Linux Security APIs and the Chromium Sandbox (SwedenCpp Meetup 2017)
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The Linux Security and Isolation APIs have become the basis of some of the most useful features server-side, providing the isolation required for efficient containers. However, these APIs also form the basis of the Chromium Sandbox on Linux, and we will study them in that context. This presentation goes more in depth on some key points from the NDC (2017) presentation.
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Linux Security APIs and the Chromium Sandbox (SwedenCpp Meetup 2017)
- 2. Linux Security and How Web Browser Sandboxes Really Work Patricia Aas SweedenCpp Meetup C++ Stockholm 0x08 2017 @pati_gallardo
- 3. Patricia Aas Programmer - mainly in C++ and Java Currently : Vivaldi Technologies Previously : Cisco Systems, Knowit, Opera Software Master in Computer Science Twitter : @pati_gallardo
- 4. One Binary Browser Gpu BrokerZygote Renderer GpuZygote Init Clone/Exec * User/Pid/Net Fork/Exec * * NO_NEW_PRIVS ForkFork Clone
- 6. Windows of Opportunity Browser Gpu BrokerZygote Renderer GpuZygote Init Clone/Exec * User/Pid/Net Fork/Exec * * NO_NEW_PRIVS ForkFork Clone
- 7. Namespaces in use CLONE_NEWUSER No privilege is needed to create a USER NS, and in one we can create a PID NS without global privilege. CLONE_NEWPID Same PID number can represent different processes in different PID namespaces. One init (PID 1) process per PID NS CLONE_NEWNET Isolate a process from network @pati_gallardo Zygote + Renderer
- 8. At Clone : Create NAmespaces Clone flags define the process* created and will create namespaces (NS) for it 1. Test which NS are available 2. Fail if not sufficient 3. Construct the biggest supported and applicable set Emulates fork with longjmp * Also used to create threads @pati_gallardo Zygote + Renderer
- 9. int flags = CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET; jmp_buf env; if (setjmp(env) == 0) { return CloneAndLongjmpInChild(flags, ptid, ctid, &env); } @pati_gallardo chromium/base/process/launch_posix.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 10. pid_t CloneAndLongjmpInChild(unsigned long flags, pid_t* ptid, pid_t* ctid, jmp_buf* env) { char stack_buf[PTHREAD_STACK_MIN]; void* stack = stack_buf + sizeof(stack_buf); return clone(&CloneHelper, stack, flags, env, ptid, nullptr, ctid); } @pati_gallardo chromium/base/process/launch_posix.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 11. int CloneHelper(void* arg) { jmp_buf* env_ptr = reinterpret_cast<jmp_buf*>(arg); longjmp(*env_ptr, 1); // Should not be reached assert(false); return 1; } @pati_gallardo chromium/base/process/launch_posix.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 13. Shrinking the Sandbox Browser Gpu Broker Seccomp Zygote SYS_ADMIN Renderer Pid capset rlimit Gpu Seccomp Zygote Init User capset chroot Clone/Exec * User/Pid/Net Fork/Exec * * NO_NEW_PRIVS Done post fork ForkFork Clone
- 14. Seccomp BPF Program Program written in an assembly-like language to filter system-calls. Runs in a simple VM in kernel space. All syscalls will be filtered by this program TSYNC : Once a Seccomp Program is installed it applies to all threads in a process@pati_gallardo Renderer + Gpu + Broker
- 15. Seccomp : BPF Policies BPF Program defined in a Policy Fundamentally a whitelist, allows a set of syscalls and has custom handling of others. An extended Policy is generally more permissive 1. BaselinePolicy 1.1 GpuProcessPolicy 1.1.1 GpuBrokerProcessPolicy 1.2 RendererProcessPolicy @pati_gallardo Renderer + Gpu + Broker
- 16. void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy) { SandboxBPF sandbox(policy); assert(sandbox.StartSandbox()); } bool SandboxBPF::StartSandbox() { InstallFilter(); return true; } @pati_gallardo chromium/content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 17. void SandboxBPF::InstallFilter() { CodeGen::Program program = AssembleFilter(); struct sock_filter bpf[program.size()]; const struct sock_fprog prog = { static_cast<unsigned short>(program.size()), bpf }; memcpy(bpf, &program[0], sizeof(bpf)); assert(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0); assert(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, &prog) == 0); } @pati_gallardo chromium/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 18. Chroot : Drop Access to FS - clone(CLONE_FS) a child process - Child chroot(”/proc/self/fdinfo/”) - Child immediately does a chdir(“/”) - Child does _exit(kExitSuccess) You can see this by looking at ls -l /proc/<pid>/root Of the Zygote or any ancestor Credentials::DropFileSystemAccess@pati_gallardo Zygotes + Renderer
- 19. bool ChrootToSafeEmptyDir() { pid_t pid = -1; char stack_buf[PTHREAD_STACK_MIN]; void* stack = stack_buf + sizeof(stack_buf); int clone_flags = CLONE_FS | LINUX_SIGCHLD; pid = clone(ChrootToSelfFdinfo, stack, clone_flags, nullptr); int status = -1; assert(HANDLE_EINTR(waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == pid); return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == kExitSuccess; } @pati_gallardo chromium/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 20. int ChrootToSelfFdinfo(void*) { assert(chroot("/proc/self/fdinfo/") == 0); assert(chdir("/") == 0); _exit(kExitSuccess); } @pati_gallardo chromium/sandbox/linux/services/credentials.cc Code Simplified To Illustrate
- 21. Trust is Relative Browser Gpu Broker Seccomp Zygote SYS_ADMIN Renderer Pid capset rlimit Gpu Seccomp Zygote Init User capset chroot Clone/Exec * User/Pid/Net Fork/Exec * * NO_NEW_PRIVS Done post fork ForkFork Clone No access to filesystem
- 23. Sources Michael Kerrisk Book: The Linux Programming Interface Course: Linux Security and Isolation APIs Chromium/Kernel source + Linux Man Pages + lwn.net All Errors Are My Own
- 24. Linux Security and How Web Browser Sandboxes Really Work Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies @pati_gallardo Photos from pixabay.com
- 25. Make Everyone Feel Safe To Be Themselves @pati_gallardo
- 26. Vivaldi Swag Patricia Aas, Vivaldi Technologies @pati_gallardo Photos from pixabay.com