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Questions tagged [qualia]

Qualia refers to the phenomenal character of subjective experience.

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0 answers
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Every experience is a new qualia? In reference to Dennett and RoboMary

Preliminary: RoboMary is a robot, but so are we - large robots made of smaller robots made of smaller robots. She does not yet have the experience of color. Dennett puts forth a physicalist way for ...
J Kusin's user avatar
  • 2,942
2 votes
1 answer
106 views

What does "non-representational features" mean in a SEP definition of qualia?

In the SEP article on Qualia - 1.(2) qualia are defined as intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-representational features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that are ...
Johnny-come-lately's user avatar
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1 answer
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What is the nature of the mental images that are perceived by patients who suffer from Charles Bonnet Syndrome?

I am not sure if this question should be asked in the Philosophy or Neuroscience forum as both domains are relevant to this inquiry. Will have a go anyway. One of the defining characteristics of CBS ...
Somnis's user avatar
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0 votes
7 answers
308 views

Why do people make theories without predictive power?

I studied neuroscience and during my studies I had a course called "The philosophy of consciousness". There we looked at a theory called Qualia, which infuriated me to no ends. Reading up on ...
Hakaishin's user avatar
  • 253
1 vote
1 answer
213 views

Do qualia bring about issues for functionalism?

Do the personal experiences of qualia, such as what it is like to smell a flower, bring about issues for functionalism?
BillyBob's user avatar
1 vote
2 answers
420 views

Can behaviourism account for qualia?

If behaviourism is focused upon observable behavioural dispositions can it at all account for qualia; the way things feel, tase etc.
BillyBob's user avatar
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0 answers
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Is functionalism a significant improvement on behaviourism with respect to behaviour?

Functionalism appears to be free of many of the issues that behaviourism faces, however is it all positive? Is there any objection at all to Functionalism being such an improvement in respect to ...
BillyBob's user avatar
4 votes
5 answers
801 views

According to Chalmers, can neuroscience resolve the "hard problem of consciousness"?

This is a question that aims to clarify Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". Suppose one day neuroscientists figured out how exactly to reproduce all (or virtually all) human ...
J Li's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
379 views

What is the difference between properties and sets?

Is there a difference between properties and sets? To me, it would seem that the property of being non-self-identical is the same thing as the empty set, and the property of being (identical to x OR ...
user107952's user avatar
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3 votes
3 answers
237 views

Could the Qualia of differring subjective impressions be compared?

Suppose some time in the future Humanity is able to map and mind-upload Human Brains, and that advances in AI had progressed to the point where it could be used to "experience subjectivity", ...
TomDot Com's user avatar
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2 answers
295 views

If the "Problem of Qualia" is valid, then how can we communicate?

I was reading about qualia and how there's apparently the problem of qualia because a unique experience is constrained to one subject (?). But I don't see how this is meaningful in any way since ...
Hierarchist's user avatar
5 votes
2 answers
252 views

How have deaf (or blind) people who hear (or see) for the first time changed philosophers' understanding of qualia?

Here's how the physicist David Deutsch (2011) describes qualia: Consider the following thought experiment. You are a biochemist with the misfortune to have been born with a genetic defect that ...
user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
867 views

What do philosophers mean when they say qualia do not exist?

In university, my professor said that his position is that there are no qualia. He acknowledged that non-philosophers can find this position bizarre, but did not explain the rationale behind why he ...
Shannon T's user avatar
  • 159
5 votes
5 answers
742 views

Is dying in a simulation ever sufficient for death, and if not does that make death inconceivable?

Is dying in a simulation -- any simulation at all -- ever physically sufficient to die at that instant outside it? I mean a simulation like in the film the Matrix, or in a dream, one that kills your ...
user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
106 views

A possibly valid argument against eliminativism

I'm posting this despite the fact that I've little or no knowledge in metaphysics. The eliminativists claim that phenomenal consciousness is not "real". Would it help if we notice that phenomenal ...
General Grievous's user avatar

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