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The Extended Mind Thesis holds that we should consider "cognition" to include the process of using external cognitive tools (rather than only considering processes internal to our brain).

The wikipedia page lists some counterarguments. I am interested in the third one:

It uses coarse-grained functionalism about the mind that ignores plausible differences between internal and external processes, such as differences between beliefs and external props and devices; or for creating a notion of cognition too heterogeneous to make up a scientific natural kind.

The main thrust of the Extended Mind Thesis is that treating distinctions between internal and external as not meaningful makes a more useful model. This objection seems (on the surface) to be circular reasoning - it rejects the Extended Mind Thesis because it rejects the Extended Mind Thesis. However, I wonder if maybe I'm not just missing something in the literature - are there alternative definitions of thought, belief, minds, or intelligence which make the distinctions between "internal and external" meaningful, and would motivate this rejection?

I can imagine the flippant answer of "Intelligence is what goes on inside my brain," but this isn't very measurable (it runs into the problem of other minds, makes it impractical to discuss intelligence of animals, etc.).

Are there well-discussed alternatives to the Extended Mind Thesis, which still provide consistent and useful definitions of intelligence?

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    'I can imagine the flippant answer of "Intelligence is what goes on inside my brain," but this isn't very measurable' - It has a more difficult question of where does the brain actually end. Why the brain and not the CNS? If the CNS, why not the PNS? Since transduction is just a conversion of physical forces outside to those inside, why stop at the skin?
    – J D
    Commented Apr 2 at 22:39
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    The main 'alternative' is internalism, see IEP, although it is not so much an alternative as a complementary doctrine. It focuses on the "narrow content" that can be localized within brains (or, at least, within bodies in embodied cognition versions) rather than "broad content" of externalists. Since both types can be singled out and studied this is more of a debate about words.
    – Conifold
    Commented Apr 2 at 23:42
  • @Conifold - Does that mean that externalism is largely unchallenged in mainstream philosophy, and there aren't any mainstream competing models (or at least none that don't incorporate it in part)? If so, could you write an answer explaining as much so that I can accept it?
    – Tim C
    Commented Apr 3 at 19:39
  • That it is a debate about words is one view of it, many internalists and externalists see it differently. They see each other as "competing" and offer arguments for/against. You can see some at the first link, and here are some more from SEP. As you said in the OP, there are definitions that make broad/narrow distinction meaningful, and the thrust of arguments is that one or the other is a "better" framework for this or that. Even if they are complementary overall, there can be meaningful debate on specific applications.
    – Conifold
    Commented Apr 3 at 20:15

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I think the objection is aesthetic. People object to the thesis because of the terminology. It is rather like an extended body thesis, which considers the body to include any tools one might use, such as cutlery, step-ladders, cars etc. You can make the point that such tools are useful, without claiming they are part of the human body- claiming that they are part of the body seems a gimmick. Likewise with the extended mind thesis.

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