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"Resident Evil" of SmartPhones--Wombie Attack
Huiming Liu
Tencent Xuanwu Lab
Contents
1.Overview
2.Demo Time
3.Technique details
4.Conclusion
ATTACKER Phone A Phone B
ATTACKER Phone A Phone B
ATTACKER Phone A Phone B
Demo Time
Technique Details
1.Firmware Patch
2.Wireless Zombie Implementation
3.Conclusion
Patch Firware? Why?
• In a word, Launch Karma attack on a smartphone
• Karma Attack
• If you have ever connected to a WiFi, Your devices will frequently send probe request to find it.
• Many devices will automatically connect if get correct responses, which is very easy to forge when the
devices send directed probes.
• Then, the devices may become MITM victims
• How about on Latest smartphones?
Karma Attack! But on Android?
• Latest Android Versions won’t send directed probe normally
• However
• All of them will send BROADCAST probe…we can use SSID dictionary to launch Karma Attack.
• Add a network manually will STILL send directed probe
• Some ROMs will send directed probe MISTAKENLY
• How about being an attacker
• WiFi chip on the SmartPhones can be both in STA and AP mode
• SmartPhones are essentially mobile and of massive amount
• If we can make the victim attack and infect another victim. The situation will be much worse
Patch Firware to Make phone infectious – How?
• Reverse Engineering the firmware
• Patch Probe Request Handler
• Patch Association Request Handler
Patch Probe Request in the UCODE? NOT GOOD!
Instead, Forward Probe Request to Firmware Layer and Response!
• Patch 1 line in UCODE to forward to firmware
• hook sub_19610E
• Call wlc_bcn_prb_template to generate template
• Modify dst mac and ssid
Patch Association Request Handler (Nexus 5) -- How?
Patch Association Request Handler (Nexus 6p) -- How?
• All required Information Elements’ parse function pointers are stored in an array dynamically created in Firmware(RAM)
• Information Element SSID’s parse function is implemented in ROM (Hard to Modify)
• So, we choose to modify the firmware instead of the ROM
• hook a function(sub_1B03AC) in Firmware
• Implement a SSID’s parse function
• Replace its original parse function pointer with our new function pointer
• Nexmon
• C-based Firmware Patching Framework for Broadcom/Cypress WiFi Chips that enables Monitor Mode, Frame Injection and much more
Results
Nexus 5
BCM4339
6.37.34.43
Nexus 6P
BCM4358
7.112.200.17
Wombie Attack Process
• Step1: Launch Karma attack to MITM other phones.
• Step2: Get RCE by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the victims’ smartphones
• Step3: Get Root Access and modify the firmware and set attack environment.
• Step4: The victim infects another victim
What’s Inside Wireless Zombie?
• 1. Background AP
• 2. MITM module
• 3. Exploit and Environment Setup module
Background AP
Traffic Hijack
Module
Exploit
Payloads
• Google’s Latest data (OCT 2017):
• Android version <=5.x 50%
• Latest Android Release Version 0.2%
• Version <= 4.x 22.3%
How to get RCE/ROOT? Android Fragmentation!
Impact
• Invisible Attack:
• Doesn't rely on Internet to spread, so we can't detect it on the internet
• Magnifier:
• Easier to exploit & more severe consequences
Combined with Krack(ATTACK WPA2)?
• Krack attack’s preconditions can be satisfied within our attack model.
• Preconditions
• Clone original wifi to a different channel
• Monitor, block and send specific message
• The way we can make it in our model
• Nexmon to Intercept Packets. (OK)
• Like running tcpdump in monitor mode and airbase-ng in the same time. (OK)
• But the Exploit Scripts are not released now
• Krack attack to WPA2 can be combined with our karma attack to launch and spread more easily
Conclusion
• 1. Karma attack to smartphone is very dangerous due to android fragmentation and the smartphone’s mobility.
• 2. To defend against this attack model, we must working with system security, wireless security, hardware security
• 3. There’s no absolute security. Apart from the vendor’s effort, the users also need to pay more attention.
Acknowledgement
Daxing Guo
Bin Ma
TombKeeper

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Huiming Liu-'resident evil' of smart phones--wombie attack

  • 1. "Resident Evil" of SmartPhones--Wombie Attack Huiming Liu Tencent Xuanwu Lab
  • 7. Technique Details 1.Firmware Patch 2.Wireless Zombie Implementation 3.Conclusion
  • 8. Patch Firware? Why? • In a word, Launch Karma attack on a smartphone • Karma Attack • If you have ever connected to a WiFi, Your devices will frequently send probe request to find it. • Many devices will automatically connect if get correct responses, which is very easy to forge when the devices send directed probes. • Then, the devices may become MITM victims • How about on Latest smartphones?
  • 9. Karma Attack! But on Android? • Latest Android Versions won’t send directed probe normally • However • All of them will send BROADCAST probe…we can use SSID dictionary to launch Karma Attack. • Add a network manually will STILL send directed probe • Some ROMs will send directed probe MISTAKENLY • How about being an attacker • WiFi chip on the SmartPhones can be both in STA and AP mode • SmartPhones are essentially mobile and of massive amount • If we can make the victim attack and infect another victim. The situation will be much worse
  • 10. Patch Firware to Make phone infectious – How? • Reverse Engineering the firmware • Patch Probe Request Handler • Patch Association Request Handler
  • 11. Patch Probe Request in the UCODE? NOT GOOD!
  • 12. Instead, Forward Probe Request to Firmware Layer and Response! • Patch 1 line in UCODE to forward to firmware • hook sub_19610E • Call wlc_bcn_prb_template to generate template • Modify dst mac and ssid
  • 13. Patch Association Request Handler (Nexus 5) -- How?
  • 14. Patch Association Request Handler (Nexus 6p) -- How? • All required Information Elements’ parse function pointers are stored in an array dynamically created in Firmware(RAM) • Information Element SSID’s parse function is implemented in ROM (Hard to Modify) • So, we choose to modify the firmware instead of the ROM • hook a function(sub_1B03AC) in Firmware • Implement a SSID’s parse function • Replace its original parse function pointer with our new function pointer • Nexmon • C-based Firmware Patching Framework for Broadcom/Cypress WiFi Chips that enables Monitor Mode, Frame Injection and much more
  • 16. Wombie Attack Process • Step1: Launch Karma attack to MITM other phones. • Step2: Get RCE by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the victims’ smartphones • Step3: Get Root Access and modify the firmware and set attack environment. • Step4: The victim infects another victim
  • 17. What’s Inside Wireless Zombie? • 1. Background AP • 2. MITM module • 3. Exploit and Environment Setup module Background AP Traffic Hijack Module Exploit Payloads
  • 18. • Google’s Latest data (OCT 2017): • Android version <=5.x 50% • Latest Android Release Version 0.2% • Version <= 4.x 22.3% How to get RCE/ROOT? Android Fragmentation!
  • 19. Impact • Invisible Attack: • Doesn't rely on Internet to spread, so we can't detect it on the internet • Magnifier: • Easier to exploit & more severe consequences
  • 20. Combined with Krack(ATTACK WPA2)? • Krack attack’s preconditions can be satisfied within our attack model. • Preconditions • Clone original wifi to a different channel • Monitor, block and send specific message • The way we can make it in our model • Nexmon to Intercept Packets. (OK) • Like running tcpdump in monitor mode and airbase-ng in the same time. (OK) • But the Exploit Scripts are not released now • Krack attack to WPA2 can be combined with our karma attack to launch and spread more easily
  • 21. Conclusion • 1. Karma attack to smartphone is very dangerous due to android fragmentation and the smartphone’s mobility. • 2. To defend against this attack model, we must working with system security, wireless security, hardware security • 3. There’s no absolute security. Apart from the vendor’s effort, the users also need to pay more attention.