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1 vote
3 answers
73 views

Does color mixing happen in the phenomenal mind or in the noumenal mind?

Context: I have been thinking about Qualia (in terms of "color") and the inverted color spectrum, and trying to figure out what mathematical functions are possible for shuffling the color ...
shivams's user avatar
  • 369
5 votes
3 answers
109 views

Exploring Methods for Articulating the Ineffable Nature of Emotions: Philosophical Insights Needed

In the realm of human experience, both emotions and colors possess an ineffable quality, challenging our ability to fully articulate them through language. This resemblance highlights a fundamental ...
Armaan Sood's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
147 views

Are phenomenological essences experiences that occur in every possible world?

Are phenomenological essences the case in every world? I believe they are a priori, but are they necessary and immutable? A stock example of an essence is the extension of white. We seem to ...
user avatar
6 votes
2 answers
1k views

Can an animal have qualia without self awareness?

Can an animal have qualia without self awareness? I understand that many animals are said to have qualia but not self awareness (perhaps not the great apes). In particular, I'm having a hard time ...
user avatar
9 votes
1 answer
386 views

How do epiphenomenalists make sense of discussions about qualia?

Epiphenomenalists believe that mental events have no causal effect on the physical. They may differ in what they consider "mental events" but it seems all of them would consider qualia / phenomenal ...
present's user avatar
  • 2,500
0 votes
0 answers
43 views

Senses without phenomenology: are they quales?

Can there be sense experience without phenomenological existence, in the Husserlian sense of the things themselves being given to consciousness? Are they like something? Just as the smell of mint has ...
user avatar
6 votes
3 answers
308 views

How have philosophers tried to argue for qualia?

What is the difference between the intuition that there is something it is like, qualitative experience, and faith in it? Is it possible to convince someone who doesn't believe there is something it ...
user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
189 views

What would constitute a reasonable expectation of privacy?

To some degree this is presumably a legal question, but my question is really trying to ask about the principle here. I guess the core question is about what expectations a "reasonable" agent might ...
Joseph Weissman's user avatar
  • 9,604
12 votes
5 answers
929 views

How can you support the idea of qualia as distinct from neuronal firing when you only experience one thing?

Physicalists are people who equate brain states with mental states. There are people in this category; and yet there are many people who do not hold this view. Such people hold that there is an ...
stoicfury's user avatar
  • 11.7k