Illusionism in the philosophy of mind

Question

Illusionism is a branch of materialism which argues that phenomenal properties of consciousness aren't ontologically subjective. Illusion is that we tend to think it is, hence the name. Ontologically, consciousness is actually objective, can be completely known through the third person.

This isn't to say that consciousness doesn't exist or that it doesn't have a subjective character, but just that all its properties can be completely described and accessed objectively.

Parallel can be drawn with Dennett's response to the knowledge argument, Dennett argues that Mary having learned everything physical about the experience of colour (physics, physiology, deep knowledge about how and why neurology allows experience of colours etc.) already experienced them in the black and white world. She's done it through objective route, by learning everything physical relevant to the experience rather than experiencing it subjectively (interaction of light with her body).

I agree with Dennett that qualia doesn't have 3I-P properties non-materialists argue it has. His paper, 'Quining Qualia' makes a convincing case. There is nothing private or exclusively subjective about consciousness. Therefore, qualia isn't a good criticism of materialism.

However, in some talk given by him, he gave an example of red stripes on the American flag and argued that red stripes don't exist, they only seem to. There are no red stripes on the screen (in the objective world) nor on your retina nor in the brain.

This brings me to the confusion since I understood illusionism to deny that consciousness is something inaccessible from the third person, objectively, not that it doesn't exist at all.

I think it's true that redness can't be found neither in objective world nor in the brain which makes me confused. Redness is physical and therefore exists, but if it does, where is it? Every physical thing has a location in space and time.

If we conclude there is no redness at all, that it's some kind of illusion (whatever its nature), than what are my eyes and brain seeing? What is the secret of magician's trick Dennett is trying to explain?

Answer 1

I believe you have misunderstood Dennett. He is not arguing that qualia are 3rd person. he is arguing that qualia do not exist. From Quining Qualia:

At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia; hence the ironic title of this chapter. But I amnot kidding.

He does not consider qualia to be "real".

Dennett does not deny that consciousness exists, but instead denies that it is anything like what we think it is. Dennett's model, explicitly, is that

1. Our neurology does processing, and that is how all processing is done in humans
2. Our processing is radically parallel, as we run multiple internal competing models simultaneously (Multiple Drafts theory)
3. One of these drafts seizes control of our integrated system, by criteria of dominance Dennett does not specify, and guides our body thru its actions
4. Our neurology writes the history of what that "draft" did into long term memory, and consciousness is identical to the memory writing process. This memory is backdated, creating the illusion that consciousness is current.
5. Qualia, for TBD reasons Dennett wasn't able to articulate in Consciousness Explained, are part of the memory writing narrative. They were not real in the initial processing, and are only accidentally invented in the memory writing process.

So -- consciousness is real, but is after the fact, backdated, non-causal, and has qualia sort of appended onto it as a further delusion. THIS is illusionism!

As with Quining Qualia, Dennett's case for this model is not presented rationally in Consciousness Explained. Instead, Dennett makes his case using "intuition pumps", which are explicitly attempts to bypass rational argument.

If you want the rational case for accepting Illusionism, the best reference to read is Susan Blackmore's A Very Short Introduction to Consciousness. Here is my review. https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1C1TJFIWBZ8ZQ?ref=pf_ov_at_pdctrvw_srp

Blackmore looks thru the test data we have on consciousness, and notes how all materialist models of consciousness fail when tested against one or another of these experiments. She considers materialism to be SO certainly true, that alternate ontologies (dualism, idealism, neutral monism) must therefore be false. Therefore, the data from consciousness must not be real! Blackmore is making an anti-science ideological case. That we should throw out the data of consciousness and qualia, and instead accept illusionism relative to qualia, selfhood, agency, etc., because the ideology of materialism is so certainly true.

Dennett, who does not want to shake anyone's faith in materialism, would never make the rational case that Blackmore does, because there is so obvious an alternative -- question materialism not consciousness, and ACCEPT out consciousness data!

Answer 2

"Illusionism" as an "-ism" should be handled, like all other "-isms", with protective gloves and/or bargepole.

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TL;DR: The experience of redness does exist, or at least it does for those of us not afflicted with some physiological impairment of the retinas or (ventro-medial?) occipital cortex or the like. The experience is intrinsically subjective and amounts to more than everything which can be written down about it by someone attempting an exhaustive objective description.

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I would have thought that the occurrence of events are part of the set of things which we can be reasonably certain about. Yes I know, we can be mistaken, misled even, about many of our subjective experiences but it is not reasonable to assert that all experience is illusion. That is about the same as asserting that nothing is true; both statements contain a form of self-contradiction.

A much better way of describing our subjective experiences is that they are constructions created by and within one's own brain. Certainly this is what modern neuroscience is telling us about the matter. The mainstream philosophical way of referring to this is: "what it is like to be" -something or other - which is the embodiment of the experience. (See Thomas Nagle What is it like to be a bat? in his book Mortal Questions.)

<Redness is physical...... but where is it?> Yes the redness, or any other sensory awareness for that matter, is embodied in a physical process within the brain. Steven Lehar describes our qualia as data structures and IMO this must be correct (see: http://slehar.com/wwwRel/Lehar.html?fbclid=IwAR18R5s4FPELPhKuDLvVeWN3VkbHJ4192ceeNr-Trd6iWlzW6CqBK_WDHQ8) In other words our brains are creating and maintaining data structures which are about, ie represent, everything we come across in the world around us and about each of us ourselves.

The most succinct description of what is going on which amounts to the "something it is like something to be it" is: the model of self in the world. This is a central reference process (or device if you like) which serves as the vitally important "You are Here!" indicator which is essential for us to be able to navigate through our physical and social environments. This idea is not new; it has been put forward by many people. The two people I most gained apprecialtion of it from are Susan Blackmore an English psychologist and Thomas Metzinger a philosopher.

In fact our consciousness (C), which I think we should define as rememberable awareness, is more exactly the process of updating of the model of self in the world. This is so because the MSITW is a set of assertions and predictions about what is around us and what we are and what we are doing which of course are all based on memory. To the extent that the model correctly predicts what is happening, there is not need for much feedback of this and they do not form part of C of the moment. What is vitally important rather is everything about the situation which was not correctly predicted.

Every discrepancy is assessed promptly (ie very fast) by the CNS areas which mediate detection and responses to archetypal dangers and threats, and to potential life enhancing resources. We experience these assessments as emotions. More detailed, complex, and abstract detections and recognitions occur within the cortex and take longer to process. The emotional charge attached to such novelties of the environment or self forms a critical part of the memory of each thing or event and are a fundamental source of meaning.

So it is that redness, or any other quale you wish to focus on, is embodied in patterns of neuronal activity and they are part of C of the moment to the extent that they form part of the MSITW. They exist explicitly whilst the neuronal interaction patterns which embody them are active. They exist implicitly, when not active, in the form of all the changes which have occurred to each and all of the neurons involved in the particular interaction patterns as a result of being part of each respective pattern.