STATCON-CASE-DIGESES.doc

OF 52
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ..........................................................1
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... 2
I. STATUTES................................................................................... 4
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance................................................................................4
Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez ...............................................................4
Lidasan vs. Commision on Elections...........................................................................4
People vs. Ferrer.........................................................................................................5
Tobias vs. Abalos ......................................................................................................5
Tañada vs. Tuvera.....................................................................................................6
II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION ................................... 7
*Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals .......................................................7
People vs. Nazario .....................................................................................................7
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa vs. Manila Railroad Company..........................................7
Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicholas..............................................................7
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc................................................................................8
Lapid vs. Court of Appeals ........................................................................................8
People vs. Jabinal .......................................................................................................8
Co vs. Court of Appeals .............................................................................................9
Benzonan vs. CA ......................................................................................................9
III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION ........................................................11
City of Baguio vs. Marcos.........................................................................................11
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito .................................................................................................11
People vs. Purisima ..................................................................................................11
U.S. vs. Hart ..........................................................................................................12
Matabuena vs. Cervantes..........................................................................................12
People vs. Manantan ................................................................................................12
Director of Lands vs. Abaya ....................................................................................13
Salaysay vs. Castro...................................................................................................13
Commissioner of Customs vs. CTA ..........................................................................14
Gloria vs. CA .........................................................................................................15
Buenaseda vs. Flavier ...............................................................................................15
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.............................................................16
Philippine Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs......................................................16
IV. ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM LANGUAGE ...............18
National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC .................................................................18
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, et al.............................................................................18

Santiago vs. Comelec.................................................................................................19
Casela vs. Court of Appeals......................................................................................19
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court ..................................................................20
King vs. Hernandez..................................................................................................20
U.S. vs. Toribio .......................................................................................................21
Commendador vs. De Villa ......................................................................................21
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. CTA .......................................................................22
People vs. Yu Hai ....................................................................................................22
Amatan vs. Aujero..................................................................................................23
People vs. Purisima ..................................................................................................23
Salvacion vs. Central Bank ......................................................................................23
Demafiles vs. Comelec...............................................................................................24
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission............................................................................24
V. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES.............................26
Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. NTC ..............................................................26
Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals..............................................................26
Manila Herald vs. Ramos ........................................................................................26
Claudio vs. COMELEC ........................................................................................27
Garcia vs. COMELEC..........................................................................................27
Liggett & Myers Tobacco vs. Collector of Internal Revenue ........................................28
Garvida vs. Sales .....................................................................................................28
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos...................................................................................29
Carandang vs. Santiago............................................................................................29
People vs. Santiago...................................................................................................30
Caltex Phils., Inc. vs. Palomar .................................................................................30
Mutuc vs. Comelec....................................................................................................31
Vera vs. Cuevas.......................................................................................................31
Republic vs. Migrino.................................................................................................32
U.S. vs. Santo Nino ................................................................................................32
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. SSC........................................................................32
Lerum vs. Cruz .......................................................................................................33
Vera vs. Fernandez..................................................................................................33
Manabat vs. De Aquino..........................................................................................34
Escribano vs. Avila..................................................................................................34
People vs. Tamani ....................................................................................................35
Fores vs. Miranda....................................................................................................35
Manila Electric Company vs. Public Utilities Employees............................................36
VI. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE ........................................37
National Tobacco Adm. vs. Commission on Audit....................................................37
People vs. Garcia......................................................................................................37
Republic vs. Court of Appeals...................................................................................38

Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals....................................................................................38
Paras vs. COMELEC............................................................................................39
Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals............................................................39
C&C Commercial Corp. vs. NAWASA................................................................40
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. City of Butuan...................................................................40
Bagatsing vs. Ramirez ..............................................................................................41
City of Manila vs. Teotico.........................................................................................42
VII. STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION .....................................43
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan......................................................................................43
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals .............................................43
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals .............................................44
Cena vs. Civil Service Commission............................................................................44
Abella vs. NLRC ...................................................................................................45
VIII.MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES ................................46
Chartered Bank vs. National Government Auditing Office........................................46
McGee vs. Republic..................................................................................................46
Fule vs. Court of Appeals.........................................................................................47
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC .......................................................................47
Marcelino vs. Cruz...................................................................................................47
Bersabal vs. Salvador ...............................................................................................48
IX. PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES..............................49
Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue ......................................49
Nilo vs. Court of Appeals ........................................................................................49
People vs. Zeta.........................................................................................................50
Buyco vs. PNB ........................................................................................................50
Subido, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan ..................................................................................51
Billones vs. CIR.......................................................................................................51
Corales vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission.....................................................52
Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA ....................................................................52
X. AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL............54
Case Name..............................................................................................................54
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION.........................................55
Case Name..............................................................................................................55

I. STATUTES
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630, G.R. NO. 115873 & 115931
25 AUGUST 1994
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent
to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716.
ISSUES: Whether or not this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced
in the title of R.A. No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No.
1590 as among those which the statute amends.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that since the title states that
the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this
is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To
insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103
of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title
of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional requirement
that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress
and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be
heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but
perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed
until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of
R.A. No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL’s own franchise under
P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a
manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary
legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of
the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.
CASCO PHILS. CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 347, G.R. NO. L-17931
28 FEBRUARY 1963
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a
claim for refund of petitioner Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 2609, the Central Bank issued Circular
No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. As a
result of which, petitioner paid the margin fees amounting to P33,765.42 and
another P6,345.72.
Prior to the second payment of margin fees, petitioner sought the refund of its
earlier payment relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said
bank, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from said fee. The Auditor of the bank refused to pass and approve said vouchers
on the ground that urea and formaldehyde is not covered within the exemptions
provided for in Republic Act No. 2609.
ISSUES: Whether or not “urea formaldehyde” which appears in the provision
should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” and therefore exempting the
petitioner from payment of margin fees.
RULING: When petitioners contended that the bill approved in Congress was
intended to exempt the individual items “urea” and “formaldehyde” citing the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, the Supreme Court ruled that these
“statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the indent of the House of Representatives.”
In construing the law, the Court ruled that the enrolled bill which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” rather than “urea and formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President.
LIDASAN VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS
21 SCRA 496, G.R. NO. L-28089
25 OCTOBER 1967
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS: Republic Act. No. 4790 which is entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” was enacted into law.
However, its constitutionality is being questioned as it also includes barrios located
in another province: Cotabato.

In creation of the Municipality of Dianaton, twelve barrios in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to Lanao del Sur which brings about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 4790 is constitutional on the ground that it does
not conform to the mandate that “No bill may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”.
Whether or not R.A. No 4790 may be salvaged by creating Dianaton through
the barrios already included within the province of Lanao del Sur by merely
nullifying those portions of the law which are repugnant to the Constitution and
saving those “not affected” by the infirmity.
RULING: In ruling upon the unconstitutionality of this law, the Supreme Court said
that “the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such prevision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.”
Thus, the title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur” is defective in that it projects the impression that solely the province
of Lanao del Sur is affected in the creation of Dianaton when it does, in fact,
dismember two municipalities from the province of Cotabato. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law and did not
inform the people in Cotabato that part of their territory was already being taken
away.
Anent the second issue, the rule that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld, the Supreme Court stated that the exemption to this
rule should apply. This exemption states that “where parts of the statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then all the provisions which are
dependent on the unconstitutional part must fall with it.” This is buttressed by the
fact that the bill was presented in Congress with the totality of the twenty-one
barrios, not nine and that the seat of government will be in a municipality in
Cotabato.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER
48 SCRA 382, G.R. NO. L-32613-14
27 DECEMBER 1972
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act against Feliciano Co
was filed. Judge Jose de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding
a prima facie case against Co, directed prosecutors to file the corresponding
information alleging that Co had become an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. Co moved to quash the information on the
ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder and thus void
for being unconstitutional.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court upheld the Anti-Subversion Act by
saying that when the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the purposes of the
prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization.
The term “Communist Party of the Philippines” is used solely for definition
purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to “any other organization having the same purpose as their
successors.” Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
As to the claim that under the statute, organizational guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party,
suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been
referred to as a “dragnet device” whereby all who participate in the criminal
covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed
as punishing membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals
of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing
or active, with specific intent to further the legal objectives of the Party.
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS
239 SCRA 106, G.R. NO. 114783
8 DECEMBER 1994
BIDIN, J.
FACTS: Before the enactment of R.A. No. 7675, “an Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the
City of Mandaluyong”, San Juan and Mandaluyong belonged to a single legislative
district. The act was signed into law on February 9, 1994. Subsequently, a plebiscite

was held wherein the people of Mandaluyong ratified the law pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners now question the constitutionality of said law as taxpayers and
residents of Mandaluyong.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is constitutional for contravening the “one
subject-one bill” rule. Petitioners contend that the division of the congressional
district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate districts is violative of this
rule.
RULING: R.A. 7675 is constitutional. The Supreme Court held that the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized treaty and
is thus contemplated in the title.
A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been adopted by
the Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation, that such should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446, G.R. NO. L-63915
29 DECEMBER 1986
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: The petitioners move for a clarification on the Court’s previous decision
(Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27). They have sought to clarify the meaning of the
clause, “unless it is otherwise provided” and the word “law” as they were used in
Article 2 of the Civil Code. In line with this, petitioners also asked the court to shed
light on the requirements of publication.
ISSUES: Whether or not the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
variability of the date of effectivity or to the requirement of publication.
RULING: The clause refers to the variability of the date of effectivity and not the
requirement of publication. This is evidenced by the sentence “This code shall take
effect one year after publication.” Thus, publication is mandatory for a law’s
effectivity.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
*FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
107 SCRA 352, G.R. NO. L-44161, 41222, 43153 & 43369
10 SEPTEMBER 1981
BARREDO, J.
FACTS: blah
blah
ISSUES: blah
blah
RULING: blah
blah
PEOPLE VS. NAZARIO
165 SCRA 186, G.R. NO. L-44143
31 AUGUST 1988
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS: Accused Nazario was charged with the violation of a Municipal Ordinance
by failing to pay municipal taxes incurred as the owner fishpond business. Accused
thus questions the constitutionality of the ordinance and, assuming its
constitutionality, its non-application to him.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance is vague and therefore
unconstitutional.
Whether or not accused is under the purview of the law, Nazario claiming that
he is the owner, and not the “manager” which the law has identified.
RULING: The ordinances in question are not vague. He is clearly, as the actual
operator of the fishponds, within the term “manager” which is among those people
sanctioned by the law.
The Supreme Court had occasion to define vagueness as when a law “lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
as to its meaning and differ as to its application.” It went on to say that a law “must
be utterly vague on its face and cannot be clarified by a saving clause or
construction.”
The Court also differentiated vague statues from those which are merely
ambiguous, the latter remaining constitutional and subject merely to interpretation
whereas in the former, one is totally devoid of any means to ascertain the meaning
of the law and what acts it seeks to enforce or prevent.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA VS. MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY
88 SCRA 616, G.R. NO. L-25316
28 FEBRUARY 1979
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: This is a mandamus petition wherein the petitioner-appellant would seek a
reversal of a lower court’s dismissal based on R.A. No. 2023 § 62. This stems from
the petitioner’s contention that under R.A. No. 2023, the loans granted by credit
unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the
respondent’s employees’ wages and salaries.
ISSUES: What power does the judiciary have in terms of interpretation of the law
when there is absence of doubt as to the scope of operation of the law.
RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision which, in turn, said
that there is nothing in the provision of the said law that provides that obligation of
laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the
deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries. The only effect of R.A. No.
2023 is to compel the employer to make deduction of the employees’ debt from the
latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’ credit union but this mandatory
character does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.
Where the law is clear and there is absence of doubt as to its application, the
courts have no other recourse but to enforce them as they are worded. Dura lex sed
lex.
DAOANG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICHOLAS
159 SCRA 369, G.R. NO. L-34568
28 MARCH 1988
PADILLA, J.
FACTS: The spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition to adopt the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. A hearing was set and notices were
served to the public. The petitioners, however, filed an opposition to said adoption
claiming that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate daughter, oppositors’ mother,
and were therefore disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not the spouses Agonoy are disqualified to adopt based on
Art. 335 of the Civil Code, the opposition basing their claim that it would produce
a foreign element into the family unit and result in the reduction of their legitimes.

RULING: The spouses are not disqualified to adopt their grandchildren, the law
being clear and unambiguous as regards the persons who may not adopt. The
statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted and must thus be
applied. Only those statutes that are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may be the
subject of construction.
Also, it must be said that the enumeration is exclusive, and therefore excludes
those items not included. In this case, the rule expression unius est exclusio alterius
applies in that “grandchildren” has not been among those prohibited by the law to
be susceptible of adoption.
ENDENCIA AND JUGO VS. DAVID, ETC.
93 SCRA 696, G.R. NO. L-6355-56
31 AUGUST 1953
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: R.A. No. 590 was enacted and directed the respondent Collector of
Internal Revenue to collect income tax on the salary of judicial officers, specifically
petitioner Endencia.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 590 is unconstitutional, the petitioner basing its
argument on the fact that such a collection of income tax is a diminution of
compensation fixed by law and thus repugnant to Art VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution.
RULING: Following the Court’s decision in Perfecto vs. Meer, the Supreme Court
reiterated that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their
salaries because the collection thereof would be tantamount to a decrease or
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The law being repugnant to the Constitution, its validity must fail and thus be
declared unconstitutional, as it has exceeded its legislative authority.
LAPID VS. COURT OF APPEALS
334 SCRA 738, G.R. NO. 142261
29 JUNE 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS: A complaint was filed charging Gov. Manuel Lapid of “Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service”. The
Ombudsman subsequently issued an order suspending Lapid for 6 months
pursuant to R.A. 6770.
On November 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the case
finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and thus suspending
him from office. The petitioner then filed for a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals and prayed for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Ombudsman
from enforcing the questioned decision.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose
penalties that are not enumerated in R.A. 6770 § 27 are final, unappealable, and
immediately executory.
Whether or not the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the
Local Government Code should be applied suppletorily to the Ombudsman Act
(R.A. 6770).
RULING: The rule inclusion unius est exclusio alterius applies in this case since
suspension without pay for one month is not among those listed as final and
unappealable, hence immediately executory. Since express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included, all those decisions which impose
penalties found in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 are not final, unappealable, and
immediately executory, it will stay the immediate execution of the Ombudsman’s
decision.
Anent the second issue, the lack of any provision providing for the suppletory
application of the Administrative Code and the Local Government Code to the
Ombudsman Act, the two former laws cannot be applied suppletorily to the latter
for that will enlarge the scope of the law beyond that contemplated by the
legislature when the latter law was enacted.
PEOPLE VS. JABINAL
55 SCRA 607, G.R. NO. L-30061
27 FEBRUARY 1974
ANTONIO, J.
FACTS: Accused Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. During the time he was caught, the prevailing doctrine
was that on Macarandang and Lucero.
The accused, on trial, admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and
the ammunition described without license or permit. However, he claims that
though he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander and said appointments expressly carried with
them the authority to possess the firearm in question.
ISSUES: Whether or not Jabinal is to be found guilty owing to his reliance on the
doctrines set forth in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero.
RULING: In deciding, the Court brought up the case of People vs. Macarandang
wherein the accused in the case was acquitted because of his appointment as a

Secret Agent. In said case, unlicensed firearms were allowed by the Revised
Administrative Code by exempting “peace officers” from said requirement. It
further provided that Macarandang’s appointment as a Secret Agent was
contemplated in the category of a “peace officer”.
In People vs. Lucero, the Court held that under the circumstances of the case, the
granting of temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to
carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed
incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said military
commander.
However, in People vs. Mapa, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Macarandang
and sustained conviction that Secret Agents are not contemplated within the
exemptions that law has provided for.
In this case, the accused was acquitted on the basis that considering his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent pursuant to the prevailing
doctrines in Macarandang and Lucero, he may not be punished for an act which at the
time it was done was held to be punishable.
CO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
227 SCRA 444, G.R. NO. 100776
28 OCTOBER 1993
NARVASA, C.J.
FACTS: In an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel, petitioner Albino
Co paid a salvaging firm a check on September 1, 1983. The check was
dishonoured and a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner based on P.D. 22,
of which he was found guilty.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals where he contended that because the
RTC erroneously based his conviction on the case of Que vs. People (which penalized
the mere issuance of a bouncing check) which was dated September 21, 1987
whereas he issued the dishonored check on September 1, 1983. Petitioner’s
contention was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are to be applied
retroactively.
RULING: The Court ruled that Court decisions must be given prospective
application. It can be made to retroact only so far as it is favorable to the accused.
BENZONAN VS. CA
205 SCRA 515, G.R. NO. 97998
27 JANUARY 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: Respondent Benito Salvani Pe is a businessman based in General Santos
City who acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau of
Lands a 26,064 m2 parcel of land. Barely three months after he acquired said land,
Mr. Pe mortgaged it together with another lot and some chattels to secure a
commercial loan from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-
industrial complex with rice mill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office
and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for
various materials.
Mr. Pe, however, failed to pay his loan after more than seven years and DBP
foreclosed the mortgage. After the foreclosure, respondent Pe leased the lot and its
improvements from DBP. When respondent, in turn failed to redeem the property
within the one year period, DBMP sold the lot to petitioners for P1,650,000.00
payable in quarterly amortizations over a five year period. The petitioners occupied
the purchased lot and introduced further improvements worth P970,000.00.
Claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to repurchase,
respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for P327,995.00. DBP
countered saying that over P3 million has already been incurred in the preservation,
maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
Respondent filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the RTC of General Santos City. Said RTC ruled
in favor of respondent and ordered the DBP to reimburse petitioners, and give
preference to respondent’s ability to repurchase the said lots.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification. A motion for
reconsideration with the same court was denied and the case was thus appealed to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent’s use of the land was in keeping with
Commonwealth Act. No. 141 § 119.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that respondent has never shown the intention
of utilizing the land given to him for free by the Government for agricultural
purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads and free
patents were intended by the law.
Respondent cannot therefore repurchase the land he had lost due to
nonpayment of debts since such a repurchase of property does not fall within the
purpose, spirit, and meaning of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the

land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it.

III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
CITY OF BAGUIO VS. MARCOS
27 SCRA 342, G.R. NO. 26100
28 FEBURARY 1969
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS: The Director of Lands, seeking to reopen cadastral proceedings, instituted
a Civil Reservation case. It is not disputed that the lands involved were amongst
those declared public lands by final decision in the case decided on November 13,
1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen
said Civil Reservation case as to the parcel of land he owns. Private petitioners and
the City of Baguio registered opposition to the reopening, the former basing their
claim on the premise that they are tree farm lessees of the said lands.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners’ opposition
to the reopening. A motion for reconsideration was also rejected thereafter. All the
petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the
petitioners were not bound by the declaratory relief heretofore stated. Nevertheless,
the private petitioners as lessees had no right to oppose the cadastral case.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not he forty-year period to file a petition for reopening
cadastral proceedings hsoudl be counted from the date the proceeding was
originally filed in court or when the decision became final.
RULING: The Court held that since the title of R.A. No. 931 is “An Act to
authorize the filing in the proper court under certain conditions of certain claims of
title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of the judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act,”
there is an apparent inconsistency between the body and title of R.A. No. 931. The
Court ruled that the forty-year period starts from the date the final decision was
rendered by enunciating that the Act’s title belongs to that type of title which
should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressly stated in the body.
EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO
156 SCRA 803, G.R. NO. L-33628
29 DECEMBER 1987
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS: The petitioner seeks injunctive relief to enjoin further proceedings in three
criminal cases all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and provisions on the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the preliminary investigations but was denied. He went to the
respondent court on prohibition and mandamus praying that a writ of preliminary
injunction and to have the restraining order lifted. Two challenged orders were
handed and a series of criminal prosecutions were filed.
Petitioner now challenges these prosecutions for failure to comply with E.O.
264.
ISSUES: Whether or not E.O. No. 264 applies to criminal actions to the end that no
preliminary investigations thereof can be undertaken or information filed in court
unless there is compliance with said Executive Order.
RULING: The Court held that E.O. No. 264 applies only to administrative and not
criminal complaints since its title, “Outlining the procedure by which complaints
charging government officials and employees with commission of irregularities
should be guided,” speaks only of “irregularities” rather than “offenses” or
“crimes”
PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA
86 SCRA 542, G.R. NO. L-42050-66
20 NOVEMBER 1978
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J.
FACTS: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or “illegal
possession of a deadly weapon,” specifically carrying outside one’s residence any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for
livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be carrying
such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a
deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above in
order that the accused be convicted.
RULING: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit
and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as
an indispensable element of the crime. Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity
in the scope of the law, its preamble may be referred to in order to determine
legislative intent.

U.S. VS. HART
26 PHIL 149, G.R. NO. 8848
21 NOVEMBER 1913
TRENT, J.
FACTS: Appellants Hart, Miller, and Natividad were arraigned and found guilty of
vagrancy under Act No. 519. Prosecution based its argument on the evidences
presented showing that Hart pleaded guilty and was convicted of gambling two or
three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.
Defense showed that Hart and Dunn operated a hotel and saloon in Angeles
which did business of P96,000 during its 19 months before the trial. Hart was also
the proprietor of a saloon in Tacondo, raised imported hogs which he sold to the
Army garrison, and had other businesses.
Act 519 divides section 1 into seven clauses separated by semi-colons, each
clause enumerating a certain class of persons who, within the meaning of the statue
can be considered as vagrants.
ISSUES: Whether or not the legislative intended to limit the crime of vagrancy to
those having “no visible means of support”
RULING: The prosecution relies on the argument that “visible means of support”
does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses”. In order for the clause “without visible means of support to
qualify the fist clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else the comma after country would have been inserted.
The Court held that if the punctuation gives the statue a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of a statute as
thus punctuated. However, an argument based on punctuation alone is not
conclusive on the court by itself and the court will not hesitate to change the
punctuation as necessary. To say that there are two classes of vagrants defined in
par. 2, sec. 1 of Act 519 implies a lack of logical classification which the Court is
not inclined to uphold. The accused are thus acquitted, they having shown that they
have “visible means of support”.
MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES
38 SCRA 284, G.R. NO. L-28771
31 MARCH 1971
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: Cornelia Matabuena assails the validity of a donation made by her brother,
the deceased Felix Matabuena to the latter’s common-law wife, Petronilla
Cervantes.
The facts show that Felix Matabuena owned the property in question, donated
it to the defendant on Feb. 20, 1956, and was accepted by the latter, and that this
donation took place during the common-law relationship of the deceased and
defendant.
ISSUES: Whether or not he donation between Felix Matabuena and Petronilla
Cervantes is valid owing to the construction of Art. 133 of the Civil Code.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the assailed donation is void. In ruling thus,
the Court overruled the lower court’s decision basing donations void between
spouses but that between Matabuena and Cervantes as valid because theirs was not
a valid marriage but a common-law one.
The Court based its own decision by applying the spirit of the law, its policy
rather than mere words. It stated that the policy behind Art. 133 is to prevent
donations in favor of the other consort because of ear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor. Moreover, it was said by the Court that the
law’s policy of what is just and right would be nullified if such an irregular
relationship were to be visited with benefits instead of disabilities.
PEOPLE VS. MANANTAN
115 PHIL 657, G.R. NO. L-14129
31 JULY 1962
REGALA, J.
FACTS: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code which provides that “no justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or
assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in any election or to take part therein, except to vote x x x”.
Manantan argues that he, a justice of the peace, is not comprehended among
the officers enumerated in the law. He further contends that a perusal of the
history of the Revised Election Code will show that since Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code which governed such an infraction included “justice
of the peace” in its enumeration while omitted in the Revised Election Code shows
the intention of the Legislature to exclude “justice of the peace from its operation.
ISSUES: Whether a “justice of the peace” is included in the prohibition contained in
Section 54 of the old Revised Election Code.
RULING: The Court ruled that Manantan’s argument is untenable in that it
overlooks the fundamental fact that under the Revised Administrative Code
qualifies the word “judge” by the phrase “of First Instance” while the Revised
Election Code does not. Justices of the peace were expressly included in the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified
whereas the Revised Election Code makes no such distinction. Also, an

examination of the history of these laws show that whenever the word “judge” was
qualified by the phrase “of the first instance,” the word “justice of the peace”
would follow. However, if the law simply said “judge,” the words “justice of the
peace” were omitted.
The defendant likewise invokes the statutory construction rule of casus omissus
pro omisso habendus est or that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally, was declared by the Supreme
Court as inapplicable to the case at bar. The rule can only be made to apply where
the omission has been clearly establish, the fact of which is belied by the fact that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration
of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities but rather merely
called it by another name.
Its is for these reasons that the dismissal by the trial court is set aside and
remanded for trial on the merits.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ABAYA
63 SCRA 559, G.R. NO. 42134
21 OCTOBER 1936
LAUREL, J.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance denying the motion of
the appellants to set aside the motion of the appellants to set aside the decision of
that court declaring a certain piece of land as public and to reopen the case in
accordance with Act No. 4043.
On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance praying that the titles with respect to a tract of land be settled and
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as
the Cadastral Act. Such tract of land was subsequently declared public land because
no one appeared to claim it.
On January 25, 1934, a motion was filed by Ramon de Arruza and Mario
Luzuriaga praying that this aforementioned decision of the lower court be set aside
and that they be allowed to present their claim in a new trial in accordance with
Act. No. 4043.
The Fiscal of Negros Occidental contended that the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction to reopen the case because the motion was not filed within the
time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. Said Act involved allowed the filing, within
ten years, of a claim to lands that “have been, or are about to be, declared lands of
the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted” in cadastral cases.
The judge of the said court denied the motion of the appellants. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the ten-year period as contemplated in Act No. 2259 or
the Cadastral Act is to be counted from the date the decision was rendered or from
the date judicial proceedings were instituted in the cadastral case.
RULING: The Supreme Court perused the history of the prior laws on the subject
and noted that of the four laws on the subject, two refer in their titles to “lands that
have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered” while the
other two fail to make any such allusion.
However, the text of all four laws speak of lands that “have been or about to be
declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted.” The
explanatory note likewise showed that the intention was to authorize filing of the
claim to lots that have been declared public lands “by virtue of judicial decisions”
but such was not adopted when the legislature made no alteration in the language
of the statute to reflect such intention.
The legislative intent, therefore, is to start counting ten years from the date of
the institution of the judicial proceeding and not from the date of judgment therein
as rendered.
SALAYSAY VS. CASTRO
98 PHIL 264, G.R. NO. L-9669
31 JANUARY 1956
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: Engracio Santos is the duly-elected Municipal Mayor and petitioner
Nicanor Salaysay is the duly-elected Vice Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal.
On September 1955, Santos was held under suspension due to administrative
charges. Salaysay then had to act as mayor in accordance with Section 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Shortly thereafter, he filed his certificate of candidacy
as mayor.
In view of filing for candidacy, the Office of the President designated Sto.
Domingo acting municipal vice mayor to replace petitioner pursuant to Section 27
of the Revised Election Code which provides that any elective provincial, municipal
or city official running for an office, other than the one he is currently holding,
shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner refused to turn over the office to Sto. Domingo and brought the
instant action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against Castro, Pascual,
and Sto. Domingo to declare invalid, illegal and unauthorized the designation of
Sto. Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor.
ISSUES: Whether a vice mayor who temporarily took over the functions of the
mayor following the latter’s suspension from office, be deemed automatically
resigned as acting mayor upon filing his certificate of candidacy for mayor.

RULING: In interpreting the phrase “actually holding” in a provision which sates
that “any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other
than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of filing his certificate of candidacy”, the Court examined
the legislative history of the provision in order to ascertain the legislative intent. It
noted that it was Commonwealth Act No. 666 which originally provided for
virtually the same provision. Since the rule of hold-over was not in force when said
law was still effective, President Roxas appointed many local officials to continue in
office even after filing their certificates of candidacy.
To enable many local officials to continue in office, the legislature amended
Commonwealth Act No. 666 by replacing the phrase “for which he has been lastly
elected” with the phrase “which he is actually holding”.
It cannot thus be said that a vice mayor merely acting as mayor because of the
disability of the latter comes under the provision and exception as he acts as mayor
only in a temporary, provisional capacity.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. CTA
224 SCRA 665, G.R. NOS. 48886-88
21 JULY 1993
MELO, J.
FACTS: The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were
constructed and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the
expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.
On various dates, the berthing facilities of the said company were used by the
vessels of the Litonjua Shipping Company and were assessed berthing fees by the
Collector of Customs. Private respondent, Litonjua Shipping Company filed a case
before the Bureau of Customs claiming for a refund of said berthing fees on the
premise that the latter’s ships berthed at a privately owned wharf or pier and is thus
not liable to the payment of the berthing charges under Section 2901 of the Tariff
and Customs Code as amended by P.D. No. 34.
The Commissioner of Customs, on the other hand, contends that the
government has the authority to impose and collect berthing fees whether a vessel
berths at a private pier or at a national port or that the port in Kiwalan is a national
port, it being under the jurisdiction of the collection district and territorial limits of
the national port of Iligan City. Private petitioner opposes this contention saying
that the Kiwalan port is absent from the list of national ports mentioned in
Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936.
ISSUES: Whether nor not a vessel which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier,
is liable for the payment of the berthing charge under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, which, as amended by P.D. No. 34 states that a vessel berthing “at
any national port” shall pay berthing fees.
RULING: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court looked into the history of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Prior to its amendment, the said law provided that
berthing fees were to be collected from any vessel berthing “at any port.”
The Court noted that the word “national” before the word “port” was inserted
in the amendment. Such a change in the phraseology by the amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had and held that such an insertion is an indication
to change the meaning of Section 2901 from its original meaning.
Thus, only vessels berthing at national ports are liable for berthing fees. The
petitioner must refund the berthing fees paid by the private respondent.
GLORIA VS. CA
306 SCRA 287, G.R. NO. 131012
21 APRIL 1999
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers who, on various dates in
September and October 1990, did not report for work. For this reason, they were
administratively charged and placed under preventive suspension.
An investigation was conducted and private respondents were found guilty as
charged. On appeal to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), they were
also found guilty. They appealed to the Civil Service Commission which only
affirmed the decision of the MSPB as to private respondent Margallo but found the
other three private respondents guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the decision of the CSC as to the three private respondents while
Margallo’s suspension was lifted. They filed for a reconsideration of the case. The
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision but ruled that the respondents were
entitled to their salary during the suspension. Petitioner Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, Ricardo Gloria, moved for a reconsideration of the ordered
payment of back salaries to the private respondents.
ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer or employee, who has been preventively
suspended pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, is
entitled to his salary and other benefits during such preventive suspension.
RULING: The Supreme Court, ruling in the negative, held that the private
respondent teachers are thus not entitled to their respective salary and other
benefits “beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension” or, in other words, no

compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending
investigation but only for the period of preventive suspending pending appeal in
the event the employee is exonerated.
The Civil Service act of 1959 provided for salaries in case of exoneration.
However, when it was revised in 1975, the provision on the payment of salaries was
deleted. Likewise, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that preventive
suspension shall be “without pay.”
The rule applicable is that when an amendment by deletion of certain words or
phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of
the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the
deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. In the case at
bar, the purpose is that the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for
the period of suspension.
BUENASEDA VS. FLAVIER
226 SCRA 645, G.R. NO. 106719
21 SEPTEMBER 1993
QUIASON, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the
order of the ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of the petitioners in
connection to the administrative complaint filed by the private respondents against
the petitioners for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
petitioners, respondents invoke Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770 which provides in part
that the “ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation.” Respondents contend that
the “authority” extends not only to those within the Ombudsman’s office but also
those in other departments or offices of the government.
It is claimed by the petitioners, however, that under this provision, the
Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other
departments or offices of the government, in view of the phrase “any officer or
employee under his authority.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman’s power “to recommend the suspension”
of a public official or employee refers to penalties in administrative cases.
Whether or not the ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in
administrative cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are
employees in other departments or offices of the government.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word
“suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated, that where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings,
the correct one may be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated. Thus, “suspension” bears the
meaning of a punitive measure since the words association with it refer to penalties
in administrative cases.
Anent the second issue, the Court, in determining the legislative intent, traced
the history of Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to “suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under
his authority pending an investigation.”
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which superseded the above
provision authorized the chief of a bureau or office to “suspend any subordinate
officer or employee, in his bureau or under his authority”
In the Civil Service Law of 1975, however, the phrase “subordinate officer and
employee in his bureau” was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase “under his
authority.” Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper
disciplining authority may suspend “any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation.x x x”
The Ombudsman law deleted the words “subordinate” and “in his bureau”
leaving the phrase to read “suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation x x x” The conclusion thus stands that Congress intended
to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees
under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed “in his
office” or in other offices of the government.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
203 SCRA 504, G.R. NO. 86738
13 NOVEMBER 1991
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS: Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of Nestle Phils.
Inc., was increased. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures and filings to
secure the approval of the Board, stockholders, and the SEC, the latter approving
the increase. In accordance with the Schedule of Fees and Charges implemented by
the SEC, Nestle paid the amount of P50,000.
On December 16, 1983, the board of directors and stockholders of Nestle
approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares of the previously
authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle to San Miguel Corporation and to
Nestle S.A.

On March 25, 1985, the petitioners filed a letter to the SEC seeking exemption
of its proposed issuances of additional shares to its existing principal shareholders
from the registration requirements of Section 4 of the Revised Security Act and
from payment of fee referred to in Section 6 (c) of the same Act on the basis of the
provisions of Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Security Act which uses the terms
“issuance of additional stock” and “increased capital stock” as a criteria for the
non-application of exemption but was denied. An appeal to the Court of Appeals
failed, the CA having affirmed the SEC’s ruling and interpretation on the matter.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act exempts
company from the requirement of registration and payment of fees based on the
premise that the term “increased capital stock” should be interpreted to refer to
“additional capital stock” or equity participation of the existing stockholders as a
consequence of either an increase of the authorized capital stock or the issuance of
unissued capital stock.
RULING: In upholding the construction of the SEC and CA, the Supreme Court
had reason to accord great respect to the interpretation given by the former
administrative agency for it would permit greater opportunity for the SEC to
implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring
proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial
conditions and prospects of the corporation.
In giving greater credence to the interpretation of the SEC, the court had
reason to state that: “[i]t is a principle too well established to require extensive
documentation that the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency
charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great
respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such
construction is clearly to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the
Constitution and other laws.”
PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRAL VS. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
51 PHIL 143, G.R. NO. 27761
6 DECEMBER 1927
DEL ROSARIO, J.
FACTS: On May 1926, when plaintiff loaded the steamship Hannover at
Palupandan with over 5 million kilos of sugar, a collector of customs assessed and
collected P10,248.84 as wharfage dues.
The plaintiff now protests that it is not liable to pay such wharfage dues since
the wharf used by the plaintiff for shipping said goods did not belong to the
Government as required by the current customs laws.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Government can legally collect duties “as a charge for
wharfage” upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves.
RULING: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court had occasion to look upon
older legislative enactments in order to determine legislative intent as regards the
phrase “as a charge for wharfage”. The Court determined that in order to
determine such, the history, relative situation and the conditions existing at the time
the law was enacted must be taken into consideration.
When original Customs Tariff of 1901 was enacted by the Philippine
Commission, the government did not own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere
within the Philippine Islands. It must also be considered that the tax in question
has been paid without any protest or objection since the time of its enactment
except when its constitutionality was assailed in Compañia General Tobacos vs. Collector
of Customs and its validity was subsequently sustained.
The Supreme Court resolved that the tax in question has at all times for twenty-
six years been levied and collected by the government before it owned or operated
any wharf, and that it has spent millions in the construction of wharves in its
principal ports of entries and that the determination of the issue in this case would
have far reaching effects on the government’s finances.
The Court cites the case of Kelley vs. Multnomah County which stated that: “where
those whose duty it is to execute a law have uniformly given it a particular
construction, and that construction has been acquiesced in and acted upon for a
long time, it is a contemporary exposition of the statute, which always commands
the attention of the courts, and will be followed unless it clearly and manifestly
appears to be wrong.”
Taking all these into consideration, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose
of the law was to authorize the Government of the Philippine Islands to levy a duty
of $1 per gross ton “as a charge for wharfage.” The long and continuous
construction which has been placed upon it by government officials tasked with the
execution of the laws are not to be easily overruled, and the very fact that Congress
has not seen fit to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument in favor of
sustaining such a construction.

IV. ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM
LANGUAGE
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR VS. NLRC
327 SCRA 158, G.R. NO. 127718
2 MARCH 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the National Federation of Labor, a legitimate
labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.
The petitioners were employed by Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general
manager and owner, respectively, of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga, a
business engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all covered
agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. Pursuant to said
law, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian
Reform Association, of which petitioners are members and co-owners.
As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of
the Patalon Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners were
terminated. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Being beneficiaries of
the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners became part-owners of the land.
Petitioners then filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in
Zamboanga praying for reinstatement with full backwages on the ground of illegal
dismissal but such was dismissed. Appeal to the NLRC was also dismissed. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation
because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes
of agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that even if the situation was the closure of
business of the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners are still not entitled to such
separation pay. Art. 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of
establishment and reduction of personnel. However, the case at bar involves
neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel. The Estate
was closed because it was acquired by DAR pursuant to R.A. 6657. Hence, it is not
applicable to the case at bar.
The closure contemplated under Art. 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and
voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as
may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that “the employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to…” the use of the word
“may” in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive
only.
The statutory construction rule of verba legis finds application in this case. It
states that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Art. 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure
of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the
benefit of the employees.
PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ET AL.
207 SCRA 561, G.R. NO. 84240
25 MARCH 1992
PARAS, J.
FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children, and was survived,
among others by acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the
full blood of the deceased: Oliva Pascual and Hermes Pascual.
Adela Pascual, spouse of the deceased, filed a Special Proceeding for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Later, she filed a
Supplemental Petition where she expressly stated that Olivia and Hermes Pascual
are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual. Again, she filed an affidavit to the
effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother
of her late husband, to belie the statement made by the oppositors.
The above-mentioned heirs entered into a compromise agreement on October
16, 1985 despite the manifestation/motion of the petitioners stating their hereditary
rights in the estate of their uncle.
On September 30, 1987, they filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights which
was thereafter denied. The Court of appeals also denied and dismissed their
petition and motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners contend that they do not fall within the purview of Art. 992
because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception.
Otherwise, they say that the term “illegitimate” must be strictly construed to refer
only to spurious children.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the petitioners are within
the prohibition of Art. 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v.
IAC.

ISSUES: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code can be interpreted as to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased and
therefore bar petitioners from inheriting from the deceased.
RULING: The Court, in citing Diaz v. IAC, said that “Art. 992 of the civil code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Article 992.” Clearly, the term “illegitimate” refers to
both natural and spurious children.
The Court furthermore elucidated that though Eligio Pascual is, indeed, a
legitimate child, petitioners are illegitimate children of Eligio and thus cannot
represent their father Eligio in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of
the decedent Andres Pascual.
When the law is clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh
or onerous. Dura lex sed lex.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 107, G.R. NO. 127325
19 MARCH 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections a Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative Sen. Roco filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not initiatory
petition properly cognizable the COMELEC.
On December 18, 1996 petitioners Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition raising
an argument that R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s
initiative to amend the constitution was left to some future law.
On January 2, 1997, private respondents, through Atty. Quadra, filed their
comment on the petition arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law
implementing the power of people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
constitution. On that same day, private respondent Delfin also filed in his own
behalf a comment arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the law that governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution and the absence of subtitle for such
initiative is not fatal since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws. Also on that same day COMELEC filed a comment contending
that R.A. No. 6735 deals with people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Sec.
2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power
and its Sec. 3 includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
On January 17, 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitutsyon and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. filed a
motion for intervention arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in
itself to be called the enabling law that implements the people’s initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Art
XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. It further said that such
law cannot be used as a basis to implement the right of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
The majority of the Court adopted and strict and literal rather than a liberal
construction of the law, which is not in keeping with the maxim, interpretatio fienda
est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is
to be adopted, as well as the rule that provisions on initiative should be liberal
construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise
by voters of the rights granted thereby.
CASELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
35 SCRA 279, G.R. NO. 26754
16 OCTOBER 1970
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: The Court of Agrarian Relations ordered defendant Mateo Casela ejected
in a case against him by Exequiel Magsaysay. However, he refused to vacate and
the court issued two more writs.
Instead of obeying, Casela instituted a civil case asking the respondent to pay
him the value of his house, improvements and damages thereto. Against this,
Magsaysay filed for a writ of execution pending the final outcome of the civil case.
Casela filed a countermotion to declare defendant and the sheriff in contempt of
court. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Magsaysay and said that the issue
should have been brought before the Agrarian Court instead of the Court of First
Instance.
Magsaysay then filed a motion of an alias writ of execution to the Agrarian
Court but was denied holding that the first decision as to ejecting Casela was

beyond the five year reglamentary period. He moved for reconsideration which was
granted. Hence, this appeal by Casela.
ISSUES: Whether or not Magsaysay’s motion for execution of December 11, 1963
was filed beyond the five-year reglamentary period and thus prescribed.
RULING: From the date when the decision in question became final and executory
(December 17, 1956) until December 11, 1963 when Magsaysay’s motion for
execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months, and twenty-four days had
elapsed. From this period must be subtracted the time during which the writs of
execution could not be served due to reasons of acts or causes not of Magsaysay’s
own making or a period of three years, nine months and twenty five days.
Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty nine days can be charged
against the five year reglamentary period.
Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of
statutes. The courts are not hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the
statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule will
especially be applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in
absurdity and injustice.
ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
150 SCRA 259, G.R. NO. L-72873
28 MAY 1987
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in the name of their deceased parents under the Registry of Deeds
of Tarlac. On March 15, 1963, Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share by
way of absolute sale. On April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own
share to the same vendees.
Petitioners occupied two fifths of the said lot and subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with the Paduas’ consent, they built a semi-concrete
house on part of the enclosed area.
Mariano Padua sought to redeem the area but his case was dismissed. Tecla
Padua, another co-heir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption by her brother. The trial court dismissed the complaint saying that it
was dropped for not being filed within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963.
ISSUES: Whether or not the interpretation and application of Article 1088 is
invoked correctly.
RULING: It is a cardinal rule in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the law maker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice. Thus, we interpret the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice re inseparable and keep them so. For what is within the
spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which
is within the letter but a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
as within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of
the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
KING VS. HERNANDEZ
114 PHIL 731, G.R. NO. L-14859
31 MARCH 1962
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS: On January 1, 1957, Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became
the owner of the business establishment known as “Import Meat and Produce” a
grocery wholesale and retail business, previously owned by the Philippine Cold
Stores, Inc. In the business were 12 Filipinos and 3 Chinese, the latter being
employees of the old owner, Philippine Cold Stores, Inc.
Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he sought
permission from the President of the Philippines to retain the services of the three
Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, coursing
his letter through the Secretary of Commerce and Industry.
This official recommended the disapproval of King’s request on the ground
that aliens may not be appointed to operate or administer a retail business under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1180 which requires capital to be wholly owned by Filipino
citizens with the exception to the technical personnel which may be allowed by the
authorization from the President. The president approved the recommendation and
stated that purchasers and salesmen are not technical positions within the meaning
of Section 2-A of C.A. 108 as amended by R.A. No. 134.
It is contended by the petitioner that this provision does not prohibit
employment of aliens in non-control positions because they do not, as such,
intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of the retail
establishment.
ISSUES: Whether or not a Chinese may be employed in a non-control position in a
retail establishment, a wholly nationalized business under R.A. No. 1180, otherwise
known as the Retail Trade law.
RULING: In rejecting the petitioner’s argument, the Supreme Court ruled that
“when the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to
the management, operation, administration and control whether as an officer,
employee, or laborer therein, it only means one thing: the employment of a person

who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control position.
The reason is obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that an
unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can
deny that while one may be employed in a non-control position who apparently is
harmless he may turn out to be a mere tool to further the evil designs of the
employer. It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that would stave
off any attempt at circumvention of the legislative purpose.”
U.S. VS. TORIBIO
15 PHIL 85, G.R. NO. 5060
25 JANUARY 1910
CARSON, J.
FACTS: The appellant was charged for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption, carabaos without a permit from the municipal treasurer
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of Section 30 and 33 of
Act No. 1147.
It appears that in the town where the animal was slaughtered, there is no
municipal slaughterhouse and appellant thus contends that under such
circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 cannot apply.
ISSUES: Whether or not the slaughter of large cattle outside of the municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited under
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 which provides that “no large cattle shall be
slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit
secured from the municipal treasurer” and “any person slaughtering or causing to
be slaughtered for human consumption any large cattle except upon permit secured
from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished x x x.”
RULING: The Court said that the language of these sections fairly admits of two
constructions: one whereby the phrase, “at the municipal slaughterhouse” may be
taken as limiting and restricting both the word “slaughtered” and the words “killed
for food” in section 30, and the words “slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered
for human consumption” and the words “killing for food” in section 33; and the
other whereby the phrase “at the municipal slaughterhouse” may be taken as
limiting and restricting merely the words “killed for food” and “killing for food”
The Court ruled that considering the whole act and keeping in mind the
manifest purpose and object of the enactment—to protect large cattle against theft
and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost,
strayed or stolen—the latter construction should be adopted. It concluded that to
adopt the first interpretation would abort the provisions for registry and record of
brands and marks of identification of large cattle, since thieves in possession of
such cattle could evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside the
municipal slaughterhouse and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing. Such
construction should be avoided which would bring such result and defeat the
object of the law.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the
statute was enacted. Literal import must yield to intent.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA
200 SCRA 81, G.R. NO. 93177
2 AUGUST 1991
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: Petitioners are officers of the AFP facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. Charges against them are in violation of the
Articles of War: mutiny, conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman,
various crimes and Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder. Petitioner
challenged the proceedings on various grounds through a motion for summary
dismissal but was denied by the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. The Petitioners then
manifested their right to raise peremptory challenges and invoked Art. 18 of CA
No. 408. However, the Court Martial ruled that C.A. No. 408 was already
terminated due to P.D. No. 39
ISSUES: Whether P.D. No. 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge
members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by Proclamation No.
2045 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law.
RULING: In answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled, applying the principle of
cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, that with the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of
P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC. VS. CTA
100 PHIL 851, G.R. NO. L-9274
1 FEBRUARY 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: Lopez and Sons imported hexagonal wire from Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties in the importation
on the basis of consular and supplier invoice. The collector, however, reassessed
the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result,
additional customs duties were levied upon petitioners.

They appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but such was dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125.
Said law, creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides in Section 7 thereof that
the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal “decisions of the commission or customs x x x.” However, Section 11 of
said law states that persons “adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the x x x
collector of customs x x x may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within
thirty days after receipt of such decision or ruling.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
owing to the discrepancy in Sections 7 and 11 of R.A. No. 1125.
RULING: There is a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11. Taken literally, Section
7 would be empty, meaningless and unenforceable because, while it grants the
Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of
customs, under Section 11, no person affected by the commissioner of customs
may appeal to the tax court.
The Court changed the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of
customs” to correct an obvious mistake in the law. It is more reasonable and logical
to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the legislature meant and intended to say,
commissioner of customs, instead of collector of customs in the first paragraph of
said Section.
It further said that “the Courts are not indulging in judicial legislation. They are
merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clerical error in the wording of a statute
in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.
PEOPLE VS. YU HAI
99 PHIL 725, G.R. NO. L-9598
15 AUGUST 1956
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Respondent Yu Hai was accused of violating Article 195 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code for having allegedly permitted the game of Panching or Paikiu, a game
of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused moved to quash on
the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or
liability had already been extinguished.
On December 24, 1954, the court sustained respondent’s motion to quash on
the theory that the offense charged was a light offense under Article 90 of the RPC
which prescribes in two months. However, it is argued by the petitioner that the
crime prescribes in ten years because the crime may be punished by a maximum
fine of 200 peso, which is correctional under Art. 26 and therefore prescribes in ten
years in accordance with Art. 90. The provincial appealed to the CFI of Caloocan
which order the dismissal of the information.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: When does a crime punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos prescribe?
RULING: Article 90 provides that crimes “punishable by a correctional penalty shall
prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor; which
shall prescribe in five years;” libel prescribes in one year; and light offenses
prescribe in two months.” Article 9 defines light offenses as those “for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos
or both is provided.” Fine, on the other hand, is classified under Art. 26 into
afflictive, correctional and light; and a fine not exceeding 6,000 pesos but not less
than 200 pesos is correctional; light if it be less than 200 pesos.
In rejecting such argument, the Court said: “Article 90 could not have intended
that light offenses as defined by Art. 9 would have two prescriptive periods—two
months if they are penalized by arresto menor and/or a fine of less than P200. The
difference of only one peso in the imposable fine would mean the difference of
nine years and ten months in the prescriptive period of the offense. And what is
worse, the proper prescriptive period could not be ascertained until and unless the
court decided which of the alternative penalties should be imposed, which the
court could not properly do if the offense had prescribed, for then it could no
longer be prosecuted.
These absurd results the lawmaker could not have wittingly intended especially
since more serious offenses as those punishable by arresto mayor prescribe also under
Article 90 in five years while other “less grave” offenses like libel and oral
defamation and slander prescribe in even shorter periods of time: one year and six
months, respectively.
AMATAN VS. AUJERO
248 SCRA 511, A.M. NO. RTJ-93-956
27 SEPTEMBER 1995
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: A criminal complaint for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
was filed against Rodrigo Umpad for shooting Genaro Tagsip, causing the latter’s
death. The crime of homicide was filed by the provincial fiscal after preliminary
investigation. Upon arraignment, the offended party and the public prosecutor
entered into a plea bargain agreement with the approval of the judge and thus the
information was amended to attempted homicide to which the accused pleaded
guilty thereto. The agreement was entered into and approved by the judge pursuant

to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser felony.
The deceased’s brother-in-law, herein complainant, wrote a letter-complaint to
the Chief Justice for respondent judge Aujero’s gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law. In reply, Aujero based his reliance on the aforementioned rule
and that the plea bargain was pursuant to that rule and with the consent of the
deceased’s wife.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law because of his interpretation of Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
RULING: In holding the judge administratively liable for gross ignorance, the Court
ruled that “the fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad
was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled
with the plea of guilty to the lesser offence of attempted homicide. The crime of
homicide necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.”
It further went on to say that where literal application of a provision of law
would lead to injustice for to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of
logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code
admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt
the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia, ruat coelum.
PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA
86 SCRA 542, G.R. NO. L-42050-66
20 NOVEMBER 1978
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J.
FACTS: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or “illegal
possession of a deadly weapon,” specifically carrying outside one’s residence any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for
livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be carrying
such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a
deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above in
order that the accused be convicted.
RULING: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit
and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as
an indispensable element of the crim.
Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity in the scope of the law, tis
preamble may be referred to in order to determine legislative intent
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
278 SCRA 27, G.R. NO. 94723
21 AUGUST 1997
TORRES, JR., J.
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, American tourist, lured and detained petitioner Karen
Salvacion and was able to rape the latter several times. Bartelli was eventually
arrested and criminal cases for serious illegal detention and four counts of rape
were filed against him. A civil case for damages with preliminary attachments were
also filed.
On the day for Bartelli’s petition for bail hearing, the latter escaped from jail.
Hence, the criminal cases were archived but the civil proceedings continued and
later granted moral and exemplary damages to the petitioner through a writ of
attachment on Bartelli’s dollar deposits.
The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused to honor the writ of
attachment, invoking Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426, as amended, which provides in part
that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign
tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latter’s
12-year-old rape victim.
RULING: In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the peculiar
circumstances obtaining make the law not applicable to the case of the 12-year old
rape victim and that the banks should comply with the writ of execution and
release the dollar deposit in favor of the victim, the Court applied the principles of
right and justice to prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute.
The questioned law would, therefore, make the favorable judgment futile. The
intention of the questioned law may have been good when it was enacted which is a
time when the economy was in shambles. However, the law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before
us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Ninguno
non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. When the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience.

DEMAFILES VS. COMELEC
21 SCRA 1463, G.R. NO. L-28396
29 DECEMBER 1967
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: The new municipality of Sebaste held its first election of officers with the
petitioners Agripino Demafiles and respondent Benito Galida vying for the
mayoralty. Galide questioned the provincial board to disregard, as “obviously
manufactured,” the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that said return
shows that 195 voters were registered, 188 voted, when according to a certificate of
the municipal election registrar, only 182 had registered.
Galido won over Demafiles and was proclaimed mayor-elect. Demafiles
protested to the COMELEC on the board’s rejection of the election returns from
precinct 7, the subsequent proclamation of Galide, and challenging the right of two
board members who were reelectionists. The COMELEC annulled the canvas and
proclamation. Upon the motion of Galido, the COMELEC reconsidered its
previous decision and held that the canvas and proclamation made stands.
ISSUES: Whether or not a pre-proclamation election case has become moot
because the proclaimed winner had immediately taken his oath pursuant to Section
2 of R.A. No. 4870 which provides that the “first mayor, vice-mayor and
councillors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general
elections for local officials and shall have qualified.”
RULING: The court, rejecting the argument, ruled: “In our view, the last portion of
the provision—‘and shall have qualified’—is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated
jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent’s reading that the
term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after
their proclamation.
It is quite probable that this is what the legislature meant. Here is a clear case of
a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids
the court from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.
The term of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following
their election, and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way
affected the basic issues in this case.
CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
206 SCRA 65, G.R. NO. 88979
7 FEBRUARY 1992
PADILLA, J.
FACTS: R.A. No. 6683 provides benefits to government employees for early
retirement and voluntary separation from government service as well as involuntary
and separation pay due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua as an employee of
the National Irrigation Authority for fifteen years with a status of “co-terminus”.
The petitioner believing that she is qualified of availing the benefits of the program,
filed an application with the respondent NIA which, however, denied the same and
instead offered separation benefits equivalent to one-half month pay for every year
of service commencing from 1980.
Recourse by the petitioner to the CSC stating that she is qualified for the
benefits of the program was again denied because her status as “co-terminus”
employee is excluded in the coverage of R.A. No. 6683, which only covers regulars,
temporary, emergency, and casual employees with the further requisite of at least
two years of consecutive service.
ISSUES: Whether or not a coterminous employee, or one whose appointment is co-
existent with the duration of a government project, who has been employed as
such for more than two years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Section
2 of Republic Act No. 6683, which provides in part that the “benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.”
RULING: Answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled that a coterminous
employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary
implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of government employees
entitled to benefits of the law necessarily implies that the former should also be
entitled to such benefits.

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