By "conceptual pluralism," I mean something like, "Multiple conceptual analyses of the same concept are true." The example for the sake of which this question occurred to me is the concept of free will: if there are multiple "correct" logics of action and modality, say, does this imply that there are multiple "correct" definitions of free will, ranging from some stripe of compatibilism all the way to some of the more fantastical versions of libertarianism (not the most outlandish, of course, if such there be; to fend off retorsion problems, we eschew unrestricted pluralism in whichever direction)?
But we could also ask, then, if there are multiple "correct" analyses of lexical concepts like SUBSTANCE, PROPERTIES, GOOD, RIGHT, FACTS, EVIDENCE, etc. All the way, I suppose, to CONCEPTS or even CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS itself. For example, John Rawls seems to prefer a method of analysis-unto-replacement, i.e. he seeks to replace an unclear concept of rightness with a much clearer concept of "according to the principles of the original position." But we could also accept, then, as pluralists, that Russellian or Fregean analysis are justifiable, as are Socratic or Wittgensteinian alternatives, etc.
Can conceptual pluralism in general be justified by logical pluralism "beforehand," or is the former justified regardless of the justification of the latter?
EDIT: apparently this phrase "conceptual pluralism" is not at all new (who'd have thought! well, I should have thought that it wasn't new...). Here's a screenshot of a Google search with results for precisely the juxtaposition I am asking about:
Also Levy[22] appears to be a recent approach by a computer scientist/mathematician to mathematical pluralism, with some emphasis on negative caveats in this connection, though adapting his analysis to my question would take some effort, so far as I have been able to tell at this point.
CLARIFICATION:
I'm envisioning an argument, here, with an air of paradox to it:
- Logical pluralism implies pluralism about the lexical concept CONCEPTS.
- Pluralism about CONCEPTS implies conceptual pluralism.
- Therefore, logical pluralism implies conceptual pluralism.
However, if logical pluralism allows that the word "implies" can sustain multiple "correct" meanings even so, then is there not a version of "implies" according to which (1) through (3) is not valid?