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I am new here because we got stuck with a question during the weekend's discussion.

Let's imagine we are playing a dice game. You can roll as many 6-sided dice as you want, and so can your opponents, simultaneously. The highest sum wins, but if there is at least one "$1$" in the roll, you score $0$ points in total.

Is there "the" best strategy with how many dice to roll in order to statistically (unlimited repeats) win the game? If there is, how can we prove it?

Our only starting point was the counterprobability for each throw. Each dice has a $5/6$ chance not to be a $1$. So $1-(5/6 + 5/6 + \ldots)$ should be at least a "$1$" in the throw. That's all we were able to manage, but we are missing the link to further calculations.

Thanks a lot for your help.

Edit: Thanks for the hint with 1−(5/6)^n

We are playing one round with only 2 players.

If it is a draw --> reroll with the selected number of dice

The other player does not know how many dice the other player selects.

The first win ends the game.

If you roll "1" the whole round scores "0"

To the question: Are you trying to win or trying to maximise the expected number of points? We are trying to find the best number of dice to win the game, but it never has occurred to me, the the number of dice of the other player is of relevance! Thanks for the input

Also thanks a lot for all of your comments. I really appreciate it.

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    $\begingroup$ First, note that your probability for at least one "1" is wrong. It gets negative as soon as the number of dice is greater than 1. The correct probability should be: $$1 - \left(\frac 56 \right)^n$$ if there are $n$ dice. $\endgroup$
    – D S
    Commented May 3, 2023 at 5:23
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    $\begingroup$ Is there only one round? That is, if you roll two dice and your opponent rolls one, your sum is 8 and your opponent's is 3, so you win that round. Do you play further? If yes, when do you decide to stop? Suppose you roll a "1", then do you get a zero only for that round or all your total points become zero? $\endgroup$
    – D S
    Commented May 3, 2023 at 5:27
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    $\begingroup$ Are you trying to win or trying to maximise the expected number of points? If your aim is winning, what happens when the number of points are equal? $\endgroup$
    – Henry
    Commented May 3, 2023 at 7:51

3 Answers 3

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You could formulate this as a simultaneous game in game theory.

Both players simultaneously choose a positive integer number of dice. Then you need to define a utility function for each player, so you might choose:

  • Rolling a 1 gives a utility of 0, regardless of the other player's roll
  • Rolling a higher sum than the opponent gives a utility of 1
  • Drawing with the opponent gives a utility of 1/2

Note that in this version of the game, both players get 0 if they both roll a 1.

You can then compute the expected utility of choosing $n$ dice when your opponent chooses $m$ dice. "Solving" this game would mean finding a Nash equilibrium (a strategy profile where no player has an incentive to deviate). I was able to compute the expected payoff for up to 5 dice each (left number refers to the payoff for the row player).

enter image description here

This seems to suggest that:

  • If the opponent chooses 1 die, then the best response is to choose 2 dice.
  • If the opponent chooses 2 dice, then the best response is to choose 3 dice.
  • If the opponent chooses 3 dice, then the best response is to choose 4 dice.
  • If the opponent chooses 4 or more dice, then the best response is to choose 1 die.

So there may be no pure strategy equilibrium because it looks like there's always an incentive to deviate. (This isn't a complete proof since I haven't computed beyond 5 dice each).

At least you can know how many dice to choose if you can somehow figure out how many dice your opponent is using!

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  • $\begingroup$ If your conclusion ("This seems to suggest that...") is correct, doesn't that mean we can prune all of the strategies rolling $5$ or more dice, in which case we're just looking for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for a game with 4 choices ($1,2,3,4$) for each player? $\endgroup$ Commented May 4, 2023 at 2:52
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    $\begingroup$ Yes I believe so - a strategy which is a never a best response is also strictly dominated (see: math.stackexchange.com/questions/2276782/…). So if my hypotheses are correct (we still need to somehow prove it), then we would be able to eliminate every choice except for 1, 2, 3 and 4, and now that we have a finite game, there exists at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by Nash's existence theorem. $\endgroup$
    – Gary Liang
    Commented May 5, 2023 at 2:55
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    $\begingroup$ O.p. has updated the post specifying how to handle ties (both players reroll using the same number of dice), turning the game into a zero-sum game. With this modification it looks like $[5]$ is the best response to $[4]$ but $[1]$ is the best response to $[5], [6], \ldots$. It also appears that $0.3[1]+0.1[3]+0.6[5]$ dominates $[6]$, hence presumably also $[7], [8]$, which reduces the game to a $5 \times 5$ game. I find $4$ Nash equilibria each with $3$ strategies with nonzero probability, but it would be good to have corroboration. $\endgroup$ Commented May 6, 2023 at 1:17
  • $\begingroup$ I should point out that my statement above that "a strategy which is never a best response is also strictly dominated" is not exactly correct in this context because we haven't shown that a strategy is never a best response to all mixed strategies yet. You would have to find a particular mixed strategy which dominates $[6], [7], [8], \dots$ like @TravisWillse did for $[6]$. $\endgroup$
    – Gary Liang
    Commented May 9, 2023 at 15:08
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This answer continues the line of reasoning in Gary Liang's good answer (with some modifications), wherein we realize the setup as a simultaneous choice game and the problem as finding Nash equilibria.

First, for any choice $(n_A, n_B)$ of number of dice for players $A, B$, respectively, assign to player $A$ utility equal to the probability that $A$ wins less the probability that $B$ wins, and assign player $B$ the negative of that quantity, so that the game is zero-sum. Using the specification that ties are resolved by rerolling again with the same die counts, exact computations give the following payouts to player $A$, rounded to the nearest $10^{-3}$: \begin{array}{c|ccccc} A \backslash B & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5\\ \hline 1 & 0 & \color{red}{-0.407} & \color{red}{-0.244} & \color{red}{-0.056} & \color{green}{\boxed{0.107}}\\ 2 & \color{green}{\boxed{0.407}} & 0 & \color{red}{-0.235} & \color{red}{-0.139} & \color{green}{0.017} \\ 3 & \color{green}{0.244} & \color{\green}{\boxed{0.235}} & 0 & \color{red}{-0.131} & \color{red}{-0.061} \\ 4 & \color{green}{0.056} & \color{green}{0.139} & \color{green}{\boxed{0.131}} & 0 & \color{red}{-0.066} \\ 5 & \color{red}{-0.107} & \color{red}{-0.017} & \color{green}{0.061} & \color{green}{\boxed{0.066}} & 0 \\ \end{array} The best responses to rolling $1,2,3,4$ dice are, respectively, rolling $2,3,4,5$ dice, and the best responses to rolling $5$ or more dice is rolling $1$ die (best responses to strategies of $B$ are boxed). (Since no die count $6$ or greater is a best response, they will never be part of a Nash equilibrium, so we prune those die counts from the game.) In particular, we see that advantage of strategies is nontransitive, that is, no matter how many dice $n_A$ you roll, there is some count $n_B$ of dice that would favors your opponent. Thus, the best we can do is to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, a straightforward calculation (made tolerable by employing a c.a.s.).

There are at least $4$ Nash equilibriua; computing directly gives the probabilities for each strategy (again they are rounded here to the nearest $10^{-3}$): \begin{array}{c|llll} \textrm{strategy} & \textrm{equilibrium a} & \textrm{equilibrium b} & \textrm{equilibrium c} & \textrm{equilibrium d} \\ \hline 1 & 0.147 & 0.289 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 0 & 0 & 0.195 & 0.298 \\ 3 & 0.260 & 0 & 0.054 & 0 \\ 4 & 0 & 0.469 & 0 & 0.075 \\ 5 & 0.592 & 0.243 & 0.752 & 0.627 \\ \end{array}

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  • $\begingroup$ It looks right, although when I tried plugging your payoff matrix into a Nash equilibrium solver (cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/~rahul/bimatrix_solver), I could only get your equilibrium c. $\endgroup$
    – Gary Liang
    Commented May 9, 2023 at 15:05
  • $\begingroup$ I checked the computation with several solvers, but each only found a single Nash equilibrium (not always (c))---I'm not sure what to make of that. In case it's helpful, the exactly payoff matrix I computed was [[0, -81/199, -21/86, -79/1421, 901/8401], [81/199, 0, -773/3295, -5431/39149, 1273/76249], [21/86, 773/3295, 0, -2807/21408, -760/12509], [79/1421, 5431/39149, 2807/21408, 0, -18049/273523], [-901/8401, -1273/76249, 760/12509, 18049/273523, 0]]. $\endgroup$ Commented May 9, 2023 at 16:13
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The probability of not getting a "$1$" in $n$ rolls for a six-sided dice is $\left(\frac{5}{6}\right)^{n}$. With that in mind we can go onto calculating the expected value of each dice roll. To calculate value of one roll, $V_1$, we shall take the probability of each outcome with the value it has, so we have: $$V_1=6\cdot\frac{1}{6}+5\cdot\frac{1}{6}+4\cdot\frac{1}{6}+3\cdot\frac{1}{6}+2\cdot\frac{1}{6}+0\cdot\frac{1}{6}=\frac{20}{6}=\frac{10}{3}$$ From here we can see that the value of $n$ rolls will be $$V_n=n\cdot\frac{10}{3}$$ To get the expected value for $n$ throws, let's denote it with $E_n$, we just multiply it with probabilty of not getting a "$1$" in $n$ dice rolls: $$E_n=n\cdot\frac{10}{3}\cdot\left(\frac{5}{6}\right)^{n-1}$$

There are numerous ways to find maximum of $E_n$, but to keep real analysis out of this we can use simple old brute force and just start plugging in $n\in\mathbb{N}$ until we see that $E_n$ is dropping. I used python for this, and here is the graph of the calculation: <span class=$$ $$" />

From here you can see that $E_n$ peaks at $5$ rolls, where the expected value is $6.697959533607684$, while for $6$ rolls it is $6.697959533607683$. So in practice you'll have the same chance of winning with either of $5$ or $6$ rolls.

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    $\begingroup$ Plug $n=1$ into the equation for $E_n$. The answer is not $10/3$, which is clearly what the correct value is per the $V_1$ calculation. The last term in the equation should be $(5/6)^{n-1}$. This affects each $n$ proportionately so the conclusion is still that $n=5$ and $n=6$ are the equal best options. $\endgroup$
    – nickgard
    Commented May 3, 2023 at 19:29
  • $\begingroup$ @nickgard thanks for pointing that out. $\endgroup$
    – bb_823
    Commented May 3, 2023 at 20:18
  • $\begingroup$ This shows that rolling 5 dice maximizes your expected score, but does it maximize your chance of winning, which requires beating the other person's score? I expect there's some game theory element, but I think it may be possible for a strategy with a lower expected value to have a higher win rate than a strategy with a higher expected value. Also, @nickgard is correct, you've double-counted the chance of a 1 - a single 1 doesn't make you lose the game entirely as far as I can tell, it just scores 0 for that round. $\endgroup$ Commented May 3, 2023 at 20:35
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    $\begingroup$ If you play the game and roll the expected-value-maximizing $5$ dice, I will beat you slightly more than half the time by only rolling one die. With probability $\frac56(1 - (\frac56)^5) \approx 0.498$, I will get a positive score while you get $0$. With probability $\frac56(1 - (\frac56)^5) \approx 0.01$, we will tie. Sure, the rest of the time, you'll get at least $10$ points and beat me, but on average I still win more often. The difference is greater with $1$ die vs. $6$ dice: the single die wins about $0.55$ of the time. $\endgroup$ Commented May 3, 2023 at 20:36
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    $\begingroup$ @bb_823 The probabilities are about $0.498, 0.01, 0.492$. The single die wins more often. $\endgroup$ Commented May 3, 2023 at 21:16

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