A small reformulation of the Cosmological Argument

Question

I am sure the cosmological argument has been raised here by people like me who know nothing about philosophy numerous times before on this board. But I'm wondering if a slightly different approach can strengthen it.

It seems to me that all forms of the argument (at least that I've seen) sets itself up for failure by laying out as a PROPOSITION that "everything in existence demands an explanation for its existence", but then of course crashes and burns at the end because it somehow secretly sneaks a "god exists but needs no explanation" in there, of course contradicting the beginning proposition.

But what if we "argue by contradiction". That is,

1. Suppose that every entity in existence owes its existence to some other entity other than itself.

2. It follows from (1) that the universe owes its existence to some other entity other than itself, which itself owes its existence to some other entity other than itself, ad infinitum, leading to an infinite regress.

3. Because 1 implies 2, and 2 is an infinite regress, it cannot be that 1 is true. The logical negation of claim 1 is "There exists an entity that does not owe its existence to some other entity other than itself".

If you are using this argument to argue for some sort of god, the guaranteed (?) entity at the end of point 3 is what one would call god. Of course, it keeps open the possibility that there are a multitude of these "necessary beings", as the argument only guarantees the existence of at least one.

Lastly, one may ask why we reject the infinite regress as an impossibility. This is where my philosophy fails me. I know that other philosophical arguments have been rejected if they lead to such a regress, and so I apply that here. I also know that modern philosophers such as William Lane Craig have argued that such regresses are unobserved in the physical world and hence should be rejected on that basis.

Anyway, let me know what you think. Am I a famous philosopher now? Haha!

Answer 1

First of all, as a matter of logic, arriving at a contradiction means that one or more of your assumptions must be false. So, to see what the argument by contradiction proves you have to consider everything that it assumes. So here are some assumptions of the argument:

A. Every entity in existence owes its existence to some other entity other than itself (this is just premise 1).

B. The universe is an entity in existence (this is required to infer 2 from 1).

C. Infinite regress of causes is impossible (this is assumed in 3).

If your argument really does lead to contradiction, then (at least) one of A,B,C must be false (given that there are no other assumptions). To conclude that A is false (as you do), you must show that B and C are true. And they are not trivially true. B resembles the problematic assumption that the set of all sets is itself a set, which leads Russell's paradox. And you yourself observe that C needs an explanation. Not every infinite regress is bad. It's one thing to reject an argument that leads to an infinite regress of assumptions, it's another to reject an argument that entails an infinity of something else (infinite sets, for instance, are commonly accepted).

Moreover, even if we accept that A is the assumption that must be denied, and conclude that "There exists an entity that does not owe its existence to some other entity other than itself" there's still some distance to go to conclude that God exists. For one thing, the conclusion is compatible with there being many entities that do not owe their existence to anything else. For another, even if there is a unique such entity, you still have to show that that entity is God. Something like the Big Bang, for instance, could be that entity. (I'm not saying that these possibilities are true, but your argument is incomplete unless you rule them out.)

You can read about cosmological arguments in great detail in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Answer 2

Welcome to Philosophy SE.

You mentioned that the cosmological argument "crashes and burns" because the existence of God as uncaused or unexplained contradicts one of the premises of the argument. This is the "what caused God?" objection, but it rests on a misreading of the argument.

The cosmological arguments put forward by philosophers do not say that "everything has a cause", and so they do not suffer from the "what caused God?" objection - this is a common internet straw man, but no famous version of a cosmological argument says it. (The SEP article on the cosmological argument doesn't even mention the "what caused God?" objection.) Cosmological arguments do not arbitrarily exempt God from needing a cause, nor do they say that God does not need an explanation.

There are two broad versions of the cosmological argument, a causal version and an explanatory version. They are similar, but there are subtle differences that when ignored lead to the "what caused God?" mistaken objection. The causal version relies on the principle of causality, which says that everything of a certain type requires a cause (such as William Lane Craig's "everything that begins to exist has a cause". He does not say that everything has a cause. Only things that begin to exist need a cause)(see note 1). If we wish to avoid an infinite regress of causes, we must terminate the chain of causes backwards at an entity which is not of the type of thing that requires a cause, since it was of this type it would indeed require a cause. And, since it is not of the type that needs a cause, it can be uncaused. "What caused God?" can be answered in an entirely consistent way by saying "nothing, God is uncaused because he didn't begin to exist. The premise only commits us to needing a cause for things that begin to exist."

The explanatory version does indeed say that everything (true proposition, entities, events) has an explanation; this is the principle of sufficient reason, and is basically a rejection of brute facts. But in the explanatory version, things can be self-explanatory (where in the causal version, things cannot be self-causing, since self causing is absurd). Since all contingent things (contingently true propositions, contingent beings, contingent events) cannot be self-explanatory, since their contingency implies that they may have been false or non-existent, we must terminate the chain of explanation at a non-contingent (i.e. necessary) thing if we wish to avoid an infinite regress of explanations.

To summarize the difference between the causal and explanatory versions of the cosmological argument:

There are, I think, worthy objections to each version of the cosmological argument (such as challenging the relevant version of the principle of causality or principle of sufficient reason, or challenging that a first cause or explanation must be a personal God and not, say, some impersonal law). But "what caused God?" is not a good objection.

As for your three-point argument, it looks fine to me. It's quite similar to how defenders of the cosmological argument justify the impossibility of an infinite chain of backward causes.

** NOTE 1: There are other version of the principle of causality. See Edward Feser's book Five Proofs of the Existence of God for more of them, such as anything which is composed of actuality and potentiality must have a cause, or anything whose existence is distinct from its essence must have a cause. Note, again, that he does not say that everything has a cause, just things of a certain type.