Rand rr2539

C O R P O R A T I O N
BEN CONNABLE, STEPHANIE YOUNG, STEPHANIE PEZARD, ANDREW RADIN, RAPHAEL S. COHEN,
KATYA MIGACHEVA, JAMES SLADDEN
Russia’s Hostile
Measures
Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against
NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of
Competition

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iii
Preface
Russia challenges the security and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and many of its member states. Russia’s conventional capabilities pose a serious threat, and it
has historically succeeded to one extent or another in sowing disorder, weakening democratic
institutions, and undermining NATO cohesion. However, it also has a long track record of
strategic shortfalls and even some ineptitude. NATO will benefit from exploring opportunities
to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile behavior in the so-called gray zone short of war,
where daily adversarial competition occurs, as the behavior that Russia exhibits in the gray
zone will no doubt extend to high-order war.
Effectively deterring, preventing, and countering Russian hostile behavior demands clear
analysis: Why and precisely how have Russian leaders applied hostile measures—for example,
economic embargoes, limited military incursions, cyberattacks, information campaigns, and
assassinations—in an apparent effort to undermine alliance security and stability?
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the project “Russia,
European Security, and ‘Measures Short of War,’” sponsored by the U.S. Army Deputy Chief
of Staff, G-3/5/7. The purpose of the project was to provide recommendations to inform the
options that the Army presents to the National Command Authorities to leverage, improve
upon, and develop new capabilities and address the threat of Russian aggression in the form of
measures short of war.
This report is accompanied by two online appendixes, available for download at
www.rand.org/t/RR2539. Appendix A, “An Evolutionary History of Russia’s Hostile Mea-
sures,” presents a detailed history of hostile measures and operations from the creation of the
Soviet Union in 1917 through the end of the Cold War. Appendix B, “Detailed Case Studies
of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures,” presents complete case studies of the measures that Russia
employed in Moldova, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Turkey during specific crises in those
countries in the post–Cold War era.
Research for this study began in 2015 and was completed in 2016. Additional research
and analysis were conducted between late 2017 and early 2019 to bring the findings and rec-
ommendations up to date with contemporaneous events. The report was under U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) security review from January to August 2019. Russian behavior and
the evolution of the European security environment between early January 2019 and the pub-
lication of this report served to reinforce the validity of the findings and recommendations
presented here.
This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and
Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally
funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.

iv Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
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v
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures and Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
CHAPTER ONE
Russian Hostile Measures in Every Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Hostile Measures in the Gray Zone and During High-Order War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ongoing Debate: Defining and Bounding the Hybrid Un-War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Approach and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Organization of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHAPTER TWO
The Evolution and Limits of Russian Hostile Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Institutionalization and Nature of Russian Hostile Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CHAPTER THREE
Gray Zone Cases and Actions During High-Order War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A Note on How We Rated the Five Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Russia’s Hostile Measures in the Gray Zone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Overview of Five Case Studies of Russian Use of Gray Zone Hostile Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Rating Russia in the Gray Zone: Tactical Success but Strategic Failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Assault by All Means Available: Hostile Measures During High-Order War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Cyber Capabilities: A Dangerous Exception to Russian Tactical Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CHAPTER FOUR
Deterring, Preventing, and Countering Hostile Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Ongoing Debate Over Deterrence and Forward-Positioned Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Using Military Forces to Deter, Prevent, and Counter Hostile Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Conclusion: Sometimes a Bear Is Just a Bear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

vi Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
APPENDIXES
A. An Evolutionary History of Russia’s Hostile Measures
B. Detailed Case Studies of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures
To access the accompanying appendixes, please visit www.rand.org/t/RR2539.

vii
Figures and Tables
Figures
S.1. Hostile Measures Across the Spectrum of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
S.2. NATO Expansion and Influence Near Russia’s Borders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
S.3. Timeline of Russian Hostile Measures in Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
S.4. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
1.1. Hostile Measures Across the Spectrum of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Map of Case Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2. Moldova Case Timeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3. Georgia Case Timeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4. Estonia Case Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5. Ukraine Case Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6. Turkey Case Timeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7. Typical Soviet Partisan Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Tables
S.1. Examples of Soviet Hostile Measures During the Cold War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
S.2. Summary of Russian Performance Across Five Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii
2.1. Examples of Foreign Encroachments into Russian Territory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Examples of Internal Revolts Against the Russian State and Its Vassals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Examples of Soviet Hostile Measures During the Cold War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2. Assessment of Russian Performance in the Moldova Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3. Assessment of Russian Performance in the Georgia Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4. Assessment of Russian Performance in the Estonia Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5. Assessment of Russian Performance in the Ukraine Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6. Assessment of Russian Performance in the Turkey Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.7. Summary of Russian Performance Across the Five Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8. Cumulative Selected Measures Across the Spectrum of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1. Example Conventional Force Enablers Against Hostile Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

ix
Summary
Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental,
economic, and diplomatic decisions [and] to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion. . . .
—Summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy, 20181
Russia threatens the security and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and, bilaterally, many of its individual member states. However, as of early 2019, the nature
and extent of the Russian threat was still being debated. We argue that the current consensus
on the complex Russian threat is simultaneously understated and overblown. Russia is dan-
gerous. It sows disorder, weakens democratic institutions, and undermines NATO cohesion.
In some ways, its full conventional threat is perhaps even more dangerous than currently por-
trayed. However, Russia has a long track record of strategic shortfalls and even some ineptitude
in its long game; it is neither infallible nor omnipotent. NATO can effectively deter, prevent,
and counter Russian hostile behavior in the gray zone—along what the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) calls the contact layer, where daily adversarial competition occurs—and during
direct, state-on-state, high-order conventional or nuclear war: in the blunt and surge layers.
Effectively deterring, preventing, and countering Russian hostile behavior against the
NATO alliance demands clear analysis: Why and precisely how have Russian leaders applied
what we refer to broadly as hostile measures—for example, economic embargoes, limited military
incursions, cyberattacks, information campaigns, and assassinations—in an apparent effort to
undermine alliance security and stability? This report builds on existing expert analyses
to help NATO find the best ways to use both its special and conventional military forces to
push back against this behavior.
All of the many thousands of hostile and often costly interactions between Western and
Soviet states or Russia since the 1917 revolution have taken place in the so-called gray zone
short of war. This long-standing reality makes the gray zone a continuous challenge and an
enduring threat to alliance cohesion and stability. And the behavior Russia exhibits in the gray
zone will extend into high-order war. This threat, too, must be evaluated and considered.
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Washington,
D.C., 2018, p. 1.

x Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
Approach and Purpose
This report draws on primary and secondary sources of historical analysis, recent case studies,
and the existing work of many top experts at the RAND Corporation and in the broader ana-
lytic community. Based on analyses of these sources, it proposes a more holistic and, arguably,
more precisely representative conceptualization of the Russian threat. It recommends a com-
plementary NATO military posture that is better able to address the broadest scope and scale
of Russian hostility. (As of early 2019, the alliance was already enacting many useful policies.)
At the same time, it is our intent to put the existing threat in less daunting context: Russian
behavior is fairly consistent and manageable when considered historically.
Our report has three purposes: (1) describe the evolution, institutionalization, and limits of
Russian hostile measures; (2) recharacterize Russian hostile measures, including their use in high-
order war; and (3) recommend ways for NATO to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile
measures in the gray zone and during high-order war (in the contact, blunt, and surge layers).
Reconceptualizing “Measures Short of War” as Hostile Measures
American Kremlinologist George F. Kennan called actions like sabotage, disinformation, and
political destabilization measures short of war (MSW). Kennan’s term was groundbreaking at
the time. But 70 years of intervening experience and analyses suggest that revision is needed.
Kennan did argue for considering MSW during war, but the very term of art he employs
includes the fixed phrase short of war. Whether or not he intended the concept to apply during
high-order war, his selected term is self-defining and ultimately unhelpful and impractical. We
argue that it reinforces the mistaken idea that these measures are employed only in the gray
zone and that they are a thing apart from high-order conventional or nuclear war.
Hostile measures—a term that folds in the more specific category of clandestine or covert
active measures—applies more accurately to the behavior Kennan sought to circumscribe.2 We
use Kennan’s term measure and the broad, generic term hostile to avoid introducing yet another
acronym or catchphrase to the debate over the character of war. Our intent is to be accurate
without claiming new theoretical ground: As many astute observers of the gray zone have
argued, this is nothing new. Building from the stable baseline set by Kennan, we define hostile
measures as follows:
State activities other than high-order conventional or nuclear attack applied against other
states at any time, and in any context, with the hostile intent of gaining advantage and
reducing that state’s capabilities, stability, or advantages.
Figure S.1 depicts the applied range of hostile measures, presenting a contrast to the
artificially bounded understanding of the gray zone. It shows conceptual phasing from left to
right: The gray zone precedes conventional war, which, in turn, precedes nuclear war. Hostile
measures typically associated with the gray zone are available to states across the full spectrum
of conflict.
2 Some might argue that active measures—or the Russian counterpart, transliterated as aktivnye meropriyatiya—is suf-
ficient. Our research shows that active measures are more narrowly applied to clandestine or covert intelligence operations
and would not include limited military operations or other relevant actions.

Summary xi
Russia’s Gray Zone Threat
The gray zone is not a specific defense and military challenge with well-defined parameters
and boundaries. Instead, it is clear recognition of a universe of challenges lying in what
amounts to a conceptual dead space in strategy development and strategic planning. This
dead space exists from the highest levels of the U.S. national security community to deep
into the Pentagon’s strategy and planning process.
— Nathan P. Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, 20163
Hostile exchanges in the gray zone between NATO member states and Russia have been
dangerous, intensely damaging, and, in some cases, extremely costly. They include overt acts
of diplomatic aggression; global intelligence operations, such as Soviet penetrations of NATO
intelligence agencies; destabilizing Cold War proxy conflicts across Africa, Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, and the Middle East; assassinations; economic sabotage; political subversion; disinforma-
tion; and limited use of direct military intervention, including Soviet support for both the
North Korean and North Vietnamese forces fighting against the U.S. military in the 1950s,
1960s, and early 1970s.4
Table S.1 presents a sample of hostile measures that the Soviets employed during the Cold
War, including as part of high-order conflict. While these are singular examples, the Soviets
combined multiple measures in sequence or parallel in almost every case.
All these activities received attention during the Cold War when Russian power was at
its zenith. But Western policy interest in Russia declined steadily after the end of the Soviet
Union in 1991 and through the late 2000s. Experts on Russia filtered out of Western intel-
ligence agencies and diplomatic services and became scarce in both academia and nongovern-
3 Nathan P. Freier, Charles R. Burnett, William J. Cain, Jr., Christopher D. Compton, Sean M. Hankard, Robert S. Hume,
Gary R. Kramlich II, J. Matthew Lissner, Tobin A. Magsig, Daniel E. Mouton, Michael S. Muztafago, James M. Schul-
tze, John F. Troxell, and Dennis G. Wille, Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College Press, 2016, p. 74.
4 More recently, the U.S. intelligence community found that Russia applied hostile measures to influence the U.S. federal
elections in 2016. See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
US Elections, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2017.
Figure S.1
Hostile Measures Across the Spectrum of Conflict
Hostile measures
(Applied across the full spectrum of conflict)
MSW
Gray zone
Hostile measures applied to gain
advantage short of war or to
improve the chances of winning a
prospective conventional war
Conventional war
During high-order fighting, states
apply hostile measures as enablers
to improve friendly or degrade
enemy combat effectiveness
Nuclear war
States employ hostile measures to
help deescalate nuclear war or
weaken hostile capability—last-
ditch efforts to survive and win

xii Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
mental policy circles. As U.S. interest in Russia waned, Russian international activity increased
steadily under Vladimir Putin in his roles, variously, as prime minister and president. NATO
concerns about Russia did not peak again until the annexation of Crimea.
In early 2014, Russia used disguised special operations units, disinformation tactics, and
local proxy forces to seize the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. This action shocked the
Western policy community and galvanized experts to analyze and define the gray zone. A
quick surge of literature on gray zone activity and on the still loosely defined concept of hybrid
warfare followed. Just a few years after this short-of-war calamity, the threat of high-order war
recaptured the strategic discourse in the U.S. national security community. Since 2014, policy
interest in Russian hostile measures in Eastern Europe has been overtaken by a renewed focus
on conventional war in Europe and Asia. As a consequence, the gap in knowledge and threat
appreciation that existed between 1991 and 2014 may be gradually reemerging.
Addressing the Reemerging Gap
Few opportunities remain to sharpen the detailed descriptions of Russian actions in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine. With some notable exceptions, there has been little effort to put into
useful context the rationale, patterns, and limits of recent Russian hostile measures. Policy-
makers struggling to deter, prevent, or counter Russian actions in Europe (and elsewhere)
would benefit from a deeper understanding of the historical-cultural context for Russian
actions. When viewed on a longer timeline, the motives and decisions of Russian leaders and
government institutions appear more logical, less grandiose, and, perhaps, even more vulner-
able to deterrence and countermeasures than they do in the narrow spotlight of recent events.
Accordingly, this report summarizes the history of ideas, institutions, and practices that
have shaped Russia’s use of hostile measures, with an emphasis on Europe—specifically, East-
ern Europe. It describes the evolved institutionalization of Russia’s approach to hostile mea-
Table S.1
Examples of Soviet Hostile Measures During the Cold War
Measure Example
Assassination 1959: A Soviet intelligence officer assassinates Ukrainian dissident Stepan Bandera
Destabilization ~1981–1983: Cuba trains Central and South American insurgents at the Soviet Union’s behest
Disinformation 1959–1986: National Voice of Iran broadcasts Soviet propaganda into Iran
1983–1988: Operation Infektion, in which the Soviets use East Germans to blame the United
States for AIDS
1986: The Soviets spread rumors about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) efforts to sabotage the
summit of leaders of Non-Aligned Movement member countries in Harare, Zimbabwe
Proxy war ~1954–1975: Soviet Union provides direct military and intelligence support to North Vietnam
1975–1991: Soviet Union directs and supports Cuban intervention in Angola, seizes control by
proxy
Sabotage 1949: The Soviets create panic in Yugoslavia by launching sabotage operations from Bulgaria
SOURCES: Various CIA documents and scholarly literature on Cold War–era Soviet activities. See Chapter Three
for a complete accounting of sources.

Summary xiii
sures and how capabilities to apply those measures have solidified over time. It also presents
findings from a process-tracing analysis of Russian operations in Moldova, Georgia, Estonia,
Ukraine, and Turkey.
The Nature of Russian Hostile Measures
Russian Leaders’ Use of Hostile Measures Is Spurred in Large Part by Existential Worry
Our historical analysis and interpretation of the literature suggest that Russia’s evolving use of
hostile measures is rooted in existential worries of the pre-Soviet and Soviet state. Russia has
always perceived itself as a nation under threat from its neighbors and from global interlop-
ers; in many cases, this belief was justified. Internal state deception, distrust, and infighting
throughout the Soviet period exacerbated individual and collective perceptions of looming
instability and destruction.
Consequently, Russian leaders are motivated by at least three general, overarching wor-
ries: (1) Western encroachment, (2) disruption to the stability of allied governments, and
(3) internal revolt. Whether or not it is true, Russian leaders believe that Western leaders prom-
ised to halt NATO’s eastern expansion during negotiations in 1990.5 Therefore, the alliance’s
eastward expansion toward Russia’s border represents both a broken promise and an inherent
threat.
The map of NATO members, aspiring members, and partners in Figure S.2 paints
a clear picture of a Russian state that regional foreign and security policy expert Sherman
Garnett described as “a wedged bear in a great tightness.”6 Member states are fully integrated
into the alliance. Membership Action Plan countries are formally on track for membership,
while aspiring member countries are working toward that status but less formally. Other coun-
tries support the alliance through the Partnership for Peace program, contribute troops to
alliance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, or engage directly with NATO through the
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme.
Thirteen countries in Eastern Europe have joined NATO, and four more have sought
accession since Putin assumed the presidency of Russia in 2000. Three current members, two
aspiring members, and five countries that formally partner with NATO abut Russia’s border
from Norway to Mongolia. Every country in Europe, with the exceptions of Kosovo and
Cyprus, are alliance members, are pursuing membership, or have (or recently had) a formal
partnership agreement with NATO. Alliance influence in Central Asia extends its reach almost
from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. From Russia’s perspective, the alliance has it effectively
surrounded and is closing in.
We note that worry is not the only factor that drives Russian behavior. Russia is a large,
complex state with many security, economic, and diplomatic interests. But worry appears to be
the primary motivator behind its use of hostile measures in Eastern Europe. Russian leaders
see a need to counter what they perceive as existential external and internal threats, so their
use of such measures is logical in the context of NATO expansion and partnership activity.
This suggests a major consideration for the alliance’s efforts to deter, prevent, and counter Rus-
5 Uwe Klußman, Mathias Schepp, and Klaus Wiegerefe, “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Did the West Break Its Promise
to Moscow?” Spiegel Online, November 26, 2009.
6 See Sherman Garnett, “Russia’s Illusory Ambitions,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, March–April 1997.

xiv Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
sian aggression: Firm commitment should be tempered by clear defensive intent. NATO has
already taken the lead in extending some genuine confidence-building measures designed to
assuage Russian worries, with decidedly mixed success.
Russia’s Hostile-Measures Operations Can Be Forecast Successfully
Our case analysis and limited process tracing showed that we cannot yet predict which tactical
measures Russia will employ in any prospective hostile-measures operation. But we can forecast
Russia’s broad approach and some patterns of operation. Logical, reactive patterns of behavior
motivated by well-known triggers lend themselves to forecasting. Russia applies hostile mea-
sures in two ways:
• opportunistically: constant pursuit of advantage through the use of hostile measures
• reactively: using hostile measures as a short- and long-term reaction to a perceived threat.
Given Russia’s clearly identified national security concerns—Western encroachment, dis-
ruption to the stability of allied governments, and internal revolt—coupled with its predilec-
tion to warn before acting, NATO should be able to successfully forecast Russia’s broad opera-
tional approach to applying hostile measures.7 Russia takes opportunistic advantage where
7 There are cases that do not fit the general approach. For example, Russia’s motives for disrupting the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election are difficult to place within the typical reactive pattern of post-Soviet Russian behavior. Setting aside the
exceptions, Russia generally applies hostile measures as part of a predictable strategic defensive approach.
Figure S.2
NATO Expansion and Influence Near Russia’s Borders
SOURCE: NATO, “NATO on the Map,” webpage, undated.
NOTE: Russia is shaded red, including the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Sea along the
northern Polish and southwestern Lithuanian borders. Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in 2014, but the Ukrainian
government deemed this annexation illegal. Thus, we include Crimea as part of Ukraine. Kosovo is not affiliated
with NATO but could be described as a NATO protectorate.
Member (joined pre-2000)
Member (joined post-2000)
Membership Action Plan
Aspirant country
Partnership for Peace or
Individual Partnership and
Cooperation Programme
No NATO affiliation

Summary xv
deterrence and prevention are weak. Thus, forecasting can assume that if a nation poses a secu-
rity threat in one or more of those three ways, and if it fails to deter or prevent Russian hostile
measures, then Russia is likely to use hostile measures aggressively against that state.
Reactive application is sometimes a long-term, generally tactical behavior designed to
spoil a threat and punish a perceived offender. Russia has applied hostile measures reactively,
and in some cases it still does, in the cases we examined. Its goal in doing so is to destabilize
countries or to signal displeasure over behavior it views as inimical to Russian interests. Rus-
sian leaders will emphasize economic and political measures over military measures whenever
possible, however. Longer campaigns that give the appearance of over-the-horizon strategy fall
into similar patterns. For example, the decades-long effort to disrupt Moldova appears to be
an extended version of the shorter-term campaign in Georgia: Both operations were designed
to prevent Western encroachment, support allied governments or pseudo-states (in this case
Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia), punish the offending governments, and instill fear
in their leaders to prevent future offenses.
Patterns in Russian Hostile-Measures Behavior and Case Study Example
While Russia is adept at masking its tactical actions as they unfold, historical analysis reveals
some consistencies in its contemporary approach. We drew these findings from our limited
sample of five cases, our historical analysis, and our broader analysis of Russian behavior, cited
throughout this report:
1. Russia consistently reacts with hostile measures when it perceives threats.
2. Both opportunism and reactionism drive Russian behavior.
3. Russian leaders issue a public warning before employing reactive hostile measures.
4. Short- and long-term measures are applied in mutually supporting combination.
5. Diplomatic, information, military, and economic means are used collectively.
6. Russia emphasizes information, economic, and diplomatic measures, in that order.
7. All arms of the government are used to apply hostile measures, often in concert.
Figure S.3 offers one example from our research. It shows the timeline of events
in the Georgia case, beginning with the Rose Revolution at the end of 2003 and ending with
the election of a new Georgian president in October 2013. Key events are presented above the
timeline, while Russian hostile measures are presented below the timeline. Enduring measures,
such as Russia’s ban on Georgian agricultural imports, are presented with an inverted “L”
shaped timeline marker from left to right and color-coded by category.
Cyber as a Caveat and Cautionary Note
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian conventional threat—while still dangerous—
waned considerably. However, internet dependence has opened NATO vulnerabilities to cyber-
attack. Whereas Russian hostile measures have only a limited effect on individual European
countries, cyber operations extend Russia’s reach into Western Europe and the United States.
Russia’s ability to affect elections and shut down or manipulate power grids, financial net-
works, and other critical infrastructure presents a critical threat to NATO security. This threat
is consistent from the gray zone through high-order war. Russia’s cyber capabilities are danger-

xviRussia’sHostileMeasures:CombatingRussianGrayZoneAggressionAgainstNATO
Figure S.3
Timeline of Russian Hostile Measures in Georgia
2003 2013201220112010200920082007200620052004 2014
EventsHostilemeasures
Rose Revolution;
Shevardnadze
ousted
Saakashvili begins
first term as
president
Georgia accuses Russia of
supporting separatist
movements
Georgian parliament demands
that Russian peacekeepers
withdraw from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia
“Spying row”
Putin warns U.S. President George W. Bush that supporting
Ukraine and Georgia’s bids for NATO membership would
cross Russia’s red line
Georgia requests inclusion in Membership Action Plan at
NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania
Shootdown of drone over Abkhazia; Georgia blames
Russia, which denies involvement
UN investigation concludes that drone was shot
down by a Russian fighter jet
Russo-Georgian War
Margvelashvili
elected president
of Georgia
Russia bans Georgian agricultural imports
Sharp increase in prices of imported Russian gas
Destruction of gas and electricity lines from Russia to Georgia
Russia bans imports of Georgian wine, wine products, brandy, and champagne
Russia bans imports of Georgian mineral water
Russia recalls its ambassador to Georgia
Russia suspends air, rail, road, sea, and postal links with Georgia
Russia establishes visa restrictions on Georgians
Russia deports Georgians accused of “immigration offenses”
Sharp increase in price of imported Russian gas
Russia sends troops to Abkhazia
Russia conducts military exercises on Georgian border
Cyberattacks
Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Cyber Diplomacy Economic Energy Military

Summary xvii
ous and not well understood, something that should be taken into account when interpreting
the general findings presented here. Their inherent danger highlights the need for sustained,
full-spectrum threat analysis.
Russian Performance and NATO Action
Russia has long-standing expertise in the use of hostile measures. However, its success in apply-
ing these measures has been uneven, and its capabilities have been somewhat overstated. Russia
applies hostile measures expertly but generally not in a way that helps it sustain a favorable
status quo in Europe. Our historical analysis and case studies suggest that Russia is tactically
competent but strategically shortsighted (or at least insufficient to thwart NATO). The Soviet
Union’s many local, short-term successes in the gray zone did not generate dominant global
communism or prevent the collapse of the Soviet state. NATO has more than doubled in size
since 1949, progressing ever eastward toward Russia’s border. Expansion may have triggered
the most recent spate of Russian aggression, but these specific cases of aggression were mostly
reactive, tactical, local, and, in some cases, counterproductive.
Table S.2 summarizes our assessment of Russia’s success rate in each of five selected
cases at both the tactical and strategic levels of effort: Moldova, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine,
and Turkey. Tactics are actions designed to achieve strategic goals. Tactical success can be
impressive and intimidating in the short term, but, in the absence of strategic progress, it can
be wasted or even counterproductive. Threshold design is drawn from the collective RAND
literature on assessment, examples of which are cited in Chapter Three of this report.
In the five cases, we assessed Russian tactical and strategic success as follows:
• Tactical: Did Russian hostile measures achieve a desired effect? Did they slow, stop, or
punish a perceived hostile action or gain Russia an immediate tactical advantage in the
target area?
• Strategic: Did the entirety of Russia’s hostile measures—its collective tactics—clearly
generate a favorable, long-term strategic change? In these cases, was long-term Western
influence stopped or rolled back, and did long-term Russian influence increase?
We determined that Russia achieved tactical success in three out of the five cases but that
it had no definitive strategic success: In every case, it failed to prevent former Soviet states or
clients from moving ever closer to the West. It sometimes delayed but did not stop progress
toward NATO accession. In three cases, Russia’s strategic success backfired: The victims of
its hostile measures accelerated their westward shifts in response to Russia’s behavior, NATO
increased its direct support for each state, and NATO and (in some cases) the European Union
reactively made firmer mutual commitments to support the defense and development of the
affected states.
Russia’s genuine tactical acumen should not be confused for either tactical omnipotence
or strategic brilliance. Russia is not invincible, and its leaders are not irrational or impervious to
deterrence. Western states can deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile measures by taking on
strong, thoughtful political positions and force dispositions. Steps to deter, prevent, and counter
Russian actions should be taken simultaneously and in concert to achieve both a combinatory
and sequential effect. NATO should first seek to deter Russian hostile measures. If deterrence

xviii Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
fails, it should seek to prevent Russia from applying hostile measures. If Russia succeeds in
applying hostile measures, NATO should find ways to counter their efficacy. For the military
component of the NATO alliance, the tools for deterrence, prevention, and countering are
generally the same: Forward military presence reinforced with an array of enabling capabilities.
Russia’s influence can be largely limited to its near abroad, or the areas directly along
its borders in former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. Even there, in countries like Estonia and
Poland, Russia’s capacity to infringe on NATO interests can be diminished with thought-
ful, measured, firm, and consistent action. Success against Russian hostile measures depends
on continuing and, if possible, enhancing the alliance’s newfound commitment to its eastern
flank.
Using a Forward Military Posture to Address Russia’s Hostile Measures
U.S. ground forces are the linchpins in the DoD’s gray zone response. All U.S. ground
forces can tangibly contribute to contesting gray zone competition with forward-deployed
forces and surge expeditionary capability. . . . Army forces are essential future gray zone
contenders.
— Nathan P. Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, 20168
The Global Operating Model describes how the Joint Force will be postured and employed.
. . . It comprises four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland. These are, respectively,
designed to help us compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict; delay,
degrade, or deny adversary aggression; surge war-winning forces and manage conflict esca-
lation; and defend the U.S. homeland.
— Summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy, 20189
This 2016 recommendation from the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute and DoD’s
call for the establishment of a contact layer of forward forces designed to compete and win in
the gray zone with countries like China and Russia also apply to NATO’s competition with
Russia in Europe. Forward posture is the key to deterring, preventing, or countering Russian
hostile measures. Our research recommends focusing on a conventional military deterrence
posture as a baseline for a NATO counter–hostile measures strategy. This conclusion was
strongly reinforced by recommendations from experts on Russian strategy at a February 2016
symposium that we organized in Cambridge, UK, and it is echoed in other research, including
8 Freier et al., 2016, pp. 84–85.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 7.
Table S.2
Summary of Russian Performance Across Five Cases
Tactical Results Strategic Results
60% success No success
NOTE: Green indicates success, red indicates failure, and gray indicates an unclear outcome.

Summary xix
previous RAND studies of Russian hostile measures. Forward-positioned conventional forces
should serve as a “baseplate” to which technical and advanced special operations capabilities
can be added.
Regional events since the 2016 symposium suggest that conventional forces are optimal
for supporting efforts to prevent, deter, and counter Russian hostile measures. Such efforts
include providing direct support to special operations forces that are directly engaged in gray-
zone competition or in thwarting Russian hostile measures during high-order war. NATO,
through its Readiness Action Plan, has begun forward posturing in a measured way to deter a
perceived threat of Russian conventional attack. The U.S. government’s European Deterrence
Initiative and NATO’s enhanced forward presence of approximately 4,500 troops dispersed
across several multinational battlegroups have sent a strong signal of defensive commitment to
Eastern European allies and Russia. Figure S.4 depicts this enhanced presence as of mid-2019.
Building on existing research by the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute and others, we
found that this strategy is likely to have a positive knock-on effect: A forward conventional
presence can, we argue, help deter Russian hostile measures. It is also likely to present oppor-
tunities for targeted actions to prevent and counter Russian such behavior, generating dual
benefits.
Dual Benefits of Forward Defense
A forward conventional baseplate—preferably involving forward-stationed multinational units
on secure military bases—also serves a dual purpose: It signals strength that can deter all hos-
tile measures, from deception operations to conventional and nuclear attacks. Forward pres-
ence enables the authorized and permitted application of military technical capabilities—such
Figure S.4
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence
SOURCE: NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Enhanced Forward Presence: Map,” webpage, last
updated June 14, 2019.
Framework nation
Contributing nation
Poland
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Four multinational
battlegroups
Tapa
Adazi
Orzysz
Legend:
Estonia:
United Kingdom
Denmark
France
Iceland
Latvia:
Canada
Albania
Czech Republic
Italy
Montenegro
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Lithuania:
Germany
Belgium
Czech Republic
Iceland
The Netherlands
Norway
Poland:
United States
Croatia
Romania
United Kingdom
Headquarters Multinational
Division Northeast
Elblag
Headquarters Multinational
Corps Northeast
Szczecin
Rukla

xx Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
as intelligence collection, information operations, and counterintelligence—that can be highly
effective in preventing and countering Russian hostile measures. In many cases, military forces
possess the best and most numerous of these capabilities. However, their use in Europe requires
careful diplomatic engagement, improved authorities, consistent relationships between con-
tributing and hosting states, and well-established boundaries.
Key Findings and Recommendations
The history, analysis, and case examples captured in this report highlight four key conclusions
about how Russia’s success in employing hostile measures and the odds that the alliance can
effectively forecast and deter, prevent, or encounter their use:
• Russia’s application of hostile measures is tactically adroit but strategically shortsighted.
Russia typically fails to achieve strategic success by applying hostile measures.
• General patterns in Russian gray zone behavior lend themselves to forecasting, and Russia
often issues formal indications and warnings before making use of hostile measures.
• Appreciation and preparation for Russian hostile measures should be broadened beyond
the gray zone to include high-order conventional and nuclear scenarios.
• A forward conventional presence can help deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile
measures of influence in Europe.
These and the more in-depth findings presented here support our recommendation that
NATO should sustain a measured forward presence in Europe indefinitely and leverage con-
ventional force enablers to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile measures.
This report is accompanied by two online appendixes, available for download at
www.rand.org/t/RR2539. Appendix A, “An Evolutionary History of Russia’s Hostile Mea-
sures,” presents a detailed history of hostile measures and operations from the creation of the
Soviet Union in 1917 through the end of the Cold War. Appendix B, “Detailed Case Studies
of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures,” presents our complete case studies of Moldova, Georgia,
Estonia, Ukraine, and Turkey.

xxi
Acknowledgments
We thank MG William Hix, U.S. Army, for sponsoring our research and for guiding our
February 2016 symposium on Russian hostile measures in Cambridge, UK. MG Christo-
pher McPadden and MG Bradley Gericke supported the continuation and completion of our
research. We are grateful to RAND colleagues Irina Chindea, Raphael Cohen, Larry Hanauer,
and Andrew Radin, who served as informal but influential reviewers, and Catherine Dale,
Bruce McClintock, and Austin Long, who provided detailed reviews of the initial draft report.
Another RAND colleague, Linda Robinson, was instrumental in envisioning, setting up, and
running the Cambridge symposium. Her energy, expertise, and outreach efforts were essential
to the event’s success and enabled us to obtain invaluable insights from our speakers and par-
ticipants. Rebecca Wasser and Gina Frost, also at RAND, were the primary coordinators of
the Cambridge symposium. Their dedication, professionalism, and absolute commitment to
excellence elevated the symposium’s impact within the community of Russia experts. Support
from the president of RAND Europe, Hans Pung, set the conditions for success in Cambridge,
and RAND Europe researchers, including Paul Cornish, Alexandra Hall, and James Sladden,
provided essential support and helped foster the intellectual discourse that made the sympo-
sium a success.
RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources staff were instrumental in cre-
ating this research opportunity and in supporting our efforts over the course of this yearlong
effort. Terrence Kelly generated the concept for this research, while Sally Sleeper and Michael
Mazarr shepherded the project to completion. We also thank the staff of our Army sponsor,
including Tony Vanderbeek and Mark Calvo, for their continuing interest in our research and
for supporting our work with enthusiasm.

xxiii
Abbreviations
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
Cheka VCheka, or Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya [All-Russian
Extraordinary Commission]
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
FSB Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation]
GPS Global Positioning System
GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye [Main Intelligence Agency]
IBCT infantry brigade combat team
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security]
MISO military information support operations
MSW measures short of war
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKVD Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del [People’s Commissariat for Internal
Affairs]
Okhrana Okhrannoye Otdelenie [Department for Protecting the Public Security and
Order]
SOF special operations forces
SVR Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Foreign Intelligence
Service of the Russian Federation]
UAS unmanned aerial system

1
CHAPTER ONE
Russian Hostile Measures in Every Context
This report builds on existing RAND Corporation research and consolidates more than
500 pages of research on Russian hostile behavior below the threshold of high-order conven-
tional war.1 It describes tactics and measures that Russia uses below this threshold and that it
is likely to use during war. It also briefly describes the evolution of Russia’s approach to state-
on-state competition to help political and military leaders and analysts understand how and
why Russia came to view success in the gray zone as existential and therefore a crucial part of
its national security strategy. The research presented here highlights specific recommendations
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) centering on the use of military assets to
deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile measures.
Hostile Measures in the Gray Zone and During High-Order War
It is increasingly important to consider the holistic nature of competition with Russia. For
many years, the U.S. National Defense Strategy was released with little fanfare: The pro
forma document has had limited influence on practice. The 2018 strategy was different. In
the unclassified summary of the strategy, then Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis and his
writing team stated plainly that the combined threats of state-on-state gray zone behavior
and high-order war were of greater strategic significance than the activities of such terrorist
groups as the Islamic State: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary
concern in U.S. national security.”2 On the following page, the strategy identified Russian
1 See, for example, Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-
Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1003-A, 2016; Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose
of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Oppose It, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
PE-198-OSD, 2016; F. Stephen Larrabee, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Nathan Chandler, Keith Crane, and Thomas
S. Szyana, Russia and the West After the Ukrainian Crisis, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1305-A, 2017;
Andrew Radin and Clinton Bruce Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora-
tion, RR-1826-OSD, 2017; Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and
Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora-
tion, RR-1498-A, 2017; Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, RR-1577-AF, 2017; David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s East-
ern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1253-A, 2016; and Bryan
Frederick, Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, and Edward Geist, Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and
NATO Posture Enhancements, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, 2017.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C.,
2018, p. 1.

2 Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO
diplomatic behavior and hostile measures as central threats in a long-term, state-versus-state
competition for global influence, listing Russia’s technology-enabled subversion of democracy
before the Russian nuclear threat.
Mattis’s conceptualization of the threat is directly relevant to NATO. In fact, the alli-
ance’s collective approach to addressing long-term competition with Russia is central to both
U.S. and European security. Understanding the context in which Russia honed what American
Kremlinologist George F. Kennan called measures short of war (MSW)—what we call hostile
measures—will help NATO policymakers conceptualize and implement strategies to deter,
prevent, and counter the threat identified in the National Defense Strategy.3
Using the Gray Zone as a Conceptual Device
Measures short of war are generally understood to be state-on-state actions, typically conducted
in the gray zone. The term gray zone was popularized after the 2014 Russian invasion of
Crimea.4 The gray zone is the conceptual space between complete nonengagement and the
outbreak of high-order war, with the latter described as intense, declared conventional or
nuclear war between the armed forces of two or more nation-states. High-order war is rare.
Gray zone activity is commonplace. Nation-states are in constant multilateral engagement in
the gray zone, seeking alliance with and advantage over other states.
A 2016 preliminary research effort by RAND Arroyo Center disputed the notion that
war is changing or that intense gray zone competition amounted to anything new.5 While the
emergence of the cyber domain, hybrid terrorist-insurgent groups (such as the Islamic State),
and instant global communication via the internet is adding new dimensions to the character
of war and gray zone competition, the nature of conflict itself is unchanging. War in any form
remains a Clausewitzian clash of independent, opposing wills. But high-order conventional
and nuclear war remain as rare today as they were throughout the 20th century, a period
during which the vast majority of conflicts were classified as irregular or civil wars.6
Instead of creating a new paradigm of conflict, the recent literature on the gray zone has
helped national security experts step back from the staid perspectives on warfare that have
hindered Western understanding of the nature of gray zone threats. Like high-order war, gray
zone conflict is a constant struggle of independent, opposing wills that plays out relentlessly in
subtle and not so subtle diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions and reac-
tions. Russia is helping the United States relearn this faded Cold War lesson with a bracing
series of gray zone setbacks for European allies and the United States itself.
3 See George F. Kennan, “Measures Short of War (Diplomatic),” in Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures
Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–1947, Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1991.
4 In this lightning operation, Russia’s military and security agencies employed a potent mix of special operations forces,
information operations, and clandestine political destabilization to seize Ukrainian territory. The term existed before 2014
but was not exhaustively explored until after the Crimea invasion. For additional background, see our case study in Appen-
dix B, available online, as well as Kofman et al., 2017. For Kennan’s original analysis as outlined in his September 1946
lecture, see Kennan, 1991.
5 Connable, Campbell, and Madden, 2016.
6 Connable, Campbell, and Madden, 2016, pp. 3–5.

Russian Hostile Measures in Every Context 3
Defining Russian Hostile Measures
In his original formulation of the term MSW, Kennan sought to describe all interstate behavior
short of war. He divides MSW into two categories: amicable and nonamicable. Of his 12 over-
arching examples, half are amicable measures, such as arbitration.7 All six nonamicable mea-
sures are overt acts, such as embargoes or the severing of diplomatic relations. He also presents
a range of hostile actions that totalitarian states might take, including the less overt, less ami-
cable acts of “intimidation, deceit, corruption, penetration, subversion . . . psychological pres-
sure, economic pressure, seduction, blackmail, theft, fraud, rape, battle, murder, and sudden
death.”8 Kennan does not reconcile these two lists, leaving the dozen above-board, overt policy
options oddly dissociated from the basket of dirty tricks that are now most closely associated
with the term MSW. Kennan’s analysis focuses almost solely on overt diplomatic actions; he
devotes little space to aggressively hostile measures. But in the more than 70 years since, MSW
has come to embody covert action and below-the-threshold-for-war hostilities. It is rarely used
in reference to Kennan’s central focus on overt diplomatic activities.
In some ways, it is useful to think about state policy options as a long, unbounded menu
that includes cultural exchanges, routine economic aid to allies, basic trade negotiations,
embargo, psychological operations, and covert destabilization. However, MSW cannot capture
every action that a government takes short of war if the term is to have any utility. A boundless
approach would also mean that the gray zone—a potentially helpful bounding tool to circum-
scribe measures used—would be limitless in scope and therefore devoid of practical meaning
to policymakers. We concur with Hal Brands’s observation that “‘gray zone’ cannot mean
everything if it is to mean anything” and extend his observation to the measures applied.9
During this and previous research on MSW, we determined that total diffusion makes terms
irrelevant but that trying to apply a specific and narrow taxonomy generates more disagree-
ment than concurrence.
There is another significant practical concern in using the term MSW. Terminology
should be both precise and accurate. It would be difficult and perhaps illogical to interpret the
measures in question as anything other than measures used in circumstances short of war. This
means that, by definition, these measures are not used during war. But at one brief point in his
argument, Kennan does suggest recharacterizing policy options:
[We] must cease to have separate patterns of measures—one pattern for peace and one pat-
tern for war. Rather, we must select them according to the purpose we are pursuing and
classify them that way.10
This is logical and practical advice. It reflects Kennan’s realistic understanding of the
problem: Almost all measures are applicable below and above the threshold for high-order war.
Policy options cannot and should not be neatly delineated by conflict phase. Some are more
or less appropriate to given conditions. But this argument does not align with Kennan’s ter-
minology. In fact, his use of the term MSW—which he drew from textbooks on international
7 Kennan, 1991, p. 4.
8 Kennan, 1991, p. 8.
9 Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 5, 2016.
10 Kennan, 1991, pp. 16–17.

law—does exactly what Kennan argues against: It separates patterns of measures below and
above the threshold for high-order war.11
Kennan is regarded as the dean of Sovietology and one of the greatest American policy
analysts of the 20th century. A Pulitzer Prize winner for his writings on international affairs
and the history of relations between Russia and the West, Kennan was also one of the first
U.S. policymakers to help apply the measures he described against the Soviet Union in the
early Cold War era.12 His ideas are rightly venerated, but they are not unassailable. As a poli-
cymaker, Kennan chose to eschew MSW in favor of the term political warfare, or “the employ-
ment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives,”
including “‘black’ psychological warfare and . . . underground resistance in hostile states.”13
Political warfare might be used to describe the policy approach that applies MSW, but Kennan
did not clearly make that distinction nor seek to resolve the two terms.14 Even to Kennan, the
term MSW was not sacrosanct.
MSW has been in common use for more than half a century, but it is insufficiently accu-
rate and, in the modern context, dated and misleading. In place of MSW, we offer the term
hostile measures. This term can be used in conjunction with political warfare or other terms
that describe the policy approach to applying such measures; we refer specifically to the actions
taken. In other words, a state could apply hostile measures to achieve political warfare objec-
tives. This proposed formulation might be helpful:
• States apply hostile measures in the gray zone to achieve political warfare objectives.
• States also apply hostile measures during high-order war to achieve wartime objectives.
To arrive at the term hostile measures, we started with Kennan’s measures short of war. We
removed short of war because it creates an artificial and unhelpful boundary. To capture the
behaviors that are most relevant to policymakers and to eliminate routine functions that are
less relevant to competition, we added the term hostile. To avoid artificial bounding beyond
the term hostile, we retained the general term measures. Ultimately, we defined hostile measures
as follows:
State activities other than high-order conventional or nuclear attack applied against other
states at any time, and in any context, with the hostile intent of gaining advantage and
reducing that state’s capabilities, stability, or advantages.
11 Kennan, 1991, p. 3.
12 For insights into Kennan and his service, see George F. Kennan, Charles Gati, and Richard H. Ullman, “Interview
with George F. Kennan,” Foreign Policy, No. 7, Summer 1972; Richard Russell, “American Diplomatic Realism: A Tradi-
tion Practised and Preached by George F. Kennan,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2000; George F.
Kennan, “Foreign Policy and the Christian Conscience,” Atlantic Monthly, May 1959; David Mayers, “Containment and
the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan’s Views, 1947–1948,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1986; and
David F. Rudgers, “The Origins of Covert Action,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 35, No. 2, April 2000.
Several historians have questioned Kennan’s efficacy as a policymaker. See, for example, Sarah-Jane Corke, “George
Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6, Summer 2006, and Scott
Lucas and Kaeten Mistry, “Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy and Political Warfare in the Early Cold
War, 1946–1950,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2009.
13 As quoted in Lucas and Mistry, 2009, p. 39.
14 Kennan used the term political warfare once in his talks at the National War College but does not reconcile the term
with MSW. See Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the
National War College, 1946–1947, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991.

These measures certainly include the nonamicable overt diplomatic actions that Kennan
focused on in his 1946–1947 lectures at the National War College. Figure 1.1 depicts the
applied range of hostile measures, presenting a contrast to the artificially bounded understand-
ing of the gray zone. It shows conceptual phasing from left to right: The gray zone precedes
conventional war, which, in turn, precedes nuclear war. Hostile measures typically associated
with the gray zone are available to states across the full spectrum of conflict.
Active Measures as a Subset of Hostile Measures
Within the broad category of hostile measures are overt actions, such as limited military incur-
sions, economic embargoes, and public information campaigns, as well as tailored clandestine
and covert hostile measures, including targeted disinformation campaigns. Historically, Rus-
sian policymakers and intelligence officers have referred to these as active measures, transliter-
ated as aktivnye meropriyatiya.15 They should be considered a subset of hostile measures.16
Ongoing Debate: Defining and Bounding the Hybrid Un-War
Debate over the meaning of gray zone, MSW, political warfare, and other terms is even more
expansive than we have suggested thus far. In prior research, aptly titled Stretching and
Exploiting Thresholds for High Order War, we identified a range of catchphrases adopted by
analysts seeking to describe hostile interstate activities other than high-order war.17 Examples
15 Dennis Kux, “Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment,” Parameters, Vol. 15, No. 4,
November 15, 2005. Also see Thomas Rid, professor of security studies, King’s College London, testimony before the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at the hearing “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and
Influence Campaigns,” March 30, 2017; U.S. Department of State, Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process
of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns, Washington, D.C., August 1986; Cathy Darlene Walters, Percep-
tions Management: Soviet Deception and Its Implications for National Security, thesis, Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate
School, March 1988; Kenneth C. Keating, Maskirovka: The Soviet System of Camouflage, thesis, Garmisch, Germany:
U.S. Army Russian Institute, June 1981; Morgan Maier, A Little Masquerade: Russia’s Evolving Employment of Maskirovka,
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016.
16 Dennis Kux, 2005, provides an overview of the history of Soviet and Russian active measures, tracing their lineage back
to the 1920s. Also see Rid, 2017, and Walters, 1988.
17 Connable, Campbell, and Madden, 2016.
Figure 1.1
Hostile Measures Across the Spectrum of Conflict
Hostile measures
(Applied across the full spectrum of conflict)
MSW
Gray zone
Hostile measures applied to gain
advantage short of war or to
improve the chances of winning a
prospective conventional war
Conventional war
During high-order fighting, states
apply hostile measures as enablers
to improve friendly or degrade
enemy combat effectiveness
Nuclear war
States employ hostile measures to
help deescalate nuclear war or
weaken hostile capability—last-
ditch efforts to survive and win

include parawar, asymmetric war, pressure pointing, lawfare, salami slicing, unrestricted warfare,
and hybrid warfare. This slew of terminology highlights the disagreement and, often, outright
confusion over the nature of gray zone interstate competition. In June 2016, a team from the
Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute produced a significant analysis of the gray
zone and hybrid war. That report concluded, “There is no common perception of the nature,
character, or hazard associated with the gray zone or its individual threats and challenges.”18
We concur with this finding but do not seek a definitive solution. Instead, we briefly describe
the ongoing analytic debate over terminology as a way to frame our findings on the gray zone
and hostile measures. Hybrid warfare, a term generally attributed to Frank G. Hoffman at the
U.S. National Defense University, is particularly salient to this debate.19 It was NATO’s term
of choice in the immediate period after Russia’s seizure of Crimea.
Genesis of the Gray Zone–Hybrid Warfare Debate
Two events in 2014 led to an intense but short-lived analytic trend. Russia’s annexation of
Crimea generated a frantic examination of Russian covert-action capabilities and tactics.20 The
Islamic State’s seizure of large parts of Iraq in 2014 accelerated a parallel, overlapping interest
in the on-again, off-again term hybrid warfare, which has been interpreted to mean anything
from the behavior of a hybrid paramilitary-terrorist organization to state-level hybrid applica-
tion of tactics in the gray zone.21 Meanwhile, there was growing awareness among nonexperts
that China was operating aggressively in the gray zone in places like the East China Sea,
Africa, and elsewhere. First, the shock and awe generated by the blitzkrieg-like success of
Russia in Crimea and the Islamic State in Iraq generated considerable analytic excitement.
A few early accounts suggested that Russia had invented a new way of war.22 Many of these
18 Nathan P. Freier, Charles R. Burnett, William J. Cain, Jr., Christopher D. Compton, Sean M. Hankard, Robert S.
Hume, Gary R. Kramlich II, J. Matthew Lissner, Tobin A. Magsig, Daniel E. Mouton, Michael S. Muztafago, James M.
Schultze, John F. Troxell, and Dennis G. Wille, Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa.: U.S. Army War College Press, 2016, p. 73.
19 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 52, First Quarter 2009. For Hoffman’s
latest perspective on this issue, see Frank Hoffman, “Sharpening Our Military Edge: The NDS and the Full Continuum of
Conflict,” Small Wars Journal, June 27, 2018.
20 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare,
Ukraine 2013–2014, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2015; Sam Jones, “Estonia Ready to Deal with Russia’s ‘Little Green Men,’” Finan-
cial Times, May 13, 2015; Anton Shekhovtsov, “Who Is Afraid of the ‘Little Green Men’?” Intersection, September 21, 2015.
21 Our previous analysis examined these terms and the various merits of the initial literature; see Connable, Campbell,
and Madden, 2016, pp. 1–8. Many terms, both new and revived from the Soviet period, poured forth in this brief period,
including new-generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, nonlinear warfare, political warfare, lawfare, reflexive control, full-
spectrum warfare, fourth-generation warfare, hybrid warfare, and active measures. See, for example, Kux, 2005; Oscar Jons-
son and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies,
Vol. 28, No. 1, 2015; Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Con-
flicts?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014; and Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine:
Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015.
22 For example, Molly K. McKew and Gregory A. Maniatis, “Playing by Putin’s Tactics,” Washington Post, March 9, 2014,
and Peter Pomerantsev, “Brave New War,” The Atlantic, December 29, 2015. McKew continued to cling to this argument
in 2017; see Molly K. McKew, “The Gerasimov Doctrine,” Politico, September–October 2017.
For counterarguments, see Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review, January–February 2016;
Freier et al., 2016; Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, Russia and Hybrid Warfare—Going Beyond the Label, Helsinki, Finland:
Kikimora Publications, 2016; and Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in
Moscow’s Exercise of Power, London: Chatham House, March 2016.

reports lent credence to Russia’s contemporaneous, chest-thumping propaganda. Some observ-
ers suggested that Vladimir Putin was applying his new type of warfare to establish hegemony
over (at least) Eastern Europe.23 There was a brief period of intense focus on the gray zone and
hybrid warfare from 2014 to 2015, characterized by descriptions of Russia’s new-generation
warfare.24
Refinement of the Gray Zone–Hybrid Warfare Debate
By early 2016, the debate over the Russian threat had stabilized, and some deeper analyses
emerged. For example, in an early 2016 article, Russia watcher Andrew Monaghan suggested
letting some of the steam out of the gray zone–hybrid warfare pressure cooker. In addition
to driving home the point that this kind of nebulous hostile behavior was long-standing—
an argument we made in our 2016 report—he also pointed out that Russian commentators
explicitly rejected the term hybrid warfare.25 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith gave warning to
policymakers who might have been captured by the initial onslaught of literature:
[T]aking the success of Russia’s operational approach [in Crimea] as a basis for defence
planning is counterproductive as it is likely to preclude the flexibility of responses needed
in any potential future Russian hostility.26
In addition to Monaghan, Renz, and Smith, other experts, such as Keir Giles at Chatham
House and Michael Mazarr and Christopher Chivvis at RAND, helped bring the discussion
back to its origins.27 The terms gray zone and hybrid have now been so thoroughly picked
over and demystified that even retracing this brief analytic history risks redundancy. By our
reading of the collective literature, the analytic community eventually reached some general
conclusions:
• Gray zone hostilities are nothing new, particularly for Russia.
• Russia will continue to apply these tactics, but its goals and means are limited.
• Deterring, preventing, or countering so-called gray zone behavior is difficult.
By 2017, analyses of the gray zone and hybrid warfare had shifted toward a balanced,
objective view of Russian power.28 As the nature of the writing changed, the pace of publica-
tion slowed considerably. Perhaps the effect of the hyperbolic tone of some initial 2014–2015
23 For example, Phillip A. Karber, “Russia’s ‘New Generation Warfare,” Pathfinder Magazine, June 4, 2015.
24 See Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New-Generation Warfare,” Association of the United States Army,
May 20, 2016.
25 Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2015–2016,
pp. 67–68; Connable, Campbell, and Madden, 2016, pp. 1–8.
26 Renz and Smith, 2016, p. 8.
27 Giles, 2016; Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict, Carlisle Bar-
racks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015; Christopher S. Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and
What Can Be Done About It, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CT-468, 2017. Also see Sam Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid Warfare,” Survival,
Vol. 57, No. 6, 2016.
28 The term hybrid warfare stuck in the European analytic community but lost some favor in the United States; it remains
ill defined, and we do not use the term in this report.

articles had boomeranged. Practical matters also intervened. In U.S. policy circles, interest in
North Korea, Iran, and China displaced some of the attention on Russia, and the specific focus
on Russian hostile measures shifted to the 2016 election and ongoing social media manipula-
tion. By early 2018, U.S. policy interest in the threat that Russian hostile measures posed to
Eastern Europe had waned, while broader NATO interest steered more toward the conven-
tional aspects of high-order war. Emphasis on long-term competition in the 2018 National
Defense Strategy may offer two opportunities to refocus analysis on the holistic nature of the
Russian threat: (1) to solidify advances in gray zone–hybrid war analysis with more-detailed
historical research and (2) to expand and improve NATO perceptions of the Russian threat in
a high-order war scenario.
One last general point appears to have been reached in policy circles, although perhaps
more by passive and unintended consensus than through concerted effort. Read collectively,
the most thoughtful reports on the gray zone and hybrid warfare suggest that gray zone tactics
are generally distinct from high-order war. We should also explicitly state a point about the
breadth of Russian behavior and associated analysis: The cited literature avoids addressing
but does not actively deny the likelihood that Russia would use hostile measures during high-
order war. But this mostly unwritten assumption has not made the hostile-measures threat
sufficiently real in policy debates over the conventional and nuclear threats.29 While the term
hybrid would suggest a blending of conventional and unconventional measures along the entire
continuum of conflict, work by top experts, including those at RAND, instead suggest or
describe a continuum separated into phases that are distinct in terms of measures applied.30
This report seeks to broaden the perspective on the applicability of hostile measures across
phases of competition.
Approach and Methodology
This report has three purposes: (1) describe the evolution, institutionalization, and limits of
Russian hostile measures; (2) recharacterize Russian hostile measures, including their use in
high-order war; and (3) recommend ways for NATO to deter, prevent, and counter Russian
hostile measures in the gray zone and during high-order war. Appendix A of this report traces
the evolutionary history of Russian hostile measures; Appendix B contains detailed case stud-
ies of Russia’s use of hostile measures in particular crises in the post–Cold War era. (Both
accompany this report online at www.rand.org/t/RR2539.) Here, we briefly summarize the
methodology behind the historical analysis and case studies, topics addressed in greater detail
in Chapter Three.
29 For one of several descriptions, see Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., NATO’s Response to Hybrid
Threats, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015, p. xxii. Lasconjarias and Larsen accurately describe Russia’s approach in
Europe as a blending of a range of unconventional and conventional measures. However, like other writers on the topic, they
do not explicitly and fully discuss the use of hostile measures during conventional war. We engaged directly with the lead
author of that report and learned that NATO Defense College analysts clearly understand that the Russian hostile measures
threat extends into the realm of high-order war. Therefore, it is by omission rather than by commission that the reader is
left with the impression that Russia will apply its hostile measures only in scenarios short of high-order war.
30 Connable, Campbell, and Madden, 2016, is one RAND report that used Kennan’s MSW paradigm.

Historical Analysis
The purpose of our historical analysis was to detail the evolution of Russia’s approach to hos-
tile measures over time. Our general approach was to write a traditional historical narrative
using both primary and secondary sources. We added a historical-cultural perspective drawn
from secondary sources to the analysis in Chapter Two. The history in Appendix A draws on
the vast scholarly and policy literature on Soviet and Russian foreign policy in both Russian
and English. We also turned to the substantial available collections of U.S. and Soviet or Rus-
sian primary source documents, translated by the research team when necessary. Among the
most important were Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence reports and assessments,
declassified through Freedom of Information Act requests; the Wilson Center’s rich collec-
tion of declassified and, in many cases, translated Cold War–era documents; and the online
National Security Archive of declassified documents related to U.S. foreign policy housed
at George Washington University.31 In addition to government documents, these collections
include personal correspondence and popular literature.
Case Studies
We conducted a small-n case study effort designed around process tracing. This is a method-
ology purposed to match its description: We identified, plotted, and then analyzed Russian
hostile measures in five selected cases. The goals of this effort were to (1) describe Russian hos-
tile measures in detail in a case context; (2) compare from case to case; and (3) set a baseline
for what should be a more detailed and wider-ranging case-study effort to show empirically
derived, generalizable patterns in Russia’s use of hostile measures. We selected cases that were
most appropriate for the subject of our research—recent and Europe-centered—and applied
the following additional criteria:
• confined the cases to post-Soviet Russia to help characterize contemporary behavior
• eliminated cases in which the risk of war was exceptionally limited
• focused on cases in geographic proximity to Russia and in which the targeted state was a
NATO member or allied with NATO
• prioritized cases in which Russian minorities resided in the targeted state
• limited cases to those characterized by a frozen conflict
• included cases of strategic interest to the United States beyond its NATO membership.
Some cases met all these criteria, while one or more criteria did not apply in others. It is
impossible to precisely quantify U.S. strategic interest, so we applied this criterion subjectively.
Process tracing could be applied to many or perhaps all of the examples referenced in the his-
torical analysis and case-study narratives in the online appendixes to this report.
Differences Between the Accompanying Online Appendixes and This Report
The accompanying online appendixes stand alone as distinct research (each has its own, sepa-
rate set of references). However, this report brings together those findings with additional con-
text and aggregates the conclusions presented there—for example, by applying a rating system
31 CIA, “Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,” webpage, last updated April 22, 2019; Wilson Center,
“Digital Archive: International History Declassified,” webpage, undated; George Washington University, “The National
Security Archive,” homepage, undated.

to assess the outcomes of the five cases of Russian use of hostile measures. Overall, we conclude
that it is possible to forecast general Russian behavior as it relates to the use of hostile measures,
but the appendixes make a case against forecasting tactical actions. The distinction is in the
level of analysis: general, strategic approaches to the use of hostile measures versus the predic-
tion of tactical patterns in a given case. This report provides a holistic analysis of the problem,
while the accompanying appendixes offer a more nuanced and detailed focus on the history of
Russian hostile measures and their use.
Organization of This Report
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter Two summarizes and expounds
on the detailed historical research presented in Appendix A, which accompanies this report
online. It describes the historical-cultural evolution of Russian hostile measures–related tac-
tics, highlighting key events and institutions to better familiarize policymakers with the insti-
tutionalized and, ultimately, limited nature of Russia’s approach. Chapter Three summarizes
and provides additional context for the detailed case studies of Russian hostile measures in
Appendix B. Chapter Four examines ways to deter, prevent, and counter Russian hostile mea-
sures, focusing on NATO’s options in Eastern Europe.
The two appendix volumes are available online at www.rand.org/t/RR2539. Appendix A,
“An Evolutionary History of Russia’s Hostile Measures,” presents a detailed history of hostile
measures and operations from the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917 through the end of the
Cold War. Appendix B, “Detailed Case Studies of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures,” presents
the five post–Cold War case studies: Moldova, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Turkey.

11
CHAPTER TWO
The Evolution and Limits of Russian Hostile Measures
Applying a Western conceptual framework to explain a foreign operational art, divorcing
it from its foreign ideational context and from what the foreigners say to themselves may
lead to misperceptions.
— Dima Adamsky, 20181
Deterring, preventing, or countering Russian hostile measures necessitates understanding Rus-
sian motivations, tactics, and strategies and—more importantly—their limits. By characteriz-
ing the historical and cultural evolution of Russia’s use of hostile measures, we sought to reveal
insights about the nature of Russian behavior in the gray zone. It is not possible to predict with
certainty the tactics that Russia will employ in any given case. However, with a fuller appre-
ciation of Russian behavior, it is possible to forecast, and then preemptively address, Russian
hostile-measures operations in prospective high-order war scenarios. Understanding the broad
motivations behind these operations and the patterns of approach—the general ways in which
Russia tends to group tactics—will allow for improved analysis and forecasting. This chapter
briefly describes Russia’s motivations for institutionalizing hostile measures.
The Institutionalization and Nature of Russian Hostile Measures
Neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconception-free game theorists.
. . . It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique “strategic
culture.”
— Jack L. Snyder, RAND Corporation, 19772
All major theories of state formation acknowledge, albeit to varying degrees, the influences of
geography, history, and culture on the nature of the state, its institutions, and its behavior.3 It
1 Dima Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion, Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 41, Nos. 1–2, 2018.
2 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, R-2154-AF, September 1977, p. v.
3 We do not attempt to describe or debate all theories here. For a quick review of some of the major theories, see Peter A.
Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies, No. 44, 1996;
Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation State, Its Achievements and Its Limitations: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty
and Citizenship,” Ratio Juris, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1996; Patrick Carroll, “Articulating Theories of States and State Forma-
tion,” Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 2009; Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein, “The Rise of
the Nation-State Across the World, 1816–2001,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 75, No. 5, 2010; George Steinmetz, ed.,

is therefore reasonable to consider Russian state formation in geographic, historical, and cul-
tural context without necessarily selecting one scientific theory over another.4 There are genu-
ine, warranted limits to the conceptualization of strategic culture: Culture is never static or
consistent, and no nation-state can exist as an isolated and therefore inviolable cultural island.
The concept of strategic culture must be considered with caution. This section describes the
broader dynamics associated with the institutionalization of Russian hostile measures within
the Russian state; see Appendix A for greater detail and additional references to the literature
on this topic through the end of the Cold War.
A Strategy Evolved from Existential Worry
Russia’s strategic culture is profoundly paranoid and likely to remain so. As a result, Russia
behaves in ways that threaten or subvert other countries and obstruct Western diplomacy.
— Edward Lucas, Center for European Policy Analysis, 20135
Russia experts debate the degree to which constant strategic worry impels Russian leaders
toward outwardly hostile behavior. Worry may not drive all aspects of policy, but Russia’s
evolving use of hostile measures clearly originated in the existential worries of the pre-Soviet
and Soviet states. Russia has always perceived itself as a nation under threat from its neighbors
and from global interlopers; in many cases, this belief was justified. Its size, geographic posi-
tion, and relative lack of physical border barriers, such as mountain ranges, make it inherently
vulnerable to incursions. Its heterogeneous population and historically fractious politics make
it inherently vulnerable to internal revolt. These vulnerabilities affect Russian culture and
motivate state behaviors—principally, state-on-state hostile measures—to counter them.6
Worry About External Invasion
Bourgeois strategy is reactionary in its social and political aims since it serves the interests
of imperialist aggressors, who conduct unjust and predatory wars in order to seize foreign
State/Culture: State Formation After the Cultural Turn, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999; and Aradhana Sharma
and Akhil Gupta, eds., The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
4 Colin Gray summarizes three waves of strategic culture theory in a 1999 article (Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as
Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 1999).
There are many other resources on strategic culture, including work by Theo Farrell, Dima Adamsky, James Wirtz, and
Michael C. Desch. See Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” SAIS Review of International Affairs,
Vol. 25, No. 2, January 2005.
5 Edward Lucas, Rethinking Russia: The Paradox of Paranoia, Washington, D.C.: Center for European Policy Analy-
sis, January 28, 2013. Also see Andrew Soldatov, “All-Encompassing Paranoia: How the Attitude Toward Security Has
Changed in Russia,” Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2017; Thomas Graham, “The Sources of Russian Inse-
curity,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2010; Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Olesya Tkacheva, and Scott
Boston, Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context A Reassessment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
PE-144-A, 2015.
6 Andrei A. Kokoshin of Moscow State University describes the evolution of Soviet doctrine, strategy, and policy in a
way that reinforces these assumptions (Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–1991, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1999).

The Evolution and Limits of Russian Hostile Measures 13
territories, to suppress national liberation movements, and to enslave the people of other
countries.
— Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, 19627
Russian elites appear to have increasingly concluded that the United States and NATO rep-
resent long-term political and potentially military threats to the current regime in Moscow.
— Bryan Frederick et al., RAND Corporation, 20178
Russia’s vast borders were and arguably still are practicably indefensible. Former senior director
for Russia on the U.S. National Security Council Thomas Graham has argued that “Moscow’s
fear is a product of Russia’s geopolitical setting, political structure, and historical experience,
all of which have shaped its strategic culture.”9 Table 2.1 lists some of the historic encroach-
ments on what is now the Russian state.
Trauma and fear associated with these invasions imprinted on Russian culture and con-
tributed directly to the development of a powerful central state and national military. Worry
7 The quote is taken from a RAND translation of a 1962 Soviet military document titled Military Strategy; the document’s
original author, who held the highest rank in the Soviet military, is typically transliterated as Vasily Sokolovsky (Vasilii
Danilovich Sokolovskii, Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Strategy, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-416-PR, April 1963, p. 137).
8 Frederick et al., 2017, p. xiii.
9 Graham, 2010, p. 56.
Table 2.1
Examples of Foreign Encroachments into Russian Territory
Century Summary of Events
13th Mongol invasion of what is now the Russian state; destruction of Moscow
14th–16th Lithuania-Russia wars; many Lithuanian attacks on Moscow
16th Livonian War leads to loss of major Eastern European holdings; attack on Moscow
16th Crimean and Turkish invasion of Russia from Crimea; attack on Moscow
17th Polish-Russian War between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia in alliance with
Sweden; attack on Moscow
17th Ingrian War; Swedes invade Russian territory and seize Novgorod
17th Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth defeats Russian Army; Smolensk captured
19th Napoleon’s Grande Armée invades Russia; Moscow attacked and burned
19th Crimean War; French and British coalition; Russian Caucasus penetrated
20th North Russia Intervention; U.S. and allied troops land on Russian territory
20th German invasion of the Soviet Union; ~20 million Russians killed and Moscow besieged
SOURCES: Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Russia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Department of
the Army, July 1996; David R. Stone, A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya,
Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006; Robin Higham and Frederick W. Kagan, eds., The Military
History of the Soviet Union, New York: Palgrave, 2002; Nicholas Rzhevsky, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Modern Russian Culture, 2nd ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

about external intervention, specifically, contributed to the formation of the state security
apparatus that became primarily responsible for applying hostile measures. Although the
NATO alliance has never invaded Russian territory, the continuity of the perceived threat is
understandable: Current alliance members, including Germany, Poland, Lithuania, the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States, have all crossed Russia’s borders with hostile intent.
Continued NATO expansion toward Russia’s borders since the fall of the Soviet Union has
exacerbated existing worries.10 According to Putin’s 2015 National Security Strategy,
The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of interna-
tional law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military activity, the further expansion
of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are
creating a threat to national security.11
This perceived threat of physical advance is further exacerbated by the all-too-real pro-
gression of Western—primarily U.S.—soft-power influence in Eastern Europe, including sup-
port for the “color revolutions” that have undermined Russian client governments.12
Worry Over Internal Revolt
In the modern world extremism is being used as a geopolitical instrument and for remaking
spheres of influence. We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called color revolu-
tions led to. For us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do everything necessary so
that nothing similar ever happens in Russia.
— President Vladimir Putin, 201413
Russian leaders have faced continual threats from internal revolts and revolts against vassal
regimes for several hundred years; Russia has been beset by instability since at least the middle
of the 16th century. Table 2.2 lists a selection of some of the hundreds of revolts and smaller,
more local uprisings against Russia and its vassal states. Note that many of these events directly
threatened Moscow and the ruling elite. Most recently, so-called color revolutions in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan exacerbated long-standing worries of internal dissent. Former U.S.
policy adviser on Russia Angela Stent has argued that modern Russian leaders see revolt in
Eastern Europe as a potential reflection of their own domestic vulnerability.14
All this chaos has contributed to a common Russian, and specifically Muscovite, cul-
tural appreciation for a safe, reliable status quo. President Putin, chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, minister of defense Sergey Shoygu, and director of the
Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov are all products of the Soviet state that
10 Radin and Reach, 2017, chapter 1; Frederick et al., 2017, chapter 3.
11 Vladimir Putin, The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, presidential edict 683, December 31, 2015.
12 Andrew Monaghan presents a sound interpretation of Russia’s perception of the NATO threat and Western failure to
appreciate this perception (Andrew Monaghan, The New Politics of Russia: Interpreting Change, Manchester, UK: Manches-
ter University Press, 2016, pp. 8–7, 67–74). Keir Giles essentially makes the same argument (Giles, 2016).
13 Quoted in Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution,’” Reuters, November 20, 2014.
14 Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2014, p. 101. Chapter 5 offers an overview of the color revolutions.

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