Questions tagged [qualia]
Qualia refers to the phenomenal character of subjective experience.
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Every experience is a new qualia? In reference to Dennett and RoboMary
Preliminary: RoboMary is a robot, but so are we - large robots made of smaller robots made of smaller robots. She does not yet have the experience of color. Dennett puts forth a physicalist way for ...
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What does "non-representational features" mean in a SEP definition of qualia?
In the SEP article on Qualia - 1.(2) qualia are defined as
intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-representational features
of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that are
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What is the nature of the mental images that are perceived by patients who suffer from Charles Bonnet Syndrome?
I am not sure if this question should be asked in the Philosophy or Neuroscience forum as both domains are relevant to this inquiry. Will have a go anyway.
One of the defining characteristics of CBS ...
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Why do people make theories without predictive power?
I studied neuroscience and during my studies I had a course called "The philosophy of consciousness". There we looked at a theory called Qualia, which infuriated me to no ends. Reading up on ...
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Do qualia bring about issues for functionalism?
Do the personal experiences of qualia, such as what it is like to smell a flower, bring about issues for functionalism?
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Can behaviourism account for qualia?
If behaviourism is focused upon observable behavioural dispositions can it at all account for qualia; the way things feel, tase etc.
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Is functionalism a significant improvement on behaviourism with respect to behaviour?
Functionalism appears to be free of many of the issues that behaviourism faces, however is it all positive? Is there any objection at all to Functionalism being such an improvement in respect to ...
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According to Chalmers, can neuroscience resolve the "hard problem of consciousness"?
This is a question that aims to clarify Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness".
Suppose one day neuroscientists figured out how exactly to reproduce all (or virtually all) human ...
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What is the difference between properties and sets?
Is there a difference between properties and sets? To me, it would seem that the property of being non-self-identical is the same thing as the empty set, and the property of being (identical to x OR ...
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Could the Qualia of differring subjective impressions be compared?
Suppose some time in the future Humanity is able to map and mind-upload Human Brains, and that advances in AI had progressed to the point where it could be used to "experience subjectivity", ...
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If the "Problem of Qualia" is valid, then how can we communicate?
I was reading about qualia and how there's apparently the problem of qualia because a unique experience is constrained to one subject (?). But I don't see how this is meaningful in any way since ...
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How have deaf (or blind) people who hear (or see) for the first time changed philosophers' understanding of qualia?
Here's how the physicist David Deutsch (2011) describes qualia:
Consider the following thought experiment. You are a biochemist with the misfortune to have been born with a genetic defect that ...
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What do philosophers mean when they say qualia do not exist?
In university, my professor said that his position is that there are no qualia. He acknowledged that non-philosophers can find this position bizarre, but did not explain the rationale behind why he ...
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Is dying in a simulation ever sufficient for death, and if not does that make death inconceivable?
Is dying in a simulation -- any simulation at all -- ever physically sufficient to die at that instant outside it?
I mean a simulation like in the film the Matrix, or in a dream, one that kills your ...
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A possibly valid argument against eliminativism
I'm posting this despite the fact that I've little or no knowledge in metaphysics. The eliminativists claim that phenomenal consciousness is not "real". Would it help if we notice that phenomenal ...