I.e., imagine an assertion like, "This is that." Taken per se, it is like "thoughts without content [that] are empty," but taken de re, is it blind? If I point at some "this" and say to a random passerby, "This is it! This is the thing, the thing I was talking about!" then is this the kind of "blindness" that Kant meant?
Now, if "here" is indexical, so is "there," and so if, "There is..." is an instance of the logical shape of existence, then isn't existence indexical? So that, per the above, we would have an explanation as to what Kant was trying to emphasize in this case: that existence claims depend on intuition for their justification, and this by essential default, because, "There is..." as a logical form (not in Kant's eyes, not even his mind's eyes, exactly, but I think he saw the shimmering of this on the horizon, considering e.g. his approach to Anselm and Descartes on proofs of God's existence) is itself an indexical type of proposition.
Are indexicals a key aspect of the intuition/concept distinction in Kant? I.e., can this distinction be illustrated/explained by virtue of permutations/combinations of indexical possibilities? Beyond what was said above: what about assertions/judgments/propositions which combine an indexical and a non-indexical subject and/or predicate, or multiple such things variously? How much, if any, of what Kant is keeping track of as he discusses things in such a maze-like way, depends on keeping track of the indexical/non-indexical distinction?LM
LBut then, however, how is "the" categorical imperative synthetic a priori but not given in intuition? Is it because of the indexical "you" in "that you can will as a universal law"?
MI had an inkling this had to do with the question of "nonconceptual content," and lo, there is an essay apparently to such effect: de Sa´ Pereira[12].
