I'm having difficulty understanding the sequent/Gentzen proof system in section 8 of a paper by Gurevich [G1977], and he defines that system by telling the reader to modify the system G1 from Kleene's Introduction to Metamathematics (1952). Screenshots of the relevant pages from [G1977] and I.M. are posted below. I'm not sure I understand exactly what the rules are of Gurevich's system, since I'm not sure I understand the intuitionistic version of Kleene's G1 (I wish Gurevich had reproduced in his paper the needed rules of G1, as he understood them).
The difficulty is that I'm not sure how to interpret Kleene's statement:
The difference between the classical and intuitionistic systems G1 is secured by the intuitionistic restriction stated for two of the postulates.
Indeed, there are two rules which have a stated restriction: it says "with $\Theta$ empty for the intuitionistic system" beneath both the right negation rule (the rule with conclusion $\Gamma \to \Theta,\neg A$) and the right thinning rule (the rule with conclusion $\Gamma \to \Theta,C$). I have trouble believing that this is truly what Kleene meant however, since it seems that no restriction at all is put on the right implication rule (the rule with conclusion $\Gamma \to \Theta,A \supset B$). This seems like a problem because that rule is always restricted in other multi-conclusion intuitionistic sequent systems that I've seen (such as LJpm from Mint's "A short introduction to intuitionistic logic").
So perhaps the rules were presented with a typo? Or maybe alternatively Kleene means that $\Theta$ should be empty in every rule for the intuitionistic version of G1. However, this seems wrong as well because it isn't consistent with his comment on "two of the postulates". Additionally, it seems wrong because then there is a problem with the left implication rule (with conclusion $A \supset B,\Delta,\Gamma \to \Lambda,\Theta$): the left subderivation in that rule will have more than one formula in the succedent if $\Lambda$ is not empty.
Can anyone explain the correct interpretation of Kleene's rules for the intuitionistic case? Thanks.
[G1977] Gurevich, Y. (1977). Intuitionistic logic with strong negation.