Is the universe 'necessarily' contingent?

Question

My question arises from a debate I had seen between Mohammed Hijabi and Alex O'Connell (the debate) where it seems like Hijabi was admitting to the fact that all contingent things must come from and stem from a necessary existence where the necessary existence is clearly different from any contingent thing that follows, while Alex on the other hand thinks that the universe is a necessary existence and is contingent at the same time which I think is logically flawed.

The logic behind the necessary separation between any contingent substance and a necessary existence can be shown by Gottfried Leibniz using his principle of sufficient reason and also his principle of non-contradiction. Although in the past there seems to be other philosophers like Spinoza that do not make use of this principle to see this clear distinction between necessary existence and contingent substance, same thing with Hegel.

I feel like the stances held by Spinoza, Hegel and also Alex are logically and mathematically erroneous and truly don't make sense, this can again be shown by using the arguments of Aristotle's "Unmoved mover" or "Unchanged changer" argument where we do know that the universe is moving (expansion of space) and changing constantly so according to Alex for the universe to be a necessary existence and contingent would make it a "changed changer" which will beg the question what changed it and how is it changed and will put the burden of explanation on Alex's stance and will need an additional explanation (which doesn't fulfill Occam's razor) but Hijabi's stance is actually well-stated and complete i.e., using Occam's razor sufficiently as well as leaving no other extra steps. Is this a right assessment of both sides and if not why?

One other thing that I would like to mention is the use of Occam's razor, I first thought that Alex was making a correct use of Occam's razor until I remembered that Occam's razor must sufficiently explain the necessary phenomena without any other additional beings and as a result of the logical contradiction (it needs the addition of another being) posed by Alex's stance it violates Occam's razor and the correct use of Occam's razor is being done by Mohammed Hijabi, but I am still partially sure of this. Is this a right assessment of the debate?

Hijabi poses logical, mathematical, philosophical rigor and consistency where there are no holes, contradictions and inconsistencies while Alex's stance poses more questions and seems to be logically contradictory. Is this right?

Answer 1

The idea you're interacting with is determinism, which is the position that the present logically implies exactly one specific past and exactly one specific future, or possibly eternalism, which is the position that any given slice across the history of the cosmos logically implies exactly one specific state for every other slice across the history of the cosmos. If one grants the determinist or eternalist claim, then the claim that the present is contingent on the past (1) is indistinguishable from the claim that the present and past logically imply one another (2).

1. that is: had the past hypothetically not been as it was, the present would be otherwise than it is.

2. that is: "the past if and only if this particular present" is logically true; and: "the past was thus" and "the present is thus" are logically equivalent/

Define for temporary use:

• necessary1: logically true given a particular set of facts

(This kind of necessity is generally applied to qualities, not states of reality separated in time. For instance, if the cat is is walking, it is not flying.)

Contrast with metaphysical necessity, which is the position that certain beings cannot not exist, that is, the statement "X not-exists" is a contradiction, even without any knowledge of the present (or any given slice across the history of the cosmos).

The cosmological argument is one of a variety of arguments which assert that the statement "X not-exists" is a contradiction where X is "a root cause for the existence of all things which is unlike in kind and quality from all other things, including the cosmos itself". It is typically followed by the separate claim that X must be eternal, intelligent, possessed of personal agency, and capable of influencing the later state of creation, i.e. God.

Define for temporary use:

• necessary2: (of an entity) having the quality of its nonexistence being a contradiction

One may state any combination of the following without contradicting oneself in the statement itself:

"The present [was][was not] necessary1 from any previous state of the cosmos, and likewise all previous states on any yet more distant previous state. There [is][is not] a necessary2 entity or state. That entity or state [must be][need not be][cannot be] unlike in kind and quality from all other things. Should there be such an entity, it [must be][need not be][cannot be] something like a God."

See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_necessity

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_truth

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

Answer 2

The other answers point out useful caveats to your assumptions but I think they could be usefully elaborated on.

gs’s distinguishment of necessary1 and necessary2 is very useful.

• necessary1: logically true given a particular set of facts
• necessary2: (of an entity) having the quality of its nonexistence being a contradiction

One of your disputants argued for necessity2, by asserting a Necessary2 being that started the cosmos. That there might be a necessary2 being OR initial state of the Cosmos is not an obviously false claim. BUT anyone making it has, per the definition of Necessity2, an obligation to show there is a bombproof logical case for the claim, and ONLY that claim to be true. I have seen a lot of philosophers and theologians make Necessity2 claims, but have yet to see ANY of them provide that bombproof logical justification. I consider all such claims to be refuted, as so many DIFFERENT initiating circumstances have been claimed, without sufficient justification, to be Necessary2. If these different initial states are logically possible, then NONE of them are Necessary2. All are actually contingent. If our universe had an external source, then what that source is, is therefore a contingent question.

So, your second debater wins on that point. What if any prior circumstance triggered our universe is a contingent question.

Now an aside on science and empiricism. There are three legs of justification that one can provide, that are spelled out in the Munchausen Trilemma. A Brute fact, a circular rationale, or an infinite series. Science is committed to the infinite series. It asks “why is this the case”, and looks for an answer. After finding one, then “why the causal stat applied in the first place” is the next question. And its answer also spawns a further question. Science will never end, until we find thing that seem immune to further justification (brute facts) or our justifications end up in a circular loop.

Rationalism basically holds that reasoning and logic are brute facts, and can be appealed to, to provide justification. Necessity2 claims trace to a brute fact of logic being valid. Such claims need to complete the logic argument, which I note they have all failed to do. But their failure does not change that they are a different category of justification.

Most rationalists hold by classical logic, and that there s a “One True Logic”, which we can know is true by direct apprehension. It is noteworthy that logicians disagree. They have identified infinite different logics, some of which apply to some aspects of our world, and others to different aspects. Empiricism, for instance, uses a four state logic (well supported, well contraindicated, currently uncertain, and intrinsically unevaluateable) rather that the two states (true, false) of classical logic. And quantum mechanics uses a fairly unique probabilistic logic. Logicians, therefore, have basically conceded that the appropriate logic to use for a particular question in our world is a CONTINGENT issue, so it is not possible to use logic as a brute fact.

Note also that your second debater assumed that, while the initial state of our universe and its laws were contingent, asserted Necessity1 about later states.

However, whether our universe is deterministic, and has laws, is NOT Necessary2, and is therefore a contingent question, subject to investigation by science.

And science has concluded that NO — it is not just the origination of our universe that is contingent, but its current state is uncertain (see Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle), and all its “laws” not only could have been otherwise, but they can and do change over time. This is clearly articulated in the Gauge Symmetry principle, where all symmetries spontaneously break. And also in the changing Cosmological Constant of our universe, which can only change if the Standard Model of Physics has varying properties. Plus all interactions in quantum mechanics are probabilistic not determined. Physics has found that none of the preconditions necessary for determinism are true of our world (known state, fixed laws, deterministic interactions).

So our universe is contingent all the way down. It is neither Necessary2 nor Necessary1.

Answer 3

Contingency implies that something could be otherwise. But everything that “could be otherwise” is merely a figment of your imagination when you think about this closely.

One can always imagine another state of affairs from the current one. So the notion of “necessity” vs. “contingency” itself is a misnomer.

Let’s suppose we live in a deterministic world. We can easily imagine the same laws but with different constants, or different laws altogether. Why does a particular law exist instead of others? The answer, presumably, would be that it is brute. Whether you call this necessary or a brute contingency makes no difference. The point is that there is no reason as to why that particular law exists instead of another.

Only one state of affairs is possible. There is nothing special regarding this with respect to god or the universe.