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1 vote
0 answers
25 views

Can, "Intuitions without concepts are blind," be explained in terms of sentences featuring indexicals?

I.e., imagine an assertion like, "This is that." Taken per se, it is like "thoughts without content [that] are empty," but taken de re, is it blind? If I point at some "this&...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
49 views

Does Kant's scheme for the analytic/synthetic distinction have room for a (degenerate?) further distinction, for "hyperanalytical" knowledge?

Kant can be easily misread (or: I myself easily misread him, for a long time) as claiming that no "existence claims" are analytically knowable. Technically, though, his system has it that (...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
6 votes
2 answers
147 views

Does Kant implicitly commit the paralogism of pure reason when saying that to have a representation it is necessary to accom­pany it with 'I think'?

In Caygill's Kant Dictionary entry of 'I Think' there is this part: Kant further claims that 'I think' is the necessary vehicle/form/accom­paniment of experience: to have a representation it is ...
gsmafra's user avatar
  • 613
3 votes
3 answers
336 views

Is "thoughts exist" a synthetic a priori statement?

I'm working off of Kant's conception of analytic/synthetic and a prior/a posteriori judgements. The definition of "thoughts" does not subsume their existence. That is, it is logically ...
Mark's user avatar
  • 387
0 votes
2 answers
129 views

Could an almighty Creator make something that existed for its own sake?

If someone sees their existence as an end in itself, yet also admits that they did not create themselves, then are they not saying that whatever created them had done so for their [the created thing's]...
C. Stroud's user avatar
  • 515
1 vote
0 answers
44 views

Is Kant's postulate of the existence of God a metaethical assumption?

Also, I would like to get some bibliographical reference about Kantian metaethics.
Valentina Maggi's user avatar
6 votes
1 answer
1k views

For Husserl, how can we know things in themselves?

I don't quite understand the nature of "going back to things themselves". How does Husserl break away from Kant?
Miniz's user avatar
  • 61
8 votes
4 answers
2k views

What are the counterexamples to Kant's argument that existence is not a predicate?

Kant argued that considering existence as a predicate is wrong. A predicate is a feature or characteristic of an object. But logically, existence adds nothing to the characteristics of that object, ...
RhaegarTagaryan's user avatar
1 vote
2 answers
243 views

Why do some philosophers argue that we do not know, a priori, that something thinks?

The Cartesian argument seems to explicate the fact that I necessarily know that something thinks, and that I necessarily know that something thinks even if I don't checking the world to verify whether ...
Hal's user avatar
  • 1,230
4 votes
1 answer
296 views

What is the analytic-synthetic dilemma concerning existence?

Reading a paper on Descartes I found the following summary of criticism: Stuart Hampshire, on the one hand, emphasizing the indubitability required of the principle by Descartes, concludes that ...
iphigenie's user avatar
  • 2,501
7 votes
1 answer
317 views

How to express Kant's notion of existence on first-order logic according to Ayer?

In Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer writes: [As] Kant pointed out, existence is not an attribute. For, when we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists. However, I can't ...
Aleksei Averchenko's user avatar