[Poland] It's only about frontend
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This document summarizes techniques for attacking the frontend security of websites. It discusses DOM-based cross-site scripting using sinks like document.write and sources like document.URL. It also covers information leaks through JavaScript, CSS, and framework templates. Other topics include JSONP, Flash, HTML5 features like postMessage, and mitigations like content security policy. The presentation encourages keeping frameworks updated and checking for newer attacks on older vulnerabilities. It provides examples of complex cross-domain policy and JSONP attacks.
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![$ whoami
• @ Digital Security
– Penteser
– ZeroNights team
• Bug hunting (Yandex, Google, CloudFlare ...)
• Speaker – OWASP RU, BlackHat 2014, HiP 2014, ZeroNights
• Like all web related security :]](https://cdn.statically.io/img/www.slideshare.net/)
[Poland] It's only about frontend
- 1. It’s only about frontend Sergey Belov Digital Security OWASP EEE. 6th of October 2015. Poland
- 2. $ whoami • @ Digital Security – Penteser – ZeroNights team • Bug hunting (Yandex, Google, CloudFlare ...) • Speaker – OWASP RU, BlackHat 2014, HiP 2014, ZeroNights • Like all web related security :]
- 3. What we're talking about Frontend security ≠ client side attacks Example – CSRF is client side attack but depend on server side
- 4. What we're talking about Some techniques are well known but some are not
- 5. What we're talking about SOP Same Origin Policy scheme://domain:port + hardening
- 7. DOM XSS document.write("Site is at: " + document.location.href); http://victim.com/action#<script>alert('xss')</script>
- 8. DOM XSS Sources document.URL location document.referrer window.name localStorage cookies …
- 9. DOM XSS Sinks eval document.write (element).innerHTML (element).src setTimeout / setInterval execScript … https://code.google.com/p/domxsswiki/
- 10. DOM XSS
- 12. Information leaks Javascript examples testServer = host.match(/[^.]+.((?:f|my.XXX)d*).YYY.com/) devServer = host.match(/^.+.dev.YYY.com$/), isXXX = testServer && testServer[1].indexOf('my.XXX') == 0, ... internalDevHOST = '172.16.22.2'; internalProdHOST = '172.16.22.5'; ... var admin_url = '/secretArea/'
- 14. MVC Frameworks
- 15. MVC Frameworks
- 16. MVC Frameworks - Templates - New elements <rockyou></rockyou> - Bindings
- 17. MVC Frameworks Logic-less templates <ul> <li ng-repeat="phone in phones"> <span>{{phone.name}}</span> <p>{{phone.snippet}}</p> </li> </ul>
- 18. MVC Frameworks Сurly braces <ul> <li ng-repeat="phone in phones"> <span>{{phone.name}}</span> <p>{{phone.snippet}}</p> </li> </ul>
- 20. MVC Frameworks Mustache Security • VueJS • AngularJS • CanJS • Underscore.js • KnockoutJS • Ember.js • Polymer • Ractive.js • jQuery • JsRender • Kendo UI https://code.google.com/p/mustache-security/
- 21. MVC Frameworks AngularJS (1.1.5) – access to window <div class="ng-app"> {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)' )()}} </div>
- 22. MVC Frameworks AngularJS (1.2.18) – access to window, after fix {{ (_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'] .getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$) .value,0,'alert(1)')() }}
- 23. MVC Frameworks Frameworks updating is important for security!
- 24. Flash
- 25. Flash A typical example <cross-domain-policy> <allow-access-from domain="*" to-ports="80"/> </cross-domain-policy>
- 26. Flash A non-typical example <cross-domain-policy> ... multiple domains (some unregistered)... </cross-domain-policy> Real bugbounty report - $$$
- 27. Flash A non-typical example <cross-domain-policy> ...domains from social networks (apps)... </cross-domain-policy> Real bugbounty report - $$$
- 28. Flash XSS via Flash getURL(_root.URI,'_targetFrame'); and many other cases https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Cross_site_flashing_(OTG-CLIENT-008)
- 29. Flash CVE-2011-2461 IS BACK! 1) Vulnerable verson of Adobe Flex 2) Full SOP bypass https://github.com/ikkisoft/ParrotNG/ http://blog.nibblesec.org/2015/03/the-old-is-new-again-cve-2011-2461-is.html
- 30. JSONP
- 32. JSONP No sensetive data? But Content-Type is: • text/javascript • application/javascript • application/x-javascript Try ?cb=new%20ActiveXObject(“WScript.Shell”).Exec(“calc”)// And get client side RCE (IE only / SE is required)
- 34. HTML5 security
- 35. HTML5 Security otherWindow.postMessage(message, targetOrigin); Window.postMessage() window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage, false); function receiveMessage(event) { if (event.origin !== "http://example.org:8080") return; // ... } Domain A Domain B
- 36. HTML5 Security Window.postMessage() if(message.orgin.indexOf(".example.com")!=-1) { /* ... */ } Wrong! example.com.attacker.com
- 37. HTML5 Security otherWindow.postMessage(message, targetOrigin); Window.postMessage() Iframe https://accounts.google.com/b/0/ListAccounts?listPages=0&mo=1&origin=https%3A%2F%2F1 23123.google.com window.parent.postMessage( “... Sensetive data / user login etc...", "https:x2Fx2F123123.google.com");
- 38. HTML5 security HTTP access control (CORS) 1) Modern 2) Secure by default 3) Very hard to make a mistake
- 39. HTML5 security HTTP access control (CORS) Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
- 40. HTML5 security HTTP access control (CORS) Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
- 41. HTML5 security HTTP access control (CORS) Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is not compatible with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
- 42. HTML5 security HTTP access control (CORS) Access-Control-Allow-Origin: $origin;
- 43. HTML5 security WebSockets 1) No authorization and/or authentication 2) WSS:// - for sensetive data 3) Validation 4) Check origin 5) …
- 44. HTML5 security Example with websockets (Agar.IO – HTML5 game) 1) Visit Agar.IO 2) Get new server (/findServer response, some random IP) 3) Connect (ws://) to some random IP Random IP handles only requests with valid origin (like agar.io). It can prevent custom clients (exclude cases with full proxy on server side) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet
- 46. Content Security Policy X-Content-Security-Policy: script-src js.example.com
- 48. Content Security Policy Last Firefox: security csp command
- 49. Content Security Policy @cure53 challenge – CSP bypass • CDN with AngularJS is allowed ajax.googleapis.com ng-app"ng-csp ng- click=$event.view.alert(1337)> <script src= //ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs /1.0.8/angular.js> </script> https://github.com/cure53/XSSChallengeWiki/wiki/H5SC-Minichallenge-3:-%22Sh*t,-it's-CSP!%22
- 51. Extensions / SmarTV - JS/HTML/CSS - Interaction with DOM - XHR qureies - Extended API
- 52. For dessert
- 53. For dessert <a href=“http://external.com”>Go!</a> In headers will be Referer: http://yoursite.com/ What about images, js, css files?
- 54. For dessert http://super-website.com/user/passRecovery?t=SECRET ... <img src=http://comics.com/password.jpg> ... Owner of comics.com Can see all secret tokens https://github.com/cure53/HTTPLeaks
- 55. Anything else? Yes: • X-Frame-Options • Iframe protection via JS – bypassing (iframe sandboxing / race conditions) • Switching to HTTPS (HSTS) • DOM Clobbering (XSS - http://www.slideshare.net/x00mario/in-the-dom-no- one-will-hear-you-scream) • Cookies (flags, domains – IE case) • ...?