other agents have to fulfill the
responsibilities of the isolated PEP.
Figure 2. Synoptical ReD Architecture
3. In general, the definition of the agent responsibility is mostly
incomplete. Most of the architectures only consider the agent
against the outcome that it has to produce. Sometimes, advanced
solutions integrate the inputs that those agents request for
performing the outcome. We define the responsibilities as a state
assigned to an agent to signify him its obligations concerning the
task, its accountabilities regarding its obligations, and the rights
and capabilities necessary to perform it. In [3] and [12] we have
proposed an initial responsibility model that can be used to depict
the agent responsibility. That responsibility model has been
upgraded in order to integrate the following concepts:
Fig.3. Responsibility model for Conviction sharing
The assignment is the action of linking an agent to a
responsibility. Delegation process is the transfer of an agent’s
responsibility assignment to another agent.
The accountability is a duty to justify the performance of a task
to someone else under threat of sanction [5]. Accountability is a
type of obligation to report the achievement, maintenance or
avoidance of some given state to an authority and, as
consequence, is associated to an obligation. Accountability
contribute to generate trust or to remove trust depending of the
accountability outcomes [20].
The obligation is the most frequent concept to appear as well in
literature [4] as in industrial and professional frameworks.
Obligation is a duty which links a responsibility with a task that
must be performed. We define a task as an action to use or
transform an object.
The capability describes the requisite qualities, skills or resources
necessary to perform a task. Capability may be declined through
knowledge or know-how, possessed by the agent such as ability to
make decision, its processing time, its faculty to analyze a
problem, and its position on the network.
The right is common component but is not systematically
embedded in all frameworks. Right encompasses facilities
required by an agent to fulfill his obligations e.g. the access right
that the agent gets once he is assigned responsible.
The commitment pledged by the agent related to this assignment
represents his required engagement to fulfill a task and the
conviction that he does it in respect of good practices. The
commitment in MAS has already been subject to many researches
[6]. The semantic analyze of the commitment [7] and [8]
advocates for considering trust between agents as a pragmatic
commitment antecedent [1].
We consider the trust in an agent as the reliance that this agent
act as it is requested. For didactic reason, we consider in this
paper that a trust level of 10 is high and a trust level of 0 is low.
3.2 Agent Responsibility Specifications
Based on the responsibility model defined above, we may
instantiate the responsibility model for each responsibility of the
agents within the network. Because of the size of the paper, only
the four most important meta-concepts are instantiated: the
obligations concerning the task (in red), the capabilities (in blue),
the rights (in green), and commitment represented as a trust value
(in black). Table 1 provides these concepts instantiated for each
responsibilities of the network. The two last columns propose a
mapping of the rights and capabilities which are necessary by
obligation.
For the PEP, we observe that the responsibility includes
obligations such as the obligation “to retrieve the logs from the
component he monitors” (O1), “to provide an immediate reaction
if necessary” (O2), etc. In order to perform that obligation, he
must have the capabilities “to be on the same network as the
component he controls” (C1), “to be able to communicate with the
PDP” (C2), “to be able to communicate with the facilitator agent”
(C3) and so on. He also must have the right “to read the log file on
the concerned network component” (R1), “to write the log in a
central logs database” (R2), and so on.
4. MONITORING NEEDS BASED
CONVICTION MODEL
Commonly an agent is considered as an encapsulated computer
system [13] that is situated in some environment and that is
capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in
order to meet its design objectives [9]. As agents have control
over their own behaviour, they must cooperate and negotiate with
each other to achieve their goals [10]. The convergence of these
agents’ properties and distributed systems behaviour makes the
multi-agent architecture an appropriate mechanism to evaluate the
security (Conviction) of critical infrastructures run by distributed
systems [11]. Nonetheless for such multi-agents systems one
would expect each involved agent to be able to meet its assigned
responsibilities in order to provide efficient monitoring of the
security [14] of a network. Indeed, this is an intrinsic
characteristic of the monitoring system which should be
guaranteed if one is to gain a reliable insight of a network security
posture. The common approach which is to put more emphasis on
the well functioning of the network itself need being augmented
with a critical evaluation of the monitoring system to ensure the
reliability of its operations. This is relevant since links between
entities part of the monitoring system may break, agents with the
task of conducting the verification and measurements may fail to
fulfill their tasks and obligations for a range of raisons including:
Erroneous assignment of their rights or alteration of the latter
during runtime [16].
Agents’ capabilities may be insufficient for accomplishing a
task assigned to them
An accumulation of tasks for an agent may result in an
overload and subsequently a failure to meet some of its
responsibilities.
And so forth.
4. Table 1: Responsibilities instantiation
Obligations concerning Task Capabilities Mapping of
Capabilities to
Obligations
Mapping of
Rights to
ObligationsLevel of Trust Rights
PEP
O1: Must retrieve the logs from the
component it monitors
C1: Is on the same network as the component to control
C2: Be able to communicate with the PDP
C3: Be able to communicate with the facilitator agent
C4: Have enough computing resource to monitor the component
to control
C5: Be able to communicate with the MAS management layer
C6. Must be able to encrypt data
C7. Be able to communicate securely with the ACE
C1, C4, C6, C7 R1, R2, R4
O2: Must provide an immediate reaction if
necessary C1, C2, C4 R3
O3: Must communicate with the facilitator
tin order to get the address of the other
components (PDP, ACE)
C3
O4: Must report the incident to the ACE in
a secure way C5, C6, C7 R5
T: 3,365
R1. Allow to read log file on the concerned network component
R2. Allow to write log in the central logs database
R3. Be able to read the Policy in the MAS management layer
R4. Allow to read and right in the alert database
R5. Allow to read the Public key database
PDP
O1: Based on the incident report from the
PEP, must decide which reaction policy is
appropriate to be deployed by the PEP
C1: Has a fast bandwidth
C2: Has high CPU resources
C3: Has a central position on the network
C4. Be able to perform backup of the policy rules
C1, C2 R1, R2, R3
O2: Must communicate with the facilitator
to get the address of the other components
(PDP, PIE, Facilitator) and make back up
C1, C3, C4 R1, R2
T: 4,897
R1. Allow to read the yellow pages database
R2. Allow to read the white page database
R3. Allow to read the policy rules status
ACE
O1: Must communicate with the PEP or
others ACE to receive alert message
C1: Has high CPU resources in order to make correlations.
C2: Has a central position on the network
C3: Be able to communicate with all agents
C4. Must be able to decrypt data from the PEP
C5. Must be able to encrypt data to upper ACE
C2, C3, C4 R4
O2. Must correlate the Alerts from different
PEP or from inferior ACE C1 R2, R3
O3. Must confirm the alert to related PIE
C2, C3, R3
O4. Must forward the alert to the upper
ACE C2, C3, C5 R1, R4
T: 8,116
R1. Allow to read policy rules status
R2. Allow to read alert database
R3. Allow to write in the confirmed alert database
R4. Allow to read the Public key database
Facilitator
O1: Must provide IT addresses of the
requested component
C1. Have a position in which it is always available
C2. Has a significant bandwidth depending on the network size
C3. Be able to perform backup of the white page and yellow page
database
C1, C2 R1, R2, R3
O2: Make a mapping between the
component name and the IP address and
keep backup
C3 R1, R2, R3
T: 5,099
R1. Allow to read and write to the white pages services database
R2. Allow to read and write to the yellow pages services database
R3. Allow to read information about the topology of the network
This call for a clear definition and specification of the conditions
under which an entity part of the monitoring system [17] can, with
reasonable evidence, be expected to fulfill a required task. In
another word, we need to provide the basis for gaining justifiable
conviction that an entity can meet its monitoring responsibilities.
4.1 Predetermination for Agents’
Responsibilities Fulfillment
Although a plethora of conditions may need to be fulfilled for
expecting an agent to meet its obligations, it is imperative that the
followings are met:
Rights: the set of rights entrusted to the agent should be such
that they enable satisfaction of its obligations.
Capability: the overall capability assigned to an agent should
be below its capability. Moreover such capability should
enable it to fulfill its obligations
Level of Trust: should be higher or equal to the minimum level
required specified in Table 1.
Based on the above requirements the conviction for an agent
fulfilling its obligation should be based on the followings:
Conviction “A” for fulfillment of Obligation “O” by an Agent
with right “R”, Capability “C” and Trust “T”: A0 (R, C, T.)
(according to the assurance description from [11]):
A0 (R, C, T) = 0 if (R0 R) (C0 C) (Tp≥T) (1)
Otherwise:
5. A0 (R, C, T) = 1 (2)
With:
R the current rights of the agent
C the current capabilities of the agent
R0 the set of rights necessary for fulfilling obligation O
C0 the set of capabilities necessary for fulfilling obligation O
R0 include in R if for each right R0, i, part of R0, R0,i є R
C0 include in C if for each capability C0, i, part of C0, C0,i є C
Tp the trust at period p.
Relations (1) and (2) imply that the satisfaction of an obligation
can only be guaranteed if the set of rights allocated to the agent and
its current capabilities are both subsets of the set of rights and
capabilities required for the satisfaction of that obligation and if the
trust level at period p (Tp) is higher or at least equal to the
reference T. As illustration, Table 2 provides the set of rights,
capabilities and trust possessed by the agents being assigned to
responsibilities on the network at a period (p). The table reveals for
instance that to make the PEP able to fulfill obligation “O1: Must
retrieve the logs from the component it monitors”, it should be on
the same network than the component to control (C1), have enough
computing resource to monitor the component to control (C4), be
able to encrypt data (C6) and be able to communicate securely with
the ACE (C7). The PEP is also entrusted with a set of rights to
satisfy O1. These include “R1: is allowed to read log file on the
concerned network component”, “R2: is allowed to write log in the
central logs database” and “R4: is allowed to read and write in the
alert database”. The minimum level for the trust parameter
expected from the PEP is set to 3.
5. DEPLOYMENT LAB CASE
CONCEPTUAL VALIDATION
Based on the specifications of the responsibilities associated to
each agent provided in Table 1, one can assess whether current
rights, capabilities and trust level of each agent can be sufficient to
fulfill a given obligation. Let’s consider for instance Table 2, the
current deployment of ReD’s agents revealed that all four agents
PEP, PDP, ACE and the facilitator, although the level of trust is
always sufficient, they will not be able to fulfill respectively their
obligations O2, O1, O1, O2. In the case of the PEP, the obligation to
provide an immediate reaction is hampered by the fact that the PEP
lacks the capability to communicate with the PDP (C2). This means
that any appropriate policy cannot be grounded to the PEP and be
implemented in case of abnormally within the system.
Table 2: rights and capabilities of monitoring agents at period t
Obligations concerning Task Current agents’
capabilities
Current agents’
obligations
Conviction of obligation
fulfillment
Level of Trust
PEP
O1: Must retrieve the logs from the component it monitors C1, C4, C6, C7 R1, R2, R4 1
O2: Must provide an immediate reaction if necessary C1, C4 R3 0
O3: Must communicate with the facilitator tin order to get
the address of the other components (PDP, ACE)
C3 1
O4: Must report the incident to the ACE in a secure way C5, C6, C7 R5 1
T: 3
PDP
O1: Based on the incident report from the PEP, must decide
which reaction policy is appropriate to be deployed by the PEP
C1, C2 R1, R2, 0
O2: Must communicate with the facilitator to get the address
of the other components (PDP, PIE, Facilitator) and make back
up
C1, C3, C4 R1, R2 1
T:4
ACE
O1: Must communicate with the PEP or others ACE to
receive alert message C2, C3, R4 0
O2. Must correlate the Alerts from different PEP or from
inferior ACE C1 R2, R3 1
O3. Must confirm the alert to related PIE C2, C3, R3 1
O4. Must forward the alert to the upper ACE C2, C3, C5 R1, R4 1
T: 8
Facili-
tator
O1: Must provide IT addresses of the requested component C1, C2 R1, R2, R3 1
O2: Make a mapping between the component name and the
IP address and keep backup
R1, R2, R3 0
T: 5
Obligation O1 of the PDP also suffers the lack of R3 which gives
the PDP the right to actually read the policy status and deploy a
problem solving mechanism. The ACE as the agent responsible for
receiving alerts from nodes within the network cannot current meet
its obligation O1 which is about communicating with the PEP and
other ACEs to receive alerts since it cannot decrypt the message
protocol coming from the PEP (C4). The facilitator’s obligation to
keep back up (O1) can hardly be satisfied given the required
capability C3 is currently not there.
6. 6. CONCLUSIONS
Critical infrastructures are more and more present and needs to be
seriously managed and monitor regarding the increasing amount
of threats. This paper presents a solution to automatically react
after an incident on a wireless network based on MAS
architecture. The system initially based on static assignments of
function to agents needed more dynamicity in order to stay
aligned with the new arising risks.
In this position paper, we firstly enhance our previous works by
providing a conceptual representation of the agent responsibilities.
Our solution exploits the concept of agent’s obligations regarding
tasks, the concepts of right and capability required to satisfy an
obligation and the concept of trust that represent the reliance that
an agent to act as it is requested . Secondly, based on that
definition of the agents’ responsibilities, a conviction level can be
estimated in order to determine the confidence that the agent can
meet its responsibilities. In the event of such conviction level
being low, decisions can be made as to whether to shift the
fulfillment of such a responsibility to a different agent.
The architecture that we exploit to demonstrate the enhanced
reaction mechanism relies on ReD, which is being tested and
currently produced in our deployment lab case. Practically ReD
defines the structural bases for the alert mechanism that we have
exploited in the paper in order to illustrate the BARWAN project.
Additional lab case demonstrations are currently running and
more formal result are being generated within the CockpiCI
project [18, 19]. The outcomes of these field experiments already
underline the accuracy of the expected conviction model
outcomes and strengthen to recalculate the assurance value within
trust function perspective.
7. ACKNOWLEGMENTS
This research is supported and funded by the European FP7-
Security project “CockpiCI”, Cybersecurity on SCADA: risk
prediction, analysis and reaction tools for Critical Infrastructures.
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