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2 votes
1 answer
57 views

What if the premise of CPR's Transcedental Deduction is wrong?

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be ...
3 votes
2 answers
77 views

Why is the argument from synthetic a priori cognition to the subjectivity of what is cognized independent of the "appearance" premise?

In Paul Guyer's Kant, section "A Life in Work", the author claims this: this argument from synthetic a priori cognition to the subjectivity of what is cognized is independent of the general ...
6 votes
2 answers
147 views

Does Kant implicitly commit the paralogism of pure reason when saying that to have a representation it is necessary to accom­pany it with 'I think'?

In Caygill's Kant Dictionary entry of 'I Think' there is this part: Kant further claims that 'I think' is the necessary vehicle/form/accom­paniment of experience: to have a representation it is ...
4 votes
1 answer
48 views

Kantian Subjectivism Contradiction?

Kant rendered the judgments of reason as subjective, neither narrating nor accurately reflecting the reality of things. "We only sense from external objects, thus perception does not express ...
3 votes
1 answer
198 views

Why are concepts without intuitions blind?

I think at this point I understand all the transcendental arguments of CPR except this one - and probably this could considerably change my understanding of Kant as a whole. Here is my confusion. ...
2 votes
1 answer
70 views

Can somebody explain the second argument of B-deduction in CPR?

For me, the Transcendental Deduction aims at proving two things: Categories or pure concepts of understanding must be applied to the manifold of intuitions, i.e, they are necessary for cognition. ...
2 votes
2 answers
354 views

According to Kant, while thinking of empty concepts without intuitions, what do we synthesise?

(This will be my last question on this book, for those of you getting bored of my questions). Very briefly I will describe the method of Transcendental Deduction (TD) in an over-simplistic manner, and ...
2 votes
2 answers
119 views

In Kant, what would happen if singular objects that we perceive in space didn't necessarily have the spatial properties that we perceive them to have?

In Paul Guyer's Kant, section "Space and Time: the pure forms of sensible intuition", Guyer argues that "Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism is incomplete." For that, he ...
1 vote
3 answers
278 views

Is "there are synthetic a priori truths" a synthetic a priori truth?

Disregarding any modern objections to the division of synthetic/analytic and a priori/a posteriori, how would one argue for or against this claim, using Kant's definitions and assumptions? Also, is ...
2 votes
2 answers
88 views

Kant's Prolegomena Note I - Geometry being an objective representation of nature

I'm trying to understand this part of Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Note I to "How is pure mathematics possible?": It would be completely different if the senses had to ...
3 votes
1 answer
435 views

Kant's Prolegomena §13 - triangle example argument

In Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant argues that space (and time) are not qualities of objects, but a priori intuitions that allow the concepts of objects in our minds. To argue in favor of ...
2 votes
2 answers
260 views

In Kant, are "pure intuition" and "intuition a priori" synonyms?

I'm reading the prolegomena, and in §7, Kant presents both "pure intuition" (reine Anschauung), mentioned many times, and "intuition a priori" (Anschauung a priori), mentioned ...
5 votes
5 answers
260 views

Does Kant justify intuitions existing without understanding?

Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding. (A89/B122) Appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the ...
3 votes
2 answers
376 views

What's Kant defense of a noumenal world actually existing?

There is a sharp distinction according to most commentaries between Berkeley and Kant - and perhaps it's purely due to the fact that Kant doesn't render experience in-itself enough to make sense of ...
2 votes
1 answer
191 views

Problem with Refutation of Idealism

Can someone please defend Kant's refutation of idealism in the B-edition, because it seems untenable to me. First, he claims that 'I' am aware of myself being subjected to a specific temporal order ...

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