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I kind of feel like this is a silly question, but does taking the logical conjunction of two statements make any sense when one of the statements doesn't make sense?

For example, suppose we have the following two statements:

  • Statement X: "47 is an even number."
  • Statement Y: "The color of the number 5 smells like cinnamon."

The first statement is obviously false, but the second statement doesn't make sense because 5 doesn't have an inherent color (and colors don't have inherent smells), so I don't know if it has a truth value. Is it possible that the second statement has no truth value, or do we force ourselves to assign a truth value to it?

If the second statement has no truth value, then consider statement Z: "The color of the number 5 smells like cinnamon and 47 is an even number." Since X is false, does that mean Z is false, or does Z have no truth value because Y has no truth value?

I'm asking because I'm not sure if it is considered valid to take the logical conjunction of two statements if one of the statements has no truth value. I think the only thing we can be certain of is that Z is not true.

Sorry, not well-versed in logic! Any guidance would be great!

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    $\begingroup$ Such a question surely has some sense in a multi-valued logic, where the possible values are T, F, and N (=nonsense), but I have no actual experience in this... and I'm confident that someone has thought about this seriously. $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 12, 2021 at 22:46
  • $\begingroup$ Given your example (with color, and cinnamon, etc.), this is really more of a linguistics question, or even a philosophy question, and not so much a mathematics question. $\endgroup$
    – Lee Mosher
    Commented Aug 13, 2021 at 0:44
  • $\begingroup$ Lee Mosher, it's philosophy, but not so much linguistics. I will ask this question in philosophy. $\endgroup$
    – PiMan
    Commented Aug 13, 2021 at 1:02
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    $\begingroup$ Wikipedia's page on many-valued logics) includes some truth tables from the various formulations of such. In particular, Kleene's (strong) logic K3 and Priest logic P3 both have "false AND indeterminate = indeterminate" but Bochvar's internal three-valued logic has "false AND indeterminate = false". So it seems there's no "canonical" answer to this, with different propositional calculi yielding different answers. $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 13, 2021 at 1:38
  • $\begingroup$ In classical propositional logic, the basis of most mathematics, science, engineering and commerce, we deal only with logical propositions that are unambiguously either true or false in the present. $\endgroup$ Commented Aug 13, 2021 at 3:27

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Mathematical logic deliberately and by design does not care about the "sense" or "meaning" of the statements it deals with. Mathematical logic provides a framework for understanding how we build up and work with complex concepts like "$47$ is even" from more primitive concepts like the definition of the constant "$47$" and the definition of the concept "even". This framework does not depend on our underlying intuitions about the most primitive concepts. Your statement $X$ can become false if we change the definition of $47$ (e.g., by choosing to write decimal numbers with the least significant digit on the left). Your statement $Y$ is only "meaningless" when we impose common intuitions about the terms like "colour" and "smell". From the point of view of mathematical logic, statement $Y$ is simply an assertion of the form $A(5) \mathrel{R} B$ (i.e, "the object $A(5)$ is related by the relation $R$ to the object $B$"), where $A(n)$, $R$ and $B$ are abstractions of the notions "colour of $n$", "smells like" and "cinnamon" respectively. (So mathematical logic is quite happy to help synesthetes with their reasoning.)

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  • $\begingroup$ I agree with this answer. So, statement $Y$ and its conjunction with $X$ aren't ill-formed, and each attains a truth value in an interpretation when suitable axioms are introduced. $\endgroup$
    – ryang
    Commented Apr 13, 2023 at 14:26
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It's always said math is the language of science, however, by no means it's the language of other natural languages. When you want to translate arbitrary English sentences to mathematical logic (suppose here you're only talking about the most used classic logic) and apply it correctly, first thing you have to make sure every translated atomic formula is a well formed formula (wff).

Formulas themselves are syntactic objects. They are given meanings by interpretations. Every predicate is interpreted by a determinate property or relation. A determinate property is a property for which given any object there is a definite fact of the matter whether or not the object has the property. Unlike the English predicates, they are given very precise interpretations, interpretations that are suggested by, but not necessarily identical with, the meanings of the corresponding English phrases. For some intrinsically vague English sentences, H. P. Grice introduced conversational implicature to help arrive at a definite fact, such as either...or... case. For meaningless sentences, no such techniques exist to settle its propositional fact as is obvious.

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