Questions tagged [formal-logic]
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Is there an interesting relationship between formula formation rules and the rules of sequent calculus?
I am happily proceeding to chapter 4 of Ebbinghaus et al.’s Mathematical Logic and able to ask a new range of clarifying questions on first-order logic.
A first-order theory, regardless of its ...
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An Analogy Between The Goal of the Tractatus and Formal Axiomatic Systems
After struggling with a few sections of the Tractatus, as well as the explanations of said sections is Monk's How to Read Wittgenstein and Glock's A Wittgenstein's Dictionary, I've come to a certain ...
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Groupings of set theoretic axioms, or even “algebras of axioms”
I want to understand how to group the axioms of a set theory to study the effect that each axiom has in relation to the others. Here’s what I mean:
First of all, assume “a set theory” is not a well-...
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On the difference between a meta-variable and a propositional atom
In all of the established propositional logics that I’m aware of, a propositional atom is treated as a meta-variable. In certain first-order proof systems, this does not hold for those same logics ...
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What are some logically equivalent formulations of “uniqueness”?
A monoid is a mathematical structure with an associative law of composition and an identity element. It can be proven that if an element of a monoid has an inverse, then the inverse is unique:
Assume ...
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The smallest possible formal definition of FOL
I find the common presentation of first order logic somewhat confusing. I feel that I often don’t understand why we need the exact terms and concepts we do.
My current recapitulation of “standard FOL” ...
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Is B(p) V B(~p) an instance of LEM in doxastic logic?
So in classical logic either p is T or p is F. But is it same in doxastic logic, ie, is B(p) V B(~p) an instance of LEM?
And the second issue, is it equivalent to B(p) V ~B(p)?
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Do intutionists think the law of the excluded middle is universally, metaphysically false?
The law of the excluded middle (LEM) is that every well-formed formula of a sound logical system is either true or false. In systems that do not reject the law of the excluded middle, there can be ...
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Can reasoning be modeled as a preference relation over sets of propositions?
So the idea is to model reasoning as a preference relation over sets of propositions. Given sets of propositions S1 and S2, we might have the relation S1 < S2, which we can read as "S2 is ...
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Do you require a more expressive logic to describe a less expressive one?
If we consider this sentence: ¬(P → Q) ⊢ ¬Q as a purely symbolic calculus, I would like to explore some kind of “reverse mathematics” where the question is, which axioms are needed in order for that ...
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I am stuck on this homework question (Formal Logic class w/ Fitch) my proofs are messed up in the end. I need to start over, but that is what i have
I think my main issue is understanding if I am translating the negation of the statement correctly. I feel as if it is ultimately not logical when negated. Can someone please translate the first line ...
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What are the possible ways to symbolically represent entities, within formal logic?
What are the different solutions proposed in the academic literature to represents symbolically individual entities within formal logic expressions?
One solution I am aware of is to use Latin letters. ...
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How does Gödel’s encoding of mathematical statements into natural numbers enable self-referential propositions?
As part of his proof for the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel encoded mathematical expressions into unique numbers. These were used to construct statements exhibiting self-referentiality, such as ...
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Treating truth as a predicate
It is interesting to me that in some conventions of logic I have seen (generally, common ones), the form of logical language is designed to make “truth” implicit. For example, merely to write:
P(x)
is ...
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How can logical soundness be determined, if it is the rules of the logic itself which dictate what is true and false?
The idea of soundness sounds conceptually intuitive.
Logic commonly has a syntax and a semantics. The syntax is a set of symbols with formation rules for creating new expressions from currently ...