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Enhanced DSR Protocol to Nullify DDoS
Attack in MANET
Avnish Kumar1, Rakesh Sharma2
____________________________________________
ABSTRACT:
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks within
the networks must be prevented or handled if it
happens, as early as possible and before reaching the
victim. Handling ddos attack is want of associated
degree hour thus on avoid depletion of the network
resources such as network bandwidth, data
structures, CPU time, Disk Space, network
connections, as they' re threats not just for the direct
targets however also for the core of the network.
Dealing with DDoS attacks is tough because of their
properties like dynamic attack rates, varied forms of
targets, huge scale of botnets, etc. Multifaceted
nature of DDoS attacks defines the need for
multifaceted defence. Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks is hard to deal with because it is
difficult to distinguish legitimate traffic from
malicious traffic, especially when the traffic is
cuming at a different rate from distributed sources.
But ddos attack become more difficult to handle if it
occurs in wireless network because of the properties
of ad hoc network such as dynamic topologies, low
battery life, Unicast routing , Multicast routing ,
scalability , Frequency of updates or network
overhead , power aware routing, mobile agent based
routing etc. So it is better to prevent the distributed
denial of service attack instead of than permitting it
to occur and so taking the required steps to handle it.
___________________________________________
Keywords: MANET, DDoS, DSR Routing
__________________________________________
I.INTRODUCTION
In view of the rising demand for wireless info and data
services, providing quicker and reliable mobile access
is becoming a main concern.
__________________________________________
First Author’s Name: Avnish Kumar, Department of Computer
Science & Engineering, HCTM Technical Campus, Kaithal, India.
Second Author’s Name: Rakesh Sharma, Department of Computer
Science & Engineering, HCTM Technical Campus, Kaithal, India.
___________________________________________
Nowadays, not solely mobile phones, however laptops
and PDAs are employed by people in their
professional and private lives. These devices are used
disjointedly for the most part that is their applications
do not interact. Sometimes, however, a set of mobile
devices form a temporary, spontaneous network as
they approach each other. This permits e.g.
participants at a meeting to share documents,
presentations and other useful info. This sort of
spontaneous, temporary network named as mobile ad
hoc networks (MANETs) sometimes just called ad
hoc networks or multi-hop wireless networks, and are
expected to play a vital role in our daily lives in close
to future.
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) could be a
spontaneous network that may be established with no
fixed infrastructure. This suggest that each one its
nodes behave as routers and participate in its
discovery and maintenance of routes to different
nodes within the network i.e. nodes among every each
other's radio range communicate directly via wireless
connections, while those that are further apart use
further nodes as relays. Its routing protocol needs to
be able to address with the new challenges that a
MANET creates such as security maintenance, nodes
mobility and quality of service, limited power supply
and limited bandwidth. These challenges set new
demands on MANET routing protocols.
Ad hoc networks have a good array of military and
business applications. They’re ideal in situations
wherever installing an infrastructure network is n’t
possible or when the aim of the network is just too
transient or may be for the reason that the previous
infrastructure network was destroyed.
Security in mobile ad hoc networks could be
a tough to achieve because to dynamically changing
and fully decentralized topology as well as the
vulnerabilities and limitations of wireless info
transmissions. Accessible solutions that are applied in
wired networks can be used to obtain an precise level
of security. These solutions are not always be suitable
to wireless networks. Therefore ad hoc networks have
their own vulnerabilities that cannot be always tackled
by these wired network security solutions.
One of the very distinct characteristics of MANETs is
that each one participating nodes got to be involved
within the routing method. Ancient routing protocols
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designed for infrastructure networks cannot be applied
in ad hoc networks, thus ad hoc routing protocols were
planned to satisfy the needs of infrastructure less
networks. Because of the different characteristics of
wired and wireless media the task of providing
seamless environments for wired and wireless
connections is very difficult. One of the major factors
is that the wireless medium is inherently less secure
than their wired counterpart. Most conventional
applications do not provide user level security
schemes based on the fact that physical network
wiring provides some height of security. The routing
protocol sets the upper limit to security in any packet
network. If routing can be misdirected, the entire
network can be paralyzed. This drawback is enlarged
in ad hoc networks since routing usually needs to rely
on the trustworthiness of all nodes that are
participating in the routing process. An additional
difficulty is that it is hard to distinguish compromised
nodes from nodes that are suffering from broken links.
One of the recent and biggest cyber attack has been
reported on Netflix, this is due broadband router has
been subverted and ‘Digital N-bombs’ slows the net
worldwide. The attacker was throwing so much of the
digital traffic that popular site like Netflix have
reportedly disrupted access. The chief executive of
CloudFlare, Mathew Prince, one of firms dealing with
“nuclear bombs” said it’s easy to cause so much harm.
Spamhaus, an anti-spam organization, was strike by a
wave of digital traffic that knocked its website offline.
Spamhaus’s work is believed to possess launched the
large DDOS, attack to bring all the way to bring down
the anti-spam cluster. The attackers sent a series of
information requests to DNS severs, that facilitate to
direct net traffic around the world. After receiving
legitimate requests (as these servers are accessed by
authorized users), the servers responded by transfer
the required information to Spamhaus, which could
not deal with the information that abruptly arrived.
The attack was so huge that it began clogging up the
DNS servers, which in turn slowed down the net
worldwide. The congestion was so heavy that it
overwhelmed the DNS routers. A flood of request to
view a site at the same time will exceed its capacity-stopping
it from loading. Spamhaus superior capacity
turning to cloudFlare, increase traffic over greater
bandwidth. However the attackers began targeting
their attacks so they would be concentrated. Hence,the
connection delayed.
Recent wireless analysis indicates that the wireless
MANET presents a bigger security drawback than
typical wired and wireless networks. Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks has conjointly
become a problem for users of laptop systems
connected to the net. A DDoS attack could be a
distributed, large-scale try by malicious users to flood
the victim network with an huge range of packets.
This exhausts the victim network of resources like
computing power, bandwidth etc. The victim is unable
to produce services to its legitimate clients and
network performance is greatly deteriorated.
II.LITERATURE REVIEW
In paper [1], Lu Han describes that the wireless ad hoc
networks were first deployed in 1990’s, Mobile Ad-hoc
networks have been widely researched for many
years. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks are collection of two
or more devices equipped with wireless
communications and networking capability The
Wireless Ad-hoc Networks don’t have gateway, each
node will act because the gateway. As per this paper,
although, countless analysis has been done on this
explicit field, it’s usually been questioned on whether
the architecture of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks is a
fundamental flawed architecture.
Kamanshis Biswas et al. in [2] mention that Mobile
Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a assortment of
communication devices or nodes that would like to
communicate without any fixed infrastructure and pre-determined
organization of obtainable links. The
nodes in MANET themselves area unit are responsible
for dynamically discovering other nodes to
communicate. Although the ongoing trend is to adopt
ad hoc networks for commercial uses due to their
certain unique properties, the main challenge is the
vulnerability to security attacks. Variety of challenges
like open peer-to-peer network architecture, dynamic
network topology, stringent resource constraints,
shared wireless medium, etc. are posed in MANET.
As MANET is quickly spreading for the property of
its capability in forming temporary network without
the help of any established infrastructure or
centralized administration, security challenges has
become a primary concern to supply secure
communication.
Andrim Piskozub in [3], provide main kinds of DoS
attacks that flood victim’s communication channel
bandwidth, is carried out their analysis and area unit
offered ways of protection from these attacks. The
DDoS attacks are considerably more effective than
their DoS-counterparts as a result of the permit
performing such attacks simultaneously from several
sites, that makes this attack more efficient and
complicates searches of attacker. Attacker uses the
consumer program, which, in turn, interacts with the
handler program. The handler sends commands to the
agents, that perform actual DoS attacks against
indicated system-victim. This paper also describes a
variety of countermeasures that should be taken to
prevent the network from DDoS attack.
Xianjun Geng et al. in [4] describe that the ill-famed,
crippling attack on e-commerce’s top companies in
February 2000 and the revenant proof of active
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network scanning—a sign of attackers probing for
network weaknesses everywhere the Internet—are
harbingers of future Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks. They signify the continued
dissemination of the evil daemon programs that area
unit likely to lead to repeated DDoS attacks in the
foreseeable future. This paper provide info about
network weaknesses that DDoS attacks exploit the
technological intility of addressing the problem solely
at the native level, potential global solutions, and why
global solutions require an economic incentive
framework.
In [5], Vicky Laurens et al. describe that as a result of
money losses caused by Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks; most defence mechanisms are
deployed at the network wherever the target server is
located. This paper believes that this paradigm should
change in order to tackle the DDoS threat in its basis:
thwart agent machines participation in DDoS attacks.
Paper consists of developing an agent to observe the
packet traffic rate (outgoing packets / incoming
packets).The deployment is based upon characterizing
TCP connections; traditional TCP connections are
often characterized by the ratio of the sent packets to
the received packets from a given destination.
Preliminary results have shown that the traffic ratio
values usually present larger values at the start of the
run when there are not enough packets to make a
decision on whether or not traffic is legitimate. A low
value for threshold allows for quicker attack detection,
but it will also increases the amount of false-positives.
Although results are promising, more analysis should
be conducted.
In [6],Stephen M. Specht et al. describe that
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have
become an oversized downside for users of laptop
systems connected to the web. DDoS attackers hijack
secondary victim systems using them to wage a
coordinated large-scale attack against primary victim
systems. As new countermeasures are developed to
prevent or mitigate DDoS attacks, attackers are
constantly developing new methods to circumvent
these new countermeasures. This paper gives us
information about DDoS attack models and proposed
taxonomies to characterize the scope of DDoS attacks,
the characteristics of the software attack tools used,
and the countermeasures available. These taxonomies
illustrate similarities and patterns in numerous DDoS
attacks and tools, to help within the development of
more generalized solutions to countering DDoS
attacks, including new derivative attacks. It is
essential, that as the Internet and Internet usage
expand, more comprehensive solutions and
countermeasures to DDoS attacks be developed,
verified, and enforced. Thus, this paper describes that
DDoS attacks create a networked system or service
inaccessible to legitimate users. These attacks are an
annoyance at a minimum, or can be seriously
damaging if a critical system is the primary victim.
Loss of network resources causes economic loss, work
delays, and loss of communication between network
users. Solutions should be developed to prevent these
DDoS attacks.
Qiming Li et al. in his paper [7], mention that
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose a
serious threat to service convenience of the victim
network by severely degrading its performance. There
has been significant interest in the use of statistical-based
filtering to defend against and mitigate the
effect of DDoS attacks. Below this approach, packet
statistics are monitored to classify normal and
abnormal behavior. Under attack, packets that are
classified as abnormal are dropped by the filter that
guards the victim network. This paper provides the
effectiveness of DDoS attacks on such statistical-based
filtering in a general context where the attackers
are “smart”. They first give an optimal policy for the
filter when the statistical behaviors of both the
attackers and the filter are static. Next, this paper
considers cases where both the attacker and the filter
can dynamically change their behavior, possibly
depending on the perceived behavior of the other
party. This paper observes that whereas an adaptive
filter can effectively defend against a static attacker,
the filter will perform a lot of worse if the attacker is
more dynamic than perceived.
B.B.Gupta in [8] ,has used anomaly based mostly
DDOS detection technique to seek out the anomalies
whenever the network traffic deviated fron traditional
profile beyond threshold. The extent of deviation
from threshold is employed as input to artificial neural
network (ANN) ,to predict the number of
zombies,which is useful to suppress the result of
attack. During this paper,the author is attemping to
seek outthe connection between the number of
zombies involved in a flooding DDOS attack and
deviation in entropy. The author used back
propagation algo in feed forward network,which uses
gradient decent optimization technique to train the
network.
In [9], Moore et. Al has created an to suppress the
result of attack by selecting the predicted range of
most suspicious attack sources for either filtering or
rate limiting. For this the autor used back scater
analysis to estimate range of spoofed addresses
involved in DDOS attack.This is an offline analysis
suppored on unsolicitated responses.
In [10], the authors introduced a dynamic DoS attack
that is characterized by exploiting the node mobility,
dynamic power management, and compromised nodes
to spread new DoS attacks dynamically.The authors
have mentioned static and dynamic DoS attacks. The
DoS attacks launched on link layer and network layer
is called as static DoS attack. Eg. Black hole and Jelly
fish attack. Malicious nodes could also be able to
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move around the entire network, to regulate
transmission power dynamically, or maybe to
propagate DoS attacks by compromising their
cooperative neighbors. Therefore, the DoS attacks
may become dynamic in terms of the expansion of
attack coverage and also the propagation of attack
impact.
In [11], the authors proposed a model to characterize
the DDoS flooding attack and its traffic statistics. Also
, they proposed an analytical model for probing for
specific patterns of the attack traffic, going to decide
if there’s associate degree anomaly within the traffic
and whether or not the anomaly is that the DDoS
attack and to choose the time once the attack is
launched. The flooding attack aims to paralyze the
complete network by inserting overwhelming attack
traffic (e.g. RREQ broadcasting) into the MANET.
The advantage of this technique is to detect DDoS
attacks more effectively by traffic pattern
identification proposed in their work.
In [12], the author proposed a system which consists
of a consumer detector and a server detector for
producing warning of a DDoS attack. The consumer
detector uses a Bloom filter -based detection scheme
to generate accurate detection results and it consumes
smallest storage and process resources. Its main task is
to observe the TCP control packets entering and
leaving a network. The detection theme is developed
from a modified hash table.The server detector will
actively assist the warning process by sending
requests to innocent hosts. With the help of consumer
detectors, a server detector can detect a forthcoming
DDoS attack at an early stage
Antonio Challita et al. in [13] describe different kinds
of DDoS attacks, present recent DDoS defense ways
as published in technical papers, and propose a novel
approach to counter DDoS. Based on common defense
principles and taking into account the different types
of DDoS attacks, this paper survey defense ways and
classify them according to many criteria. This paper
proposes a simple-to-integrate DDoS victim based
defense method, Packet Funneling, that aims at
mitigating an attack’s effect on the victim. During this
approach, heavy traffic is “funneled” before being
passed to its destination node, so preventing
congestion at the node’s access link and keeping the
node on-line. This technique is simple to integrate,
requires no collaboration between nodes, introduces
no overhead, and adds slight delays only in case of
heavy network loads. The proposed packet funneling
approach promises to be a suitable means of coping
with DDoS traffic, with simple integration at minimal
price.
In [14],Rizwan Khan et al. describes that Mobile ad
hoc networks area unit expected to be wide utilized in
the close to future. However, they are vulnerable to
numerous security threats because of their inherent
characteristics. Malicious flooding attacks are one of
the fatal attacks on mobile ad hoc networks. These
attacks will severely clog an entire network, as a result
of clogging the victim node. If collaborative multiple
attacks area unit conducted, it becomes harder to
prevent. To defend against these attacks, the authors
propose a novel defense mechanism in mobile ad hoc
networks. The proposed scheme enhances the number
of legitimate packet processing at each node. The
simulation results show that the proposed scheme also
improves the end-to-end packet delivery ratio.
III.HOW FLOODING ATTACK IN MANET
OCCURS
The Flooding attack occupation was proposed in [10].
Flood attacks occur when a network or service
becomes so weighed down with packets initiating
incomplete connection requests that it can no longer
process genuine connection requests. By flooding a
server or host with connections that cannot be
completed, the flood attack eventually fills the hosts
memory buffer. Once this buffer is full no further
connections can be made, and the result is a Denial of
Service. Flooding packets in the whole network will
consume a lot of network resources. To reduce
congestion, the protocol has already adopted some
methods which are briefly described as follows.
1) Firstly, the number of RREQ that can be originated
per second is limited. Secondly, after broadcasting a
RREQ, the initiator will wait for a ROUTE REPLY. If
a route is not received within round-trip milliseconds,
the node may try again to discover a route by
broadcasting another RREQ, until it reaches a
maximum of retry times at the maximum TTL value.
Time intervals between repeated attempts by a source
node at route discovery for a single destination must
satisfy a binary exponential back off. The first time a
source node broadcasts a RREQ, it waits round-trip
time for the reception of a ROUTE REPLY [11].
2) But for the second RREQ, the time to wait for the
ROUTE REPLY should be calculated according to a
binary exponential back off, by which the waiting
time now becomes 2 * round-trip time.
3) Thirdly, The RREQ packets are broadcasted in an
incremental ring to reduce the overhead caused by
flooding the whole network. At first, the packets are
flooded in a small area confined by a small starting
time-to-live (TTL) in the IP headers. After RING
TRAVERSAL TIME, if no ROUTE REPLY is
received, the forwarding area is enlarged by increasing
the TTL by a fixed value. The procedure is repeated
until a ROUTE REPLY is received which means that
a route has been found. In the flooding attack, the
attack node violates the above rules to exhaust the
network resources. Firstly, the attacker will produce
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many IP addresses which do not exist in the networks
if he knows the scope of the IP addresses in the
networks. As no node can return ROUTE REPLY
packets for this ROUTE REQUEST, the reverse route
in the nodes’ route table will be conserved longer than
normal. If the attacker cannot get the scope of IP
addresses in the network, he can just choose random
IP addresses. Secondly, the attacker successively
originates mass RREQ messages with these void IP
addresses as destination and tries to send excessive
RREQ without considering the RREQ RATELIMIT,
that is, without waiting for the ROUTE REPLY or
waiting a round-trip time. Besides, the TTL of RREQ
is set up to a maximum at the beginning without using
an expanding ring search method. Under such attack,
the whole network will be full of RREQ packets from
the attacker. The communication bandwidth and other
node resources will be exhausted by the flooded
RREQ packets. For example, the storage of route table
is limited. If the large amounts of RREQ packets are
arriving in a very short time, the storage of the route
table in the node will be used up soon so that the node
cannot receive new RREQ packets any more.[12]
IV. EFFECT OF FLOODING ATTACK
Flooding Attack will seriously degrade the
performance of reactive routing protocols and have an
effect on a node within the following ways. This was
proposed in [11].
A. Degrade the performance in buffer: The buffer
used by the routing protocol may exceed the limit
since a reactive protocol needs to buffer data packets
when the RREQ packets are being sent by the source
node. Also, if a large number of data packets
originating from the application layer are actually
unreachable, genuine data packets in the buffer may
be replaced by these unreachable data packets,
depending on the buffer management scheme used.
B. Degrade the performance in wireless interface:
Depending on the design of the interface of wireless
network, the buffer used by the wireless network
interface may overflow due to the large number of
RREQs sent in the route discovery process. Similarly,
genuine data packets may be dropped if routing
packets have higher priority over data packets.
C. Degrade the performance in RREQ packets:
Since RREQ packets are broadcast into the entire
network, the increased number of RREQ packets in
the network results in more MAC layer collisions and
congestion in the network and delays for the data
packets. Higher level protocols like TCP which is
sensitive to round trip times and congestion in the
network gets affected.
D. Degrade the performance in lifetime of Manet:
Since MANET nodes are likely to be power and
bandwidth constrained, useless RREQ packets
transmission can reduce the lifetime of the network
also incurring additional overheads of authenticating a
large number of RREQs.
The following metrics are used to evaluate the
performance of flooding attack.
• Packet loss rate:
The ratio of the number of packets dropped by the
nodes divided by the number of packets originated by
the application layer continuous bit rate (CBR)
sources. The packet loss ratio is important as it
describes the loss rate that can be seen by the transport
protocols, which in turn affects the maximum
throughput that the network can support. The metric
characterizes both the completeness and correctness of
the routing protocol.
• Average delay:
Average of delays incurred by all the packets which
are successfully transmitted.
• Throughput:
Average number of packets per second × packet size.
• Average number of hops:
Total length of all routes divided by the total number
of routes.
V. FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPOSED
METHODOLOGY
Disabling IP Broadcasts: A broadcast is a data
packet that is destined for multiple hosts. Broadcasts
can take place at the data link layer and the network
layer. Data-link broadcasts are sent to all hosts
attached to a particular physical network. Network
layer broadcasts are sent to all hosts attached to a
particular logical network. The Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) supports the
following types of broadcast packets:
a) All ones: By setting the broadcast address to all
ones (255.255.255.255), all hosts on the network
receive the broadcast.
b) Network: By setting the broadcast address to a
specific network number in the network portion of the
IP address and setting all ones in the host portion of
the broadcast address, all hosts on the specified
network receive the broadcast. For example, when a
broadcast packet is sent with the broadcast address of
131.108.255.255, all hosts on network number
131.108 receive the broadcast.
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c) Subnet: By setting the broadcast address to a
specific network number and a specific sub
number, all hosts on the specified subnet receive the
broadcast. For example, when a broadcast packet is set
with the broadcast address of 131.108.3.255, all hosts
on subnet 3 of network 131.108 receive the broadcast.
Because broadcasts are recognized
hosts, a significant goal of router configuration is to
control unnecessary proliferation of broadcast packets.
Cisco routers support two kinds of broadcasts:
directed and flooded. A directed broadcast is a packet
sent to a specific network or seri
whereas a flooded broadcast is a packet sent to every
network. In IP internetworks, most broadcasts take the
form of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) broadcasts.
Consider the example of flooded broadcast
which cause DDoS attack. Here, a nasty
attack is the Smurf attack, which is made possible
mostly because of badly configured network devices
that respond to ICMP echoes sent to broadcast
addresses. The attacker sends a large amount of ICMP
traffic to a broadcast address and uses a
address as the source IP so the replies from all the
devices that respond to the broadcast address will
flood the victim. The nasty part of this attack is that
the attacker can use a low-bandwidth connection to
kill high-bandwidth connections.
traffic sent by the attacker is multiplied by a factor
equal to the number of hosts behind the router that
reply to the ICMP echo packets
Figure 3.1 Smurf Attack
The diagram in Figure depicts a Smurf attack in
progress. The attacker sends a stream of ICMP echo
packets to the router at 128Kbps. The attacker
modifies the packets by changing the source IP to the
IP address of the victim’s computer so replies to the
echo packets will be sent to that address. The
destination address of the packets is a broadcast
address of the so-called bounce site
129.63.255.255. If the router is (mis
Sept-Oct, 2014.ISSN:2349-7173(Online)
NUMBER OF
ATTACKERS
PER
NETWORK
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org
subnet
by all
series of networks,
type of DDoS
victim’s IP
The amount of
t site, in this case
mis-) configured to
forward these broadcasts to hosts on the other side of
the router (by forwarding layer 3 broadcasts to the
layer 2 broadcast address FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF) all
these host will reply. In the above example that would
mean 630Kbps (5 x 128Kbps) of ICMP replies will be
sent to the victim’s system, which would effectively
disable its 512Kbps connection. Besides the target
system, the intermediate router is also a victim, and
thus also the hosts in the bounce site. A similar attack
that uses UDP echo packets instead of ICMP echo
packets is called a Fraggle attack.
From above example it is cle
broadcast cause the flood on the victim node. By
disabling IP Broadcasts, host computers can no longer
be used as amplifiers in ICMP Flood and Smurf
attacks. However, to defend against this attack, all
neighboring networks need to disable IP bro
VI. PROPOSED WORK & RESULTS
Proposed technique to implement prevention
mechanism is By Disabling IP Broadcast. IP
Broadcast is employed in DSR routing Protocols to
broadcast RREQ packets on all the nodes within the
network. Flood attack happens be
numerous RREQ packets within the network in order
that network becomes congested and no bandwidth is
obtainable to send packets. Thus by disabling the IP
Broadcast all the RREQs that are broadcast to all
nodes is disabled.
We place a threshold value on the scale of
packet ,which can be sent by a node and if a node
exceeds the threshold value then it will be considered
as an attacker node. After finding the attacker nodes,
we have a tendency to handle it by finding the path
during which attack is being executed and summing
up the broadcast ids whose effect will be nullified.
Code for implementing the technique is shown in
Figure. This is implemented in Get Broadcast ID
function of dsr.pc file.
.
WITHOUT
ATTACK
NUMBER OF COLLISIONS PER NETWORK
FLOODING
BASED DDoS
ATTACK
EXISTING
PREVENTION
TECHNIQUE
3 11 8543 7055
4 11 8571 7091
5 11 8685 7175
6 11 8741 7233
7 11 8756 7315
8 11 8897 7400
9 11 8918 7535
Page 18
ng clear that IP
broadcasts.
. because of initiating
reshold ttack PREVENTION
TECHNIQUE(A
ODV)
PROPOSED
PREVENTION
TECHNIQUE(D
SR)
3955 979
4018 1313
4175 644
4210 668
4315 430
4400 527
4535 706
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Access Online Journal) Volume1, Issue2, Sept-Oct, 2014.ISSN:2349-7173(Online)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
VII.CONCLUSION
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
BASE
PAPER
PREVENTIO
N
TECHNIQU
E
The proposed scheme incurs no further overhead,
because it makes minimal modifications to the present
data structures and functions associated to blacklisting
a node within the existing version of pure DSR. Also
the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of its
resultant routes established, resource reservations and
its computational complexity.
REFERENCES:
[1]Lu Han “Wireless Ad hoc Networks” October 8, 2004.
[2]Kamanshis Biswas “Security Threats in Mobile ad-hoc
Networks” March 2007.
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