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Chapter 10 Firewalls Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden http://www.its.bth.se/staff/hjo/ +46-708-250375
Outline Firewall Design Principles Firewall Characteristics Types of Firewalls Firewall Configurations Trusted Systems Data Access Control The Concept of Trusted systems Trojan Horse Defense
Firewalls Effective means of protection a local system or network of systems from network-based security threats while affording access to the outside world via WAN`s or the Internet
Firewall Design Principles Information systems undergo a steady evolution (from small LAN`s to Internet connectivity) Strong security features for all workstations and servers not established
Firewall Design Principles The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the Internet Aims: Establish a controlled link Protect the premises network from Internet-based attacks Provide a single choke point
Firewall Characteristics Design goals: All traffic from inside to outside must pass through the firewall (physically blocking all access to the local network except via the firewall) Only authorized traffic (defined by the local security police) will be allowed to pass
Firewall Characteristics Design goals: The firewall itself is immune to penetration (use of trusted system with a secure operating system)
Firewall Characteristics Four general techniques: Service control Determines the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound Direction control Determines the direction in which particular service requests are allowed to flow
Firewall Characteristics User control Controls access to a service according to which user is attempting to access it Behavior control Controls how particular services are used (e.g. filter e-mail)
Types of Firewalls Three common types of Firewalls: Packet-filtering routers Application-level gateways Circuit-level gateways (Bastion host)
Types of Firewalls Packet-filtering Router
Types of Firewalls Packet-filtering Router Applies a set of rules to each incoming IP packet and then forwards or discards the packet Filter packets going in both directions The packet filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header Two default policies (discard or forward)
Types of Firewalls Advantages: Simplicity Transparency to users High speed Disadvantages: Difficulty of setting up packet filter rules Lack of Authentication
Types of Firewalls Possible attacks and appropriate countermeasures IP address spoofing Source routing attacks Tiny fragment attacks
Types of Firewalls Application-level Gateway
Types of Firewalls Application-level Gateway Also called proxy server Acts as a relay of application-level traffic
Types of Firewalls Advantages: Higher security than packet filters Only need to scrutinize a few allowable applications Easy to log and audit all incoming traffic Disadvantages: Additional processing overhead on each connection (gateway as splice point)
Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway
Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway Stand-alone system or Specialized function performed by an Application-level Gateway Sets up two TCP connections The gateway typically relays TCP segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents
Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed Typically use is a situation in which the system administrator trusts the internal users An example is the SOCKS package
Types of Firewalls Bastion Host A system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical strong point in the network´s security The bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level gateway
Firewall Configurations In addition to the use of simple configuration of a single system (single packet filtering router or single gateway), more complex configurations are possible Three common configurations
Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (single-homed bastion host)
Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration Firewall consists of two systems: A packet-filtering router A bastion host
Firewall Configurations Configuration for the packet-filtering router: Only packets from and to the bastion host are allowed to pass through the router The bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions
Firewall Configurations Greater security than single configurations because of two reasons: This configuration implements both packet-level and application-level filtering (allowing for flexibility in defining security policy) An intruder must generally penetrate two separate systems
Firewall Configurations This configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access (public information server, e.g. Web server)
Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (dual-homed bastion host)
Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration The packet-filtering router is not completely compromised Traffic between the Internet and other hosts on the private network has to flow through the bastion host
Firewall Configurations Screened-subnet firewall system
Firewall Configurations Screened subnet firewall configuration Most secure configuration of the three Two packet-filtering routers are used Creation of an isolated sub-network
Firewall Configurations Advantages: Three levels of defense to thwart intruders The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the Internet (internal network is invisible to the Internet)
Firewall Configurations Advantages: The inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the internal network (the systems on the inside network cannot construct direct routes to the Internet)
Trusted Systems One way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious programs is to implement trusted system technology
Data Access Control Through the user access control procedure (log on), a user can be identified to the system Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible operations and file accesses The operation system can enforce rules based on the user profile
Data Access Control General models of access control: Access matrix Access control list Capability list
Data Access Control Access Matrix
Data Access Control Access Matrix: Basic elements of the model Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects, the concept of subject equates with that of process Object: Anything to which access is controlled (e.g. files, programs) Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject (e.g. read, write, execute)
Data Access Control Access Control List: Decomposition of the matrix by columns
Data Access Control Access Control List An access control list lists users and their permitted access right The list may contain a default or public entry
Data Access Control Capability list: Decomposition of the matrix by rows
Data Access Control Capability list A capability ticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user Each user have a number of tickets
The Concept of Trusted Systems Trusted Systems Protection of data and resources on the basis of levels of security (e.g. military) Users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of data
The Concept of Trusted Systems Multilevel security Definition of multiple categories or levels of data A multilevel secure system must enforce: No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level (Simple Security Property) No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal security level (*-Property)
The Concept of Trusted Systems Reference Monitor Concept: Multilevel security for a data processing system
The Concept of Trusted Systems
The Concept of Trusted Systems Reference Monitor Controlling element in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of subjects to objects on basis of security parameters The monitor has access to a file (security kernel database) The monitor enforces the security rules (no read up, no write down)
The Concept of Trusted Systems Properties of the Reference Monitor Complete mediation: Security rules are enforced on every access Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized modification Verifiability: The reference monitor’s correctness must be provable (mathematically)
The Concept of Trusted Systems A system that can provide such verifications (properties) is referred to as a trusted system
Trojan Horse Defense Secure, trusted operating systems are one way to secure against Trojan Horse attacks
Trojan Horse Defense
Trojan Horse Defense
Recommended Reading Chapman, D., and Zwicky, E. Building Internet Firewalls. O’Reilly, 1995 Cheswick, W., and Bellovin, S. Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley, 2000 Gasser, M. Building a Secure Computer System. Reinhold, 1988 Pfleeger, C. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 1997

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Firewals in Network Security NS10

  • 1. Chapter 10 Firewalls Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden http://www.its.bth.se/staff/hjo/ +46-708-250375
  • 2. Outline Firewall Design Principles Firewall Characteristics Types of Firewalls Firewall Configurations Trusted Systems Data Access Control The Concept of Trusted systems Trojan Horse Defense
  • 3. Firewalls Effective means of protection a local system or network of systems from network-based security threats while affording access to the outside world via WAN`s or the Internet
  • 4. Firewall Design Principles Information systems undergo a steady evolution (from small LAN`s to Internet connectivity) Strong security features for all workstations and servers not established
  • 5. Firewall Design Principles The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the Internet Aims: Establish a controlled link Protect the premises network from Internet-based attacks Provide a single choke point
  • 6. Firewall Characteristics Design goals: All traffic from inside to outside must pass through the firewall (physically blocking all access to the local network except via the firewall) Only authorized traffic (defined by the local security police) will be allowed to pass
  • 7. Firewall Characteristics Design goals: The firewall itself is immune to penetration (use of trusted system with a secure operating system)
  • 8. Firewall Characteristics Four general techniques: Service control Determines the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound Direction control Determines the direction in which particular service requests are allowed to flow
  • 9. Firewall Characteristics User control Controls access to a service according to which user is attempting to access it Behavior control Controls how particular services are used (e.g. filter e-mail)
  • 10. Types of Firewalls Three common types of Firewalls: Packet-filtering routers Application-level gateways Circuit-level gateways (Bastion host)
  • 11. Types of Firewalls Packet-filtering Router
  • 12. Types of Firewalls Packet-filtering Router Applies a set of rules to each incoming IP packet and then forwards or discards the packet Filter packets going in both directions The packet filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header Two default policies (discard or forward)
  • 13. Types of Firewalls Advantages: Simplicity Transparency to users High speed Disadvantages: Difficulty of setting up packet filter rules Lack of Authentication
  • 14. Types of Firewalls Possible attacks and appropriate countermeasures IP address spoofing Source routing attacks Tiny fragment attacks
  • 15. Types of Firewalls Application-level Gateway
  • 16. Types of Firewalls Application-level Gateway Also called proxy server Acts as a relay of application-level traffic
  • 17. Types of Firewalls Advantages: Higher security than packet filters Only need to scrutinize a few allowable applications Easy to log and audit all incoming traffic Disadvantages: Additional processing overhead on each connection (gateway as splice point)
  • 18. Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway
  • 19. Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway Stand-alone system or Specialized function performed by an Application-level Gateway Sets up two TCP connections The gateway typically relays TCP segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents
  • 20. Types of Firewalls Circuit-level Gateway The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed Typically use is a situation in which the system administrator trusts the internal users An example is the SOCKS package
  • 21. Types of Firewalls Bastion Host A system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical strong point in the network´s security The bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level gateway
  • 22. Firewall Configurations In addition to the use of simple configuration of a single system (single packet filtering router or single gateway), more complex configurations are possible Three common configurations
  • 23. Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (single-homed bastion host)
  • 24. Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration Firewall consists of two systems: A packet-filtering router A bastion host
  • 25. Firewall Configurations Configuration for the packet-filtering router: Only packets from and to the bastion host are allowed to pass through the router The bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions
  • 26. Firewall Configurations Greater security than single configurations because of two reasons: This configuration implements both packet-level and application-level filtering (allowing for flexibility in defining security policy) An intruder must generally penetrate two separate systems
  • 27. Firewall Configurations This configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access (public information server, e.g. Web server)
  • 28. Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (dual-homed bastion host)
  • 29. Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration The packet-filtering router is not completely compromised Traffic between the Internet and other hosts on the private network has to flow through the bastion host
  • 31. Firewall Configurations Screened subnet firewall configuration Most secure configuration of the three Two packet-filtering routers are used Creation of an isolated sub-network
  • 32. Firewall Configurations Advantages: Three levels of defense to thwart intruders The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the Internet (internal network is invisible to the Internet)
  • 33. Firewall Configurations Advantages: The inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the internal network (the systems on the inside network cannot construct direct routes to the Internet)
  • 34. Trusted Systems One way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious programs is to implement trusted system technology
  • 35. Data Access Control Through the user access control procedure (log on), a user can be identified to the system Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible operations and file accesses The operation system can enforce rules based on the user profile
  • 36. Data Access Control General models of access control: Access matrix Access control list Capability list
  • 37. Data Access Control Access Matrix
  • 38. Data Access Control Access Matrix: Basic elements of the model Subject: An entity capable of accessing objects, the concept of subject equates with that of process Object: Anything to which access is controlled (e.g. files, programs) Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject (e.g. read, write, execute)
  • 39. Data Access Control Access Control List: Decomposition of the matrix by columns
  • 40. Data Access Control Access Control List An access control list lists users and their permitted access right The list may contain a default or public entry
  • 41. Data Access Control Capability list: Decomposition of the matrix by rows
  • 42. Data Access Control Capability list A capability ticket specifies authorized objects and operations for a user Each user have a number of tickets
  • 43. The Concept of Trusted Systems Trusted Systems Protection of data and resources on the basis of levels of security (e.g. military) Users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of data
  • 44. The Concept of Trusted Systems Multilevel security Definition of multiple categories or levels of data A multilevel secure system must enforce: No read up: A subject can only read an object of less or equal security level (Simple Security Property) No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal security level (*-Property)
  • 45. The Concept of Trusted Systems Reference Monitor Concept: Multilevel security for a data processing system
  • 46. The Concept of Trusted Systems
  • 47. The Concept of Trusted Systems Reference Monitor Controlling element in the hardware and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of subjects to objects on basis of security parameters The monitor has access to a file (security kernel database) The monitor enforces the security rules (no read up, no write down)
  • 48. The Concept of Trusted Systems Properties of the Reference Monitor Complete mediation: Security rules are enforced on every access Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized modification Verifiability: The reference monitor’s correctness must be provable (mathematically)
  • 49. The Concept of Trusted Systems A system that can provide such verifications (properties) is referred to as a trusted system
  • 50. Trojan Horse Defense Secure, trusted operating systems are one way to secure against Trojan Horse attacks
  • 53. Recommended Reading Chapman, D., and Zwicky, E. Building Internet Firewalls. O’Reilly, 1995 Cheswick, W., and Bellovin, S. Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley, 2000 Gasser, M. Building a Secure Computer System. Reinhold, 1988 Pfleeger, C. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 1997