Updated Mvc Web security updated presentation

Web Security
By John Staveley
DDDNorth 01/10/2016
https://uk.linkedin.com/in/johnstaveley/
@johnstaveley

Overview
Why Security?
– (case studies)
Who are the hackers?
How?
– (with solutions)
SecurityEssentials.sln
(https://github.com/johnstaveley/SecurityEssentials)
...and then on the server
Further resources
Summary
Questions

Who am I?
John Staveley
Mvc.net developer
Not a security expert!

Why Security? - Some headlines
ZdNet 2014, “Hundreds of millions of records have been
stolen this year through hacks and data breaches as a result
of poor, or flawed security.”
Davos 2015, “Every time we talked to a top 500 company
about cyber-security, they'd say to us: 'talk to my technology
guy', now the board of directors and the CEOs of the
companies pay attention. There is a new sense of urgency" –
Head of a security company
FSB 2013, 41% of small businesses are a victim of cyber
crime.

Why Security? - Some example breaches
Sony – films, confidential email, payroll
Target – 110 million records lost including credit card details.
Current cost $110m
Home Depot – 56m credit card, 53m email addresses
JPMorgan – 10s of millions of customers data lost
BadUSB
ICloud celebrity pictures
Snapchat – 13Gb of data
Ebay – 145 million user records lost. $220m loss
Heartbleed
etc

Why Security? - and the rest...

Why Security?
Loss of reputation
Blacklisting
Litigation
Fines e.g. Data protection act, PCI compliance
Suicides (Ashley Madison)

Who are the hackers?
 Script kiddies
 Hacktivists
 Insiders
 Organised Crime – Russian Business Network
 Advanced Persistent Threat

Who are they? - hackers for hire

What we will/won't cover
 WILL:
 Web application security (MVC)
 DDOS
 Social Engineering
 WON'T:
 Physical security
 Network security
 Trojans, Worms, Viruses
 IDS, Firewalls, Honey pots
 Internal threats
 Advanced persistent threats

Presentation Approach
 OWASP Top 10
 Not for profit
 Cover all technologies
 Reviewed every 3 years
 Helps you prioritise
 Chapter outline
 What is the hack?
 Who has been affected by it?
 What are the mitigations/countermeasures?
 Questions
 DEMO
 SecurityEssentials.sln

SQL Injection – What is it?
string strQry = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE
UserName='" + txtUser.Text + "' AND Password='" +
txtPassword.Text + "'";
EXEC strQry
Put in username field: Admin' And 1=1 –
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserName='Admin'
And 1=1 --' AND Password=''
Put in password field: '; DROP TABLE Users --
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserName='' AND
Password=''; DROP TABLE Users –'
http://www.not-secure.com/products?Id=14
Havij

SQL Injection - Examples
 Sony Playstation 2011 - “Worst gaming community data
breach of all-time.”
 77 million accounts affected
 12 million had unencrypted credit card numbers
 Site was down for a month
 CyberVor, Aug 2014 – Used botnet to steal billion
passwords from 400,000 sites

SQL Injection - Countermeasures
 Assume all input is evil – validate everything
 Use an ORM like EF/NHibernate
 Use stored procedures
 Don't use EXEC sp_executesql @strQuery
 Reduce SQL account permissions
 Concept: Least Privilege

2 - Broken authentication and session management
 Password security
 Session Hijacking
 Weak Account Management

Password Security
 What is it? - Storage, Policy and entry
 Password storage
 Plain text = No security (http://plaintextoffenders.com/)
 Base64 encoding = No security
 Avoid Encryption – can be broken
 Use hashing (password = 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99)
 Common hashes can be googled
 Use a salt
 Don't use RC4, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1
 HashCat
 Use PBKDF2, SCrypt, Bcrypt, (Argon2)
 Passwords Policy:
 Enforce minimum complexity
 Do not reject special characters
 Validate passwords against a list of known bad passwords
 Do not allow personal information in the password
 Password Entry:
 Don't disallow paste on a web page

Password Security - Examples
 Case Study: Richard Pryce
 Case Study: Ebay May 2014
 Up to 145 million users affected
 $200m loss
 Poor password encryption blamed
 Case Study: LinkedIn 2012
 6.5 million user accounts stolen by Russian criminals

Password Security - Examples
 SecurityEssentials.sln pwd: Hash, checking, strength

Session hijacking – The What

Session Hijacking – The how
 Concept – Man In The Middle (MITM)
 Opening up the browser
 CSRF
 Sensitive data exposure
 DEMO: Session stealing using document.cookie=""

Session Hijacking - Countermeasures
 Counter client code access of cookies (Anti-XSS): HttpOnly
 Counter auth token 'Sniffing' – Use HttpsOnly (MITM)
 <forms loginUrl="~/Account/Login" timeout="60" requireSSL="true"
slidingExpiration="false"/>
 Private error logging/trace
 Reducing session timeout reduces exposure
 Track sessions - session invalidated during logoff?
 SecurityEssentials.sln web.config with transforms

Weak account management – What is it?
 Account enumeration, Owning the account
 Why?
– Sensitive data
– Admin privileges
 Registration
 Logon
 Remember me
 Password reset
 Change account details
 Logoff
 Call Centre

Weak account management – Case Study

Weak account management – Case Study
 News contained details Sarah Palin used Yahoo mail
 Security Information
 Birthday?
 2 minutes on Wikipedia
 Zip Code?
 Wallisa only has 2 postcodes
 Where did you meet your spouse?
 High School
 => Password reset

Weak account management – Case Studies
 Case Study: Find my phone in iCloud/iBrute 2014

Weak account management - Countermeasures (1)
 Account enumeration - Can occur on registration, logon or
password reset forms e.g. Password Reset:
 Success - “An account reset key has been emailed to you”
 Failure - “That user account does not exist”
 Success or Failure - “An account reset key has been
emailed to you”
 Use Https ([RequireHttps]) to protect sensitive data (MITM)

 Brute force Logon - Do not lock out on incorrect logon –
DOS
 Brute force Registration/Password reset:
– CAPTCHA and/or throttling to prevent brute force
 Verify email address by sending an email
 Re-challenge user on key actions e.g. prompt for old
password when entering new password
 Log and send email when any account state changes

 Password reset
 Don't send new password out – DOS
 Send email with expiring token (1 hour)
 Security questions: Concise, Specific, has a large range of answers, low
discoverability, constant over time
 Never roll your own membership provider or session
management – use the default one in the framework
 Outsource the solution e.g. Azure Active Directory or
OpenId
 SecurityEssentials.sln – Account Management process,
anti-enumeration and brute force by throttling and
CAPTCHA, logging, email verification, email on change,
activity log, auto-complete off, increase logon time failure

3 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Cross site scripting (XSS) – What is it?
www.mysite.com/index?name=Guest
Hello Guest!
www.mysite.com/index?name=<b>Guest<b>
Hello Guest!
www.mysite.com/index?name=Guest<script>alert('Gotcha!')</script>
Hello Guest!
www.mysite.com/index?name=<script>window.onload = function() {var
link=document.getElementsByTagName("a");link[0].href="http://not-real-
xssattackexamples.com/";}</script>
www.mysite.com/index?name=<script>Insert evil script here</script>

Cross site scripting (XSS) – What is it?
Encoded data vs unencoded
e.g. <b>Guest<b> vs <b>Guest</b>
Cookie theft!
<script>alert(document.cookies)</script>
Concept: Don't trust your users!
Reflected vs Persisted XSS
Attack Vector: Social Network, Email etc

Cross site scripting (XSS) – Examples
 Case Study: Legal Helpdesk
 Enabler:
 Session stealing
 DOS
 Sensitive data exposure
 Ebay, Sep 2014
 About.com, Oct 2014 – 99.98% of links susceptible
– Mar 2015 – still unpatched

Cross site scripting (XSS) - Countermeasures
Validate untrusted data – don't trust your users!
Sources of data – html post, urls, excel/csv import, import of
database
Mvc3 - “A potentially dangerous Request.Form value was
detected from the client”, except:
What if you want to post HTML? [AllowHTML]
Countermeasure: Encode reflected data
Mvc3 encodes Html by default
Except @Html.Raw(Model.MyStuff)
For 'safe' HTML fragments use WPL (AntiXSS) Library for
HTML, CSS, URL, JavaScript, LDAP etc
Concept: Black vs White listing
SecurityEssentials: Incorporation of AntiXSS Library
Comparison with ASP.Net web forms

4 – Insecure Direct Object
References

Insecure direct object references – what is it?
www.mysite.com/user/edit/12345
// Insecure
public ActionResult Edit(int id)
{
var user = UnitOfWork.UserRepository.Get(e => e.Id == id);
return View("Details", new UserViewModel(user);
}
// Secure
public ActionResult Edit(int id)
{
var user = UnitOfWork.UserRepository.Get(e => e.Id == id);
// Establish user has right to edit the details
if (user.Id != UserIdentity.GetUserId())
{
HandleErrorInfo error = new HandleErrorInfo(new Exception("INFO: You do not have
permission to edit these details"));
return View("Error", error);
}
return View("Edit", new UserViewModel(user);
}

Insecure direct object references - Examples
 Immobilise Jan 2015
 Citigroup, 2011
– 200,000 customer details exposed

Insecure direct object references - Countermeasures
 Check the user has permission to see a resource
– Don't expose internal keys externally
– Map keys to user specific temporary non-guessable ones to
prevent brute force
 Frequently overlooked:
– Ajax calls
– Obfuscation of paths does not work
– Passing sensitive data in urls
 SecurityEssentials.sln User edit

5 – Security Misconfiguration

Security Misconfiguration – What is it?
 Unnecessary features enabled e.g. FTP, SMTP on a web
server, ports opened
 Default accounts and passwords still enabled and
unchanged
 Errors reveal internal implementation e.g. Trace.axd

Security Misconfiguration - Examples
 Webcams, Nov 2014
 Secure Elmah, Google inurl:elmah.axd “error log for”

Security Misconfiguration - Countermeasures
 Encrypt connection string
 Server retail mode
 Ensure application is set for production – automate using
MVC config transforms
 SecurityEssentials.sln web.config

Sensitive Data exposure – What is it?
 Email addresses
 Contents of emails
 Passwords
 Auth token
 Credit card details
 Private pictures

Sensitive Data exposure - Examples
 Snapchat Jan 2014
– Phone number upload feature brute forced
 Tunisian ISP
– Login pages for Gmail, Yahoo, and Facebook
– Pulls the username and password, and encodes it with a weak
cryptographic algorithm
 Wifi Pineapple

Sensitive Data exposure - Countermeasures
 Use and enforce SSL/TLS – [RequireSSL]
 Google: “SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU
load, less than 10KB of memory per connection and less
than 2% of network overhead.”
 StartSSL.com or letsencrypt.org
 HSTS header and HSTS preload
 Encrypt sensitive data in storage
 Disclosure via URL
 Browser auto-complete
 Don't store it! e.g. CVV code
 SecurityEssentials forcing SSL/TLS, HSTS header, prevent
server information disclosure, web.config

7 – Missing Function Level Access
Control

Missing Function Level Access Control – What is it?
 Checking the user has permission to be there
 www.mysite.com/admin (Requires admin role!)

Missing Function Level Access Control - Countermeasures
 Path level in web.config
 Method level attribute e.g. [Authorize(Roles=”Admin”)]
 Controller level Authorize attribute
 Any point in code using identity features in .net
(System.Web.Security.Roles.IsUserInRole(userName,
roleName)
 Use [NonAction]
 Don't show links on UI to unauthorised functions
 Don't make server side checks depend solely on
information provided by the attacker
 Obfuscating links is no protection
 Least Privilege
 SecurityEssentials.sln unit tests

8 – Cross Site Request Forgery

Cross-Site request forgery - What is it?
 Attacker sends malicious link
 <img src=”www.mysite.com/logoff” />
 Requires to be logged on

Cross-Site request forgery - Examples
TP-Link Routers, Mar 2014
 300,000 routers reprogrammed
 DNS Servers changed
 Exploit known for over a year
Brazil 2011, 4.5m DSL routers reprogrammed

Cross-Site request forgery - Countermeasures
 Exploits predictable patterns, tokens add randomness to
request
@Html.AntiForgeryToken()
<input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden"
value="NVGfno5qe...... .......yYCzLBc1" />
 Anti-forgery token
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
 NB: Ajax calls
 ASP.Net web forms
 SecurityEssentials (controller and ajax)

9 - Using components with known vulnerabilities
 Case Study: WordPress, 2013
 3 Year old admin module
 10s of thousands of sites affected
 No Brute force protection
 Possible effects:
 Circumvent access controls
 SQL Injection, XSS, CSRF
 Vulnerable to brute force login
 NuGet – keep updated
 Apply Windows Update
 OWASP Dependency Checker
 SecurityEssentials.sln NuGet

10 - Unvalidated redirects and forwards – What is it?
 Attacker presents victim with an (obfuscated) url e.g.
https://www.trustedsite.com/signin?ReturnUrl=http://www.nastysite.com/
 User logs into safe, trusted site
 Redirects to nasty site, malicious content returned
 Any redirecting url is vulnerable
 MVC3 vulnerable

Unvalidated redirects and forwards - Countermeasures
MVC4 problem solved (for login):

Form Overposting – What is it?
[HttpPost]
public ViewResult Edit(User user)
{ TryUpdateModel( … }
[HttpPost]
public ViewResult Edit([Bind(Include = "FirstName")] User user)
{ TryUpdateModel( … ,propertiesToUpdate, … }

DDOS – What is it?
 Account lock out
 Site running slow in browser
 Server unable to fulfil a request

DDOS - Examples
 Case Study: Meetup, Mar 2014
– $300
– Site down for days

DDOS - Examples
ZdNet, 2015: Global DDOS attacks increase 90% on last
year

DDOS – How and countermeasures
Protocol exploits such as ICMP, SYN, SSDP flood
XSS
Being popular
System exploits - covered by fixes from MS generally
Botnets
Ambiguous regex
Not closing connections
Filling up error log
Long running page
Outsource the solution - Cloudfare

Social Engineering – What is it?
 You are the weakest link in the security terrain. e.g
phishing, spear phishing (12 emails sent => 90% success
rate).
 People want to help
 Nobody thinks they are a target
 Virtually no trace of the attack

Social Engineering - Examples
 Spam
 Shoulder surfing
 Found treasure (e.g. USB drive)
 Case study: Email password reset
 Denial of service and social engineering

Social Engineering - Countermeasures
 Less than 1% of security budget is spent on people
 Notifications
 Principle of least privilege
 Logging and two factor authentication

Securing your site – Code Cheat sheet (1)
 Don't trust your users!
 Use an ORM
 Use a strong account management process
 Captcha/throttling
 Defeat account enumeration
 Hash passwords, encrypt data
 Least Privilege
 Use and enforce SSL
 Encode all output
 Secure direct object references
 [Authorize]/[Authorize(Roles=””)] users
 Conceal errors and trace
 Use antiforgery tokens

Securing your site – Code Cheat sheet (2)
 Keep components up to date
 Validate redirects
 Form overposting
 DDOS
 Headers
 Train staff in social engineering

...and once on the server
 Apply a good SSL policy on the server:
http://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practises/
 Poodle, Freak, Drown
 Encrypt the connection string on the production server
 Enable retail mode on the production server
 Patch the server
 Run on your site to check security standards are enforced
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

Further Resources
 OWASP Top 10
 Pluralsight courses
 CEH Certification
 ZdNet
 SecurityNow podcast

Summary
 Hacks have been increasing in number and sophistication
 OWASP Top 10
 Specific solutions in Mvc (SecurityEssentials.sln)

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