Many logicians and philosophers believe that all sentences expressible in the language of Peano Arithmetic have determinate truth-values, even though no nice formal system can capture all of these truths. It is more controversial whether the Continuum Hypothesis has a determinate truth value. I am wondering whether the determinacy of arithmetic could potentially have consequences for the determinacy of the Continuum Hypothesis as expressed in the following two mathematical questions below. Using the fact that any arithmetic sentence (in the language of Peano Arithmetic) can be translated into a corresponding sentence in the language of set theory, we have:
(1) Is it the case that for every model M of ZFC, there exists a model N of ZFC such that M and N agree on all arithmetic truths (suitably interpreted in the language of set theory) yet disagree on the truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis?
If the answer to (1) is "No", what is the answer to the following much stronger question:
(2) Is it the case that for every model M of ZFC, any model N of ZFC that agrees with M on all arithmetic truths also agrees with M on the truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis?