I'll weigh in validating Cort Ammon's answer (it depends on the context of the abduction) and provide some examples.
P1. Whenever it rains, the streets get wet.
P2. The streets are wet now.
C. Therefore it must have rained.
Logical fallacy, since a construction truck may have recently watered the street to keep dust from being stirred up by passing vehicles. Here the logic presumes deductive certainty of the conclusion where none can be had. This example is a fallacy.
P1. Whenever it rains, the streets get wet.
P2. The streets are wet now.
C. Therefore it probably has rained.
Not a logical fallacy, since from a frequentist's perspective, the majority of times streets are wet all things being equal is from rain and not another source. Hence, the logic presumes inductive certainty. This example is not a fallacy.
Note that some consider there to be a distinction between abduction and inference to best explanation. Another example of abduction could be:
P1. Whenever it rains, the streets get wet.
P2. The streets are wet now.
C. Therefore many members of the the local community may have simultaneously had leaky water service lines resulting in a temporary flood.
Also inductively certain but manifesting a less likely frequentist's probability. Thus, one might extend arguments 2 and 3 to address why one conclusion is more probably than another to determine which inference to explanation is the best. This example is not a fallacy, but is an uncogent inference and therefore not a candidate for "best" explanation.