I see a big problem looming behind your question:
Using ACLs on subnets and static IP addresses is a common and simple mechanism for defining access privileges. Subnets are (usually) organized by routing, and if static IPs are enforced by DHCP snooping etc. then those criteria can be considered fairly secure.
However, if you begin moving your addresses around at will - roaming users with static addresses - then those criteria are considerably weakened - you put all your trust in a client's MAC address (instead of MAC & location). Also, you'd need to handle a zoo of virtual routers with proxy ARP and distributed VLANs. While that should be doable, it's definitely not a small feat and encumbered by security compromise. Most likely, the result isn't worth the effort.
Imho, this is exactly the right moment to reconsider your security concept.
One possible approach would be to enable your network to identify users instead of machines or just addresses. In extreme, that results in a zero trust concept where each service is sufficiently hardened to withstand attacks, so that security on the network side becomes expendable.
A more traditional approach is to use IEEE 802.1X port security in combination with VLAN-based security zones. That requires you to define each VLAN in each location, but as long as that can be handled it's quite secure (and the logical evolution of your current concept).
Another possibility is an overlay network. All clients need to connect to your network via VPN, regardless of location. Within that VPN, each client can be identified by its unique address where you can then anchor your trust.