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Agglomeration, in deontic logic, is the rule that says: OBA, OBB, therefore OB(A&B). There is a quick argument from agglomeration to the nonexistence of at least one kind of irresolvable moral dilemma: such a dilemma appears in the form of OBA, OB~A, therefore OB(A&~A), i.e. you would be obligated to bring about a contradiction. Supposing that ought-implies-can, this would mean that it was possible for a contradiction to be true. But assuming the law of noncontradiction, this must not be the case; ergo...

On the other hand, if you deny agglomeration, then the above kind of irresolvable moral dilemma doesn't manifest.

Alethic trivialism is when every proposition is true. That contradictions would lead to alethic trivialism (AKA the doctrine of logical explosions) is taken for evidence (so to speak) that the law of noncontradiction is true, instead. Deontic trivialism would be when everything is obligated.

I haven't been able to design the argument to give us the stronger conclusion, "If agglomeration is false, then deontic trivialism is actually true." But it seems to me that negating agglomeration leads to, "Deontic trivialism could be(come) true." For suppose you had a list of all actions possible at a given time: a1, a2, etc. Usually, because it is impossible to perform every an at the same time, we would say that not every one of the an could be obligatory. However, if such impossibility is not an issue (due to the lack of agglomeration), then why couldn't all the an be simultaneously obligatory?

I imagine we could just throw in, as a basic premise, "Even though some contradictory sets of actions can be obligatory, it is never true that every such set can be obligatory." How ad hoc of a solution would this be, though? (You might try out, "A is obligatory iff it is deducible in the appropriate system; in some such system, it is possible to infer that ~A is also obligatory; but it is never possible to infer that every A whatsoever is obligatory..." But again, how should this be so?)

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    Even for non-contradictory sets of actions only some are ever obligatory, and it is not ad hoc at all. Ethics is supposed to serve as a guide to action, throwing in too many obligations defeats the purpose. Aside from purely logical rules, your deontic system must have some substantive postulates, and they must be chosen to preclude trivialism (and much more besides) even if logic by itself does not block it. Otherwise, it is useless. By the way, trivial propositional systems are ruled out the same way, they lack discriminative power to be of any use.
    – Conifold
    Commented Nov 11, 2021 at 19:34
  • There are ethical philosophers who have disputed the action-guidance thesis. I am, in the end, addressing them, since it is they who (in philosophy) think that irresolvable moral dilemmas exist (are examples of genuine moral states of affairs that are not sufficiently action-guiding). I suppose the next level of the argument would be: if ethics is not action-guiding, then deontic trivialism could be true.
    – Kristian Berry
    Commented Nov 11, 2021 at 19:47
  • Believing in irresolvable moral dilemmas does not thereby dispute the action-guidance thesis, often it simply acknowledges that ethics must sometimes fail to do its job, perhaps for deep seated reasons. This world isn't perfect. And even non-actional morality seeks to distinguish, good from bad, so you are not addressing them either. It is also unclear what "could be true" even means. Is it logically possible to construct some such "deontic system"? Sure. Is it of interest as ethics? Probably not.
    – Conifold
    Commented Nov 11, 2021 at 20:27
  • You could have a negative deontic trivialism, where every action is forbidden. You can still distinguish between the concepts of the obligatory and the forbidden. Suppose there were a world where everything was colored red, but it was possible for things to change color, or for things to be colored differently. Would this mean that we could not at all distinguish between red and not-red, in that world? Of course not.
    – Kristian Berry
    Commented Nov 11, 2021 at 20:43
  • Also, from the SEP article on moral dilemmas: "Ethicists who are concerned that their theories not allow for moral dilemmas have more than consistency in mind. What is troubling is that theories that allow for dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding. A theory can fail to be uniquely action-guiding in either of two ways: by recommending incompatible actions in a situation or by not recommending any action at all. Theories that generate genuine moral dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding in the former way. [cont]
    – Kristian Berry
    Commented Nov 11, 2021 at 20:45

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