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WIRELESS LAN
SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
 In a wired network one has to be physically
connected to transfer or receive Data.
 It is possible to control the users in the network by
controlling the physical access.
 Wireless Network means using a radio transmitter
and receiver. With varying degrees, radio signals
will penetrate most building materials.
 Therefore it is NOT POSSIBLE to set up absolute
physical boundary- and expect that no outsider will
be able to intrude into the network.
 With wireless networks we have no control of who
might be receiving and listening to the transmissions.
 It could be someone in the building across the road,
in a van parked in the parking lot or someone in the
office above.
 Therefore, it is important that we understand the
vulnerabilities of the wireless LAN and take
necessary precautions.
 As a part of the original specification, IEEE 802.11
included several security features, such as open
system and shared key authentication modes;
 The Service Set Identifier (SSID);
 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).
 Each of these features provides varying degrees of
security.
Wireless lan security(10.8)
LIMITING RF TRANSMISSION
 It is important to consider controlling the range of
RF transmission by an access point.
 It is possible to select proper transmitter/antenna
combination that will help transmission of the
wireless signal only to the intended coverage area.
 Antennas can be characterized by 2 features
 Directionality
 Gain.
 Omni-Directional Antennas - 360-degree
coverage area
 Directional Antennas Limit - better-defined areas
SERVICE SET IDENTIFIER (SSID)
 SSID is used for the access point for association
between the NIC (Network Interface Card) in the
client and the AP.
 It is a Network name (Id of the BSS or Cell) that
identifies the area covered by an AP.
 The AP periodically broadcasts its SSID as a part
of the management frame (beacon packet). Beacon
packet is necessary for clock synchronization.
 Unfortunately, as management frames of 802.11
are always sent in the clear, an attacker can easily
listen on the wireless media for the management
frames and discover the SSID to conned to the AP.
 The SSID can be used as a security measure by
configuring the AP to broadcast the beacon packet
without its SSID.
 The wireless station wishing to associate with the
AP must have its SSID configured to that of the AP.
 If die SSID is not known, management frames sent
to the AP from the wireless station mil be rejected .It
is also advised that the SSID of the AP is changed
from the factory set defaults to some name. which
is difficult to guess.
MAC ADDRESS ACCESS CONTROL
 Many access support MAC address Filtering. This
is Similar to IP Filtering.
 The AP manages a list of MAC addresses that are
allowed or disallowed in the wireless network.
 The idea is that the MAC address of the network
card is unique and static.
 By controlling the access from known Address, the
administrator can allow or restrict the access of
network only to known clients.
Wireless lan security(10.8)
AUTHENTICATION MODES
 Two types of client authentication are defined in
802.11:
 Open System Authentication
 Shared Key Authentication
 0pen System Authentication is no authentication at
all.
 Shared Key authentication on the other hand (is
based on the fact that both stations taking part in
the authentication process have the same “shared
key”.
 It is assumed that this key has been transmitted to
both stations through some secure channels other
than the wireless media itself.
 In typical implementations, this is set manually on
the client station and the AP .
 The authenticating station receives a challenge text
packet (created using the WEP Pseudo Random
Number Generator (PRNG)) from the AP.
 The station encrypts this PRNQ using the shared
key, and sends it back to the AP.
 If, after decryption, the challenge text matches then
one-way authentication is successful.
 To obtain mutual authentication, the process is
repeated in the opposite direction
WEP (WIRED EQUIVALENT PRIVACY)
 WEP was designed to protect users of a WLAN
from casual eavesdropping and was intended to
offer following facilities:
 Reasonably strong encryption- It relies on the
difficulty of recovering the secret key through a brute
force attack. The difficulty grows with the key length.
 Self-synchronizing-Each packet contains the
information required to decrypt it. There is no need to
deal with lost packets.
 Efficient- It can be implemented in software with
reasonable efficiency.
 Exportable-Limiting the key length leads to a greater
possibility of export beyond the US.
 The WEP algorithm is the RC4 cryptographic
algorithm from RSA Data Security.
 RC4 uses stream cipher technique.
 It is a symmetric algorithm and uses the same key
for both enciphering and deciphering the data.
 For each transmission, the plaintext is bitwise
XORed with a pseudorandom key stream to
produce cipher text.
 For decryption the process is reversed.
THE ALGORITHM OPERATES AS FOLLOWS:
1. It is assumed that the secret key has been
distributed to both the transmitting and receiving
stations by some secure means.
2. On the transmitting station, the 40-bit secret
key is concatenated with a 24-bit Initialization
Vector (IV) to produce a seed for input into the WEP
PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator).
3. The seed is passed into the PRNG to
produce a stream (keystream) of pseudorandom
octets.
4. The plaintext PDU is then XORed with the
pseudo-random keystream to produce the cipher
text PDU.
5. This cipher text PDU is then concatenated
with the 24-bits IV and transmitted on the wireless
media.
6. The receiving station reads the IV and
concatenates it with the secret key, producing the
seed that it passes to the PRNG.
7. The receiver's PRNG produces identical key
stream used by the transmitting station- When this
PRNG is XORed with the cipher text, the original
plaintext PDU is produced.
It is worth mentioning that the plaintext PDU is also
protected with a CRC to prevent random tampering
with the cipher text in transit.
POSSIBLE ATTACKS
 The possible security attacks on Wireless LAN are:
 Passive Attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical
analysis.
 Active attacks to inject new traffic from unauthorized
mobile stations, based on known plaintext.
 Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on tricking (lie
access point.
 Dictionary-building attack that, after analysis of about a
day's worth of traffic, allows real time automated
decryption of all traffic.
 Hijacking a session: Following successful
authentication, it is possible to hijack the session.
 Analysis suggests that though these attacks are not
common, it is possible to perform them using
inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment.
802. IX AUTHENTICATION
 To prevent attacks on wireless LAN, the IEEE
specification committee on 802.11 included the
802.1x authentication framework.
 The 802.1x framework provides the link layer with
extensible authentication, normally seen in higher
layers.
 802.1x requires three entities
• The supplicant: Resides on the wireless
LAN client
• The authenticator: Resides on the access
point.
• The authentication server: Resides on the
server authenticating the client (e.g., RADIUS
Kerberos, or other servers).
 In a single network there could be many points of
entry. These entries are through access points.
 Once the link between a supplicant(wireless
station) and an authenticator (AP) is achieved, the
connection is passed to the authentication Server.
 The AP authenticates the supplicant through the
authentication server.
 If the authentication is successful, the
authentication server instructs the authenticator to
allow the supplicant to access the network services.
 The authenticator works like a gatekeeper.
Wireless lan security(10.8)
 The authenticator creates one logical port per client,
based on the client association ID.
 This logical port has two data paths;
 The Uncontrolled data path allows network traffic through
to the network.
 The Controlled data path requires successful
authentication to allow network traffic through.
 Complete association with an AP involves three states:
1. Unauthenticated and unassociated
2. Authenticated and unassociated
3. Authenticated and associated
Wireless lan security(10.8)
 IEEE 802.1x offers flexibility in authentication and
possible encryption .
 After the link has been established, PPP(Point-to-
Point Protocol) provides for an optional
authentication proceeding to the network laver
protocol phase. This is called EAP extensible
Authentication Protocol.
 Through the use of EAP, support for a number of
authentication schemes may be added, including
Smart cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time
Passwords, CHAP (Challenge Handshake
Authentication Protocol., or some other user-
defined authentication systems.
 There are still some vulnerabilities in the EAP. To
overcome this, a new standard is being proposed in
IETF to override the EAP proposal.
 This new standard is called PEAP ^Protected EAP).
PEAP uses an additional phase of security over
and above EAP
WIRELESS VPN
 Virtual Private Network technology (VPN) has been
used to secure communications among remote
locations via the Internet since the 1990s.
 It is now being extended to wireless LAN. VPNs
were traditionally used to provide point-to-point
encryption for long Internet connections between
remote users and the enterprise networks.
 VPNs have been deployed in wireless LANs as well
.
 When a wireless LAN client uses a VPN tunnel,
communications data remains encrypted until it
reaches the VPN gateway.
802.11I
 Task Group "i" within IEEE 802.11, is developing a
new standard for WLAN Security.
 The proposed 802.11 standard is designed to
embrace the authentication scheme of 802.1x and
EAP while adding enhanced security features,
including a new encryption scheme and dynamic
key distribution.
 Not only does it fix WEP, it takes Wireless LAN
security to a higher level.
 The proposed specification uses the Temporal Key
Integrity Protocol (TKIP) to produce a 128-
bit"temporal key" that allows different stations to use
different keys to encrypt data.
 TKIP introduces sophisticated key generation
functions, which encrypts every data packet sent
over the air with its own unique encryption key.
Consequently, TRIP greatly increases the
complexity and difficulty of decoding the keys.
 Intruders will not have enough time to collect
sufficient data to decipher die key.
 802.11i also endorses the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) as a replacement for WEP
encryption. AES has already been adopted as an
official government standard by the US
Departmentof Commerce
 .It uses a mathematical ciphering algorithm that
employs variable key sizes of 128-,192- or 256-bits,
making it far more difficult to decipher than WEP.
AES, however, is not readily compatible with today's
Wi-Fi Certified WLAN devices.
 It requires new chipsets which, for WLAN
customers, means new investments in wireless
devices.
 Those looking to build new WLANs will find it
attractive.
 Those with previously installed wireless networks
must justify whether AES security is worth the cost
of replacing equipment.

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Wireless lan security(10.8)

  • 2. INTRODUCTION  In a wired network one has to be physically connected to transfer or receive Data.  It is possible to control the users in the network by controlling the physical access.  Wireless Network means using a radio transmitter and receiver. With varying degrees, radio signals will penetrate most building materials.  Therefore it is NOT POSSIBLE to set up absolute physical boundary- and expect that no outsider will be able to intrude into the network.
  • 3.  With wireless networks we have no control of who might be receiving and listening to the transmissions.  It could be someone in the building across the road, in a van parked in the parking lot or someone in the office above.  Therefore, it is important that we understand the vulnerabilities of the wireless LAN and take necessary precautions.  As a part of the original specification, IEEE 802.11 included several security features, such as open system and shared key authentication modes;  The Service Set Identifier (SSID);  Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).  Each of these features provides varying degrees of security.
  • 5. LIMITING RF TRANSMISSION  It is important to consider controlling the range of RF transmission by an access point.  It is possible to select proper transmitter/antenna combination that will help transmission of the wireless signal only to the intended coverage area.  Antennas can be characterized by 2 features  Directionality  Gain.  Omni-Directional Antennas - 360-degree coverage area  Directional Antennas Limit - better-defined areas
  • 6. SERVICE SET IDENTIFIER (SSID)  SSID is used for the access point for association between the NIC (Network Interface Card) in the client and the AP.  It is a Network name (Id of the BSS or Cell) that identifies the area covered by an AP.  The AP periodically broadcasts its SSID as a part of the management frame (beacon packet). Beacon packet is necessary for clock synchronization.  Unfortunately, as management frames of 802.11 are always sent in the clear, an attacker can easily listen on the wireless media for the management frames and discover the SSID to conned to the AP.
  • 7.  The SSID can be used as a security measure by configuring the AP to broadcast the beacon packet without its SSID.  The wireless station wishing to associate with the AP must have its SSID configured to that of the AP.  If die SSID is not known, management frames sent to the AP from the wireless station mil be rejected .It is also advised that the SSID of the AP is changed from the factory set defaults to some name. which is difficult to guess.
  • 8. MAC ADDRESS ACCESS CONTROL  Many access support MAC address Filtering. This is Similar to IP Filtering.  The AP manages a list of MAC addresses that are allowed or disallowed in the wireless network.  The idea is that the MAC address of the network card is unique and static.  By controlling the access from known Address, the administrator can allow or restrict the access of network only to known clients.
  • 10. AUTHENTICATION MODES  Two types of client authentication are defined in 802.11:  Open System Authentication  Shared Key Authentication  0pen System Authentication is no authentication at all.  Shared Key authentication on the other hand (is based on the fact that both stations taking part in the authentication process have the same “shared key”.
  • 11.  It is assumed that this key has been transmitted to both stations through some secure channels other than the wireless media itself.  In typical implementations, this is set manually on the client station and the AP .  The authenticating station receives a challenge text packet (created using the WEP Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)) from the AP.  The station encrypts this PRNQ using the shared key, and sends it back to the AP.  If, after decryption, the challenge text matches then one-way authentication is successful.  To obtain mutual authentication, the process is repeated in the opposite direction
  • 12. WEP (WIRED EQUIVALENT PRIVACY)  WEP was designed to protect users of a WLAN from casual eavesdropping and was intended to offer following facilities:  Reasonably strong encryption- It relies on the difficulty of recovering the secret key through a brute force attack. The difficulty grows with the key length.  Self-synchronizing-Each packet contains the information required to decrypt it. There is no need to deal with lost packets.  Efficient- It can be implemented in software with reasonable efficiency.  Exportable-Limiting the key length leads to a greater possibility of export beyond the US.
  • 13.  The WEP algorithm is the RC4 cryptographic algorithm from RSA Data Security.  RC4 uses stream cipher technique.  It is a symmetric algorithm and uses the same key for both enciphering and deciphering the data.  For each transmission, the plaintext is bitwise XORed with a pseudorandom key stream to produce cipher text.  For decryption the process is reversed.
  • 14. THE ALGORITHM OPERATES AS FOLLOWS: 1. It is assumed that the secret key has been distributed to both the transmitting and receiving stations by some secure means. 2. On the transmitting station, the 40-bit secret key is concatenated with a 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) to produce a seed for input into the WEP PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator). 3. The seed is passed into the PRNG to produce a stream (keystream) of pseudorandom octets. 4. The plaintext PDU is then XORed with the pseudo-random keystream to produce the cipher text PDU.
  • 15. 5. This cipher text PDU is then concatenated with the 24-bits IV and transmitted on the wireless media. 6. The receiving station reads the IV and concatenates it with the secret key, producing the seed that it passes to the PRNG. 7. The receiver's PRNG produces identical key stream used by the transmitting station- When this PRNG is XORed with the cipher text, the original plaintext PDU is produced. It is worth mentioning that the plaintext PDU is also protected with a CRC to prevent random tampering with the cipher text in transit.
  • 16. POSSIBLE ATTACKS  The possible security attacks on Wireless LAN are:  Passive Attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical analysis.  Active attacks to inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations, based on known plaintext.  Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on tricking (lie access point.  Dictionary-building attack that, after analysis of about a day's worth of traffic, allows real time automated decryption of all traffic.  Hijacking a session: Following successful authentication, it is possible to hijack the session.  Analysis suggests that though these attacks are not common, it is possible to perform them using inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment.
  • 17. 802. IX AUTHENTICATION  To prevent attacks on wireless LAN, the IEEE specification committee on 802.11 included the 802.1x authentication framework.  The 802.1x framework provides the link layer with extensible authentication, normally seen in higher layers.  802.1x requires three entities • The supplicant: Resides on the wireless LAN client • The authenticator: Resides on the access point. • The authentication server: Resides on the server authenticating the client (e.g., RADIUS Kerberos, or other servers).
  • 18.  In a single network there could be many points of entry. These entries are through access points.  Once the link between a supplicant(wireless station) and an authenticator (AP) is achieved, the connection is passed to the authentication Server.  The AP authenticates the supplicant through the authentication server.  If the authentication is successful, the authentication server instructs the authenticator to allow the supplicant to access the network services.  The authenticator works like a gatekeeper.
  • 20.  The authenticator creates one logical port per client, based on the client association ID.  This logical port has two data paths;  The Uncontrolled data path allows network traffic through to the network.  The Controlled data path requires successful authentication to allow network traffic through.  Complete association with an AP involves three states: 1. Unauthenticated and unassociated 2. Authenticated and unassociated 3. Authenticated and associated
  • 22.  IEEE 802.1x offers flexibility in authentication and possible encryption .  After the link has been established, PPP(Point-to- Point Protocol) provides for an optional authentication proceeding to the network laver protocol phase. This is called EAP extensible Authentication Protocol.  Through the use of EAP, support for a number of authentication schemes may be added, including Smart cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time Passwords, CHAP (Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol., or some other user- defined authentication systems.
  • 23.  There are still some vulnerabilities in the EAP. To overcome this, a new standard is being proposed in IETF to override the EAP proposal.  This new standard is called PEAP ^Protected EAP). PEAP uses an additional phase of security over and above EAP
  • 24. WIRELESS VPN  Virtual Private Network technology (VPN) has been used to secure communications among remote locations via the Internet since the 1990s.  It is now being extended to wireless LAN. VPNs were traditionally used to provide point-to-point encryption for long Internet connections between remote users and the enterprise networks.  VPNs have been deployed in wireless LANs as well .  When a wireless LAN client uses a VPN tunnel, communications data remains encrypted until it reaches the VPN gateway.
  • 25. 802.11I  Task Group "i" within IEEE 802.11, is developing a new standard for WLAN Security.  The proposed 802.11 standard is designed to embrace the authentication scheme of 802.1x and EAP while adding enhanced security features, including a new encryption scheme and dynamic key distribution.  Not only does it fix WEP, it takes Wireless LAN security to a higher level.  The proposed specification uses the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) to produce a 128- bit"temporal key" that allows different stations to use different keys to encrypt data.
  • 26.  TKIP introduces sophisticated key generation functions, which encrypts every data packet sent over the air with its own unique encryption key. Consequently, TRIP greatly increases the complexity and difficulty of decoding the keys.  Intruders will not have enough time to collect sufficient data to decipher die key.  802.11i also endorses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a replacement for WEP encryption. AES has already been adopted as an official government standard by the US Departmentof Commerce
  • 27.  .It uses a mathematical ciphering algorithm that employs variable key sizes of 128-,192- or 256-bits, making it far more difficult to decipher than WEP. AES, however, is not readily compatible with today's Wi-Fi Certified WLAN devices.  It requires new chipsets which, for WLAN customers, means new investments in wireless devices.  Those looking to build new WLANs will find it attractive.  Those with previously installed wireless networks must justify whether AES security is worth the cost of replacing equipment.