The short answer is "yes". This argument contains a fallacy of asserting an unsupported conclusion. And that is common to all arguments which use inductive evidence to argue for a "never" or "always" conclusion.
A longer answer is: this argument would benefit from a much more explicit restructuring. Here is a suggestion, which I think captures your claim, and I think does so without being fallacious:
- Define the "physical" as the conclusions of a completed science
- Postulate that a completed science is causally closed
- Postulate that nothing considered "spiritual" or "abstract" or "conscious" today is part of the conclusions of a completed science -- IE Popper/Frege's worlds 2 and 3 are not needed for a scientific understanding of our universe.
- Define Gods and Spirits as world 2 entities.
- Define a miracle as an event in which a world 2 entity is causal on world 1, the physical, providing an causal exception violating the completed science.
- With our currently uncompleted science, there are events which have been postulated to be miracles, should science ever be completed.
- Investigation of these claims cannot be definitive with uncompleted science, but no investigations to date have provided any evidence for such claims to actually be miracles.
- Therefore it is reasonable to infer that there have been no miracles, and will not be any.
More complete answer:
Of my suggested alternate 1-8 argument, there is a LOT of legitimate criticism of 1-8 by philosophy.
For 1, it is impossible to define a completed science, that is Hempel's Dilemma. And IF science is completed, our current conception of it includes emergence, and is pluralist, and no pluralist logic structure can be complete and fully coherent -- which would lead to a fully complete science being IN coherent, so that one cannot MAKE valid universal claims about it.
Both 2 and 3, which are claims about 1, are highly suspect. We know that math seems to be causal on quantum events ("shut up and calculate" -- information theory based Quantum interpretation, etc). And that consciousness sure seems to be causal. Hunger (a qualia) motivates me.
And for 2 to be true, SCIENTISM must be true -- IE there is no value to history knowledge, math knowledge, etc., as every fact about the world must be derivable from scientific knowledge. This of course is not possible for a pluralist science as noted above. So for this argument to work, it needs both reductionism added to eliminate scientific pluralism, and scientism added to eliminate those pesky non-science knowledges. But our current best understanding is that reductionism and scientism are refuted ... which leaves this argument in conflict with scientific consensus of today...
For 3 to be true, then the emergent pluralism that is the most popular current form of physicalism, cannot be true. Emergent consciousness is not a consensus, but it is the currently most common position in philosophy of mind, and the majority view among physicalists.
I won't challenge 4, 5, or 6, but 7 appears to be false in multiple areas. The emergent consciousness and position is what most physicalists have been forced to adopt, rather than abandoning physicalism.
That our universe has apparent Fine Tuning, is an observation in need of an explanation, and currently intentionality is the only one consistent with Popper's testability criteria.
That abiogenesis could happen, is theoretically implausible in the extreme, with every mechanism proposed to date.
Every event of conscious agency, appears to be a miracle per our evolutionarily intrinsic model of consciousness (Caretesian dualism is adopted innately by all children).
Multiple areas of psi studies show consistent psi phenomenon, using our best science methods, as summarized by the AAAS scientific professional society that studies these questions. https://parapsych.org/articles/36/55/what_is_the_stateoftheevidence.aspx
So 1, 2, 3, and 7 all appear to be invalid assumptions, and to get to 8, one needs absolute reductionism and scientism too, both of which also appear untrue. So -- this more clearly articulated and non-fallacious argument, appears simply to be wrong.