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[CB16] BLE authentication design challenges on smartphone controlled IoT devices: analyzing Gogoro Smart Scooter by Chen-yu Dai [GD] & Professor Shi-Cho Cha [CSC]

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1. The document discusses challenges in designing authentication protocols for smartphones controlling IoT devices via BLE. Limited input/output interfaces and privacy standards for devices pose challenges. 2. The study focuses on analyzing BLE protocols to discover these challenges, applying the methods to commercial products like the popular Gogoro Smart Scooter. 3. Analyzing the Gogoro protocol revealed flaws without SMP pairing, allowing others to unlock scooters. A dual-counter enhanced authentication protocol is proposed to better authenticate devices.

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BLE authentication design challenges on smartphone controlled IoT devices: analyzing Gogoro Smart Scooter GD、CSC Privacy and Risk Management Lab IM, NTUST, Taiwan
Abstracts • Smartphones are commonly used as the controller and Internet gateway for BLE-enabled IoT devices. • Designing a strong authentication protocol between them is the key part of IoT security. • App design has challenges such as limited input / output interfaces and privacy protection standards. • Our study focused on the method to analyze BLE protocols, discovering and solving these challenges. • We applied this method on commercial products, including popular Gogoro Smart Scooter from Taiwan.
Speakers G D • Graduate Student at NTUST IM • CHROOT/HITCON Coordinator • Team T5 CTO • Digital Forensics & Incident Response • Threat Intelligence Program & Plat. • Research on Foods, plays CTFs • Occasionally got vulnerabilities • Synology Bounty Program (2015) CSC • Associate Professor at NTUST IM • Ph.D., Dept of IM, NTU • Gomaji (TW.8472) Board member • CISSP, CCFP, CSSLP, CISM, PMP • Published many practical security papers on journals. Helped many private and public sectors to establish info security policy.
Table of content 1. introduction to Bt Low Energy, Security Manager Protocol, Smartphone authentications to controls IoT devices via BLE. 2. BLE 4.0 has many privacy features, restricting vendor powers, Hardware identifiers are either limited or randomized. 3. Challenges when designing auth methods, many vendors giving up SMP pairing, using just plaintext transmissions. 4. How to analyze BLE protocols, we exaimed many health and IoT devices, including Gogoro Smart Scooter vehicle. 5. Without SMP pairing, these vendor-designed authentications are sometimes flawed, so we are able to ignite other Gogoro. 6. We propose a better auth protocol: Dual-counter enhanced.
Bluetooth 4.0 High Speed Classic Low Energy WiFi mixed BT Most common BT Originally "Wibree" Persistent connections Persistent connections Non-persistent High power consump. Mid power consump. Low power consump. High bandwidth Mid bandwidth Low bandwidth Short range Mid range Long range (never tried) Headphones, Keyboards, Mouse Health wrists, Temp. sensors, IoT devices
Bluetooth 4.0 Low Energy Method 方向 功能 Request Central -> Peripheral 一般發送訊息 Response Peripheral -> Central 回覆 Request 用 Commands Central -> Peripheral 不用 Response Notifications Peripheral -> Central 不用 Confirm Indications Peripheral -> Central 需要 Confirm Confirmations Central -> Peripheral 回覆 Indication 用 Usually Server has smaller battery and operates only when requested. Fig. Ref: Stanfy Inc, 2015 BLE is session-less, 7 methods, similar to HTTP
BLE widely adopted in Health & IoT Curiosity to understand how it works.
BLE built-in profiles • Time, Temp, Engergy • Weight, User profile • Blood pressure, glocuse • Body mass, heart rate • Speed, direction, location
BLE playgrounds • Nordic nRF App • Node.js bleno
BLE is easy to hijack • Sending vibrate message to nearby MI wristbands Ref: “Le IoT 想想物聯網 blog”
All BLE sniffer got is in plaintext ?!
Security Manager Protocol Pairing Bonding Re-establishment Short Term Key Permanent Key Permanent Key
BLE 4.0 SMP pairing Pairing Mtd. MitM attacks Usability Just Works Vulnerable Convenient, Un-authed Passkey Entry If you brute-PIN Needs screen & Keyboard Out-Of-Band Secure via NFC Needs NFC transceivers BLE 4.2 screen numb. comp. Just Works is Un-authed Why vendors did not use SMP pairing: 1. Pairing takes time and effort 2. Paired does not always means secure 3. No screen for numeric comparison
BLE 4.0 privacy features • HW Identifier Read Limitations • Prevents App/Ads tracking user • MAC Address always 02000000000000 • HW Identifier Randomization • Prevents AP tracking/nearby scanning • MAC Address different per power-cycle • SMP paired device gets fixed MAC via IRK • How to authenticate device without HW identifier?
Gogoro Smart Scooter
Key Fob Unlock (BLE) Origin Handle Value Function Key Fob CONNECT_REQ Init connection Scooter 0x37 01 00 Command ID Scooter 0x25 c2 e7 20 bf d2 99 9d 43 68 c6 2d 65 39 3d 72 c9 f3 Rand. Challenge Key Fob 0x36 d2 25 57 33 19 18 51 fd ae 7d 1b ed 85 e0 10 78 e2 Signed. Response Scooter LL_TERMINATE_IND Ends connection (this is much better than widely adopted Keeloq protocol)
Mobile App (Gateway) • My Gogoro single-sign-on • App gets scooter information
Mobile App Pairing & Unlock Only GATT protocol, no BLE SMP pairing observed.
Vendor's challenge • How to design authentication protocol when we did not BLE pairing and have no HW identifier?
Analyzing method analyze protocol w/ Ubertooth One Reversing iOS & Android App Figure out unlock procedure Write simulation unlock program Analyze storage Security_Key Analyze Network API interfaces Threat Modeling Notify vendor Responsible disclosure
BLE Gogoro Service BLE Service UDID last 8 bytes must be Scooter MAC Address
Gogoro App Protocol Origin Cmd Function App A0 GetScooterSettingWithType App A1 GetScooterErrors App A2 GetScooterInfo App A3 SetScooterSetting Scooter A4 ScooterGetSettingStatus Scooter A5 ScooterErrorStatus Scooter A6 ScooterInfoState Scooter A7 ScooterSetSettingStatus Scooter A8 NotifyScooterError Scooter A9 NotifyInfo Scooter AE PurchasedStatus Scooter AF ScooterInfoState Scooter B0 ECU Challenge nonce App B1 ECU Response digest Scooter B2 ECU unknown Scooter B3 ECU Error App B4 ECU Cmd (Lock, Unlock, Open Trunk) B-prefix: ECU Challenge Response 90 A2 08 00 00 00 02 C4 (hex) 90: Header, A2: Command, 08: Length, 02: Parameter, C4: Checksum A-prefix: querying information
Gogoro Unlock flow 1. Scooter scans nearby peripheral for GATT Gogoro Service And if UUID {351AAF0F-}last 8 byte matches its MAC Address 2. Mobile App reads GATT Scooter status, enable unlock button. Click to send ECU_Cmd(0xB4): 00 Lock, 01 Unlock, 02 Op Truck 3. Scooter writes ECU_Challenge (0xB0), a random 256 bit nonce 4. Mobile App notify ECU_Response (0xB1), also 256 bits ECU_Response =SHA256(ECU_Challenge, Security_Key) 5. Scooter compares ECU_Response if correct then ECU_Cmd will be executed, Unlocked.
the Security_Key • ECU_Response =SHA256(ECU_Challenge, Security_Key) • Early App put Security_Key in Document folder (slightly encrypted) • iOS MobileAppProp.plist has ScooterSKey • Android Settings.xml has AppSettings_DefScooter/encryptedkey2 • Decrypting: AES-256, CBC/PKCS7Padding, IV=UserId, Key = ScooterUUID • Document folder can be backed-up via iTunes / Android adb • Various methods: cable Juicy Attack, iTunes backup folder extraction etc. • AndroidManifest.xml has allowBackup flag set to true • Security_Key can be retrieved from WebAPI • Attacker can brute My Gogoro membership • App Cookie can be stolden (MobileAppProp.plist has Web_Token) • https://mobile-pro.gogoroapp.com/WebService/Web/GetKey
Insecure App Data Storage • Token, Certificate should be stored encrypted • Manages Timeout, Password Tamper etc. • Limits user, process access and key export • Most OS platforms has secure storage zone • Apple iOS/macOS Keychain • iPhone 6~ Secure Enclave • Android Keystore • Samsung S6~ KNOX • Windows Protected Storage • HSM Such as UbiKey
Unlock code generator • We wrote our Android App to generate ECU_Response and unlocked scooters successfully if Security_Key is known. • Demo Via this experiment we proved: 1. Security_Key is necessary to unlock scooter. 2. Security_Key can be cloned or transferred. 3. Gogoro Scooter cannot identify Mobile App hardware.
Gogoro Analysis Summary • HW identifier privacy makes authentication difficult • IoT device trusts Security_Key rather than your Mobile Phone • Protect your Security_Key hard !!! • Insecure App Data Storage vulnerbility • Security_Key should not be stored in Document folder • Should be stored at Keychain / KeyStore • Other possible weakness • WebAPI should do SSL Cert Pining to prevent MitM • Relay-Attack for Challenge-Response might be possible • Dumping Security_Key from Key Fob MCU or Scooter ECU ?
Gogoro system is generally safe… • Although BLE SMP pairing is not adapted, Challenge/Response is better than Keeloq OTP • Obtaining Security_Key from mobile phone is possible only when malware infected/jailbroken. • Obtaining Security_Key from PC backup folder still needs to infect PC and decrypt slightly AES. • Obtaining Security_Key from WebAPI might be the easiest way if username / password can be retrieved, brute-force or from other leaked database.
How to steal a Gogoro Scooter • Infect the owner’s phone or backup PC • Obtain and decrypt Security_Key from plist • Owner open App to check fuel in Public Wifi • Do SSL MitM to get his cookie • Ask WebAPI for Security_Key • Simulate the BLE Gogoro Service • With target scooter’s MAC UUID • Approach target scooter and do ECU Challenge Response • Rode away as soon as possible. • But you still cannot exchange battery :-(
SSL MitM to retrieve Security_Key
Responsible disclosure • 2016/02 App supports BLE unlock • 2016/04 We notified Gogoro Vendor • 2016/04 Fixed Security Key store • 2016/07 Fixed SSL Cert verification • 2016/07 Issued force logout update We will keep investing on security area and have more frequently release for security improvement in the future.
Designing good IoT-phone authentication • Device does not know each other • IoT device does not know phone • IoT device knows secret key • IoT server provision secret key to phone • Preventing Security_Key cloning • BLE 4.2 SMP Secure Connections • Phone has hardware identifier • store it in Secure Element • use OOB OTP such as SMS • add dual-counter to detect
Auth Methods Comparisons Method Advantage Disadvantage Server Provision Secret Key Phone device independent Easy to steal, hard to detect BLE 4.2 Secure Connections Prevents MITM and clone. Need a numeric display Hardware Identifier ID device. Prevents clone. Privacy concern Store in Secure Element Encrypted, difficult to clone Not every phone has SE OOB OTP such as SMS Trusting phone number. OOB Channel cost (SMS) Dual-counter detection Can easily detect abuse. Cannot prevent abuse.
Dual-counter enhanced Device  S. Phone Counter S Device  Server Counter D Device  Server KD Permeant Shared Key TD Counter D IDS Identification KSD HMAC(KD, IDS) (temp) HTD HMAC(KD, TD ) (temp) Device  Smart Phone Cha. RAND() Res. HMAC(KSD, HTD, TD) TS Counter S R Command Request HTS,R HMAC(KSD, TS, R) When HMAC(Key) is used, Counter will change. If counter de-synced, User can detect abuse. HMAC of Can revoke HMAC(Key) when phone lost Can detect when HMAC(Key) is abused
Conclusion 1. introduction to Bt Low Energy, Security Manager Protocol, Smartphone authentications to controls IoT devices via BLE. 2. BLE 4.0 has many privacy features, restricting vendor powers, Hardware identifiers are either limited or randomized. 3. Challenges when designing auth methods, many vendors giving up SMP pairing, using just plaintext transmissions. 4. How to analyze BLE protocols, we examined many health and IoT devices, including Gogoro Smart Scooter vehicle. 5. Without SMP pairing, these vendor-designed authentications are sometimes flawed, so we are able to ignite other Gogoro. 6. We propose a better auth protocol: Dual-counter enhanced.
Future research • Hardware hacking • Dump Security_Key from Key Fob MCU (TI CC2540) • Dump Security_Key from Scooter ECU (Atmel) • Cryptography analysis • Challenge nonce randomization strength? • Challenge response acceptance timeframe? • Relay-Attack on challenge responses • Attacker A approach Owner • Attacker B approach Scooter • A & B Relay challenge response over internet
Public Rental in Berlin Our current research is based on Taiwan Gogoro. Berlin Gogoro might work different from Taiwan’s.
Special thanks to • Professor CSC’s guidance and research • Gogoro designed a BLE Smart Scooter • Hiraku help dumping iOS app • Support from lab and company colleagues
Q&A • IoT is Security or Nothing • Any questions? • GD@TeamT5.org
References • Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Smart (Low Energy) Security. Bluetooth SIG, 2016 https://developer.bluetooth.org/TechnologyOverview/Pages/LE-Security.aspx • Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Specification Version 4.0, Bluetooth SIG, 2010 • Andrew Garkavyi, Bluetooth Low Energy. Essentials for Creating Software with Device to Smartphone Connectivity, Stanfy Inc, 2015 https://medium.com/@stanfy/bluetooth-low-energy-essentials-for-creating-software-with-device-to-smartphone-connectivity- 5164c71963e7 • Mike Ryan, Bluetooth: With Low Energy comes Low Security, iSEC Partners, USENIX WOOT, 2013. • Mike Ryan, Hacking Bluetooth Low Energy: I Am Jack's Heart Monitor, ToorCon 14, 2012. • Lindell, A. Y. Attacks on the pairing protocol of bluetooth v2.1, BlackHat US, 2008. • Samy Kamkar, Drive It Like You Hacked It, Defcon 23, 2015 http://samy.pl/defcon2015/2015-defcon.pdf • Gogoro, Gogoro Smart Scooter 規格書, 睿能創意股份有限公司, 2015. http://images.gogoroapp.com/download/PDF/tw/Gogoro-Smartscooter-Spec-Sheet-2015-06-17-02-Chinese.pdf • Google, Android Physical Identifier Privacy, Google, 2016. • https://developer.android.com/about/versions/marshmallow/android-6.0-changes.html#behavior-hardware-id • Apple, iOS Physical Identifier Privacy, Apple, 2016. https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/UIKit/Reference/UIDevice_Class • N. Gupta, Inside Bluetooth Low Energy. Artech House, 2013. • Le IoT 想想物聯網 Blog, 2016 https://thinkingiot.blogspot.tw/

More Related Content

[CB16] BLE authentication design challenges on smartphone controlled IoT devices: analyzing Gogoro Smart Scooter by Chen-yu Dai [GD] & Professor Shi-Cho Cha [CSC]

  • 1. BLE authentication design challenges on smartphone controlled IoT devices: analyzing Gogoro Smart Scooter GD、CSC Privacy and Risk Management Lab IM, NTUST, Taiwan
  • 2. Abstracts • Smartphones are commonly used as the controller and Internet gateway for BLE-enabled IoT devices. • Designing a strong authentication protocol between them is the key part of IoT security. • App design has challenges such as limited input / output interfaces and privacy protection standards. • Our study focused on the method to analyze BLE protocols, discovering and solving these challenges. • We applied this method on commercial products, including popular Gogoro Smart Scooter from Taiwan.
  • 3. Speakers G D • Graduate Student at NTUST IM • CHROOT/HITCON Coordinator • Team T5 CTO • Digital Forensics & Incident Response • Threat Intelligence Program & Plat. • Research on Foods, plays CTFs • Occasionally got vulnerabilities • Synology Bounty Program (2015) CSC • Associate Professor at NTUST IM • Ph.D., Dept of IM, NTU • Gomaji (TW.8472) Board member • CISSP, CCFP, CSSLP, CISM, PMP • Published many practical security papers on journals. Helped many private and public sectors to establish info security policy.
  • 4. Table of content 1. introduction to Bt Low Energy, Security Manager Protocol, Smartphone authentications to controls IoT devices via BLE. 2. BLE 4.0 has many privacy features, restricting vendor powers, Hardware identifiers are either limited or randomized. 3. Challenges when designing auth methods, many vendors giving up SMP pairing, using just plaintext transmissions. 4. How to analyze BLE protocols, we exaimed many health and IoT devices, including Gogoro Smart Scooter vehicle. 5. Without SMP pairing, these vendor-designed authentications are sometimes flawed, so we are able to ignite other Gogoro. 6. We propose a better auth protocol: Dual-counter enhanced.
  • 5. Bluetooth 4.0 High Speed Classic Low Energy WiFi mixed BT Most common BT Originally "Wibree" Persistent connections Persistent connections Non-persistent High power consump. Mid power consump. Low power consump. High bandwidth Mid bandwidth Low bandwidth Short range Mid range Long range (never tried) Headphones, Keyboards, Mouse Health wrists, Temp. sensors, IoT devices
  • 6. Bluetooth 4.0 Low Energy Method 方向 功能 Request Central -> Peripheral 一般發送訊息 Response Peripheral -> Central 回覆 Request 用 Commands Central -> Peripheral 不用 Response Notifications Peripheral -> Central 不用 Confirm Indications Peripheral -> Central 需要 Confirm Confirmations Central -> Peripheral 回覆 Indication 用 Usually Server has smaller battery and operates only when requested. Fig. Ref: Stanfy Inc, 2015 BLE is session-less, 7 methods, similar to HTTP
  • 7. BLE widely adopted in Health & IoT Curiosity to understand how it works.
  • 8. BLE built-in profiles • Time, Temp, Engergy • Weight, User profile • Blood pressure, glocuse • Body mass, heart rate • Speed, direction, location
  • 9. BLE playgrounds • Nordic nRF App • Node.js bleno
  • 10. BLE is easy to hijack • Sending vibrate message to nearby MI wristbands Ref: “Le IoT 想想物聯網 blog”
  • 11. All BLE sniffer got is in plaintext ?!
  • 12. Security Manager Protocol Pairing Bonding Re-establishment Short Term Key Permanent Key Permanent Key
  • 13. BLE 4.0 SMP pairing Pairing Mtd. MitM attacks Usability Just Works Vulnerable Convenient, Un-authed Passkey Entry If you brute-PIN Needs screen & Keyboard Out-Of-Band Secure via NFC Needs NFC transceivers BLE 4.2 screen numb. comp. Just Works is Un-authed Why vendors did not use SMP pairing: 1. Pairing takes time and effort 2. Paired does not always means secure 3. No screen for numeric comparison
  • 14. BLE 4.0 privacy features • HW Identifier Read Limitations • Prevents App/Ads tracking user • MAC Address always 02000000000000 • HW Identifier Randomization • Prevents AP tracking/nearby scanning • MAC Address different per power-cycle • SMP paired device gets fixed MAC via IRK • How to authenticate device without HW identifier?
  • 16. Key Fob Unlock (BLE) Origin Handle Value Function Key Fob CONNECT_REQ Init connection Scooter 0x37 01 00 Command ID Scooter 0x25 c2 e7 20 bf d2 99 9d 43 68 c6 2d 65 39 3d 72 c9 f3 Rand. Challenge Key Fob 0x36 d2 25 57 33 19 18 51 fd ae 7d 1b ed 85 e0 10 78 e2 Signed. Response Scooter LL_TERMINATE_IND Ends connection (this is much better than widely adopted Keeloq protocol)
  • 17. Mobile App (Gateway) • My Gogoro single-sign-on • App gets scooter information
  • 18. Mobile App Pairing & Unlock Only GATT protocol, no BLE SMP pairing observed.
  • 19. Vendor's challenge • How to design authentication protocol when we did not BLE pairing and have no HW identifier?
  • 20. Analyzing method analyze protocol w/ Ubertooth One Reversing iOS & Android App Figure out unlock procedure Write simulation unlock program Analyze storage Security_Key Analyze Network API interfaces Threat Modeling Notify vendor Responsible disclosure
  • 21. BLE Gogoro Service BLE Service UDID last 8 bytes must be Scooter MAC Address
  • 22. Gogoro App Protocol Origin Cmd Function App A0 GetScooterSettingWithType App A1 GetScooterErrors App A2 GetScooterInfo App A3 SetScooterSetting Scooter A4 ScooterGetSettingStatus Scooter A5 ScooterErrorStatus Scooter A6 ScooterInfoState Scooter A7 ScooterSetSettingStatus Scooter A8 NotifyScooterError Scooter A9 NotifyInfo Scooter AE PurchasedStatus Scooter AF ScooterInfoState Scooter B0 ECU Challenge nonce App B1 ECU Response digest Scooter B2 ECU unknown Scooter B3 ECU Error App B4 ECU Cmd (Lock, Unlock, Open Trunk) B-prefix: ECU Challenge Response 90 A2 08 00 00 00 02 C4 (hex) 90: Header, A2: Command, 08: Length, 02: Parameter, C4: Checksum A-prefix: querying information
  • 23. Gogoro Unlock flow 1. Scooter scans nearby peripheral for GATT Gogoro Service And if UUID {351AAF0F-}last 8 byte matches its MAC Address 2. Mobile App reads GATT Scooter status, enable unlock button. Click to send ECU_Cmd(0xB4): 00 Lock, 01 Unlock, 02 Op Truck 3. Scooter writes ECU_Challenge (0xB0), a random 256 bit nonce 4. Mobile App notify ECU_Response (0xB1), also 256 bits ECU_Response =SHA256(ECU_Challenge, Security_Key) 5. Scooter compares ECU_Response if correct then ECU_Cmd will be executed, Unlocked.
  • 24. the Security_Key • ECU_Response =SHA256(ECU_Challenge, Security_Key) • Early App put Security_Key in Document folder (slightly encrypted) • iOS MobileAppProp.plist has ScooterSKey • Android Settings.xml has AppSettings_DefScooter/encryptedkey2 • Decrypting: AES-256, CBC/PKCS7Padding, IV=UserId, Key = ScooterUUID • Document folder can be backed-up via iTunes / Android adb • Various methods: cable Juicy Attack, iTunes backup folder extraction etc. • AndroidManifest.xml has allowBackup flag set to true • Security_Key can be retrieved from WebAPI • Attacker can brute My Gogoro membership • App Cookie can be stolden (MobileAppProp.plist has Web_Token) • https://mobile-pro.gogoroapp.com/WebService/Web/GetKey
  • 25. Insecure App Data Storage • Token, Certificate should be stored encrypted • Manages Timeout, Password Tamper etc. • Limits user, process access and key export • Most OS platforms has secure storage zone • Apple iOS/macOS Keychain • iPhone 6~ Secure Enclave • Android Keystore • Samsung S6~ KNOX • Windows Protected Storage • HSM Such as UbiKey
  • 26. Unlock code generator • We wrote our Android App to generate ECU_Response and unlocked scooters successfully if Security_Key is known. • Demo Via this experiment we proved: 1. Security_Key is necessary to unlock scooter. 2. Security_Key can be cloned or transferred. 3. Gogoro Scooter cannot identify Mobile App hardware.
  • 27. Gogoro Analysis Summary • HW identifier privacy makes authentication difficult • IoT device trusts Security_Key rather than your Mobile Phone • Protect your Security_Key hard !!! • Insecure App Data Storage vulnerbility • Security_Key should not be stored in Document folder • Should be stored at Keychain / KeyStore • Other possible weakness • WebAPI should do SSL Cert Pining to prevent MitM • Relay-Attack for Challenge-Response might be possible • Dumping Security_Key from Key Fob MCU or Scooter ECU ?
  • 28. Gogoro system is generally safe… • Although BLE SMP pairing is not adapted, Challenge/Response is better than Keeloq OTP • Obtaining Security_Key from mobile phone is possible only when malware infected/jailbroken. • Obtaining Security_Key from PC backup folder still needs to infect PC and decrypt slightly AES. • Obtaining Security_Key from WebAPI might be the easiest way if username / password can be retrieved, brute-force or from other leaked database.
  • 29. How to steal a Gogoro Scooter • Infect the owner’s phone or backup PC • Obtain and decrypt Security_Key from plist • Owner open App to check fuel in Public Wifi • Do SSL MitM to get his cookie • Ask WebAPI for Security_Key • Simulate the BLE Gogoro Service • With target scooter’s MAC UUID • Approach target scooter and do ECU Challenge Response • Rode away as soon as possible. • But you still cannot exchange battery :-(
  • 30. SSL MitM to retrieve Security_Key
  • 31. Responsible disclosure • 2016/02 App supports BLE unlock • 2016/04 We notified Gogoro Vendor • 2016/04 Fixed Security Key store • 2016/07 Fixed SSL Cert verification • 2016/07 Issued force logout update We will keep investing on security area and have more frequently release for security improvement in the future.
  • 32. Designing good IoT-phone authentication • Device does not know each other • IoT device does not know phone • IoT device knows secret key • IoT server provision secret key to phone • Preventing Security_Key cloning • BLE 4.2 SMP Secure Connections • Phone has hardware identifier • store it in Secure Element • use OOB OTP such as SMS • add dual-counter to detect
  • 33. Auth Methods Comparisons Method Advantage Disadvantage Server Provision Secret Key Phone device independent Easy to steal, hard to detect BLE 4.2 Secure Connections Prevents MITM and clone. Need a numeric display Hardware Identifier ID device. Prevents clone. Privacy concern Store in Secure Element Encrypted, difficult to clone Not every phone has SE OOB OTP such as SMS Trusting phone number. OOB Channel cost (SMS) Dual-counter detection Can easily detect abuse. Cannot prevent abuse.
  • 34. Dual-counter enhanced Device  S. Phone Counter S Device  Server Counter D Device  Server KD Permeant Shared Key TD Counter D IDS Identification KSD HMAC(KD, IDS) (temp) HTD HMAC(KD, TD ) (temp) Device  Smart Phone Cha. RAND() Res. HMAC(KSD, HTD, TD) TS Counter S R Command Request HTS,R HMAC(KSD, TS, R) When HMAC(Key) is used, Counter will change. If counter de-synced, User can detect abuse. HMAC of Can revoke HMAC(Key) when phone lost Can detect when HMAC(Key) is abused
  • 35. Conclusion 1. introduction to Bt Low Energy, Security Manager Protocol, Smartphone authentications to controls IoT devices via BLE. 2. BLE 4.0 has many privacy features, restricting vendor powers, Hardware identifiers are either limited or randomized. 3. Challenges when designing auth methods, many vendors giving up SMP pairing, using just plaintext transmissions. 4. How to analyze BLE protocols, we examined many health and IoT devices, including Gogoro Smart Scooter vehicle. 5. Without SMP pairing, these vendor-designed authentications are sometimes flawed, so we are able to ignite other Gogoro. 6. We propose a better auth protocol: Dual-counter enhanced.
  • 36. Future research • Hardware hacking • Dump Security_Key from Key Fob MCU (TI CC2540) • Dump Security_Key from Scooter ECU (Atmel) • Cryptography analysis • Challenge nonce randomization strength? • Challenge response acceptance timeframe? • Relay-Attack on challenge responses • Attacker A approach Owner • Attacker B approach Scooter • A & B Relay challenge response over internet
  • 37. Public Rental in Berlin Our current research is based on Taiwan Gogoro. Berlin Gogoro might work different from Taiwan’s.
  • 38. Special thanks to • Professor CSC’s guidance and research • Gogoro designed a BLE Smart Scooter • Hiraku help dumping iOS app • Support from lab and company colleagues
  • 39. Q&A • IoT is Security or Nothing • Any questions? • GD@TeamT5.org
  • 40. References • Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Smart (Low Energy) Security. Bluetooth SIG, 2016 https://developer.bluetooth.org/TechnologyOverview/Pages/LE-Security.aspx • Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Specification Version 4.0, Bluetooth SIG, 2010 • Andrew Garkavyi, Bluetooth Low Energy. Essentials for Creating Software with Device to Smartphone Connectivity, Stanfy Inc, 2015 https://medium.com/@stanfy/bluetooth-low-energy-essentials-for-creating-software-with-device-to-smartphone-connectivity- 5164c71963e7 • Mike Ryan, Bluetooth: With Low Energy comes Low Security, iSEC Partners, USENIX WOOT, 2013. • Mike Ryan, Hacking Bluetooth Low Energy: I Am Jack's Heart Monitor, ToorCon 14, 2012. • Lindell, A. Y. Attacks on the pairing protocol of bluetooth v2.1, BlackHat US, 2008. • Samy Kamkar, Drive It Like You Hacked It, Defcon 23, 2015 http://samy.pl/defcon2015/2015-defcon.pdf • Gogoro, Gogoro Smart Scooter 規格書, 睿能創意股份有限公司, 2015. http://images.gogoroapp.com/download/PDF/tw/Gogoro-Smartscooter-Spec-Sheet-2015-06-17-02-Chinese.pdf • Google, Android Physical Identifier Privacy, Google, 2016. • https://developer.android.com/about/versions/marshmallow/android-6.0-changes.html#behavior-hardware-id • Apple, iOS Physical Identifier Privacy, Apple, 2016. https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/UIKit/Reference/UIDevice_Class • N. Gupta, Inside Bluetooth Low Energy. Artech House, 2013. • Le IoT 想想物聯網 Blog, 2016 https://thinkingiot.blogspot.tw/