In what cases are counter-terrorist operations justified?

Question

Many inhabitants of northern Israel have been evacuated since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, due to the incessant attacks by Lebanese Hezbollah. The Hezbollah leader himself has taken pride in these attacks and rejected US efforts at de-escalation:

Nasrallah said that Hezbollah has carried out 670 "operations" at the border with Israel since the start of the war.

"Between 6-7 operations a day. There wasn't a single border outpost that wasn't hit several times," he asserted. "The sites were attacked not only with anti-tank weapons but also using various means," he added, claiming that the organization's attacks are "exhausting Israel."

Nasrallah also claimed that "48 of the border posts were attacked more than once. Hezbollah carried out 494 attacks, including 50 attacks on border points that were attacked more than once. The organization also targeted the technical and intelligence equipment along the border, which was completely destroyed."

As Israel threatens to launch a military operation against Hezbollah, I wonder what level of threat would justify such an operation from the point of view of international law and the international community. There is no doubt that such an operation would produce civilian casualties and produce international outcry, but the situation where a part of a country is under constant rocket fire does not seem normal either. The number of casualties seems like a poor marker, given the Israeli efforts to protect its population (evacuations, bomb shelters, military actions.) A cross-border raid, like the Hamas raid of October 7 or 2003 Hezbollah cross-border raid, would probably be sufficient as a justification to the public, but do rocket attacks themselves tip the scale at any point?

Answer 1

I wonder what level of threat would justify such an operation from the point of view of the International law and International community.

This is not strictly answerable. In international customs, and most likely law as well, you will find that any attack cross border from a sovereign state (which is waaaay more the case of Lebanon than Gaza) would be a casus belli if confirmed.

Modern international law recognizes at least three lawful justifications for waging war: self-defense, defense of an ally required by the terms of a treaty, and approval by the United Nations.

However, look at the ongoing Gaza war. Israel was highly justified in "doing something" to respond to 10/7. Yet the international sentiment has also been turning against it, in some countries. In other countries there is still qualified support for Israel. In addition, even if Israel had ample justification to retaliate for 10/7, that doesn't automatically mean that its chosen modes of operations in Gaza since then have been compliant with the international laws on the protection of non-combatants.

So, even in as blatant an event as 10/7 "the operation" is not judged the same by all countries. How do you expect a definite answer to this question then?

By historical standards Israel would be highly justified to deter and retaliate against attacks from Lebanese soil, as soon as anything was fired their way. Equally clear from looking at history *, there are probably all sorts of pressure, even from supportive governments, to "look the other way, turn the other cheek" and not get started on another regional war. Take for example Biden: how much you want to bet the last thing he wants in an election year is to have deal with Israeli requests to resupply their munition stockpiles?

The real question is really towards the Israeli public, and military. Do they want to put up with the repeated attacks? If not, are they capable of waging two wars? Are they ready to take their cost in Israeli lives? Are they willing to pay the, certain to be massive, cost in international outcry?

Fighting back is already their legal right. Is it a good idea? Because "the international community" will certainly not give them a pass either way (though Israel's usual supporters will likely hold their nose somewhat).

* the Saddam SCUD campaign against Israel in 1991 being a prime example: Israel would have been justified to retaliate, heck everyone else was already at war with Iraq, but there was a lot of pressure from the West on Israel to stay put.

Or, Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Very similar circumstances, really. You'll find that there was little support for Israel intervening. But also little outright Western sanctioning in reaction to it doing it. Not because it is a complicated question of international law, but rather because the actions of Israel in that region are controversial by the very nature of Israel being involved so justification is entirely in the eye of the beholder.

Add to it that Lebanon is a bit of a special (basket) case, especially right now. It is a near-failed state, so any attacks on Hizbollah - which is not Lebanon - will have the extra PR burden of being seen to kick a dog that is down: how much is a sovereign state - Lebanon - responsible for the actions of a not-government-controlled militia on its territory? You can bet Lebanon's government will be milking that angle from the very start.

One last factor to consider is how much Hizbollah embeds with civilians. In the case of Gaza, Hamas is so part and parcel of the urban population centers that fighting it results in lots of civilian deaths. In 2006, KIA losses were as follows: 150 Israeli, 500 Hizbollah (averaging both sides claims), 1100 Lebanese civilians. If Hizbollah manages to get itself attacked in civilian zones, more PR risks for Israel. Conversely, if Israel manages to mostly only kill Hizbollah fighters, they'll get a much more tolerant reception.

Answer 2

There is no case where military operations are justified by death tolls.

Military action is justified by the ability to achieve a strategic goal. Goals do not become achievable by incurring losses.

If the goal is achievable, then waiting achieves nothing but sacrificing one's own civilians to make the military operation palatable to voters.

If the goal is not achievable, then the use of violence is the wrong tool, especially if the operation will also lead to civilian losses.

So basically: if there is a good plan that achieves security, then it should be executed as soon as possible. If there is no plan, then a plan needs to be made, and then executed.

Answer 3

I wonder what level of threat would justify such an operation

With some answers given, I will tackle the question from another angle.

• Hezbollah is indiscriminately firing at civilians in the Northern Israel.
• Israel has evacuated its civilian population from the villages and cities along the Lebanon border.
• Additionally, Hezbollah violates 1701 UN resolution and station its troops, weapons, rockets etc. in Soutern Lebanon
• Lebanon and Israel are still at War since 1948. Only an armistice treaty was signed in 1949.

For any sane nation the above bullets are more than enough to engage in a military operation and restore a peace that its citizens deserve. This is called (according to @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica answer) a self-defense.

Answer 4

The Israeli government can call it "counter-terrorism" but note that these military operations will be on foreign soil, without the permission of the foreign government. That's basically war. Let's speak in simpler terms - How can the Netanyahu government invade Lebanon, and attack Hezbollah, with the least amount of international repercussion for Israel? The answer to that depends on the goals of the war:

1. Israel wants to attack Hezbollah directly because it is the declared enemy of Israel and supports Hamas.

   “For those who demand to know why we are fighting on the [southern] front, we are obliged to reply. There are two goals on this front: to pressure the enemy and its government to cease the aggression against Gaza. The second goal is to relieve the pressure on the resistance [Hamas] in Gaza.” _{(Ref. 1)}

2. Israel's also wants to invade Lebanon to capture some territory to create a buffer zone in the north (as removing Israeli settlements to do this is unpopular and will have local political ramification).

   Israeli officials are floating the idea of buffer zones — similar to the one that existed when Israel occupied southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000 — extending around four kilometers (2.5 miles) inside southern Lebanon and several kilometers inside Gaza, an enclave that is only 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) wide. Netanyahu has also said that Israel wants to control the Philadelphi Corridor, running along the Gazan border with Egypt. _{(Ref. 2)}

3. Netanyahu wants to ward of criticism, preserve his political career and salvage his political legacy.

   At least 70,000 Israelis from the northern border have evacuated their homes in the wake of the attack, turning the area — like the devastated south — into a closed military zone ... Moshe Davidovich, the head of a local council who sent 40,000 people packing even before the official evacuation order came in, said many residents saw the battle on the northern front as a fight for their homes ... they didn’t trust their “nongovernment” in Jerusalem, where leaders are “consumed with politics and tactics — no strategy,” Davidovich said ... “We will return our citizens in the north and in the south,” Netanyahu said Thursday. “For that we’ll apply maximum power with maximum precision everywhere that’s needed.” ... But many along the northern border have no faith in Netanyahu, who told Israelis for years that Hamas was contained in Gaza ... _{(Ref. 2)}

   Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak stated ... "Netanyahu's failure in leading the war lies in his denial of the understanding that, in this case, victory cannot be achieved without a clear position on the "day after" and a plan to implement that vision ... these considerations may lie on the distant horizon, but the "day after" requires that already in the immediate term, we must coordinate and build relations of trust, behind the scenes as well, with the US and our neighbors ... such relations cannot exist with the present government in power, because, as is the case among the majority of the Israeli public, in Washington and regional capitals, nobody believes a word Netanyahu says ... The requisite conclusion is that the Netanyahu government is causing grave harm to Israel's strategic standing and leading a war that has no endpoint. This is causing enormous damage. Netanyahu's premiership must be terminated before the consequences of his flaws become irreversible ... _{(Ref. 3)}

Keeping these goals in mind, we can analyse the likely concerns the world will have to it and the political reaction to it.

Since Hezbollah (partly or fully) has been designated as a terrorist organisation in European Union, France, Kosovo, United States, Germany etc. its destruction will be welcomed by many of these countries. However, Netanyahu's government has already bankrupted the Israeli military's professionalism and respect by pushing its policies of indiscriminate killing of civilians in Gaza. An Israeli attack on Hezbollah / Lebanon is likely to incur even more (genuine) collateral damage - Hezbollah actually has a well trained, professional military with battle experience and Israel will be forced to use even more force than necessary. But the international community will find this highly unacceptable as disgust against Netanyahu's foolish policy to mindlessly engage in a revengeful slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza has lost them support even from the public of their allies.

So, Netanyahu's government / Israel's diplomatic corps will have to come up with some concrete ways to assure the international community that its military will act with utmost professionalism and will seek to minimize collateral damage in Lebanon. If it does this, it could win some support for the 1st goal.

Apart from the collateral damage aspect, the international community also fears the war spreading to other regions in the middle-east. Hezbollah has allies too - Iran and Syria support it, and Russia and China in turn have political stakes in them:

An escalation with Hezbollah could call the group's allies Iran, Russia and Syria to action, which could catapult the whole region into conflict ... "With Iran's sponsorship and backing, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups created the United Fronts Doctrine a few years ago," Mohanad Hage Ali, a senior fellow at the Beirut-based research institute Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, told DW. "The intent was to create a deterring doctrine against Israel," Ali said, "and the assumption is that whenever one party is under existential threat, the others join in." _{(Ref. 4)}

We can already see this in action with the Houthis and Hezbollahs recent actions against Israel.

This is something that worries most Arab countries because these groups can find large support in the Arab population for the Palestinian cause today (again, because Netanyahu's foolish policy of killing so many civilian Palestinians in Gaza has outraged most Arabs). If large number of citizens get involved with this group, it could potentially drag a whole country into the conflict. Apart from the human cost of war, many of the Arab countries are the largest oil producing nations too. And if their leaders tell the world that the conflict isn't good for them, the world will back them and pressure Israel. As some of them are allies of the US, even the Americans will be hard-pressed to not take their views into consideration.

Thus, Israel's diplomatic corps will have to ideally win over the major countries in the middle-east, and also win support from Russia and China, to reassure the world that the whole region will not be dragged to war if they attack the Hezbollahs.

As for the second goal of capturing Lebanon territories, I don't see anyway they can do that without clearly violating international laws. The only loophole that I can think Israel can use is to claim that the borders are disputed. Nevertheless, as the many UN resolutions against it highlight, Israel is already blamed by the world for indiscriminate land grabbing and genocide (killing and displacing natives from their land). So it is unlikely to win any support for this from the world, though the US might be willing to back them and protect them from any repercussions in the UN. (But that's after the war and we are talking about winning support for starting a war - I don't believe any nation, other than the US, would support this Israeli military goal).

The criticism against the third goal can be somewhat contained by highlighting that many of the Israeli want to expand the war against Hezbollah _{(Ref. 5)}.

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The best way forward for Israel, in my opinion, to win over the international community and get new allies is for Israel to get rid of Netanyahu from Israeli politics, and let a new Israeli PM (preferably elected after a national election) take charge of Israel.

References:

1. Hezbollah chief says response to killing of senior Hamas official is ‘inevitable’

2. On Lebanese border, Israelis fear a new kind of war with Hezbollah

3. Hamas is far from falling apart in southern Gaza: Former Israeli premier

4. How Gaza siege could escalate Israel-Hezbollah conflict

5. As War Rages, Israelis' Trust in Netanyahu Plummets, Polls Find

6. Only 15% of Israelis want Netanyahu to keep job after Gaza war, poll finds

Answer 5

Terrorism constitutes a real threat to democracy, the rule of law and the enjoyment of human rights. As such it must be countered through prevention and suppression by the member States of the Council of Europe. However, poorly implemented or overly Draconian counter-terrorism measures can be counterproductive. While law enforcement operations aimed at terrorists are necessary and justified, counter-terrorism measures should not go beyond what is necessary to maintain peace and security, nor should they subvert the rule of law and democracy in the cause of trying to save it.

https://www.coe.int/en/web/counter-terrorism

There's no rule, but rather guidelines. The above is what the Council of Europe said on the matter.

In addition to the two treaties, the Council of Europe counter-terrorism framework also entails a number of issue -specific recommendations and guidelines that provide member States guidance for introducing issue-specific prevention, enforcement or adjudication tools. These include Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)8 on the use of information collected in conflict zones as evidence in criminal proceedings related to terrorist offences and Guidelines on the links between terrorism and transnational organised crime.

These binding and non-binding standards form part of the overarching Council of Europe counter-terrorism policy elaborated in the Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategies. The first Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2018 for the period of five years. It has recently been superseded with the second Counter-Terrorism Strategy to be implemented from 2023 to 2027.

They have guidelines and these guidelines say that the nations engaging in counter-terrorism need to respect and uphold human rights, generally-speaking.

Answer 6

Israel is already conducting counter-terrorist operations against Hezbollah. These range from artillery and air strikes across the border to targeted killings deeper inside Lebanon, albeit the latter have been more limited in recent times. But then the latter appears to be picking up speed lately:

“Israel is turning from defending to pursuing Hezbollah, we will reach wherever the organization operates, in Beirut, Damascus and in more distant places,” Gallant added.

(And then explosions in Syria, on both Hezbollah and Iran's own high-value targets.)

I suppose your real question is when does it become justified to pursue the total destruction of Hezbollah like it's been the case with Hamas recently, i.e. transition from "mowing the grass" to whatever euphemism is used for the high[er]-intensity phases of the conflict. (Someone proposed "taking out the trash"; I myself suggested here "ploughing the field".) The main issue with that is not justification but feasibility. Israel already tried that in 2006 and before that engaged in a long campaign 1985-2000. For reasons that are complicated, the IDF eventually pulled back short of achieving this ultimate goal of eradicating Hezbollah. Realistically, Israel would have to entirely occupy Lebanon for years or even decades to entirely suppress Hezbollah from re-emerging there. It might find that the trade-offs are not worthwhile.

I suppose what might be in the cards with the current Israeli government in place is re-occupying a wider buffer zone inside Lebanon. That would prevent some of the shorter-ranged attacks from reaching Israel proper. But with Hezbollah even supplied with [Iranian] top-attack ATGMs these days, it's somewhat of a tricky proposition what option would best limit future Israeli casualties, overall.

A second senior Biden administration official said there are elements inside the Israeli government and military in favor of an incursion. There’s “a growing group that says: ‘Hey, let’s just take a shot. Let’s just do it,’” the senior official said, adding that any incursion could lead to a “major, major escalation that we don’t even know the proportions of.” [...]

In recent days Israel has been stepping up its air campaign, bombing deeper into Lebanon. Strikes last week came within 27 miles of the capital Beirut, the farthest into Lebanese territory from the border since the violence started immediately following Hamas’ October 7 massacres in Israel.

On Monday, Israel struck the Hezbollah stronghold Baalbek in the northeast of the country.

“There are fears this will grow to an expansive air campaign reaching much further north into populated areas of Lebanon and eventually grow to a ground component as well,” another person familiar with the US intelligence said.

Israel’s top general visited the northern border Tuesday and said that Hezbollah “must pay a heavy price” for its actions since October 7.

“It’s clear that the first thing we need to do is push back the enemy. Then, create a very strong barrier,” said Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi.

Likewise, there's a bit of a competition among Israeli politicians on getting hawkish on Lebanon:

Some Israeli leaders, such as Benny Gantz, a member of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s war cabinet, remarked in February 2024 that Israel could strike the Lebanese military as part of a broader war. “It is important that we be clear—the one responsible for the fire from Lebanon is not only Hezbollah or the terrorist elements that carry it out, but also the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese state that allows the shooting from its territory,” Gantz said. He also added: “There is no target or military infrastructure in the area of the north and Lebanon that is not in our sights.”

Right-wing Israeli politicians who are not presently in government (due to spats with Netanyahu) like Avigdor Liberman have openly called for a re-occupation of Southern Lebanon:

The former defense minister says Israel’s military must “close off” a swath of southern Lebanon and push the terror group north of the Litani river, even if it means 50 years of occupation.

“It can’t be that there are entire towns where close to half of the buildings were simply destroyed,” he says during his Yisrael Beytenu party’s weekly faction meeting, referring to northern Israel where structures have suffered missile damage.

“We will not annex anything, and we will not build settlements, but we will release the territory only when there is a government in Beirut that knows how to exercise its sovereignty.”

“Everything between the Litani and Israel must be under the control of the IDF,” he says, comparing it to the post World War II military occupation of Germany. “If Lebanon won’t pay in territory we haven’t done anything,” he declares.

Alas, while Hamas could be sealed off its supply pretty easily, Lebanon borders Syria, which is far from being as cooperating as Egypt is, with Israel.

Because of Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran, it is likely that Tehran would resupply Hezbollah quickly if it used this arsenal in a conflict with Israel. This resupply is easier than in the past, as Iran’s presence in Syria expanded considerably after Tehran came to the rescue of the Syrian regime when civil war broke out after 2011, creating a land bridge that enables weapons to go from Iraq to Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This stands in sharp contrast to Hamas, where weapons and people must be smuggled via tunnels from Gaza.

And there's Hezbollah in Syria as well, and Israel has been bombing them too, with tacit cooperation of Russia. (And the Russian game is complicated too: on one hand they are competing with Iran for influence in Syria. On the other, they somewhat need Iran's cooperation against Ukraine, even if on a limited scale: Shaheds-cum-Gerans are a fact, and there's speculation about a short-range missiles deal etc.)

Anyhow, repeated invasions of Lebanon have been part of Israel's "100-year war"--to use the words of IDF commander and later politician Raphael Eitan. (That analogy is not totally out of fashion with others.) And so we might not have seen the last of these ground operations.

And to answer the core of the question, the issue is thus not mainly a legal, but political one. The will of whoever runs Israel matters, and to some extend the will of the main foreign supporter of Israel--the US. One might guess that a different US president, more attuned to the Israeli right-wing vision, and who's shown a lower sensitivity to civilian casualties in the 'shithole countries', or just for taking things up a notch with Iran may make a more intense anti-Hezbollah operation more likely to have US support too. (There's also a "bomb Iran" chorus in the legislative circles in the US.)

BTW, my armchair strategizing says that Hezbollah cannot afford to go 'all out' with their missile arsenal against Israel unless either they're threatened with losing it to a ground invasion (a 'use it or lose it' situation) or Iran itself gets seriously bombed, e.g. if Trump greenlights the taking out of Iran's nuclear installations. At least publicly, even the Biden administration is being strategically ambiguous about that, or even hinting at supporting the Israelis in whatever they'd do in that (Iranian nuclear program) regard. OTOH the present US administration has said they are against a war in Lebanon.

Answer 7

When the nation conducting the operation is more powerful than the terrorists, plus any nations that would defend that group.

It's been that simple since BCE, and there's no reason for it to ever change.

International law is a set of deals between individual nations. Even in less contentious aspects, such as trade tariffs, the principles of reciprocity and self-interest are held sacrosanct.

Answer 8

If Israel were attacked by Lebanon, the answer would be very clear: Israel has a right to react and even capture land to defend itself from the attacks.

Problem is, Israel is attacked by Hizballa, which does not represent Lebanon (though they have some members in its parliament). Lebanon cannot stop Hizballa (last time they tried, Hizballa occupied Beirut). Israel does not want war with Lebanon, but it is very hard to beat Hizballa without a invading Lebanon.

The situation here is somewhat similar to the situation in west Yemen: there, too, a militant organization not approved by the official government uses the territory to launch attacks, without any relation to the interests of the local population. The following quote by Ali Al Bukhaiti, an ex-senior Houthi spokesman is relevant:

Bukhaiti speculated that if the Houthis were to hit an American warship in the region, the US would struggle to respond.

“The Houthis have no permanent military bases, they are armed militias,” Bukhaiti said. “The USA can’t harm them. If the US opens a war it will harm the Yemeni civilians.”

“The Houthis hide, it [the USA] doesn’t know where they are,” he added. “They fight like a gang. They bomb, and attack, and then hide under the ground in tunnels.”

To solve these problems, new military tactics and tools have to be developed, in order to cope with the threats of long-range missiles and underground warfare.