How can Marbury v Madison be reconciled with what the Constitution explicitly states?

Question

A key premise in Marbury v Madison is that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is clearly defined by the Constitution, and therefore a legislative act that redistributes the jurisdiction must be unconstitutional:

In the distribution of this power, it is declared, that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction."...

If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.

However, there seems to be a very significant elision here. The very next words in the cited section of the Constitution are:

both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

(My emphasis)

How can the court claim that the legislature cannot change the parameters of the court’s jurisdiction when the cited clause in the Constitution explicitly states that Congress has the authority to regulate it?

Answer 1

It's really pretty simple.

First, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the US Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus in a number of types of cases. From Wikipedia:

And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive [original] jurisdiction over all cases of a civil nature where a state is a party ... And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers ... The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue ... writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. — Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 13

The Marshal Court interpreted this as giving the US Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving writs of mandamus.

Which is not an unsurprising interpretation of the law given that Marbury v. Madison - a case involving writs of mandamus - was heard under original jurisdiction by the US Supreme Court: "We agree that the law says we can do what we're already doing."

BUT, Article III of the US Constution states:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. — U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2

OOPS!

The US Supreme Court has original jurisdiction only for cases involving states or foreign dignitaries.

All the other verbiage is about appellate jurisdiction, which was not applicable here.

ERGO...

The Marshall Court decided that Congress only has the power under Article III to set the rules for appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction, and did not have the power under the US Constitution to extend the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to writs of mandamus:

If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.

In short, laws can't change the Constitution.

The concept of judicial review follows from that.